dissenting.
Without any complaint from Mrs. Brister that she was confused or that she lacked understanding of what her duties or obligations were in connection with the divorce decree’s provision allowing her ex-husband to visit with his three-year-old son the court holds that the divorce decree is ambiguous. In my opinion, the decree was sufficiently certain and without a record of the contempt hearing before us, we must presume that all procedural requirements were met. Because I disagree with both the majority and concurring opinions, I will address them separately.
DIVORCE DECREE
The court’s opinion concludes that the divorce decree is too vague and ambiguous to be enforced. Apparently it was clear enough to Mrs. Brister. She does not allege that she complained to the trial court that she did not understand' the divorce decree.1 Nor has she complained to us that she did not understand the divorce decree. Rather, she has repeatedly urged this court to treat the motion for contempt like a charging instrument in criminal cases and hold that it was void because it did not *837recite the language in the divorce decree that required her to surrender the child.2
Even if we were to consider a complaint which was not made by the relator, the court’s disapproval of the divorce decree will impede flexibility which is critical in dealing with family law matters. The “periods of possession” provision, commonly referred to as visitation, of the divorce decree clearly and correctly accommodated the father’s variable shift work schedule.3 Although this provision is more complicated to comply with or enforce, it is nevertheless, essential that we allow trial judges wide latitude in these matters in order to allow parents who do shift work to maintain a relationship with their children.
Many divorced parents do not have the luxury of working nine to five, Monday through Friday. Many jobs require employees to work weekends, evenings and night shifts. This situation poses a challenge for divorced parents seeking visitation. This problem is compounded by the fact that many divorces are not amicable. The parties harbor ill will toward each other and express this resentment by denying the noncustodial parent access to the child(ren) or by not paying child support. The majority and concurring opinions today ignore this reality and today’s unfortunate decision will severely restrict the ability of those possessory conservators who work shifts to have access to their children. The court gives sole managing conservators excuses for not complying with court mandates granting “periods of possession” to possessory conservators who do shift work. The majority opinion exacerbates the very problem that the possession order attempts to correct: assuring that children and noncustodial parents have an opportunity to continue to nurture the parent child relationship despite the end of their parents’ marriage.
It is often said that the parents divorce each other and that parents do not divorce their children. The unfortunate result of today’s opinion is that parents who do shift work will also divorce their children. The anger and frustration noncustodial parents experience when a custodial parent thwarts their efforts to see their children is discouraging. Before too long, they give up trying to enforce their visitation rights because they cannot afford the cost of litigation or they are emotionally drained or both. The children are victims once more.
The majority holds that the “period of possession provision” of the divorce decree *838was vague and improperly worded and, thus, could not be enforced by contempt. The court does not provide the bench and bar any guidance as to how to accommodate parents engaged in shift work. Blind obedience to rules fashioned to govern people with traditional jobs (Monday through Friday — nine to five) is unacceptable. Furthermore, even Mrs. Brister’s attorney admitted that he “has no quarrel with the terms of the divorce decree.” 4 Therefore, since the relator did not attack the divorce decree, it is highly irregular for the court to make this argument for relator and then dispose of the case on the basis of a complaint the relator never made. This is a classic “straw-man” technique and it is unfair to Mr. Brister and his child.
Although not in effect at the time this divorce decree became final, the Texas Family Code was amended to provide for a “standard possession order,” which the trial court should use in all cases. Tex.Fam. Code Ann. § 14.033 (Vernon Supp.1991). However, even this standard possession order does not accommodate variable work schedules. It merely permits the court to “render an order that grants periods of possession of the child as similar as possible to those provided by the standard order.” Id. at § 14.033(m). Therefore, even the Family Code does not provide guidance for courts entering this type of order.
Here, the court fears that the order gives the possessory conservator power to designate the terms of possession of the child under the court’s order. However, the trial court has imposed limits on this power because the father was required to provide notice of his schedule not less than one week prior to the end of the month preceding the month when he would have possession of the child and he was limited to two periods of possession per month. This is a reasonable balance between employer, mother, father and child. Actually, instead of giving the father or possessory conservator unlimited power to set unilateral conditions for delivering possession, on the contrary, the court’s opinion today gives a sole managing conservator the unlimited power to veto the terms of possession of parents who do shift work without the pos-sessory conservator having any recourse but to seek modification of the divorce decree each time their schedule changes. This approach is impractical and not economically feasible for the average household who lives from month to month. For the sake of the children, we can and must devise better solutions to this problem.
