(concurring specially).
I concur in the result. I write separately because I believe that the court’s analysis is not only faulty, but unnecessary. This case involves a claim for UIM benefits under a policy of insurance issued to Schons for injuries received while an occupant in an underinsured motor vehicle involved in an accident with a second under-insured motor vehicle. Her injuries were caused by the negligence of both drivers involved in the accident. Schons received the occupied vehicle’s liability policy limits of $50,000 and $48,000 from the $50,000 liability policy covering the second vehicle. Schons also received $50,000 in UIM benefits from the occupied vehicle’s policy because of the second vehicle’s UIM status. Because the occupied vehicle’s insurance policy precluded Schons from receiving any UIM benefits based on its UIM status, Schons seeks to recover UIM benefits from a policy of insurance covering her own vehicle.
The court holds that Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (2000), precludes recovery under Schons’ insurance policy because the UIM limits under her policy do not exceed the limit of UIM benefits available from like coverage contained in the occupied vehicle’s policy. Section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5), sets out when a person injured due to the negligence of the driver of an underinsured motor vehicle is entitled to excess insurance protection.1 Under that section, “excess insurance protection is limited to * * * the extent by which the limit of liability for like coverage * ⅜ ⅝ exceeds the limit of liability of the coverage available to the injured person from the occupied motor vehicle.” In this case, the occupied motor vehicle’s insurance policy precludes Schons from recovering UIM benefits for the occupied vehicle’s underin-sured status. Thus, there is no like coverage available for Schons’ automobile insurance policy to exceed and, therefore, the excess insurance protection provisions of Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5), are inapplicable to this case.
Moreover, the result reached by the court fails to meet the legislative purposes underlying the enactment of the No-Fault Act. Denying people like Schons UIM benefits from the policy covering their own vehicle does absolutely nothing to “relieve uncompensated victims from the economic stress caused by automobile accidents.”2 *750The act s other purposes are not implicated. Schons has not received any payment for the underinsured status of the vehicle she was occupying at the time of the accident. Further, there is no source for such a payment other than the UIM benefits Schons purchased for her vehicle. Therefore, there is no danger of a duplicate recovery were she to receive UIM benefits under her policy. Further, there is no danger that she would be overcompensated because her damages exceed the amount available under all possible sources of insurance coverage, including the UIM benefits being sought here. Finally, there is no risk that Schons’ UIM coverage would be effectively converted into liability coverage. Cf. Myers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 288, 291-92 (Minn.1983) (upholding insurance policy language as properly preventing the conversion of UIM coverage into third-party liability coverage).
In addition to the legislative purposes being frustrated, it appears that the premium Schons paid for UIM coverage for her vehicle was wasted. As the occupant of a vehicle that had $50,000 in UIM coverage, she was entitled to and did receive the benefit of that coverage for the underin-sured status of the other vehicle involved in the accident. Although Schons purchased UIM coverage, she will receive no UIM benefits to compensate her for the injuries she received as a result of the negligence of the driver of the occupied underinsured vehicle. Thus, having paid the premium, Schons gets nothing for it under these circumstances.
Because section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5), does not apply, I believe that Schons, on the facts presented by this case and the purposes underlying the No Fault Act, absent any other provision precluding recovery, is entitled to recover UIM benefits from her automobile insurance policy.
Analysis of subdivision 3a(5) is unnecessary, however, because the outcome of this case is controlled by Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(6) (2000), which expressly precludes recovery on these facts. Subdivision 3a(6) provides:
Regardless of the number of policies involved, vehicles involved, persons covered, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown on the policy, or premiums paid, in no event shall the limit of liability for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages for two or more motor vehicles be added together to determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident.
MinmStat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(6). The language of this provision is clear and unambiguous.3 UIM coverages for two vehicles may not “be added together to determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident.” Id. Because Schons seeks to add together the UIM coverage from the occupied vehicle with that of her own vehicle to “determine the limit of insurance coverage available,” id., to her from the accident, subdivision 3a(6) operates to preclude recovery.
. "However, if the injured person is occupying a motor vehicle of which the injured person is not an insured, the injured person may be entitled to excess insurance protection afforded by a policy in which the injured party is otherwise insured.” Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5).
. The No-Fault Act’s stated purposes are "to (1) relieve uncompensated victims from the economic stress caused by automobile accidents, (2) prevent overcompensation of automobile accident victims, * * * and (5) prevent automobile accident victims from receiving duplicate recovery.” Scheibel v. Ill. Farmers *750Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 34, 37 (Minn.2000) (citing Minn.Stat. § 65B.42 (2000)).
. We have recognized that subdivision 3a(6) was enacted in an effort to eliminate "stacking” of coverages. Broton v. W. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 428 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn.1988). "Stacking” refers to applying the coverage limits on multiple vehicles under which the injured person is insured to one accident, Wasche v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 913, 917 (Minn.1978), which is not .what Schons seeks. While the elimination of stacking may have been the purpose behind subdivision 3a(6), "The letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2000). By its terms, subdivision 3a(6) does much more than eliminate stacking. It expressly prohibits adding the limits of liability for any two or more motor vehicles to determine the limit of underinsured or uninsured coverage.