I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that the 1988 Legislature has amended the Revised Probate Code to expand the authority and the responsibility of a temporary personal representative. Thus, I agree with the conclusion that the statute of limitations saving provision begins to run when the probate court issues letters of authority to a temporary personal representative. However, I would give this rule prospective application only.
The single question in this case is whether the “personal representative” envisioned by Revised Judicature Act § 5852 includes a temporary personal representative. The statute states in pertinent part:
If a person dies before the period of limitations has run or within 30 days after the period of limitations has run, an action which survives by law may be commenced by the personal representative of the deceased person at any time within 2 years after letters of authority are issued although the period of limitations has run. But an action shall not be brought under this provision unless the personal representative commences it within 3 years after the period of limitations has run. [MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852 (emphasis added).]
In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff asserts that the appointment of a temporary personal representative does not trigger the limitation period. She *71contends that the complaint was timely filed, because the statutoiy period began to run on the date she became the “permanent” personal representative. By contrast, defendant argues that the complaint was filed too late, because the statute began to run with her initial appointment as “temporary” personal representative.
The foundation for plaintiffs argument is Szydelko v Smith’s Estate.1 It held that the appointment of a “special administrator,” the historical predecessor of a temporary personal representative, did not commence the two-year period of limitation. However, the Court of Appeals adopted defendant’s viewpoint.2 In doing so, it distinguished Szydelko.
The Court of Appeals stated that plaintiff’s reliance on Szydelko was misplaced. It reasoned that Szydelko involved a suit against, not on behalf of, an estate. Also, the tolling statute and an assortment of probate statutes defining the powers of estate fiduciaries had been amended since Szydelko.3
Although I agree with the Court of Appeals that the Probate Code has been substantially revised since that time, the revision has not been interpreted by this Court during the interim. Therefore, the statutory interpretation that this Court now gives sets forth a new rule. I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that this case is not a case in which prospective application of the law should apply. Jahner v Dep’t of Corrections, 197 Mich App 111, 114; 495 NW2d 168 (1992).
*72Thus, I would overrule Szydelko prospectively. To do otherwise would create a substantial hardship for plaintiff, who did nothing more than rely on precedent that had been settled for sixty-five years.
Neither party disputes the facts of the case. Carolyn Lindsey died from complications following surgery performed at defendant Harper Hospital. Plaintiff, Lindsey’s daughter, is the personal representative of the estate. The lawsuit is a malpractice/wrongful-death action against the hospital and several of its doctors.
The period of limitation for a malpractice action is two years. MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4). However, when an action is brought on behalf of a decedent’s estate, MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852 is triggered. It allows a “personal representative” an additional two years to file after letters of authority have been issued.
The parties agree that the date of the first alleged malpractice was October 1, 1987. Consequently, October 1, 1989, became the deadline for filing a lawsuit. However, because this is a malpractice claim brought by an estate as a wrongful death action, the tolling provision is triggered. We have been asked to interpret the tolling provision.
For purposes of comparison, before 1988 the statute read:4
*73If a person dies before the period of limitations has run or within 30 days after the period of limitations has run, an action which survives by law may be commenced by or against the executor or administrator of the deceased person or the claim may be proved as a debt against the estate of the deceased person, as the case may be, at any time within 2 years after letters testamentary or letters of administration are granted, although the period of limitations has run, subject to the limitations provided in section 20 of chapter 8 of Act No. 288 of the Public Acts of 1939, being section 708.20 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. But no executor or administrator shall bring an action under this provision unless he commences it within 3 years after the period of limitations has run. [1961 PA 236.]
The earlier version of the statute as well as the amended version is a saving provision designed to extend the period of limitation where death has occurred. Essentially, MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852 adds three years to the underlying statutory period of limitation wherever a party dies before the statute runs. Hence, in a medical malpractice case, where the decedent dies within two years after the act of malpractice, the tolling provision extends the period of limitation another three years. Hardy v Maxheimer, 429 Mich 422; 416 NW2d 299 (1987); Hawkins v Regional Medical Laboratories, PC, 415 Mich 420; 329 NW2d 729 (1982).
