dissenting. I respectfully dissent from today’s decision. I would uphold the circuit court’s finding of civil trespass and irreparable harm as well as issuance of the temporary injunction.
Wal-Mart has a no-solicitation policy posted at the entry of every store. The UFCW instituted a nationwide “blitz” of WalMart stores for the sole purpose of soliciting union membership inside Wal-Mart stores. It is undisputed that Wal-Mart allows solicitation for union memberships on its parking lots and the solicitation policy applies only to entry inside Wal-Mart’s stores.
In addition to the posted no-solicitation policy, Wal-Mart notified the UFCW, by letters to its counsel, that continued entry onto store premises by union representatives for the purpose of solicitation of union memberships that would be considered an act of trespass.
In its order the circuit court relied upon Arkansas Model Jury Instruction 1107 for its definition of civil trespass: “A trespasser is a person who goes upon the premises of another without permission and without invitation, express or implied . . . .”
Based upon the posted no-solicitation policy and the letters to UFCW’s counsel, the circuit judge could reasonably find UFCW’s representatives did not have license to solicit inside Wal-Mart stores and to do so exceeded the business invitation conferred by Wal-Mart.
Upon finding a civil trespass by UFCW, the circuit court then found irreparable harm would likely occur if an injunction did not issue.
UFCW representatives entered Wal-Mart stores in almost every state. IN some instances the visits were repetitious and resulted in employees being distracted from their assigned work duties by the repeated entries. In at least one store employees argued with union representatives over whether the union representatives would leave the store voluntarily.
I agree with the majority that harm is considered irreparable when it cannot be adequately compensated by money damages or redressed in a court of law. Kreutzer v. Clark, 271 Ark. 243, 607 S.W.2d 670 (1980). However, I disagree the evidence in this case does not support a finding of irreparable harm. The issue is not whether Wal-Mart lost money, but the likelihood of continued disruption of its employees and interference with Wal-Mart business by the activities of UFCW representatives. This is the type of harm injunctions are issued to prevent.
Under the majority’s ruling, one could go onto Wal-Mart’s premises three days in a row for the express purpose of setting a fire. Such conduct would likely distract employees from their work but the activity would not be enjoined absent a showing of lost profits and customer complaints.
The majority opinion avoids addressing the issue of the propriety of the nationwide injunction by finding no irreparable harm existed to support the issuance of the injunction.
The trial court has discretion to determine the geographic scope of an injunction. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) and Champion Golf Club, Inc. v. Sunrise Land Corp., 846 F. Supp. 742, 759 (W.D.AR 1994). On the state court level a temporary injunction against competition by former employees in a five state area was upheld. Richardson v. Andrews, 718 S.W.2d 833 (Tx. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986). In the case of Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 810 F. 2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987), the issuance of a nationwide injunction to prevent dilution of the plaintiffs estate created rights under a trademark anti-dilution statute was found proper.
Moreover, an injunction is a form of judgment capable of being registered in a foreign jurisdiction. Marie Callender Pie Shops, Inc. v. Bumbleberry Enterprises, Inc., 39 Ore. App. 487, 592 P.2d 1050 (1979). There is no distinction made under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act between a judgment requiring the payment of money and injunction. LaVerne v. Jackman, 84 Ill. App. 2d 249 (1967).
The UFCW conceded personal jurisdiction in this case. Evidence was introduced regarding an organized nationwide “blitz” of Wal-Mart Stores. There was sufficient evidence before the court to sustain the issuance of the injunction.
If the standard for review of the trial court’s decision is to uphold a ruling granting or denying an injunction unless there has been an abuse of discretion, the circuit court’s decision in this case should be affirmed.