This is an original proceeding in mandamus. Our alternative writ was issued upon relators’ application therefor and respondent’s waiver of service and acceptance of the application as the alternative writ. After the filing of respondent’s return, the parties filed a stipulation as to the facts, whereupon relators filed their motion for judgment notwithstanding respondent’s return.
Relator Normandy School District is a city school district duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Missouri. Section 165.263 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. Relator, The Curators of the University of Missouri, is a legal entity of the State of Missouri duly existing under the Constitution of the State of Missouri [Sections 9(a) and 9(b), Article IX, Constitution of Missouri, V.A.M.S.], and designated as a body politic by Section 172.020 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. Respondent, Fred R. Small, is and was at all the times mentioned herein the duly elected, qualified and acting President of the Board of Directors of Normandy School District of St. Louis County, Missouri, and as such it was his duty among other things to execute lawful and properly authorized conveyances of real estate on behalf of the District.
By this proceeding in mandamus, relators seek to compel respondent to execute a deed conveying certain described property of the relator Normandy School District to The Curators of the University of Missouri under the provisions of a contract entered into by and between the parties, relators herein. The contract resulted from a resolution adopted by The Board of Curators of the University of Missouri at its October 27, 1961 meeting, which resolution authorized the making of a particular offer to the Board of Education of the Normandy School District. The resolution, after the recital of numerous alleged facts in whereas paragraphs, authorized the President and Business Manager of the University to negotiate with the Normandy School District for the transfer to it of a particularly described tract of land, consisting of approximately 128 acres of land with improvements, owned by the Normandy School District and located therein at 8001 Natural Bridge Road, St. Louis County, and further authorized and directed the making of a firm offer to said Normandy School District that, “ * * * if it can and will transfer marketable title to the University, the University will pay the School District the sum of $60,000.00 therefor.” Various conditions were ordered to be joined in the offer, including the following provision: “That title shall be conveyed to The Curators of the University of Missouri by warranty deed for use in its educational purposes, subject only to taxes and restrictions and encumbrances of record and that a final decision shall be obtained from the *866Supreme Court holding that the School District is authorized to make this transfer.”
The offer was communicated to the Normandy School District by the letter of the President of the University, dated October 27, 1961, in accordance with the said resolution adopted by The Board of Curators of the University. Thereafter, on November 4, 1961, the Normandy School District accepted the mentioned offer and agreed to take steps to promptly comply with the conditions stated in the offer. The acceptance was purportedly authorized by a resolution adopted by the Normandy School District which purported to state the reasons for the acceptance. Included in the resolution authorizing acceptance of the offer was a provision that if, after acceptance, “ * * * it is determined by the Supreme Court that the District cannot convey title as herein provided, both parties shall be released from the terms of this contract.”
Thereafter, the form for a general warranty deed conveying the particularly described property to The Curators of the University of Missouri “ * * * in consideration of the sum of Sixty-Thousand Dollars ($60,000.00) and other good and valuable consideration * * *” was prepared and submitted to the president of said School District Board (respondent), who refused to execute it on behalf of said School District. The proposed deed would have conveyed the mentioned property to The Curators of the University of Missouri "subject to all restrictions and easements of record,” with a habendum clause, as follows: “To Have and to Hold the same, together with all rights and appurtenances to the same belonging, unto the Party of the Second Part, and to its transferees, successors and assigns so long as used for its educational purposes.”
The stipulation of facts recites that the Normandy School District of St. Louis County comprises an area of approximately fifteen square miles; that it has a population of approximately 52,000 people, and has twenty-six separate incorporated areas within its boundaries; that on September 20, 1958, the voters of the School District approved a $625,000 bond issue to enable said School District to purchase the property here involved; that the 128 acres, with the then existing improvements, were purchased in 1959; that the purchase price was $600,000; and that, when said bond issue was approved by the voters, it was determined that a tax of five cents per $100 valuation of real property for a period of twenty years would be necessary to retire said bonds; and that subsequent to the acquisition of the property by the School District, an increase in the value of real property within the School District, as determined by a reassessment thereof, caused the tax to be reduced to 3.8 cents for $100 assessed valuation to retire said bonds in twenty years. There is no stipulation or other evidence as to the actual market value of the property on November 4, 1961.
