¶ 43. {dissenting). I dissent because I conclude that the circuit court did not deprive Edward Ramos of his right to the effective exercise of a peremptory challenge under Wisconsin law. Instead, I conclude that by using a peremptory challenge to strike a juror who should have been excused for cause, Ramos effectively exercised this challenge for the purpose it is intended — to impanel an impartial jury. Further, I conclude that Ramos is not. entitled to automatic reversal of his conviction because it is well established that, in cases like this, the defendant is not entitled to a new trial unless a biased juror actually sat on the jury. Consequently, I conclude that Ramos' challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution must fail because he *31was not deprived of any right to which he was entitled under Wisconsin law. Thus, although I agree that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it failed to excuse the juror for cause, I conclude that this error was harmless.
A.
¶ 44. Ramos concedes that an impartial jury was impaneled in this case. See majority op. at 20, n.3. Accordingly, Ramos does not claim that his right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment was violated. Rather, Ramos claims that his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated because the circuit court, by failing to excuse the juror for cause, effectively deprived Ramos of a statutorily-provided peremptory challenge.
¶ 45. The United States Supreme Court considered an analogous Fourteenth Amendment challenge in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988).1 The Court indicated: "Because peremptory challenges are a creature of statute and are not required by the Constitution, it is for the State to determine the number of peremptory challenges allowed and to define their purpose and the manner of their exercise." Id. at 89 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court determined that a defendant's right to due process is violated "only if the defendant does not receive that *32which state law provides." Id. Applying Oklahoma law, the Ross Court concluded that the petitioner was required to exercise his peremptory challenge to remove the juror, and that the trial court's error constituted "grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him." Id. Since a biased juror was not forced upon the petitioner, the Court held that Ross has received all that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore his Fourteenth Amendment challenge failed. Id. at 89-91.
B.
¶ 46. Accordingly, this court must determine whether Ramos received all that Wisconsin law allowed him in order to decide whether his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process has been violated. See id. at 89. As indicated by the majority, see majority op. at 16-17, Ramos clearly was entitled to the effective exercise of seven peremptory challenges. See Wis. Stats. §§ 972.03 & 972.04(1); State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 724, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985) (indicating that a defendant has a "right to the effective exercise of his peremptory challenges"), overruled on other grounds, State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). However, the Wisconsin Statutes do not indicate in what manner these peremptory challenges may be used. Consequently, in order to determine whether Ramos "effectively" exercised all of his peremptory challenges, and thereby received that to which he was entitled, this court must look to Wisconsin precedent. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 89 (court looked to Oklahoma precedent to determine whether defendant received that which state law provided).
*33¶ 47. The majority essentially concludes that, under Wisconsin law, if a defendant uses a peremptory challenge to strike a "for cause" juror, the defendant is thereby deprived of the effective exercise of that challenge because he or she did not use it to strike a juror for "no cause," i.e., based on a hunch or intuition.2 In other words, the majority holds that a defendant "effectively" exercises his or her full complement of peremptory challenges only if he or she uses every challenge to strike a juror for "no cause." Accordingly, the majority concludes that it is irrelevant that an impartial jury was impaneled in this case; all that matters is that Ramos used one of his peremptory challenges to strike a "for cause" juror, and therefore did not use it to strike a "no cause" juror.
¶ 48. After carefully reviewing Wisconsin precedent, as well as federal case law, I reach the opposite conclusion. It is well settled that peremptory challenges are "but one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair trial." Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992); accord Ross, 487 U.S. at 88. Therefore, peremptory challenges are not intended to enable the state or the defendant to select particular jurors who they think may be more favorable to their side; rather, peremptory challenges are intended to be a means to the end of ensuring the selection of an unbiased jury.3 See McCollum, 505 U.S. *34at 57; Ross, 487 U.S. at 88. Consistent with this purpose, Wisconsin courts have determined that a defendant is not deprived of the right to the effective exercise of a peremptory challenge simply because the defendant uses a challenge to strike a juror who should have been removed for cause.
