(dissenting). Plaintiffs Andrew Stachnik, Clayton Stevens and Violet Stevens brought this action for specific performance of a contract to sell land. Evidence submitted before the trial court indicated that defendants Carl O. Winkel, now deceased, and Mary Winkel did arrive at something in the nature of an agreement on May 15, 1968. The substance of the "agreement” was put in writing on the next day, May 16, and indicated as follows:
"It is agreed that Andrew Stachnik and Clayton and Violet Stevens shall, purchase by land contract your property located in Glen Arbor Twp. Leelanau Co. situated on Wheeler Road.
"The conditions of purchase are, $3500.00 with a deposit of $200.00 toward said purchase the balance to be paid at the rate of $100.00 per month with interest of 6% on the unpaid balance. Payments to commence on July 1, 1968. Á 2 week grace period on said payments. The accompany [sic] check to be cashed upon the submittal of the land contract properly signed and executed.
"Clayton Stevens, et al
Carl O. Winkel
Mary E. Winkel”1
Defendants Beach approached the Winkels on the second or third of June, 1968 along with their attorney. They were advised by the Winkels that the property had already been sold to plaintiffs. Defendants and their attorney then met with the Winkels in Flint, Michigan and convinced the Winkels that their agreement with plaintiffs was of no force. Thereupon, the Winkels executed and delivered a warranty deed to the same property to defendants Beach on June 4, 1968.
*390A non-jury trial was held and judgment for the defendants was entered. For purposes of the present appeal2 the significant finding of the trial court may be paraphrased as follows:
In view of representations by plaintiffs Stachnik and Stevens that their efforts toward purchase of the land were made on behalf of the "Company”, an error was made in having the May 16 agreement indicate sale of the property to plaintiffs rather than defendants Beach.
The Court of Appeals, in its opinion on appeal, noted that the record below is reviewed de novo when equitable proceedings (here an action for specific performance) are involved. That Court reversed the trial court and granted plaintiffs specific performance. For purposes of the present appeal the significant findings of the Court of Appeals3 are the following:
(1) In view of the fact that Mrs. Winkel (Mr. Winkel at the time of trial was deceased) acknowledged reading the May 16 agreement and indicated to defendants when they approached her that the land had already been sold to plaintiffs, there was a sufficient meeting of the minds respecting the May 16, 1968 contract of sale;
(2) The doctrine of "clean hands” would not bar plaintiffs’ right to specific performance because:
(a) defendants Beach are in no position to assert the doctrine, having themselves unilaterally persuaded the Winkels that their original agreement was defective, thereby subjecting them to lawsuit;
(b) the clean hands issue was not raised by defendants Beach at the trial and therefore may not be raised for the first time on appeal; and
*391(c) in any event, the assertion that plaintiffs did not have clean hands because they breached an agency relationship with defendants Beach in purchasing the property in their own right is unconvincing because the testimony of Mrs. Winkel indicates that it was not the asserted agency capacity of plaintiffs which induced the sale.
We granted leave to appeal. On appeal defendants Beach first contend that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that there was a meeting of the minds respecting the May 16, 1968 agreement in disregard of a trial court finding to the contrary. Defendants’ other contentions concern the applicability of the clean hands doctrine and its effect upon plaintiffs’ right to specific performance.
I. Meeting of the Minds4
Defendants Beach pertinently direct us to authority indicating that it is with great reluctance that an appellate court will reverse findings of fact of the chancellor. Thus in Vargo v Ihlenfeldt, 359 Mich 265, 266; 102 NW2d 550 (1960), the Court stated, when faced with plaintiffs’ argument that the chancellor incorrectly determined the facts:
"Plaintiffs, pained at the result below, would have us disagree with proof-supported and decisive findings of fact recorded by the trial chancellor; findings which, as our decisions boresomely disclose, are within the comparatively better province of one who sees and hears the controlling evidence as it comes from the lips and personal demeanor of disinterested as well as interested witnesses. It is an established truism that an appellate *392court is not as well equipped to do justice — the case being one of pure fact dispute — as is the chancellor-trier of fact whose immediate task is that of personal appraisal of proof and witness.”
The Court of Appeals correctly observed that in this equity case that Court (and, for that matter, this Court, upon further review) exercises de novo review. That Court went on, however, to observe that it would not disturb the findings of the trial court unless convinced that it would have reached a different result had it been in the lower court’s position. This Court has similarly commented respecting the appellate perspective upon exercise of de novo review. See, e.g., Padover v Farmington Twp, 374 Mich 622, 632; 132 NW2d 687 (1965), quoting from Christine Building Co v City of Troy, 367 Mich 508; 116 NW2d 816 (1962). These observations are consistent with the quoted statement from Vargo, supra. We approach de novo review, as by its own admission did the Court of Appeals, cognizant of the limitations of our appellate perspective.