Relators’ statement of facts, which has the approval of the respondent, recites that: “On the 13th day of May, 1960, by authority of Section 70.220, R.S.Mo., the University of Missouri and the School District entered into a contract for the joint use of this property for the purpose of establishing and operating a Junior College under the name of University of Missouri- — Normandy Residence Center, under which the District was to recondition the club house and ready the property for school purposes, and the University was to furnish the teaching staff and give the institution the benefits of the University’s own curriculum for the first two years of college work, and the dignity and sanction of the University itself as a goal for students finishing the 14th grade in said Residence Center.”
It is further admitted “that the School Board of relator School District, at a regularly called and duly held meeting on November 4, 1961, made determinations: (1) that the aforesaid property located at 8001 Natural Bridge Road in said School District is not required for the use of the School *867District, (2) that the said property could be used for purposes of offering education beyond grade twelve by an institution of higher education, and particularly by the University of Missouri, (3) that the taking over of the Junior College now designated as University of Missouri — Normandy Residence Center by The Curators of the University of Missouri for use by it for its educational purposes would be of great and inestimable value to the residents of Normandy School District and to the youth residing therein and others seeking such advantages, (4) that it would be to the best educational interest of the Normandy School District to transfer the aforesaid property to The Curators of the University of Missouri for use in its educational purposes, (5) that the said written offer of The Curators of the University of Missouri then before the Board was fair and reasonable considering the educational and other advantages that would be afforded to the relator School District and the entire community, and (6) that said offer should be accepted.”
The record, however, fails to show that any specific obligation was to be assumed by The Curators of the University of Missouri in exchange for the conveyance of the mentioned real estate to it “for use in its educational purposes,” other than the payment of $60,000, although the stipulation of facts signed by the parties does recite that: “Upon acquisition of the subject property by the Board of Curators, the University will continue to operate the facility as a two-year college financed by student fees, until such time as the legislature shall authorize its expansion and the development of further facilities on the site.” No such proposition was incorporated in the offer submitted to the School District by the president’s letter of October 27, 1961.
We need not here relate other detailed facts and circumstances alleged in the application for the alternative writ of mandamus, mentioned in the stipulation of facts filed by the parties, or set out in the statement in relators’ brief, all tending to show that it is highly desirable and would be extremely beneficial to both of the relators and to the general public that the contract between the relators be carried into effect by the execution and delivery of the mentioned deed.
Relators contend. that the relator School District is empowered to make the conveyance in question under the provisions of Section 165.833 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. (Senate Bill No. 7, Section 14, Laws 1961) ; that Section 165.833 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. is a valid and constitutional legislative enactment, since the title of Senate Bill No. 7, Laws 1961, and the provisions of Section 14 (Section 165.833 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.) fairly relate to the same subject and have a natural connection with that subj ect; and that transfers under Section 165.833 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. are not governed by the provisions of Section 165.370 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.
The title of Senate Bill No. 7 is as follows: “An Act to provide for the formation of junior college districts and to establish the powers and duties of the state board of education with respect thereto.”
Section 14 of Senate Bill No. 7, now Section 165.833 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., is as follows: “Whenever there is within any school district any school property that is not required for the use of the school district and such property could be used for purposes of offering education beyond grade twelve by an institution of higher education, the board of education is hereby authorized to lease or sell and convey the same to such public institution, and the proceeds derived from such sale shall be placed to the credit of the building fund of such district.” (Italics ours.)
Section 23 of Article III of the Constitution of Missouri 1945, in part, provides: “No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title * * *.”
*868Section 165.370 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. (effective since 1909), in part, provides: “ * * * and whenever there is within the district any school property that is no longer required for the use of the district, the board is hereby authorised to advertise, sell and convey the same, and the proceeds derived therefrom shall he placed to the credit of the building fund of such district.” (Italics ours.)
Section 165.317 RSMo '1959, V.A.M.S. provides: “The government and control of such town or city school district shall he vested in a board of education of six members * * *.”
