(dissenting).
I cannot agree with this opinion. I see no ambiguity in the language of the policy. It covers a temporary, substituted automobile, “while temporarily used with the permission of the owner as a substitute for the owned automobile or trailer when withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.”
It seems to me that this language is as clear as it could be. Under it, what car was the mother’s car used as a temporary sub*163stitute for? It could not be a substitute for the 1958 Chevrolet, because that had been sold in March. It could not be a temporary-substitute for the 1961 Chevrolet, because that was never in operable condition during the time involved. The majority seem to proceed on the theory that as long as only one car was in use liability existed, even though it was not covered by the policy. In Simon v. Milwaukee Auto. Mutual Ins. Co. 262 Minn. 378, 385, 115 N. W. (2d) 40, 45, we said:
“* * * Where the insurance contract is unambiguous, the language used must be given its ordinary and usual meaning the same as any other contract, and we have no more right to redraft an insurance contract under the guise of strict construction to reach a result that we would prefer than we have to redraft any other contract.”
We have no more right to redraft the contract to arrive at a result we desire under the guise of liberal construction than we have under the guise of strict construction. We have frequently said that insurance contracts are like any other contracts — the parties have the right to contract as they see fit. It is not our function to rewrite insurance policies so as to provide coverage which under the clear terms of the policy the parties have not provided for.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
Nelson, Justice (dissenting). I concur in the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Knutson. Mr. Justice Otis took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.