In the present case, suit was filed on October 1, 1992. Plaintiff contends that letters of authority were *74issued to her appointing her as permanent personal representative of her mother’s estate on October 9, 1990. She does not dispute the fact that letters of authority were issued appointing her temporary representative on September 14, 1990. Her position is that that appointment did not trigger the statutory period. Therefore, plaintiff argues, this lawsuit was timely, having been brought within the two years of the court’s granting her the letters of authority as permanent personal representative.
Defendant, however, contends that the two-year period stated in the saving provision began to run when the letters of authority were first issued. Thus, defendant argues that the present action is barred and that plaintiff’s reliance on Szydelko was misplaced because that was an action against an estate and not by an estate. In order to fully comprehend the reason why the rule established by this Court today should apply prospectively, it is necessary to look at this Court’s decision in Szydelko.
On January 4, 1928, Mr. Szydelko was killed instantly when struck by a truck driven by an employee of Hattie B. Smith. Ms. Smith herself died four days later on January 8, 1928.5 One day after her death, a “special administratrix” was appointed for her estate. Then, twenty-one months later, on October 2, 1929, that same person was appointed “general executrix.” The Szydelko estate filed suit against the Smith estate on September 4, 1931. However, by then, the period of limitation for a personal injury case had expired. Nevertheless, the tolling provision *75comparable to the current RJA § 5852 applied to actions against an estate. 1929 CL 13981.
In short, excepting antiquated terminology and the possibly important distinction that Szydelko involved a suit against an estate, the issue in Szydelko was the same as in the present case: Did the extra two years for filing commence with the appointment of the special administratrix (now temporary personal representative) or with the appointment of the general executrix (now personal representative)?
The Szydelko Court held that the two years did not begin to run until the fiduciary was appointed general executrix. That meant that the suit was not barred by the statute of limitations. The key to the Court’s holding was 1929 CL 15589:
An administrator . . . shall collect all the goods, chattels and debts of the deceased, and preserve the same for the executor or administrator who may afterwards be appointed .... All personal actions, the cause of which does by law survive and which may be pending either for or against the intestate of such special administrator, may be proceeded with and be prosecuted by or against such special administrator ....
Taking note of the word “pending” in the statute, the Szydelko Court interpreted the statute as meaning that a special administrator could defend actions filed before the decedent’s death. It could not be made the defendant in any new lawsuit. Unfiled litigation would have to await the appointment of a general administrator or executor. Therefore, the Court concluded:
[UJnder the probate statutes of this State it must be held that the two-year limitation period does not begin to run *76until letters of general administration have been issued. [Szydelko, supra at 523.]
Szydelko thus supports the conclusion that the additional two years for filing this lawsuit began not when the plaintiff was appointed temporary, but rather when appointed permanent, personal representative.
The terminology changes between 1932 and the present should not affect the analysis. While it is true that RPC § 175 allows temporary personal representatives to file lawsuits,6 the current language is not materially different from 1929 CL 15589.7 Both the former and the current provisions observe a distinction between suits commenced by the temporary fiduciary and “personal actions” (apparently lawsuits initiated during the decedent’s lifetime) that were already “pending.” But in that category too, the former statute and the current one are nearly identical.8
The Szydelko case was problematic because it was a postdeath lawsuit against an estate. It was the one *77type of lawsuit that special administrators (now temporary personal representatives) were not empowered to deal with. No one was to be sued until a (permanent) administrator or executor was appointed. This Court recognized that a lawsuit could be evaded altogether if an administrator or executor were sought only after expiration of the combined length of the statute of limitations plus two years. The easy solution for the Szydelko Court was to hold that the two additional years did not begin until the permanent fiduciary had been appointed. That is how Szydelko interpreted what is now RJA § 5852. Although the problem arose because of a suit filed against an estate, it is important to noté that the Szydelko Court did not limit its interpretation of the tolling statute to that context.
