(dissenting)
Because I would not impose on state and local government agencies a rubric that has not been announced by the legislature, I would reverse the trial court’s decision that appellant City of Grant approved respondent American Tower’s application to build a tower in the city.
Upon notice given “before the end” of the initial 60-day period following an application, the municipality may give itself up to an additional 60 days to investigate, deliberate upon, and decide the merits of a zoning application. Minn.Stat. § 15.99, subd. 3(f) (1998). The 60-day-extension clause is meaningless by any interpretation given to it.
In all cases, for any reason, the municipality is free to employ the extension clause. Minn.Stat. § 15.99, subd. 3(f) says nothing to limit the reasons useable in a notice for extension, which may be specific to the case or generic to the circumstances of the municipality. Moreover, the need to declare reasons has been counted a direction without a mandate. Manco of Fairmount, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Rock Dell Township, 583 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Minn.App.1998), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1998).
Because the legislature has employed a meaningless limit on the freedom of agencies to employ a deadline of 120 days rather than 60 days, there are no rules of *44construction making it reasonable to suggest that the extension be for circumstances unique to the application as opposed to those that are generic for the zoning process available in the municipality. It is no more reasonable to suggest that the notice be given to individual applications after the time of their application as opposed to a notice effectively given to all prospective applicants.
It is a judicial responsibility to effectuate the legislature’s intent. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1998). But the courts cannot manufacture content for statutes without language or history of the enactment that makes that intent evident. See id. (requiring regard for the unambiguous language of an enactment, without pretextual pursuit of its spirit). No doubt the legislature intended that the 60-day extension should be only for “extenuating circumstances.” But it left to municipalities the task of determining which circumstances are extenuating, without limitation.
When respondent’s application was received, appellant found it necessary to employ a 120-day approval period in all cases then arising. The legislature has permitted this municipal determination. If the law is to be otherwise, it is for the legislature, not the courts, to alter the mandate. See Marbinco v. Hastings, 265 Minn. 490, 497, 122 N.W.2d 631 (1963) (stating “[i]f there is to be a change in the statute, it must come from the legislature, for the courts cannot supply that which the legislature purposefully omits or inadvertently overlooks”).
Because I see nothing in this statute or its history that gives us the freedom to enlarge the importance of the initial 60-day approval period or to diminish the freedom of municipalities to extend the period for 60 additional days, I respectfully dissent from the differing construction of the statute in the majority opinion. I concur with the majority in its conclusion that state law is not preempted by the Telecommunications Act.