Respondent contends that a school district has no power to sell its property in any other manner than directed by Section 165.370 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.; that the proposed sale by School District to the University does not conform to the statutory directions; that Section 165.833 RSMo (Senate Bill No. 7, Section 14, Laws 1961) is unconstitutional and void under Section 23, Article III, Constitution of Missouri 1945 in that the subject of said section is not germane to the general subject of the Act; that the subject of Section 165.833 is not clearly expressed in the title; and that the proposed sale to the University of Missouri is void and cannot be made.
Relators argue that the title of an act need not embrace every detail of the legislation contained in it; that all the Constitution requires is that the subjects embraced in the act shall be fairly and naturally germane to that recited in the title; that the provisions of Section 165.833 are fairly relevant to the general purposes of the Act in question; and that the particular provisions of Section 165.833 are germane to the wide purposes announced in the title of the Act and are connected with its subject matter. Relators also say that the subject matter of Section 165.833 and the title of the Act are entirely compatible, because the general subject of the section and purposes of the Act are to further education beyond the twelfth grade. Relators also insist that “the fact that the title refers to the formation of junior college districts, and Section 14 refers to the transfer of property by a school district does not create an incongruous, unnatural or disconnected relation between the title and that section.” Rela-tors say that “Section 165.833 makes special provisions for the transfer of school property from school districts to other educational institutions of the State,” but insists that the provisions apply only “in those instances where the transferred property is to be used by the transferee for educational purposes.” Relators further say that the section “requires a private sale and the purposes contemplated by the Legislature can be accomplished only by direct negotiations between the respective educational institutions, rather than by an advertised public sale.”
Relators and respondent, in their respective briefs, cite and rely upon Edwards v. Business Men’s Assurance Co., 350 Mo. 666, 168 S.W.2d 82, 92, which construed Section 28, Article IV of the Constitution of Missouri 1875, the substance of which is now Section 23, Article III of the Constitution of Missouri. In that case the Court said:
“The purpose of the constitutional provision, supra, has been stated as follows: ‘First, to prevent hodge podge or “log rolling” legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no intimation and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered in order that they have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.’ State ex rel. United Railways Co. v. Wiethaupt, 231 Mo. 449, 459, 133 S.W. 329, 331; Southard v. Short, 320 Mo. 932, 8 S.W.2d 903.
*869“In the case of State v. Hurley, 258 Mo. 275, 278, 167 S.W. 965, 966, the court said: ‘The purpose of the constitutional provision (section 28, art. 4, Const.Mo.) is that the title shall generally indicate what the act contains, and by the terms “generally indicate” we mean that it shall refer in a comprehensive manner to the subject-matter of the enactment; but it need not necessarily refer to subordinate matters connected therewith or reasonably within the purview of the statute.’
“The provision requires that matters which are incongruous, disconnected and without natural relation to each other must not be joined in one bill, and the title must be a fair index of the matters in the bill. State ex rel. Niedermeyer et al. v. Hackmann, 292 Mo. 27, 31, 237 S.W. 742. It does not prevent the inclusion in one bill, under one general title, of subjects naturally and reasonably related to each other. St. Francis Levee Dist. of Missouri v. Dorroh, 316 Mo. 398, 414, 289 S.W. 925. * * * ‘The law does not require each separate legislative thought to be embodied in a different bill, when they have a natural connection with each other.’ Thomas v. Buchanan County, 330 Mo. 627, 636, 51 S.W.2d 95, 98. ‘The evident object of the provision of the organic law relative to the title of an act was to have the title, like a guideboard, indicate the general contents of the bill, and contain but one general subject, which might be expressed in a few or a greater number of words. If those words only constitute one general subject; if they do not mislead as to what the bill contains; if they are not designed as a cover to vicious and incongruous legislation, — then the title can stand on its own merits, as an honest title, and does not impinge on constitutional prohibitions.’ City of St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600, 616, 31 S.W. 1045, 1049; Asel v. Jefferson, 287 Mo. 195, 204, 229 S.W. 1046, 1048. * * *
“The constitutional provision simply requires that the title shall give information of the general subject of the act. While it may be so general in its terms as to omit matters germane to the principal features of the statute, if it sufficiently indicates the substantial purpose of the law, it will not be violative of the Constitution. State v. Sloan, 258 Mo. 305, 313, 167 S.W. 500; State ex inf. Barrett v. Imhoff, 291 Mo. 603, 238 S.W. 122, 126.”