Here, the possessory conservator acted in good faith and three days after the decree was signed promptly provided Mrs. Brister with a copy of his work schedule for August 1989 to December 1989. He was only required to give notice within a week before the beginning of the month in which he sought to enforce his right to *839possession. On each month, he clearly indicated two periods of possession that were very similar to the standard possession provision included in the divorce decree. Ironically, his initial requests for possession were for the first and third weekend in August and, thus, followed the standard possession order. Despite this notice and his phone calls to notify Mrs. Brister of his intent to exercise his rights to possession of the child, Mrs. Brister refused to comply with the divorce decree the very first time Mr. Brister tried to see his child. Mrs. Brister did not and does not now complain about the wording of the decree. She offered no explanation of her failure to comply with the judge’s order. Therefore, the judge correctly found Mrs. Brister in contempt of court and ordered a reasonable period of confinement in her own home. We ought not take this weapon from the trial courts. Sometimes drastic measures are necessary to get a person’s attention. Since the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction, the order of contempt and confinement is not void and Mrs. Brister is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus on this ground.
MOTION FOR CONTEMPT
The concurring opinion attacks the motion for contempt as basis for granting relief to Mrs. Brister by way of habeas corpus. For a contempt proceeding to be subject to collateral attack by a habeas corpus petition, it must be void, not merely voidable or erroneous. See Ex Parte Filemyr, 509 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1974, orig. proceeding) (contempt order that failed to state how decree was violated was void); Ex Parte Rhodes, 352 S.W.2d 249, 250 (Tex.1962, orig. proceeding) (order must be void not merely erroneous). Unless the petition for habeas corpus shows that the contempt judgment is void on its face or is so completely without evidentiary support as to render it void the petition will be denied. Ex Parte Butler, 523 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, orig. proceeding) (evidence showed violation of order and no valid defense); Ex Parte Henderson, 512 S.W.2d 37, 39-40 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1974, orig. proceeding) (review of evidence is to determine whether trial court’s findings are so completely without evidentiary support as to render judgment void). Therefore, in the absence of a statement of facts, the court should presume there was evidence to support the trial court’s judgment of contempt. Ex Parte Savelle, 398 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex.1966); Ex Parte Wagner, 368 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex.1963).
The concurring opinion states that the motion for contempt was insufficient to support contempt in this case because it did not provide notice of the contemptuous conduct. However, the motion for contempt was not completely void of notice; it referred the court to the provisions of the divorce decree that set out both parties’ rights to possession of the child. Although it incorporated the divorce decree by reference, the motion for enforcement did not recite the exact language requiring Mrs. Brister to surrender the child. Thus, the motion did provide Mrs. Brister with notice regarding the contemptuous conduct. More importantly, there is no evidence that Mrs. Brister ever brought this claim to the attention of the trial court at the hearing.5
We have no statement of facts from this contempt hearing and Mrs. Brister did not file a written motion attacking the contempt motion on any ground. Therefore, error was not preserved as to this contention and Mrs. Brister cannot complain here. Furthermore, assuming arguendo, that Mrs. Brister did object to the motion for contempt on these grounds, the order does provide notice. It specifically refers Mrs. Brister to the divorce decree and the por*840tions regarding when Mr. Brister shall have possession. This did not result in the motion for contempt being completely devoid of notice. Therefore, Mrs. Brister’s failure to raise the adequacy of notice at the hearing on this motion constituted a waiver.
The concurring opinion relies on a series of cases to support its position that the motion for enforcement did not provide “full and complete notification in accordance with the requirements of due process and the Texas Family Code.” In Ex Parte Conoly, the court of appeals held that the relator could not be held in contempt for acts which occurred after the motion for contempt was filed because the relator would not have any notice of his alleged contemptuous conduct. 732 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, orig. proceeding). In Ex Parte Durham, the court held that the relator could not be held for longer than the original order of confinement provided when he had no notice that the term of confinement would be increased. 708 S.W.2d 536, 537 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, orig. proceeding). In Ex Parte Deckert, the court held that the relator could not be held in contempt for violation of a court order which ordered three separate acts where the motion for contempt did not specify which act or acts he had not performed. 559 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, orig. proceeding). The motion for contempt merely stated that the relator failed to comply with the order of a specific date. Id. Finally, the order of commitment was void because it recited that relator was in violation of the divorce decree which had been superseded by subsequent orders. Id.
These cases are distinguishable from the instant case because Mrs. Brister was given notice of her violation of the periods of possession provision of the divorce decree and the divorce decree was valid and in effect at the time of her acts of contempt. Furthermore, both the motion for contempt and the order of commitment specifically refer to the divorce decree and recite the date and place of the two acts of contempt. Therefore, the contempt proceeding was not void and is not subject to collateral attack by writ of habeas corpus.
