(dissenting). We respectfully dissent from the opinion of the Court. This case involves a citizen-initiated transfer of property between two adjacent school districts. Section 461 of the School Code of 1955,1 replaced by § 951 of the School Code of 1976 which is substantially the same, requires approval by the voters of a *13school district whenever more than ten percent of the taxable valuation of property in that district is to be detached from the district and transferred to an adjacent district. The issue presented is whether the ten percent requirement applies to each single transaction or if it applies on an accumulated basis.
We would hold that in order to effectuate the purpose of the statute, which prohibits the piecemeal destruction of a school district without the approval of the voters, the ten percent requirement should be read as cumulative in nature. Accordingly, we would reverse the Court of Appeals decision.
I
On May 7, 1975, the State Board of Education approved the request of a group of citizens to transfer their property (hereinafter Elenbaum transfer), constituting 8.4% of the taxable valuation of the Owendale-Gagetown School District, to the Elkton-Pigeon-Bay Port School District. The legality of the Elenbaum group’s transfer is not involved in this appeal. On May 14, 1975, the Huron and Tuscola Intermediate Boards of Education denied the petition of the intervening defendants (Goslin) to transfer their property from Owendale-Gagetown to the Cass City School District. The Goslin group appealed this decision to the State Board of Education, which reversed that denial and approved the transfer in an order dated May 19, 1976. The Goslin transfer represents 9.2% of the latest available taxable valuation of the entire Owendale-Gagetown School District.2
*14The plaintiff school district commenced suit, in June, 1976, against the State Board of Education in Ingham Circuit Court alleging, inter alia, that the Goslin transfer violated. MCL 340.461; MSA 15.3461. The school district claimed that pursuant to the School Code of 1955 a vote of the school district’&^electors was necessary to effectuate the Goslin transfer. The district contended that the Goslin property combined with the Elenbaum transfer totals 17.6% of the latest taxable valuation of the entire Owendale-Gagetown School District, and thus the ten percent limit was exceeded.3
The circuit court reversed the state board’s order on August 2, 1976. The trial judge determined that the ten percent requirement is cumulative in nature. The total of all property previously transferred and proposed to be transferred out of the district must be considered. The trial court held that if the cumulative total exceeds ten percent of. the latest assessed valuation of the entire school district, there must be approval by the district’s electors before the proposed transfer may occur.
The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, reversed the trial court’s order on the limited ground that the school district lacked standing to raise the question of whether its residents had the right to vote on the property transfer. See School Dist of City of Lansing v State Board of Education, 367 Mich 591; 116 NW2d 866 (1962). At this point, the Court of Appeals did not decide the statutory interpretation question._
*15Our Court denied the school district’s application for leave to appeal. 401 Mich 818 (1977). Plaintiffs motion for rehearing, which was treated as a motion for reconsideration, was also denied.4 402 Mich 841 (1977). Plaintiffs petition to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari was denied. 436 US 906 (1978).
The circuit court granted motions adding individual electors of the school district as parties plaintiff and permitting Keith Goslin and others to intervene as parties defendant. On February 16, 1979, the trial judge, concluding that all the proper parties were now before the court, again reversed the order of the state board. He reaffirmed his earlier decision that the valuation limit provided in the statute must be read as cumulative in nature.
The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the trial court, concluding that the statute in question did not require a vote in the instant case. That decision reviewed the "unambiguous language of the statute” and held that the trial court erred by cumulating the previously transferred Elenbaum property with the Goslin property. The Court of Appeals refused to consider the plaintiffs argument that the state board’s action was arbitrary *16and capricious and therefore constituted an abuse of discretion. Owendale-Gagetown School Dist v State Board of Education, 92 Mich App 719; 285 NW2d 435 (1979).
This Court granted leave to appeal both the statutory interpretation and abuse of discretion questions. 408 Mich 930 (1980).
