(dissenting).
I dissent.
I would hold that by adopting its 1984 budget, containing line item expenses for the Classic, that this is an official act of the City of Sturgis, and constituted “official sponsorship” of the Classic as required by SDCL 10-45-13(3).
The majority interprets the requirements of the words “official sponsorship” to mean an express resolution specifically declaring the sponsorship. This interpretation, in my opinion, is too narrow and not contemplated by the statute. The legislature, in passing this statute, simply intended that the city demonstrate its sponsorship by some official action on its part. There is nothing in the statute to indicate that sponsorship occurs only when a specific resolution has been introduced and passed, if such a requirement was intended, it could easily have said so.
The budget for 1984 for the City of Stur-gis was never offered or received into evidence in the trial court, however, Robert Voorhees, the mayor, testified that, “As near as I can tell, we’ve [Sturgis] been wed to the thing [Classic] since history. Our budget’s — you can go back as far as the budget goes [1941] and you can find where we’ve budgeted for the Classic.” The 1984 budget was obviously the best evidence in this regard, but since the Mayor’s testimony was received without objection, it became the next best evidence in the case.
The Mayor further testified that the city council is actively involved with the events of the Classic. The City sends out and pays for ads in motorcycle magazines relating to the rules applicable during the Classic. It informs motorcyclists of state law regarding such things as protective eyew-ear. The City hires extra police officers at an average cost of $25,000, and it appropriates monies to the Street Department for maintenance of the racetrack and fairgrounds. The Main Street is closed off during the Classic. While these activities may not be, in and of themselves, determinative of “official sponsorship,” they are nevertheless consistent with the inclusion of the Classic as a budget line item which, in my opinion, is very persuasive evidence of the City’s official sponsorship of the 1984 Classic. Simply stated, the actions of the City of Sturgis constituted substantial compliance with the “official sponsorship” mandate of SDCL 10-45-13(3). Application of Leo’s Bus Service, Inc., 342 N.W.2d 228, 230 (S.D.1984). See also: Orme v. Lendahand Co., 128 F.2d 756 (D.C.Cir.1942).
In Application of Veith, we wrote, “the rule that laws exempting property from taxation should be strictly construed in favor of the taxing power does not call for strained construction, but must always be reasonable and will not be applied to defeat the expressed intent of the legislature.” 261 N.W.2d at 426. In C.A. Wagner Construction Company v. City of Sioux Falls, 71 S.D. 587, 594, 27 N.W.2d 916, 920 (1947), we held that the constitutional and statutory provisions for exemption from taxation or assessment are to be given a reasonable, natural, and practical construction to effectuate the purpose for which the exemption was created.
Any official action, though not in form a resolution, may be one in legal effect. 5 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 15.06, citing Lindahl v. Independent School District No. 306, 270 Minn. 164, 133 N.W.2d 23, 26 (1965). Thus, although the adoption of a line item budget for the Classic lacks the formal attributes of a specific resolution, this deficiency of form is not and should not be fatal to the exemption claim.
The majority opinion leans too far to the hyper-technical in order to invalidate the exemption claim. The City’s complete sup*598port of the Classic has been clearly demonstrated from the record before this court. By applying “a reasonable, natural, and practical” construction to SDCL 10-45-13(3), substantial compliance therewith has been adequately shown. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court and hold that the City of Sturgis, by adopting a line item budget, “officially sponsored” the 1984 Classic. The City’s action was clearly within the spirit and intent of the legislature and the result does not call for a “strained construction” in order to justify the exemption.