Relators also cite Brown v. Sloan’s Moving & Storage Co., Mo.Sup., 296 S.W.2d 20, 24; Hoerath v. Sloan’s Moving & Storage Co., Mo.Sup., 305 S.W.2d 418; Graff v. Priest, 356 Mo. 401, 201 S.W.2d 945, 952, certiorari denied 332 U.S. 770, 68 S.Ct. 83, 92 L.Ed. 356, and say that these cases are in accord with the Edwards case insofar as it construes the constitutional provision in question. Relators also cite State ex rel. Reorganized School Dist. No. 4 of Jackson County v. Holmes, 360 Mo. 904, 231 S.W.2d 185, 187, 188 where the Court said: “We have uniformly ruled that where all the provisions of a statute fairly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection with it, are the incidents or means of accomplishing it, then the subject is single. * * * ‘In adopting a title, the legislature may select its own language, and may use few or many words. It is sufficient that the title fairly embraces the subject-matter covered by the act; mere matters of detail need not be stated in the title.’ State ex rel. Attorney General v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, loc. cit. 445-446, 13 S.W. 677, 678. If the title is a fair index to all that is embraced in the statute, then it complies with the constitutional mandate that the title clearly express the subject of the bill.”
Relators also refer to cases where the Court “drew the distinction between titles to legislative acts which set forth a number of details, in which cases the particulars not expressly stated are deemed improperly included in the text of the act, and titles which are general and, therefore, not controlled by the rule applicable to the more particularized titles.” Relators then argue that Senate Bill No. 7 “has the broad and general purpose of providing for higher education and its title is stated in general *870terms”; and that “the only limitation on the contents of the Act is that its provisions must relate to the purpose of the legislative enactment.” Relators then cite State v. Bennett, 102 Mo. 356, 14 S.W. 865, 10 L.R.A. 717; State ex rel. Lorantos v. Terte, 324 Mo. 402, 23 S.W.2d 120 and ' Edwards v. Business Men’s Assurance Co., supra, as illustrative of general titles having broad coverage. Relators also point to the fact that this Court, in the case of State v. Ward, 328 Mo. 658, 40 S.W.2d 1074, 1076, said with reference to the constitutional provision in question that: “ ‘ * * * a very strict and literal interpretation would lead to many separate acts relating to the same general subject, and thus produce an evil quite as great as the mischief intended to be remedied; hence a liberal interpretation and application must be allowed. * * * ’ ” And see: Graff v. Priest, supra, 201 S.W.2d 945, 952; State on inf. of Wallach, Pros. Atty. v. Beckman, 353 Mo. 1015, 185 S.W.2d 810, 815.
We think it clearly appears that the provisions of Section 165.833 are wholly foreign to the title and subject matter of the Act in which the section has been placed. The title is “An Act to provide for the formation of junior college districts and to establish the powers and duties of the state board of education with respect thereto.” (Italics ours.) The section in question provides that whenever there is within any school district any school property that is not required for the use of the school district such school district may lease or sell and convey the same to any public institution of higher learning offering education beyond grade twelve. The section also provides how the proceeds derived from such sale shall be disposed of. There was nothing in the title of the Act to advise the public or any member of the Legislature that the Act contained authority for any school district to sell at private sale and convey to any institution of higher learning offering education beyond the twelfth grade any school property of the district not required for its use. Relators say that all of the provisions of the Act relate to “higher education,” however, “higher education” is not the title of the Act. The title is much more specific. The purported authority sought to be granted to any school district having any school property that is not required for the use of the school and the directions as to the disposition of the proceeds of the sale of such property are not germane to the formation of Junior College Districts or to the establishment of the powers and duties of the State Board of Education with respect to such Junior College Districts.
