(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the offense of prisoner in possession of a controlled substance, MCL 800.281(4); MSA 28.1621(4), is a strict liability crime. I believe that “knowing” possession of the controlled substance is an element of the crime and therefore I conclude that defendant was denied his right to a properly instructed jury by the court’s refusal to give his requested instruction. Accordingly, I would reverse defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
On the basis of its ruling that the crime of prisoner in possession of a controlled substance is a strict liability crime, the trial court refused to permit defendant to present witnesses to support defendant’s theo*408ries that he did not have knowledge of the contents of the package and that he possessed the package under duress. During an offer of proof made outside the presence of the jury, inmate Tyrone Williams testified that on the day of the incident he encountered defendánt in a common area of the prison. He stated that he suspected he was about to be “shook down,” so he forced defendant to take the package containing the marijuana that was eventually retrieved from defendant. Williams indicated that when defendant asked what was in the package, he told defendant “it makes no difference,” and instructed defendant, under threat of physical harm, to deliver the package. Steven Roy, another witness, testified that he saw Williams give the package to defendant. Defendant testified that he was not told of the contents of the package and that he took the package only because Williams threatened that defendant could be stabbed if he did not take the package.
Defendant requested that the trial court instruct the jury that defendant must have knowingly possessed the marijuana. The trial court declined to do so and instead gave the following instruction on the offense of inmate in possession of controlled substances:
The defendant is being charged with being a prisoner and having contraband, in this case marijuana, in his possession. To prove this charge the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that the Defendant was incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections. And second, that he was in possession of contraband, namely marijuana. Possession does not necessarily mean ownership. Possession means that the person had actual physical control of the alleged contraband.
*409The thrust of the instruction was that mere possession was a sufficient basis for conviction.
Defendant argues that he was denied his right to a properly instructed jury by the court’s refusal to instruct the jury that he must have knowingly possessed the marijuana. I agree.
MCL 800.281(4); MSA 28.1621(4) states in relevant part that “a prisoner shall not possess any alcoholic liquor, prescription drag, or controlled substance.” The statute itself makes no reference to a specific intent. In People v Norman, 176 Mich App 271, 274; 438 NW2d 895 (1989), a panel of this Court ruled that § 1(4) does not require proof of specific intent for a conviction; however, the panel did not hold that § 1(4) creates a strict liability offense. Rather, the Norman panel implied that “a showing of general intent” is sufficient for a conviction under the statute. Id. at 276. Further, in People v Vaughn, 200 Mich App 32, 38; 504 NW2d 2 (1993), this Court, without specifying the intent necessary for a conviction under § 1(4), stated that some evidence must be presented “that would permit an inference of scienter.” Case law, therefore, suggests that § 1(4) creates a general intent crime, not a specific intent crime, and certainly not a strict liability crime. For a general intent crime, the prosecutor must prove that the defendant purposely or vohmtarily performed the wrongful act.
This Court has vacillated on the issue whether the existence of knowledge as an element makes a crime one of specific intent rather than general intent. People v Perez-DeLeon, 224 Mich App 43, 55-56; 568 NW2d 324 (1997). However, given this Court’s implication in Norman and Vaughn that the crime of prisoner in possession of contraband is a general intent *410crime, the existence of knowledge as an element of the crime would not make the crime a specific intent crime. Rather, the element of knowledge would limit the statute’s application to knowing, rather than innocent, violations of the provisions of the statute. See, e.g., People v Watts, 133 Mich App 80, 82-84; 348 NW2d 39 (1984); People v Laur, 128 Mich App 453, 455; 340 NW2d 655 (1983). Construing the statute to require the element of knowledge is consistent with this state’s general rule of avoiding the presumption of strict liability in a criminal penal statute. People v Perry, 145 Mich App 778, 783-784; 377 NW2d 911 (1985).
In Perry, the defendant inmate was charged with possessing a pipe that he allegedly used to attack another inmate. MCL 800.283; MSA 28.1623. At trial, the defendant testified that he was attacked by the other inmate and that, in the struggle, he managed to pull the pipe away from his attacker’s hand. When the guards arrived, the defendant was holding the pipe. In connection with this testimony, the defendant requested that the trial court instruct the jury as follows:
I instruct you that the defendant has a right to defend himself whether in prison or not. The right of self defense extends to and permits the taking of a weapon from another who would use that weapon offensively.
If you believe that the defendant obtained possession of the pipe by taking it from an aggressor, and thereafter possessed the weapon in order to keep it away from an aggressor, without using it for offense purposes, then the defendant must be found not guilty. [Id. at 780.]
The trial court declined to give the instruction, reasoning that, if the jury believed defendant’s story, the *411jury would not convict him of possession even without the requested instruction.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly admonished the jury to “follow” the law as provided by the court’s instructions. The court then instructed the jury that the elements of the offense of inmate in possession of a weapon were (1) possession (2) of a weapon. This Court, after noting that the entire thrust of the court’s instructions, especially when augmented by the prosecutor’s arguments at trial, was that “mere possession” was a sufficient basis for conviction, id. at 783, concluded:
We believe that defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed that, if the jury believed that defendant had acquired the pipe purely in self-defense and had intended to give it to the guards at the first opportunity, defendant was not guilty of “possessing” the weapon. The statute, MCL 800.283; MSA 28.1623, does not expressly provide for such an instruction. However, without such an instruction, the statute would, in effect, impose strict liability upon any prisoner found holding a weapon. As a general rule, strict liability will not be presumed in a criminal penal statute:
“The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is universal and persistent in mature systems of law as believe in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. . . .
“Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence as an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism and took deep and early root in American soil. As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of *412the offense that it required no statutory affirmation.” (Citations omitted.) [Id. at 783-784.]
The Court then noted that this principle is particularly true when dealing with a possessory offense. Id. at 784. Concluding that possession requires the intent to possess, the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction and instructed the trial court on retrial to so instruct the jury.
Like the offense of inmate in possession of a controlled substance, the offense of prisoner in possession of a weapon is encompassed within the act prohibiting the possession of weapons and contraband by inmates. Neither statute expressly contains an element of intent or knowledge. However, given this Court’s implications in Norman, supra, and Vaughn, supra, as well as this Court’s holding in Perry, supra, and the general rule disfavoring the presumption of strict liability in a criminal penal statute, 1 conclude that the offense of inmate in possession of a controlled substance is not a strict liability crime and that an element of knowing possession must be read into the statute. Accordingly, 1 would reverse defendant’s conviction.