OPINION DISSENTING TO THE OVERRULING OF THE MOTION FOR REHEARING WITHOUT WRITTEN OPINION
DALLY, Judge.The Court, on its own motion, filed and set this matter for rehearing to further consider its original disposition of the appeal. The majority now overrules the motion for rehearing without written opinion.
I dissent because the majority of the Court in this case and in the cases of Le-Blanc v. Gist, Judge, Criminal District Court, Jefferson County et al., 603 S.W.2d 841 (Tex.Cr.App.1979, and Opinion Dissenting to the Overruling of the Motion for Rehearing without written opinion, filed this day) continues to enlarge upon and extend V.T.C.A. Family Code, Sec. 54.02, by judicial legislation under the guise of discovered legislative intent.
V.T.C.A. Family Code, Sec. 54.02, in pertinent part, as it was written by the Legislature, provides:
“(a) The juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a child to the appropriate district court or criminal district court for criminal proceedings if:
“(1) the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of felony;
“(2) the child was 15 years of age or older at the time he is alleged to have committed the offense and no adjudication hearing has been conducted concerning that offense; and
“(3) after full investigation and hearing the juvenile court determines that because of the seriousness of the offense or the background of the child *858the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.
“(b) • • -
“(c) The juvenile court shall conduct a hearing without a jury to consider transfer of the child for criminal proceedings.
“(d) . . .
“(e) • • •
“(f) . . .
“(g) If the juvenile court retains jurisdiction, the child is not subject to criminal prosecution at any time for any offense alleged in the petition or for any offense within the knowledge of the juvenile court judge as evidenced by anything in the record of the proceedings.
“(h) If the juvenile court waives jurisdiction, it shall state specifically in the order its reasons for waiver and certify its action, including the written order and findings of the court, and transfer the child to the appropriate court for the criminal proceedings. On transfer of the child for criminal proceedings, he shall be dealt with as an adult and in accordance with the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 1965. The transfer of custody is an arrest. The examining trial shall be conducted by the court to which the case was transferred, which may remand the child to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
“(i) If the child’s case is brought to the attention of the grand jury and the grand jury does not indict for the offense charged in the complaint forwarded by the juvenile court, the district court or criminal district court shall certify the grand jury’s failure to indict to the juvenile court. On receipt of the certification, the juvenile court may resume jurisdiction of the case.”
The majority of the Court by judicial legislation has added to Sec. 54.02 by holding that:
(1) The examining trial is mandatory. Jones v. State, 576 S.W.2d 853 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); White v. State, 586 S.W.2d 843 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Ex parte Menefee, 561 S.W.2d 822 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
(2) If there is a failure to find probable cause in the examining trial such finding terminates criminal proceedings and is tantamount to remanding the proceedings back to the juvenile court even though no formal order of transfer has been entered. Ex parte LeBlanc, 577 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). These holdings are not required by and do not follow the plain words of the statute; these holdings are contrary to well-established legal principles ably pointed out in the dissenting opinions in White v. State, supra; Ex parte LeBlanc, supra; Ex parte Menefee, supra. These holdings by the majority amount to judicial legislation.
Although we are in strong disagreement with the majority the dissenting judges have recognized the vote of the majority as the rule of law. Ex parte Kirkwood, 599 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Ex parte Ytuarte, 579 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Ex parte Juarez, 579 S.W.2d 211 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Ex parte Gloston, 579 S.W.2d 212 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). The petitioners in the last cited cases were granted relief because they did not have examining trials after being certified and transferred for prosecution as adults and before being indicted.
Now in this case and in LeBlanc v. Gist, Judge, Criminal District Court, Jefferson County, et al., supra, the majority by additional judicial legislation has held that: (3) there can be only one examining trial, and (4) a juvenile cannot be re-certified for prosecution as an adult.
I dissent to the further judicial legislation indulged in by the majority in this case.
DOUGLAS, TOM G. DAVIS, and W. C. DAVIS, JJ., join in this dissent.