(concurring specially).
I concur in the court’s opinion except for the basis of the rejection of defendant’s *15public policy argument. Defendant seeks to invoke our supervisory authority to establish a rule of practice in the courts. I believe this court has a right and responsibility to adopt such rules in appropriate situations. I do not accept the premise that the judicial branch should ever refuse to exercise its authority to adopt rules of practice, to improve the administration of justice. We should not abdicate our responsibility to enhance the quality of justice in Iowa merely because the problem is one that the General Assembly can also address.
That the judicial branch has the necessary authority is well established. See Iowa Civil Liberties Union v. Critelli, 244 N.W.2d 564, 568-69 (Iowa 1976). That the judicial branch has the responsibility to adopt rules of practice to implement public policy manifest in our constitutions and statutes has never been more eloquently pointed out than in the dissenting opinion of Justice Weaver in State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 120, 191 N.W. 530, 540 (1923), in advocating retention of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases:
It seems little less than solemn mockery for us to protest our devotion to the “sacred constitutional right,” or our virtuous purpose to rigidly enforce it and in the same breath declare our approval of the admission of “evidence without any inquiry as to how that evidence was obtained.” ... It is this growing disregard of fundamental rights and orderly methods of justice, which has given rise to the infamies of the so-called “sweat box” and “third degree” practices which cast discredit upon our professions of loyalty to law. The reasoning which justifies those things, and justifies a rule by which the court will refuse to inquire into the means employed to obtain evidence, if carried to its logical results, would be equally effective to admit evidence procured by physical torture and restore the rack and thumbscrew to the dignity of judicial aids in the prosecution of alleged criminals.
We have frequently recognized and exercised our independent constitutional responsibility to supervise the processes by which justice is administered in our criminal courts.
Notable examples include this court’s decisions in Polly v. State, 355 N.W.2d 849 (Iowa 1984) (adopting cause and prejudice standard for state collateral review proceedings), State v. Reaves, 254 N.W.2d 488 (Iowa 1977) (establishing conditions precedent to challenge on appeal of guilty plea convictions), Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1974) (adding to standard for taking guilty pleas), State v. Martin, 217 N.W.2d 536 (Iowa 1974) (adopting standard for impeachment through use of prior convictions), and State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969) (adopting rules governing taking of guilty pleas). In the present case, the question should not be whether the court should defer to the legislature but whether the rule advocated by defendant should be adopted in the interests of justice.
Cogent arguments exist to support defendant’s position. Three members of this court found them persuasive in State v. Hughes, 200 N.W.2d 559 (Iowa 1972). I still believe that in an ideal system the practice now incorporated in ABA Standards, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 18-7.5 (2d ed.1980) should be adopted. Under that standard, when a revocation application is based solely on an alleged criminal law violation the revocation proceeding should be deferred until disposition of the charge. The probationer may be detained pending that disposition if the court finds public safety would otherwise be endangered. The probationer is given the option of a prompt revocation hearing. The problem, however, is that our system cannot accommodate the additional burdens of hearing time, trial time, and procedural complexity that this standard would probably impose. Because of resource shortages, our courts must struggle now to comply with postconvietion action and criminal case processing demands, and the additional burden would aggravate the situation. On this basis I agree with *16the court that we must reject the rule advocated by defendant.