The issue presented can be illustrated in the following manner. The School District in question is not a Junior College District, neither are The Curators of the University of Missouri a Junior College District, but relators seek to use a provision of “An Act for the formation of junior college districts and to establish the powers and duties of the state board of education with respect thereto,” (italics ours) as authority for the proposed transfer of the mentioned property by the School District to the University. If the section relied upon does, in fact, on its face purport to authorize such a transfer, are its provisions within the purposes of the Act as indicated by its title ? If the section authorizes such a conveyance does the title of the Act “give information of the general subject of the Act,” including the provision in question? Did the title give any intimation to the public or the members of the Legislature that such a provision was included in the Act? In other words, is the authority now relied upon to support the proposed conveyance within the purview of the title of the Act and germane thereto ? The answers to these questions must certainly be, no. Re-lators refer to the “wide purposes announced in the title,” but we do not find it wide enough to include the authority now sought to be exercised under the mentioned provision of the Act. We must and do hold that the subject matter of Section 14 of the Act (Section 165.833 RSMo) is. not “clearly expressed” in the title of the *871mentioned Act and the said section is unconstitutional and void. However, even if valid, the section could hardly be said to authorize a sale of school property for ten percent of its value, since such would not be upon the usual terms of a private sale and the building fund would be deprived of nine-tenths of its value.
Relators further contend that: “The power of government and control vested in the Relator District by necessary implication includes the power to permit the use of the land in question for educational purposes by the State University, if the Board of Education of Relator District shall have found that the educational interests of the Relator District will he best served thereby.’’ (Italics ours.) However, no such issue is presented to us on this record which concerns a proposed sale and conveyance of property of the value of some $600,000 owned by the School District, but not required for the use of the School District, to The Curators of the University of Missouri “for use in its educational purposes” for $60,000. It is clear from the admitted facts that the proposed sale was not made after advertisement; that it was not made at public sale; that the sale was not to the highest bidder after advertisement; and that the parties are and have been proceeding on the basis of a private contract and private sale for a cash consideration not exceeding ten percent of the cost of the property to the School District in 1959. Relators further argue that: “The proposed transfer is lawful as merely a transfer of state property held by one trustee for the state for educational purposes to another trustee for the state for educational purposes”; and that, “property belonging to school districts is the property of the state and is held by the school district as a statutory trustee and the residents of the school district have no private property interest therein.”
Relators rely upon the rule stated in 47 Am.Jur. 342, Schools, Sec. 65, as follows: “The ownership of school property is generally in the local district or school board as trustee for the public at large. Such property occupies the status of public property and is not to be regarded as the private property of the school district by which it is held or wherein it is located.” Re-lators also cite State ex rel. Richart v. Stouffer, Mo.Sup., 197 S.W. 248; School District of Oakland v. School District of Joplin, 340 Mo. 779, 102 S.W.2d 909; City of Edina, etc. v. School District, 305 Mo. 452, 267 S.W. 112, 36 A.L.R. 1532.
While it is true that: “In Missouri the property of school districts acquired from public funds is the property of the state, not the private property of the school district in which it may be located, and the school district is a statutory trustee for the discharge of a governmental function entrusted to the state by our Constitution” (School District of Oakland v. School District of Joplin, supra, 102 S.W.2d 909, 915) and while “school districts are purely public corporations, and may be created and abolished at will by the Legislature or by any one by it lawfully authorized” (State ex rel. Richart v. Stouffer, supra, 197 S.W. 248, 252(4)) and while the Legislature may make statutory provision for the transfer of title to property from one such public corporation to another (see Section 165.300 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.), nevertheless the question here is whether or not there is any statutory authority for any such transfer of the property of the Normandy School District to The Curators of the University of Missouri as is here proposed. Absent such authority a school district may not sell, transfer or give away its property or devote it to a different use than that prescribed by the statutes under which such public corporation exists and its property is held.
Relators, however, insist that authority for the proposed transfer of title exists under Section 165.317 RSMo 1959, V.A M.S., which provides that the government and control of such town and city school districts shall be vested in the Board of Education. Relators say that section vests *872the School Board of Relator District with all the powers required to effectively and efficiently carry out its educational purposes, including the sale and transfer of the mentioned property for the mentioned consideration and under the mentioned circumstances to The Curators of the University of Missouri.
