concurring.
In Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) the problem that sharply divided the Court was that the indictment did not allege a specific intent to commit an object offense. Here, however, just such specific intent is alleged. Thus, whatever the merit of permitting use of the averment of “attempt” to serve double duty by construing it to embrace the missing specific intent allegations, Dovalina does not solve the problem presented here by Pousson. Indeed, since the indictment in Dovalina particularly alleged that he did “unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally attempt to cause the death1” of the named victim, whereas here that is the very omission of which Pousson complains, the Dovalina plurality holding is not in point and its opinion hardly persuasive.
Here the indictment alleges, in conclusory language to be sure, that Pousson did “attempt to cause the death” of the named victim, and then goes on to explain factually the act amounting to more than mere preparation — “by shooting at the victim with a gun.” Coupled with the other factual allegations including the prescribed specific intent, the indictment avoids any fundamental defect and is sufficient to state an offense denounced by a provision of the penal code.
Accordingly, I concur in the result in this respect.
ONION, P. J., and ROBERTS and ODOM, JJ., join in this opinion.. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.