When Szydelko was decided, the term “personal representative” had no meaning different from that of “executor” and “administrator.” The Court was concerned with gleaning the intent of the Legislature in enacting the tolling provision. Therefore, it examined the Probate Code as it existed in 1932 and saw that various limitations and restrictions had been imposed upon temporarily appointed “special administrators.” The conclusion was that the legislative intent was to toll the statute of limitations until the appointment of an executor or administrator with general, unrestricted authority.
There the law has rested for over forty years. If, dining that time, the Legislature ever intended to alter the ruling in Szydelko, it certainly had the time to do it. Plaintiff’s argument is that, if the Legislature had wanted to change the outcome in Szydelko, it would have revised both the tolling provision and the Pro*78bate Code. Because it did not do so, it was reasonable for plaintiff to rely on the legal inteipretation in Szydelko.
However, in 1978, the Legislature revised the Probate Code. In that revision, the term “personal representative” was introduced, but it was a term used in a generic sense, rather than to connote a specific status, position, or rank. MCL 700.9(3); MSA 27.5009(3).
The 1978 amendments did not alter either the wrongful death act or the RJA § 5852 tolling provision, which is the focus of this appeal. The legislative intent behind 1978 PA 642 was to revise the Probate Code and not to change the statutes of limitations or their tolling provisions. Although the amendments authorized a temporary personal representative to commence a lawsuit, it does not follow that RJA § 5852 was implicitly amended or that Szydelko was legislatively overruled.
In 1985, the Legislature rewrote the wrongful death act and added some special provisions to the Probate Code. Again, neither the statute of limitations nor the RJA § 5852 special tolling provisions were amended.
In 1988, the Legislature did amend RJA § 5852. The amendment came ten years after the major revision of the Probate Code, six years after Hawkins,9 and three years after the revision of the wrongful death *79act. Thus, the amendment was not contemporaneous with any of the unrelated statutory amendments that the Court of Appeals held require disregarding Szydelko's interpretation of the direct predecessor of RJA § 5852. Despite the fact that the 1988 amendment did replace the terms “executor” and “administrator” with the more modem terms “personal representative,” there is no reason to conclude that the Legislature intended any change in the tolling provision. The only real change made was to render the statute inapplicable to claims filed against estates. That type of action is now governed by MCL 700.703; MSA 27.5703.
The interpretation of the act given by the Szydelko Court, where suit was brought against an estate, is no less valid when suit is brought by an estate. The internal language of the act does not make its interpretation dependent upon whether the estate is the plaintiff or the defendant. Distinctions continue to exist between those who are appointed only temporarily to conserve or protect assets and those who receive a permanent appointment to handle all an estate’s affairs. Hence, the Szydelko ruling continues to provide a rational and sensible interpretation of RJA § 5852. I find that plaintiff’s reliance on Szydelko is not misplaced. However, I think that the time has come to overrule Szydelko.
The Szydelko holding was motivated by concern that estates could avoid suit by delaying the appointment of a permanent fiduciary. The present 1988 amendments of the tolling statute and the Revised Probate Code erase that concern. 1988 PA 221 deleted from the tolling statute all mention of actions against an estate. At the same time, 1988 PA 222 significantly revised the code provisions dealing with *80claims against estates. Thus, it appears that the current provisions force a temporary personal representative to deal with claims against the estate. See RPC §§ 703, 710 and 712. In any event, deletion from RJA § 5852 of any mention of claims against an estate assures that the Szydelko dilemma cannot reoccur. That being the case, the rationale for Szydelko no longer exists.
The general rule is that judicial decisions are to be given complete retroactive effect. Hyde v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223, 240; 393 NW2d 847 (1986). However, the Court has often limited the application of decisions that have overruled prior law or reconstrued statutes. Tebo v Havlik, 418 Mich 350, 360; 343 NW2d 181 (1984). Complete prospective application has generally been limited to decisions that overrule clear and uncontradicted case law. Id. at 361, 363.
