Plaintiffs are appealing the holding of the Court of Appeals that when property is detached from one school district and added to another, the matter need not be approved by a vote of the school tax electors of the district from which it is removed unless the parcel involved exceeds ten percent of the latest taxable valuation of the transferor school district. The issue is one of statutory construction. We conclude that the Court of Appeals decision accords with the plain meaning of § 461 of the School Code of 19551 and that the legislative intent underlying the statute is not so clearly contrary as to justify a departure from a literal reading of the statutory language.
I
The intervening defendants in this case petitioned the Huron and Tuscola Intermediate Boards *5of Education to transfer their property from the Owendale-Gagetown School District to the Cass City School District. Their petition was denied on May 11, 1975, and they appealed to the State Board of Education. On May 19, 1976, the state board reversed the decision of the intermediate boards and ordered that the property be transferred as requested.
The Owendale-Gagetown School District petitioned the Ingham Circuit Court to review the decision of the State Board of Education. It alleged, inter alia, that § 461 of the School Code of 1955 required a vote of its school tax electors and that approval of the transfer by the State Board of Education was an abuse of discretion. The school district briefed only the former issue, and in its behalf noted that a prior transfer to the ElktonPigeon-Bay Port School District constituted 8.4% of the valuation of the Owendale-Gagetown School District. By adding that transfer to the present transfer of 9.2% of the latest taxable valuation of the district, a total of 17.6% of the valuation of the district would be lost by these two transfers. Thus, Owendale-Gagetown argued, since the present transfer, when added to the prior transfer, would exceed the ten percent valuation mentioned in § 461, a vote by the school tax electors of its district was required. The Ingham Circuit Court agreed and reversed the State Board of Education’s approval of the transfer.
The State Board of Education appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed on August 15, 1977, holding that the Owendale-Gagetown School District lacked standing to challenge the property transfer. This Court denied the school district leave to appeal.
*6On October 11, 1978, the Ingham Circuit Court granted a motion by the school district to add as plaintiffs resident electors from the district. The circuit court also granted a motion to intervene by those seeking to transfer out of the Owendale-Gagetown School District. Relying on its previous interpretation of § 461 of the School Code of 1955, the Court again reversed the State Board of Education’s approval of the intervening defendants’ petition to transfer from the district.
The State Board of Education appealed. On October 1, 1979, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court. It held that § 461 required a vote of the electors only when the area involved in a single transfer exceeded ten percent of the latest taxable valuation of the school district. This Court granted leave to appeal.
II
The pertinent statute provided:
"The county board of education may, in its discretion, detach territory from 1 district and attach it to another when requested to do so by resolution of the board of any district whose boundaries would be changed by such action, or when petitioned by not less than 2/3 of the resident owners of the land to be transferred. The county board of education shall take final action in regard to the resolution or petition within a period of 60 days of the receipt of the resolution or petition. Only territory contiguous to a district may be transferred. Whenever the latest available taxable valuation of the area to be detached is more than 10% of the latest available taxable valuation of the entire school district from which it is to be detached, the action of the county board of education directing such detachment shall not be valid unless approved, at an annual or special elec*7tion called for that purpose in the district from which the detachment is to be made, by an affirmative vote of a majority of the school tax electors of the district, voting thereon.” MCL 340.461; MSA 15.3461. (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs contend that the italicized portion of this statute must be construed so as to require a vote of the electors of the transferor district for any property transfers after ten percent of the school district’s property value has been transferred.
As plaintiffs concede, a literal reading of the statute does not favor their position. The phrase "area to be detached” is to be construed. Both the phrase itself and its context clearly point to the area involved in a single transfer. By identifying the area as that which is "to be detached”, the statute cannot easily be read to have applied to that which already had been detached. Further, the statute, prior to using the phrase, stated:
"The county board of education may, in its discretion, detach territory from 1 district and attach it to another when requested to do so by a resolution of the board of any district whose boundaries would be changed by such action, or when petitioned by not less than 2/3 of the resident owners of the land to be transferred.” MCL 340.461; MSA 15.3461.
The territory the county board may have detached was that identified either in a resolution of the boards of affected districts or in a petition of the landowners seeking the transfer. Thus, when the statute later referred to "the area to be detached”, the only area which it was specifying was that which would be identified in such a resolution or petition. To conclude that this language refers to the areas involved in all prior petitions or resolu*8tions that had resulted in transfers would contravene its clear and unambiguous meaning.
Ordinarily, this conclusion would render further interpretation of the statute unnecessary. Legislative intent controls statutory construction, and, in ascertaining such intent, the Legislature must be presumed to have intended the meaning expressed by the language it has chosen. When that language is clear and unambiguous, no further interpretation is necessary. Dussia v Monroe County Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich 244; 191 NW2d 307 (1971); City of Grand Rapids v Crocker, 219 Mich 178; 189 NW 221 (1922). There is, however, an exception to this fundamental rule of statutory construction that arises when a literal reading of the statutory language "would produce an absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and the policies of the act in question.” Salas v Clements, 399 Mich 103, 109; 247 NW2d 889 (1976).
Plaintiffs argue that this is a case in which a literal reading would circumvent the legislative intent. Pointing to the fact that a school district could be destroyed by many transfers of less than ten percent, the plaintiffs argue that what cannot be accomplished directly in one large transfer, without approval of its electors, should not be permitted to occur indirectly through many small transfers.
