{dissenting). This was an emergency complaint for writ of superintending control in the nature of mandamus. The plaintiff, a candidate for the office of Wayne county prosecutor in the primary election to be held in the fall of 1964, prayed that this Court issue a writ of superintending control requiring the defendants to designate his name on the ballot for Wayne county prosecutor as “assistant attorney general.”
Plaintiff filed for the office of prosecutor on April 1, 1964. On July 21, 1964, a candidate by the name of John L. Sullivan also filed for that office. Plaintiff, pursuant to CLS 1961, § 168.561 (Stat Ann 1956 Bev § 6.1561), requested the Wayne county election commission to grant him the aforesaid designation. For a period of approximately 18 months up to April 1, 1964, he had been an assistant attorney general. He resigned to become a candidate for prosecutor, to join a law firm, Sullivan, Sullivan, Hull & Banger, and to accept cases by assignment from the Wayne circuit court.2
On July 25, 1964, the Wayne county election commission granted the designation but upon a rehearing on July 28, 1964, it was revoked and each of the Sullivans was given a designation of resident address.
By order of this Court dated July 30, 1964, Joe B. Sullivan was granted the designation “former assistant attorney general” and John L. Sullivan *636was granted the designation “attorney at law.” Prom said order I dissent for the following reasons.
Michigan election law, chap 24, § 561 (CLS 1961, § 168.561 [Stat Ann 1956 Rev § 6.1561]), provides in part as follows:
“The said ballots so prepared by the board of election commissioners in each county for use by the electors of any political party at said primary election shall include the names of all candidates of said political party for the office of governor, lieutenant governor and United States senator, the names of all candidates of said political party for district offices, and, in each county, the names of all candidates of said political party for county offices: Provided, That if 2 or more candidates for the same office have the same or similar surnames, the board of election commissioners, upon the request of any such candidate filed in writing not later than 3 days after the last day for filing nominating petitions, shall print the occupation or residence of each of such candidates having the same or similar surnames on the ballot or ballot labels under their respective names. The term ‘occupation’ shall be construed to include political office, even though it is not the candidate’s principal occupation.” (Emphasis supplied. )
The election commission concluded that, he having joined a law firm and engaged in the practice of law since April 1, 1964, the present occupation of Joe B. Sullivan was “attorney,” and that since the present occupation of John L. Sullivan was also “attorney” the designation of occupation would not effect the purpose of the statute by distinguishing one from the other. In accordance with the statute, each candidate was granted a designation of his residence.
Plaintiff contends that the designation of his residence is insufficient identification in a county the' *637size of Wayne and that, consequently, by authority of Dougherty v. Holm; Peterson, Intervenor, 232 Minn 68 (44 NW2d 83), he should be permitted the designation “assistant attorney general.” In Dougherty a majority of the court held that a justice of the supreme court who had been in that position for almost 14 years, and who, by virtue of his position, was unable to become an active candidate while he occupied the bench, was entitled to the designation “former Supreme-Court-Justice, Saint Paul” as a means of occupational identification.
Based upon the reasoning of the majority of the Minnesota court, this Court has substituted its judgment for that of the election commission in the absence of any allegation of fraud or wrongful or arbitrary action on the part of that commission.
In the construction of the Michigan statute, I do not believe that a man’s occupation and the position which he holds or may have held are meant to be synonymous. The word occupation has a recognized and well-accepted meaning. Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed, 1960) defines it, so far as is applicable here, as follows:
“2. That which occupies, or engages, the time and attention; the principal business of one’s life; vocation; business.”
By way of further explanation is found the following:
“One’s occupation is that to which one’s time is devoted, or in which one is regularly or habitually engaged.”
This Court in the case of People v. DeRose, 230 Mich 180, at page 182, construed the word “occupation” and said:
“One’s occupation is the regular business in which he is engaged for profit.”
*638It is significant that in the affidavit as to change of name and identity filed by Joe B. Sullivan on April 1, 1964, he stated:
“that he is an attorney at law (assistant attorney general).”
The occupation of those engaged in the practice of the law is attorney or lawyer. The title under which one carries on his occupation or profession varies from position to position.
The office of assistant attorney general is not a political office. It is under Michigan civil service and partisan political activity while holding such office is circumscribed.3 Consequently the provision in the statute with regard to political office is not applicable.
A further objection to the granted designation is that Joe B. Sullivan is not now an assistant attorney general. The language of the statute is clear that the sought-for designation must apply to one’s occupation at the time of application for designation, not at the time of filing for office. The statute requires that:
“The board of election commissioners, upon the request of any such candidate filed * * * not later than 3 days after the last day for filing, * * * shall print the occupation * * * of each of such candidates.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Reading from the statute, “the occupation” could refer to any period of time. However, it is clear that it must refer to only 1 period of time since “the *639occupation” means just that, not “the occupations.” Thus, “the occupation” of a candidate must refer to only one occupation, and this would not logically be a past occupation.