In determining whether a change in the legal interpretation of a statute should be applied retroactively, the Court examines three factors: (1) the purpose of the new rule, (2) the general reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect of retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice. People v Young, 410 Mich 363, 366; 301 NW2d 803 (1981). Furthermore, this Court has stated that “[a] rule of law is ‘new’ . . . either when an established precedent is overruled or when an issue of first impression is decided which was not adumbrated by any earlier appellate decision.” People v Phillips, 416 Mich 63, 68; 330 NW2d 366 (1982).
In this case, defendant advocates a change in the law in order to enjoy the benefit of a limitation defense that was not available under the rule set forth *81in Szydelko. This suit was filed two years and two weeks after plaintiff was appointed temporary personal representative. Hence, defendant insists that plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim be barred.
Defendant’s is a technical interpretation of the statute. Thus, it is hard to identify any purpose behind the new rule defendant advocates other than to clarify a technical rule of law (i.e., Does appointment of a temporary personal representative now trigger the two-year limitation period of this statute?). Dismissing a medical malpractice wrongful death claim to clarify this issue extends a benefit to defendant far beyond the merits of the issue or the purpose for the new rule.
I have already alluded to the general reliance placed upon the rule in Szydelko. Someone searching for the effect of death upon the limitation period would find at § 5852 in the RJA that a personal representative has two years after appointment to file suit. It makes no reference to a temporary personal representative. Further amplification of this section in the annotations or through the Shepardization of cases would disclose the Szydelko case. Its holding would show that the two-year period runs from the appointment of the permanent personal representative of decedent’s estate. One could be expected, therefore, to place reliance upon the only precedent on point, a holding unchallenged for the last sixty-five years.
The administration of justice is not enhanced by our now jeopardizing lawsuits filed within two years of appointment of a personal representative if a temporary representative was appointed earlier.
Consequently, if § 5852 is now to be interpreted as triggering the two-year limitation period upon *82appointment of a temporary personal representative, the new rule should be applied prospectively only. Excluded from its scope should be the present and all pending cases.
I would overrule Szydelko. However, I would hold that this plaintiff was entitled to rely on it for the proposition that RJA § 5852 would be triggered two years after she was appointed (permanent) personal representative. Therefore, I would reverse the Court of Appeals decision and allow plaintiff to go forward with her lawsuit.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J. Riley, J., took no part in the decision of this case.259 Mich 519; 244 NW 148 (1932).
213 Mich App 422; 540 NW2d 477 (1995).
213 Mich App 427-428.
The 1988 amendment was made effective to estates commenced after January 1, 1989, and applied to this case. House Bill 5044 stated:
The bill would amend the Revised Judicature Act to delete a provision that establishes a statute of limitations on claims against estates. Currently, an action “by or against the executor or administrator” must be commenced within two years after letters of authority are issued, although the period of limitations has run, but *73cannot be brought more than three years after the period of limitations has run. The bill would allow such an action, with those limitations, only by — and not against — the personal representative. [House Legislative Analysis, HB 5044, May 31, 1988.]
However, the earlier language, in effect at the time of decedent’s injury and death, is important in interpreting the 1988 act.
The opinion does not indicate whether Smith’s death was related to the accident.
“The temporary personal representative may commence and maintain actions as personal representative . . . .” RPC § 175.
“An administrator . . . may commence and maintain actions as an administrator . . . .” 1929 CL 15589.
1929 CL 15589 provided:
All personal actions, the cause of which does by law survive and which may be pending either for or against the intestate of such special administrator, may be proceeded with and be prosecuted by or against such special administrator ....
Similarly, RJA § 175 provides:
All personal actions, the cause of which by law survives and which may be pending either for or against the deceased, may be proceeded with, and be prosecuted by or against, the temporary personal representative ....
Hawkins, supra, overruled Rhule v Armstrong, 384 Mich 709; 187 NW2d 223 (1971). In that case, the Court stated:
Therefore, MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852 operates to extend the time in which to bring such suits. That statute, quoted above, gives the fiduciary an additional two years from the date of issuance of letters testamentary in which to bring suit provided that, in any event, the fiduciary brings suit not more than three years after the limitations period has run. [Hawkins at 438.]