II
The controlling statute in this case, MCL 340.461; MSA 15.3461, provides:
"The county board of education may, in its discretion, detach territory from 1 district and attach it to another when requested to do so by resolution of the board of any district whose boundaries would be changed by such action, or when petitioned by not less than 2/3 of the resident owners of the land to be transferred. The county board of education shall take final action in regard to the resolution or petition within a period of 60 days of the receipt of the resolution or petition. Only territory contiguous to a district may be transferred. Whenever the latest available taxable valuation of the area to be detached is more than 10% of the latest available taxable valuation of the entire school district from which it is to be detached, the action of the county board of education directing such detachment shall not be valid unless approved, at an annual or special election called for that purpose in the district from which the detachment is to be made, by an affirmative vote of a majority of the school tax electors of the district, voting thereon.” (Emphasis added.)5
*17Owendale-Gagetown argues that we should construe the statute to require cumulation of property transfers so as to trigger the popular vote requirement in the instant case. Such a construction, it is argued, will give this section force and validity. The opposite construction would nullify the statute. Furthermore, the district contends that even if a literal interpretation of the statute suggests that the ten percent requirement was not met, such a reading of the statute does not comport with the purpose of the statute. Finally, it is argued that a literal interpretation would permit easy circumvention of the statute.
The state board contends that the decision of the Court of Appeals is in accord with the plain meaning of § 461. "Area to be detached”, argues the state board, clearly refers to only the Goslin property transfer petition in the instant case.
Ill
Our reading of the statute leads us to the conclusion that this section of the School Code of 1955 was designed to permit minor alterations in school boundaries to be accomplished in a simple manner. The ten percent requirement prevents major alteration of a school district without the consent of its residents. These complementary statutory purposes are derived from the language of the section, consideration of other sections of the School Code of 1955, and a review of predecessor legislation.
In Ira School Dist No 1 Fractional v Chesterfield School Dist No 2 Fractional, 340 Mich 678; 66 NW2d 72 (1954), this Court construed a predecessor statute to §461. 1948 CL 353.1; MSA 15.407 provided:
*18"A township board may in its discretion detach the property of any person or persons from 1 district and attach it to another, or divide or consolidate districts: Provided, however, That * * * no district shall be divided into 2 or more districts without the consent of the majority of the qualified school electors of said district present and voting at a meeting called for such purpose, and 2 or more districts shall not be consolidated without the consent of a majority of the qualified school electors of each district present and voting at a meeting called for that purpose.”
That legislation permitted a township board to detach property without the consent of a majority of the electors of the district from which the land was to be detached. A vote of the district was required only when the district was to be divided or consolidated. The controlling question in Ira School Dist was whether a vote was required in that district before 70% of the assessed valuation of the property located therein could be detached and annexed to the Chesterfield School District. The majority superficially analyzed the statute and concluded that no vote was required because property was detached, Le., no district was divided or consolidated with another.
Almost immediately thereafter, the School Code of 1955 was enacted. A comparison of § 461 of that act with the 1948 Compiled Laws provision demonstrates an apparently strong reaction of the Legislature to the result permitted by Ira School Dist. That determination brought into focus the realization that small districts could be effectively destroyed under the prior law. It therefore follows that the Legislature enacted the ten percent requirement to reinforce the legislative policy of protecting the territorial and fiscal integrity of school districts. There is "a settled policy of the State to strengthen the graded schools and to *19make it difficult to take from them portions of their territory”. School Dist No 1, Fractional, of Twps of Bethany & Pine River & City of St Louis v Joint Twp Boards of Twps of Bethany & Pine River, 233 Mich 327, 331; 207 NW 5 (1925).
We cannot agree with an interpretation of § 461 which permits a continual piecemeal dismemberment of a school district without the approval of the voters. Such a construction does violence to the statutory purpose evidenced, in part, by the changes in language of the 1955 act.
Furthermore, the Legislature has enacted and maintained other provisions concerning boundary changes and the elimination of school districts. MCL 340.431; MSA 15.3431 permits annexation of one district to another, but only after a majority vote of the electors of the district to be annexed. MCL 340.401-340.415; MSA 15.3401-15.3415 sets forth the procedure for consolidation of two or more school districts and requires a vote. The division of a school district also requires a vote of the electors. MCL 340.446; MSA 15.3446. Thus, it appears, a vote is required whenever a viable school district is scheduled to disappear and whenever there is to be a significant alteration or detachment of property. This legislative policy further indicates that the Legislature did not intend to permit a piecemeal, seriatim annexation or destruction of a school district to occur without a vote of electors.