¶ 49. Specifically, in Carthaus v. State, 78 Wis. 560, 47 N.W. 629 (1891), the defendants argued that they were entitled to reversal of the circuit court's judgment of conviction because they "were compelled, as shown by the record, to exercise their eighth and last peremptory challenge" to strike a juror that should have been struck for cause. Defendants' brief in Carthaus at 10 (emphasis original). Therefore, the defendants in Carthaus made the same argument that Ramos makes in this case: they claimed that because of the circuit court's error, they "were obliged to challenge [the juror] and thus lost one strike." State's brief in Carthaus at 30 (emphasis added). This court disagreed, concluding:
As to the objection to the juror. . .we think it has no merit. He was peremptorily challenged by the defendants, and set aside. It is said the defendants should not have been put to their peremptory challenges as to this juror . . ., because in so doing they exhausted their peremptory challenges; but it does not appear that they were prejudiced in any way by that fact. A fair and impartial jury was impaneled, and what more could the defendants ask for?
78 Wis. at 508. Therefore, this court held that where a defendant uses a peremptory challenge to strike a "for *35cause" juror, and no prejudice thereby results to the defendant, the defendant has received all that Wisconsin law provides. See id.
¶ 50. Similarly, in Pool v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 94 Wis. 447, 69 N.W. 65 (1896), this court held that where a circuit court errs in overruling a challenge of a juror for cause, a defendant is not entitled to a new trial "unless it is shown that an objectionable juror was forced upon the party, and sat upon the case after such party had exhausted his peremptory challenges." Id. at 453. Likewise, in Bergman v. Hendrickson, 106 Wis. 434, 82 N.W.304 (1900), this court concluded that a defendant is not entitled to reversal where a circuit court refuses to discharge a juror for cause unless prejudice results to the defendant. Id. at 438-39.
¶ 51. More recently, in State v. Traylor, 170 Wis. 2d 393, 489 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App.) review denied, 491 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. 1992), the defendant contended that his counsel was ineffective because she used peremptory challenges to strike certain jurors rather than moving the court to excuse the jurors for cause. Id. at 395-96. The court of appeals, relying on Carthaus and Pool, concluded: "Wisconsin's longstanding rule is that where a fair and impartial jury is impaneled, there is no basis for concluding that a defendant was wrongly required to use peremptory challenges." Id. at 400. Furthermore, the court determined that unless a defendant can show that "the exhaustion of peremptory challenges left him with a jury that included an objectionable or incompetent member," the defendant is not entitled to reversal of his or her conviction under Wisconsin law. Id.
¶ 52. Carthaus, Pool, Bergman, and Traylor establish that, under Wisconsin law, "effective" exercise of a peremptory challenge does not mean that the *36defendant must use every peremptory challenge to strike a juror for "no cause." Instead, these cases demonstrate that where a defendant uses a peremptory challenge to strike a "for cause" juror, the defendant has effectively exercised the challenge for the purpose it is intended — to impanel an impartial jury. Further, these cases clearly establish that, under Wisconsin law, a defendant is not entitled to a new trial unless he or she can make some showing of prejudice.4
¶ 53. The majority dismisses Carthaus, Pool, Bergman, and Traylor because it concludes that these cases are relevant only when a defendant makes a Sixth Amendment challenge, since the courts in these cases focused on whether an impartial jury had been impaneled. However, the majority wrongly assumes that when a defendant makes a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on state law, it is always irrelevant whether an unbiased jury was impaneled. Ross establishes that the essential inquiry in a Fourteenth Amendment case of this type is whether the defendant received all that he or she was entitled under state law. 487 U.S. at 89. Therefore, in such a case, if a defendant *37is not entitled to a new trial under the applicable state law unless a biased juror sat on the jury, then it is highly relevant that an impartial jury was impaneled. See id. at 89-91 (in deciding petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment claim, court considered it relevant that under Oklahoma law, a defendant is entitled to a new trial "only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.").
¶ 54. Moreover, contrary to the majority's conclusion that Carthaus, Pool, and Bergman are limited to an articulation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, these three cases dealt solely with the right to peremptory challenges under Wisconsin law. This is so because the U.S. Supreme Court did not even determine that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was applicable to the states until 1966. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966).5 Indeed, the briefs as well as the opinions in these cases are bereft of any citation to the state or federal constitutions. It is therefore clear that this court in Carthaus, Pool, and Bergman considered the very issue that we face today: to what was the defendant entitled under Wisconsin law? Thus, I conclude that Carthaus, Pool, Bergman, as well as Traylor, are controlling here.