The Legislature did not stop with the general statute now relied upon, but included Section 165.370 dealing with the particular and specific matter of the disposition of property “that is no longer required for the use of the district.” This section authorized the Board “to advertise, sell and convey the same” and to place the proceeds to the credit of the building fund of the district. The special statute controls over the general statute. “Under the established rules of statutory construction where there are two laws relating to the same subject they must be read together and the provisions of the one having a special application to a particular subject will be deemed to be a qualification of, or an exception to, the other act general in its terms.” Eagleton v. Murphy, 348 Mo. 949, 156 S.W.2d 683, 685, 138 A.L.R. 749; Fleming v. Moore Bros. Realty Co., 363 Mo. 305, 251 S.W.2d 8, 15(6, 7).
Relators further argue that: “There is, however, no statute which, by express terms or implication, can be reasonably construed to withdraw from the general powers granted a school district the right to permit the use of its property by another educational institution, when it has been found that such use is to the best interest of advancing the educational advantages of the school district”; and that “unless there is sound and compelling reason to hold otherwise, the statute should be construed so as to aid, not impede, the carrying out of the general purpose of the Legislature. State [on Inf. of Taylor] v. Kiburz, 357 Mo. 309, 208 S.W.2d 285.” (Italics ours.)
Again, we must say that the issue presented by this argument is not before the Court. The record before us presents a proposed private transfer of some $600,000 worth of the School District’s property to The Curators of the University of Missouri for $60,000, it being agreed that the property is “for use in its educational purposes” and the deed provides that the property be so owned and held “so long as used for its educational purposes.” It is apparent from the record presented that relator School District proposes to totally divest itself of any beneficial interest in or any ownership of or control over the described 128 acres of land and improvements.
Relators insist that this transfer of title “does not constitute a sale within the purview of Section 165.370 R.S.Mo., and the provisions of that statute relating to a sale of school district land are not applicable to this transfer”; that the statutory “procedure applies only to sales where property is being transferred away from educational uses and placed in the general channels of commerce * * * that it is not applicable to the transaction here under consideration”; that “where the transfer is from one state agency to another, both of which are charged with the duty to advance educational purposes, and where the property is to remain in educational channels, the reason for the requirement of public sale does not apply”; and that “the law favors a statutory construction harmonizing with reason and tending to avoid harsh, unreasonable or incongruous consequences and, especially, results detrimental to the public interest.” State v. Bern, Mo.App., 322 S.W.2d 175, 177, and cases therein cites. Relators further argue that “upon consummation of the proposed transfer” the Normandy School District “will have control over the use that may be made of the property” because of the “limitation that the property be used only for educational purposes.” We find no merit in this argument for the reason that whether we call the transaction a transfer or a sale the record shows an attempt to dispose of property not now required for the use of the School District, but by a method unsup*873ported and unauthorized by any statutory or constitutional authority.
Relators’ final contention is that “the consideration for the proposed transfer * * * is fair and reasonable under the circumstances and constitutes ‘adequate’ consideration commensurate with the value of the interest to be transferred”; that “the record before the court shows the benefit to be received by the Normandy School District and the taxpayers residing therein is commensurate with the value of the interest in the property being transferred to the University of Missouri”; and “upon completion of the proposed arrangement, Relator School District will be relieved of the perpetual administrative, financial and other burdens attendant to the ownership and operation of the Junior College which it now is operating under contract and in conjunction with the University of Missouri.”
It is clear from the record that the alleged benefits to the School District above $60,000 are entirely contingent upon the subsequent management, control and use of the property which in turn are contingent upon subsequent appropriation of funds by the Legislature for such use by the University. Relators recognize the contingency since they say that consummation of the proposed transfer will “put it in the power of the University to expand its higher educational program by the establishment of a branch University in a location already seeded for success should the Legislature in its wisdom and within its available resources approve this form of progress.” The essential and decisive facts are that the District seeks to divest itself of title to the property in exchange for some ten percent of its value without any attempted compliance with the applicable statutory provisions. This it cannot do, absent express legislative authority.
Our peremptory writ is denied and the application therefor is dismissed.
EAGER, J., concurs in result in separate opinion filed. HYDE, J., concurs in separate opinion filed. HOLLINGSWORTH, J., concurs in result and concurs in the separate opinions of EAGER and HYDE, JJ. STORCKMAN, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. WESTHUES, C. J., dissents and concurs in the dissenting opinion of STORCKMAN, J.