We, however, cannot agree that the legislative intent is so clear as to justify a departure from the statutory language. While the present situation may not have been intended or considered by the Legislature, the interpretation which plaintiffs advocate also seems unlikely to have been within the legislative intent. Plaintiffs’ interpretation would require a vote of the school tax electors for any *9transfer — no matter how small or how far in the future — after the ten percent limitation had been reached by prior transfers. It does appear clear that the Legislature did not intend to require voter approval for relatively minor property transfers.
Additionally, plaintiffs’ interpretation would require the courts to fill gaps left by the legislative silence regarding how the ten percent valuation should properly be computed on a cumulative basis. Specifically, the question would arise in circumstances in which property transferred out of the district later changes its value in comparison with the rest of the district. Suppose a transfer represented eight percent of the entire district’s taxable valuation at the time of the transfer, but subsequently would represent only five percent of the district’s valuation if it were valued as part of the district. If a later petition seeks to transfer three percent of the latest taxable valuation of the district, the question whether the prior transfer is to be treated as five percent or eight percent would be determinative of whether the three percent transfer would need to be approved by the voters. The statute’s absence of any formula suggests the Legislature never envisioned that the ten percent limitation would be treated on a cumulative basis. The fact that the courts would be asked to fill such gaps as this further indicates that plaintiffs’ concerns should be more properly addressed to the Legislature.
The strong competing interests at stake in this case also make it difficult to conclude that the legislative intent is so clear and that the literal meaning is so unjust and unreasonable as to justify a departure from the statutory language. On the one hand, there are the interests of a school *10district in surviving as strong and viable as possible. On the other hand, there are the interests of those parents who live on the borderline with another district who would favor having their children educated in the other district. We are not now in a position either to ascertain whose interests the Legislature would or should have favored had they considered the present situation or to shape our own solution for how both of these interests might be best accommodated. We do note, however (though we do not now review, see infra), that approval by the County Board of Education, or, on appeal, the State Board of Education, was necessary for any proposed transfer. See MCL 340.461; MSA 15.3461, and MCL 340.467; MSA 15.3467.2
Therefore, we conclude that under § 461 of the School Code of 1955 a transfer had to be approved by the school tax electors only when, considered alone, it was greater than ten percent of the latest available taxable valuation of the district.
Ill
In appellants’ petition for review filed in the circuit court, they also alleged that the State Board of Education’s approval of the transfer was arbitrary and capricious, so as to constitute an abuse of discretion. The appellants urge this Court, in the event that it does not adopt appellants’ statutory construction, to reverse the Court of Appeals holding that the abuse of discretion issue was abandoned in the circuit court and to remand to the circuit court so as to allow them an opportunity to present additional evidence._
*11On the first appeal of this case, the Court of Appeals concluded in its per curiam opinion that all issues other than the statutory construction issue were abandoned in the circuit court. The Court stated:
"None of the additional issues raised were subsequently argued in plaintiffs brief to the circuit court. Failure to brief an issue on appeal constitutes abandonment of the question. Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182; 94 NW2d 388 (1959), City of St Ignace v McFarlane, 45 Mich App 81; 206 NW2d 226 (1973).”
On the second appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Court would not consider the abuse of discretion issue since it was held to have been abandoned on the first appeal.
The appellants’ short argument on this issue is both confusing and unresponsive to the Court of Appeals holding. Appellants first argue that the circuit court judge granted their motion for summary judgment based on his interpretation of MCL 340.461; MSA 15.3461, and that therefore there was no need for him to decide the abuse of discretion issue. However, we have not been able to find in the record any indication that the plaintiffs ever filed a motion for summary judgment either time the matter was in circuit court. The Court of Appeals was correct that the issue was not included in the brief plaintiffs filed when the matter was initially in the circuit court. A statement in that brief itself discloses that the reason why only the statutory construction of MCL 340.461; MSA 15.3461 was addressed was not that the brief was limited to the issues contained in a motion for summary judgment, but rather that the statutory construction issue was in the plaintiffs’ view the *12" 'heart’ of the matter”.3
Appellants also .contend that they cannot be expected to raise an issue in their appeal to the Court of Appeals for which no evidence had yet been received in the circuit court. However, because the Court of Appeals holding was that the matter was abandoned in the circuit court and not in the Court of Appeals, whether the appellants should be expected to argue it in the Court of Appeals is irrelevant as to whether the issue had previously been abandoned in the circuit court.
Because the Court of Appeals was correct in its assertion that the only issue the appellants argued in their brief in the circuit court concerned the statutory construction of MCL 340.461; MSA 15.3461, and because appellants do not provide'any reasons for concluding that the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that appellants thereby abandoned all other issues, we see no reason to address it further.
Therefore, we affirm.
Williams, Fitzgerald, and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Coleman, C.J.1955 PA 269, § 461 as amended by 1957 PA 135, § 1; MCL 340.461; MSA 15.3461. This law was repealed by the School Code of 1976, MCL 380.1 et seq.; MSA 15.4001 et seq.; see MCL 380.951; MSA 15.4951.
Both of these provisions have been repealed. See the School Code of 1976, MCL 380.1 et seq.; MSA 15.4001 et seq.
The brief stated: "Other issues could be brought before this court for appeal but this is the succinct 'heart’ of the matter”.