Consequently, even if it be granted that “assistant attorney general” is a proper term under the statute, it is improper in this case because, in fact, Joe B. Sullivan does not presently hold that position. On the other hand, to grant the designation “former assistant attorney general” is for this Court to fashion relief not prayed for by the plaintiff and relief which is completely beyond the bounds of statutory authority.
Article 2, § 4, of the Constitution of 1963 provides:
“The legislature shall enact laws to regulate the time, place and manner of all nominations and elections, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution or in the Constitution and laws of the United States. The legislature shall enact laws to preserve the purity of elections, to preserve the secrecy of the ballot, to guard against abuses of the elective franchise, and to provide for a system of voter registration and absentee voting. No law shall be enacted which permits a candidate in any partisan primary or partisan election to have a ballot designation except when required for identification of candidates for the same office who have the same or similar surnames.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Elliott v. Secretary of State, 295 Mich 245, this Court ordered the rotation of names of candidates on a nonpartisan ballot even though this was not required by law, saying (pp 249, 250):
“It is not consistent with fairness or purity of elections or the avoidance of misuse of elective franchise for election officials to prepare ballots in such a condition as will afford 1 candidate or nominee an unfair advantage over rival candidates or nominees. Hence we think the conclusion is justified that, *640even in the absence of specific constitutional or statutory provision, it is the clear duty of election officials, when reasonably possible, to prepare ballots in such a manner as will most effectively comply with the constitutional mandate touching the preservation of the purity of elections and guarding against abuse or misuse of the elective franchise.”
Can it be said that in the present case, to be consistent with fairness or purity of elections and to avoid misuse of the elective franchise, the plaintiff ought to be granted the designation which has been determined upon by the Court and which he does not even request? As heretofore noted, the designation of occupation would be inadequate since both men are attorneys. (In fact, such is the case as to all candidates for said office.) Consequently, the other provision of the statute, designation by residential address, must be resorted to as was done by the election commission. Wayne county has a population of 2,666,739. Because of this large population can it be said that a residence address is meaningless and will not serve as a means to identify the candidates? Such may be the case, but I am unable to make any such finding as a matter of fact upon the record before this Court. Absent such a finding, I do not believe this Court is warranted in going beyond the provisions of the statute.
It has long been the rule of this State that courts should refrain from usurping or interfering with the functions of an administrative body. The Court so stated the rule in the case of Goodfellow v. Detroit Civil Service Commission, 312 Mich 226, 232:
“We must not usurp the functions of an administrative body. This the Constitution of the State forbids. Constitution (1908), art 4.”
In the case of Bischoff v. County of Wayne, 320 Mich 376, on page 386, the Court quoted with ap*641proval the rule in the case of Mann v. Tracy, 185 Cal 272, 277 (196 P 484):
“ ‘The determination of facts and the propriety of action of administrative boards is not a judicial function.’ ”
The unanimous action taken by the election commission was explained by member Edgar M. Branigin, immediately following the vote thereon, as follows:
“The only other matter is this, that I believe that last time we ran into a problem in regard with the designation of ‘attorney at law’ involving in the same John L. Sullivan vs. Joe B. Sullivan; and at that time, we first felt that because he was an attorney at law, that he should be granted the designation of ‘attorney at law’ to Joe B. Sullivan and only the address to the other one.
“However, we found out after a little research that it was the general belief of everyone that we talked to, that anyone in order to be a candidate for prosecuting attorney would have to be a lawyer; and, therefore, to give the designation ‘attorney at law’ would be unfair to the others because some people might even infer that others that were in the race were not attorneys at law; and that is the reason why I feel the designation should only be given as his address.”- — Minutes of election commission, July 28, 1964, afternoon session.
Since plaintiff was accorded by the Wayne county election commission the most suitable designation provided for in the statute, I voted to deny the application.
Kelly, J., did not sit.Page 2, transcript of minutes of meeting of election commission, July 28, 1964—afternoon session.
“It became apparent and was without dispute that Mr. Sullivan not only after April the 1st, but prior to April the 1st, had joined.a law firm by the name of Sullivan, Sullivan, Hull & Ranger, which indicates that he was in the practice of law; that on the very day before his resignation had become effective, that he had accepted an assignment from Judge Joseph Rashid; and that subsequent to that time, he received other appointments in regard to representation in the courts on behalf of defendants.” ..........
Rules of the civil service commission, Section 7.3.
“No employee in the State civil service shall become a candidate for nomination to any elective office without first obtaining a leave ■of absence. The leave of absence shall remain in force and effect until the candidacy becomes official by the filing of petitions or by the action of a eaueus or a convention. When a State civil service employee becomes an official candidate for elective office in. any manner, or accepts appointment to an elective office set forth as above, he shall at once resign from his civil service position.”