(dissenting). As shown in Chief Justice Kavanagh’s opinion, a decision in this case was arrived at previous to the service of his opinion and the writing of this dissenting opinion. Realizing that nothing I write can change the result, I shall only briefly set forth my reasons for dissenting to the order entered herein on July 29, 1964. I believe my dissent is amplified and sustained by the opinion of the lower court and the briefs filed in this Court.
In construing the constitutionality of legislative enactments, such legislation must be presumed valid and the burden is on those who question its validity. Young v. City of Ann Arbor, 267 Mich 241; City of Ecorse v. Peoples Community Hospital Authority, 336 Mich 490. The legislature’s power to legislate is unlimited, except as expressly limited by the Constitution. Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority v. Boards of Supervisors of Five Counties, 300 Mich 1; Smith v. Lakeshore & Michigan S. R. Co., 114 Mich 460; Attorney General v. State Board of Assessors, 143 Mich 73.
*586Article 6, § 24, of the 1963 Constitution, contains no express prohibition against enactment by the legislature of section 646 of the general election law (CLS 1961, § 168.646), as last amended by PA 1963 (2d Ex Sess), No 56 (Stat Ann § 6.1646, 1964 Current Material, p 82). The language of article 6, § 24 of the 1963 Constitution clearly grants a right to elected judges to reserve the incumbency designation, but nowhere does it prohibit the legislature from granting an incumbent designation to appointed incumbent judges.
The legislature, being the repository of the lawmaking power, is deemed to have the unrestrained right to legislate in the absence of express prohibition within the Constitution. Defendants admit that such express prohibition is here lacking, but assert that such prohibition should be implied. Where the constitutional language is clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence of such intent may not be used. Attorney General v. State Board of Assessors, supra; People, ex rel. Twitchell, v. Blodgett, 13 Mich 127. Since section 24 contains such clear and unambiguous language, there is no need or justification to look outside the Constitution to find the meaning of the language used in section 24.
Furthermore, the discussions at the Constitutional Convention did not relate to the transitional period involved in this case. Under the 1963 Constitution all holders of judicial office must in the first instance be elected, thereby eliminating the possibility of appointment to judicial office by the governor, as existed prior thereto. Hence, in enacting the incumbency designation in section 24, it was only necessary to consider the problems of elected judges. The entire Constitutional Convention discussion dealt with the desire to aid these elected judges to maintain *587continuity of service, and such discussion shows no intent to prohibit the legislature from designating appointed incumbent judges as such during the transitional period.
Believing that Hon. Marvin J. Salmon, circuit judge, ruled correctly in allowing the designation, I have dissented to the order of our Court.