(concurring). The rules of statutory construction compel me to concur with the well-reasoned opinion of my brother Kavanagh. But justice requires me to declare that the result of this opinion is contrary both to the philosophy of the no-fault act and to good public policy.
The plain language of the statute, reinforced by the legislative history, as recognized by Justice Kavanagh’s opinion, mandates the conclusion reached. But the result is almost incredible. A garage keeper, whose employee’s negligence in repairing a vehicle left for maintenance and resulting in damage to that vehicle and to the garage, is rewarded by reparations from the insurer of the owner of the damaged vehicle.
Without the effect of the no-fault act, under the garage keeper’s liability act, proof of damage such as occurred here would be prima facie evidence that the garage keeper would be liable in damages to the vehicle owner. MCL 256.541; MSA 9.1721. *151The garage owner would suffer the damages to the garage.
The untoward result of this opinion offends the philosophy of the no-fault act and good public policy in two ways. First, it violates the no-fault act’s objective of reducing the "high costs” inherent in the preexisting tort system. Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 578; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). No-fault reparation of the garage keeper because of his own employee’s negligence by the vehicle owner’s insurer increases rather than contains the cost of the system. Second, such reparation is to a non-premium paying, non-member of the no-fault system by the insurer of a vehicle owner who is without fault. Thus, a burden is put on the premium payers without justifiable reason or any discernible public benefit. See Citizens Ins Co v Tuttle, 411 Mich 536, 546-547; 309 NW2d 174 (1981).
In sum, judicial restraint in statutory interpretation unfortunately compels a result flying in the face of the policy of the no-fault act and commonsense justice.
Ryan and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Williams, C.J.