It was the claim of defendants Beach at trial that plaintiffs Stachnik and Stevens were agents commissioned by the Beaches to inquire into and arrange the purchase of the Winkel property for the Beaches. At the time plaintiffs were employed by defendants Beach to remove timber from land of the Beaches adjoining the Winkel land. There was record testimony indicating that ownership of the Winkel land was significant to the Beaches because the Winkel land provided access to the Beach property.
Plaintiffs consistently denied that there was any agency relationship with the Beaches established prior to the signing of the May 16 agreement. Review of the evidence indicating the understand*393ing of the Winkels is essential to resolution of the meeting of minds issue.
Mary Winkel testified that she "took it for granted” that because plaintiffs had said they worked for a big lumber company (referring, apparently, to the Beaches’ enterprise) that plaintiffs were purchasing for the "Company”. On the other hand, the agreement which the Winkels signed indicated that plaintiffs were purchasing in their own right. The following testimony of Mrs. Winkel appears on the record:
”Q. And in your discussions on the evening of the 15th of May in the housetrailer on the property, who did you understand you were going to sell the property to?
“A. Well, I knew we were selling it to him.
”Q. To Mr. Stevens?
’A Yes.
"Q. And you knew that, also, on the 16th when you signed it, didn’t you?
'A. Yes.
r’Q. Now, on the 16th did you see Mr. Stevens write a check and deliver it to either yourself or your husband?
’A. Yes.
”Q. Would this be the check, being Exhibit Two, this is the check you received?
'A. Yes.
”Q. Did you know that Mr. Stachnik was one of the purchasers of the property?
’A. Yes.”
Mary Winkel also testified that she understood plaintiffs would be moving onto the property after the sale and the record reflects that plaintiffs did in fact occupy the house trailer which sat upon the property immediately after the sale. Even more conclusive is Mary Winkel’s testimony that she *394"felt”, prior to the time of the Winkels’ meeting with defendants Beach and their attorney, that she and her husband had sold the property to plaintiffs and that she told defendant Harry Beach when first contacted by him after the signing on May 16 that "there was an agreement already”.
The evidence of a meeting of the minds on this record is overwhelming. By contrast, there is slight record evidence indicating that the Winkels were induced to sell because of plaintiffs’ representations that they were agents for others. Given this record the Court of Appeals correctly found that there was mutual agreement respecting the May 16 writing.
II. Clean Hands
The difficulty with this issue is that it was never argued or presented to the trial court. We therefore have no findings to review. Since we do review in equity proceedings de novo, however, we will not bar consideration of this issue upon appeal. Such consideration as we give must necessarily be limited by our appellate perspective.
Plaintiffs persistently denied the existence of any agency relationship with defendants Beach respecting their role in the purchase of the Winkel property. The testimony of Mary Winkel, as attested by the discussion of the foregoing issue, likewise lends but slight support to defendants’ claim that plaintiffs did not have "clean hands”. Defendant Harry Beach was the only other witness. In testifying he first indicated that he contacted plaintiffs asking them "to go up and try to talk to [the Winkels] and see if the property was for sale” in the last part of May, 1968. Harry Beach subsequently changed his account to indi*395cate plaintiffs were contacted in the first part of May. The former account corresponds with the testimony of plaintiff Stevens that Harry Beach only contacted him after the May 16 agreement was signed. Reviewing the cold record, we must conclude that defendants have failed to sustain their burden of proof in establishing that plaintiffs were disloyal employees who availed themselves of a profit-making opportunity in breach of their understanding with their employer.5
Affirmed. Costs to appellees.
T. G. Kavanagh, C. J., concurred with J. W. Fitzgerald, J. Swainson and Lindemer, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case.Plaintiff Stevens tendered a check for $200 to the Winkels at the time the agreement was signed.
Defendants abandoned on this appeal certain issues which were raised and treated in both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The holdings and findings of the courts below are set forth only as they are pertinent to the issues before this Court.
See footnote 2, supra.
The trial court opinion indicated that that court "did not pass” upon the meeting of the minds issue. The Court of Appeals did pass upon that issue, finding that there was a meeting of the minds. We view the trial court resolution as set forth above tantamount to a conclusion that there was no meeting of the minds.
In our review of this issue we are limited because we cannot view the demeanor and assess the credibility of the respective witnesses. Suffice it to say that this record presents no compelling evidence of a lack of clean hands on the part of plaintiffs.