¶ 55. Further, I do not agree that State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992), is applicable in this case. In Gesch, the defendant argued that his right to an impartial jury was violated because the circuit court failed to excuse a juror who was related by blood *38to a state witness. Id. at 662 — 65. Unlike the present case, in Gesch the defendant did not exercise a peremptory challenge to strike the "for cause" juror; therefore, he sat on the jury. Id. at 671. The State argued that because the defendant had not exercised a peremptory challenge, he had waived his right to raise the circuit court's error on appeal. Id. The court concluded that the defendant had not waived this issue, and further held that his right to an impartial jury had been violated. Id.
¶ 56. However, the Gesch court did not determine whether the defendant's right to the effective exercise of a peremptory challenge would have been violated had he used a peremptory challenge to strike the juror, because this was not the issue before the court. Moreover, the court apparently agreed with the State that if the defendant had struck the juror and subsequently been convicted, the circuit court's refusal to excuse the juror would have been harmless error. See id. at 671. Finally, since the defendant in Gesch claimed that his right to an impartial jury had been violated, see id. at 665-66, pursuant to the majority's own reasoning, Gesch is inapposite in this case. See majority op. at 23-24 (arguing that Carthaus involved the right to an impartial jury and therefore is distinguishable).
¶ 57. Today's decision effectively overrules Carthaus, Pool, Bergman, and Traylor, and marks a departure from this court's commitment to upholding controlling precedent. This court's covenant of faithfulness to the doctrine of stare decisis cannot be overemphasized, for it underpins the very legitimacy of the judiciary. Fidelity to precedent helps to ensure that the existing law will not be abandoned without strong justification. See State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, *39441-42, 511 N.W.2d 591 (Abrahamson, J., concurring), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S. Ct. 2245 (1995). The principle underlying Carthaus, Pool, Bergman, and Traylor applies as vigorously today as it did when those cases were decided. Therefore, there is no justification for overruling these cases. As such, I conclude that Ramos received all that Wisconsin law provides. Consequently, his Fourteenth Amendment challenge fails. Accordingly, I conclude that although the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in this case by failing to excuse the challenged juror for cause, such error was harmless. It did not deprive Ramos of any right to which he was entitled under Wisconsin law.6 Thus, I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
¶ 58. In closing, I emphasize that the majority has effectively created a "win-win" situation for defendants. Pursuant to Gesch, if a circuit court erroneously fails to excuse a juror for cause, the defendant may refuse to exercise a peremptory challenge, wait until the jury renders its verdict, appeal if he or she does not like the result, and then receive a new trial. Pursuant to the majority's decision in this case, even if a defendant uses a peremptory challenge to strike the "for cause" juror in such situations, the defendant may wait until the jury renders its verdict, appeal if he or she *40does not like the result, and then receive a new trial. Therefore, Gesch, combined with the majority's opinion today, will result in a tremendous waste of judicial resources and taxpayers' money — in this case and in future cases as well.
¶ 59. For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 60. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent.
The Ross Court also considered whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury had been violated. The Court held: "So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated." Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988). However, since Ramos is not making a Sixth Amendment challenge, this portion of the Ross opinion is not controlling.
However, the majority presumably would agree that a defendant has no right to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike a juror based on race, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), or gender, see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
As the Supreme Court of Tennessee has indicated: "As important as the. . .proper exercise of peremptory challenges undoubtedly are, these procedures are designed to insure the *34selection of a fair and impartial jury, not to enable the accused himself to select particular jurors." State v. Simon, 635 S.W.2d 498, 507-08 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1055 (1982).
Accordingly, a defendant is afforded no more protections under Wisconsin law than are provided by the Sixth Amendment. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 88 (holding that, where a defendant uses a peremptory challenge to strike a "for cause" juror, the Sixth Amendment is not violated so long as the jury was impartial).
Furthermore, I conclude that Wisconsin law is similar to Oklahoma law, in that both establish that where a trial court erroneously refuses to remove a juror for cause, such an error provides grounds for reversal "only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him." See id. at 89 (describing Oklahoma law). Therefore, I also conclude that Wisconsin law is not similar to Kentucky law. See majority op. at 22-23 (describing Kentucky law).
A few years earlier, the Supreme Court determined that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and right to confrontation, see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), were applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Wis. Stat. § 805.18 provides that an error is harmless if it does not effect the substantial rights of the party seeking reversal of the judgment. Although § 805.18 is part of the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, this court has determined it is applicable in criminal cases pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1). See State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 547, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985). Thus, because Ramos received all to which he was entitled under Wisconsin law, and therefore his substantial rights were not violated, I conclude that the circuit court's error was harmless.