Finally, even assuming that a literal reading of the statute could permit the Goslin transfer to be effective without a vote, we reject that view. It is well-settled that the spirit and purpose of a statute should prevail over the strict letter. See, e.g., People v Lynch, 410 Mich 343, 354; 301 NW2d 796 (1981), People v McFarlin, 389 Mich 557, 563-565; *20208 NW2d 504 (1973), Stambaugh Twp v Iron County Treasurer, 153 Mich 104, 107; 116 NW 569 (1908). The specific language of this statute, when presented in the proper context, has less than a clear and precise meaning. The phrases "area to be detached” and "entire school district” are ambiguous when viewed in light of the statutory purpose. These phrases may be construed narrowly or broadly. "Area to be detached” may mean either the territory involved in a single transfer or an accumulation of the current and previous property transfers. Similarly, "entire school district” may mean the district as constituted at the time of the latest transfer or the entire school district as it originally existed, prior to any transfers of property. We must construe the language of the statute in light of the statutory purpose to permit only minor alterations in school district boundaries to be accomplished without a vote. Thus, we conclude that the statute requires consideration of property transfers on an accumulated basis.
Each party claims that the statutory interpretation advanced by the opposing party leads to an absurd result, citing People v McFarlin, supra. The state board argues that to permit one transfer of property constituting ten percent of the taxable valuation of the school district without a vote, but to require a vote when one lot with a single-family dwelling is sought to be transferred the next day leads to an absurd result. We disagree. That result may be characterized as absurd only if the statute does not seek to preserve the territorial and fiscal integrity of a school district, aside from minimal detachments. Yet, we have already concluded that preserving a district is a significant purpose of this legislation. A vote of the electors is mandated before any significant alterations to a school dis*21trict’s boundaries are permitted. It became necessary to draw a line at some point.
On the other hand, the school district contends that to permit continuous nine percent property transfers leads to an absurd result. This result and procedure invites a stark circumvention of the underlying purpose of the statute. It permits a school district to lose, one piece at a time in separate petitions, a significant portion of its taxable valuation, potentially well in excess of ten percent, without the statutorily mandated vote. We are persuaded that this type of consequence is what the Legislature sought to prevent.
Accordingly, we conclude that the statute requires a cumulative reading of the ten percent requirement. This construction necessarily follows from the statutory purpose.
Our resolution of the issue of statutory interpretation renders unnecessary any consideration of the issue of abuse of discretion.
We would reverse and remand this case to the Ingham Circuit Court for further proceedings.- No costs, a public question being involved.
Kavanagh and Levin, JJ., concurred with Blair Moody, Jr., J.The School Code of 1955, MCL 340.1 et seq.; MSA 15.3001 et seq., was repealed and replaced by the School Code of 1976, MCL 380.1 et seq.; MSA 15.4001 et seq. The ten percent requirement is contained in MCL 340.461; MSA 15.3461 (1955 act) and MCL 380.951; MSA 15.4951 (1976 act).
The record does not reflect whether the figure of 9.2% is based upon a valuation of the entire school district, including the Elenbaum transfer, or only upon the remaining property in the district.
On July 7, 1976, the State Board of Education approved three additional property transfers from Owendale-Gagetown to adjacent school districts. Owendale-Gagetown has also petitioned for review of these transfers. Owendale-Gagetown School Dist v State Board of Education (Ingham Circuit Court Docket No. 76-19296-AA).
Our order read in part:
"MCL 340.461; MSA 15.3461 provides for a vote of the school tax electors on a transfer only when 'the latest available taxable valuation of the area to be detached is more than 10% of the latest available taxable valuation of the entire school district from which it is to be detached’. The record discloses that the latest available tax valuation of the area to be detached in this case is less than 10% of the Owendale-Gagetown School District as constituted at the time of the State Board of Education decision.” 402 Mich 841, 842.
We reject the suggestion that this order decided the issue in the instant case. Our language indicates that the Goslin transfer by itself was less than ten percent of the district’s valuation. We did not decide if the statute required an accumulation of transfers.
In the instant case a joint meeting of two intermediate school boards was held. See MCL 340.463; MSA 15.3463 and MCL 340.292a; MSA 15.3292(1). MCL 340.467; MSA 15.3467 provided for appeal to the State Board of Education.
The relevant provisions of the School Code of 1976 are MCL 380.951; MSA 15.4951, MCL 380.953; MSA 15.4953, and MCL 380.971; MSA 15.4971.