It is a sad day for Mr. Brister and the trial judge who took into consideration the special circumstances of Mr. Brister’s work schedule in molding a reasonable divorce decree to meet Mr. Brister’s needs without impinging too much on Mrs. Brister’s rights. But for Mrs. Brister’s lack of good faith, it may have worked. Mr. Brister is denied the love, companionship and society of his son. His three-year-old son is denied the emotional sustenance of his father. Even though Mrs. Brister willfully offended the dignity and authority of the trial court, on hyper technical grounds, my colleagues choose not to hold her accountable for her actions. No new law is made. Merely rote incantations of old law without any guidance to the bench and bar as to how to deal with child visitation rights for parents who do shift work. Mrs. Brister may have won; but the child, as well as all of us lose in the process. If my colleagues insist on this hyper technical application of state law, they at least owe it to the people to suggest how this problem can be remedied.
Regrettably, today’s decision will dissuade trial courts from tailoring its orders to the realities of the parents’ particular circumstances. The dubious gain in certainty is not worth forcing “one size fits all” orders on the parties.
For these reasons, I dissent. I would hold that Mrs. Brister is not entitled to relief under either basis and would deny her petition.
PHILLIPS, C.J., and SPEARS, J., join in this opinion.
. Even in criminal proceedings, which give meticulous attention to due process, a relator must prove that she first made complaint in the trial court to preserve her right to complain by writ of habeas corpus. Ex Parte Harris, 618 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).
. At oral argument before this court, the relator’s attorney stated the following:
What I respectfully request the court to do is write an opinion that relates to the charging instrument in this case. I have no strong quarrel with the terms of the divorce decree in this case. As I stated before and I will state again to your honors, that the thrust of the argument is that if we make an analogy between the divorce decree and the penal code — the penal code contains things that people shouldn’t do and if they do them, they can be indicted and they can go to jail.
In criminal cases defects in the charging instrument must be raised by motion to quash or they are waived. Criminal cases interpret the Code of Criminal Procedure as allowing a defendant to complain of lack of notice in a charging instrument by pretrial exception. Gengnagel v. State, 748 S.W.2d 227, 228 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Graham v. State, 657 S.W,2d 99, 104 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). Only if the charging instrument fails to allege the contemptuous acts is the instrument fundamentally defective. Here, at most, the defects of the motion for contempt appear to be the failure to allege with reasonable certainty the acts relied upon. Gengnagel, 748 S.W.2d at 228. Therefore, this is a mere notice defect which must be raised in a timely manner or it is waived. Id. At the very least in a civil contempt case, the relator should raise defects in the motion for contempt at the hearing in the trial court to give the trial judge an opportunity to address the problem there before his order is scrutinized by this court.
. The decree provided:
IT IS ORDERED that the standard visitation schedule set out hereinabove shall be modified according to [father's] work schedule by [father’s] giving [mother] notice of not less than one week prior to the end of .the preceding month the following month’s work schedule indicating work days and days off, notifying [mother] of visitations on days off beginning at 6:00 pm of one day through 6:00 pm of the second day following, said days off not to exceed two times per month.
. During oral argument, relator’s attorney said: "[T]he main thrust of the petition for writ of habeas corpus in this case, frankly, is not the vagueness or an alleged vagueness in the divorce decree. It is mainly a defect or set of defects in the charging instrument in this case.
Justice Cook: "You are saying that the decree did not contain the magic language that the managing conservator shall surrender possession.
Relator’s attorney: "No. I am not saying that, your honor. I am saying that the decree did say that — it was the charging instrument — the motion for contempt does not quote that portion of the decree as is required by law. Number one, and did not with specificity say the time, the place as ordered by the decree at which she allegedly failed to surrender the child — so I am not saying that about the decree — the relator is not — but only about
the motion for contempt.... I am focusing on the failure of the motion to allege the failure to surrender.”
This is the same position the relator advanced in his brief.
With regard to requiring noncustodial parents to send work schedules to custodial parents, the following exchange took place at oral argument:
Relator’s attorney: I think it would be better if they were retrieved from the employer. I think it would have more effect. Just as the employer is required, in other circumstances, to withhold earnings for child support.
Justice Gonzalez: How far in advance — -are you suggesting that we put this obligation on the employer?
Relator’s attorney: I would say that a managing conservator should have those at least 6 months in advance....
. Commentators on the procedures for obtaining relief through writ of habeas corpus advise relator to file a complete record including transcript and statement of facts. See Greenhill & Beirne, Habeas Corpus Proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas, 1 St. Mary’s L.J. 1, 2 (1969); W. Dorsaneo, 5 Texas Litigation Guide § 133.110(l)(b) (1990).