concurring.
I agree with the majority that applicant should be given notice that the State seeks an affirmative finding on whether applicant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the alleged offense. I would, however, also base this finding on the same rationale which requires pleading enhancement allegations for punishment purposes and not solely on the analysis employed by the majority.
It has been well established since Long v. State, 36 Tex. 6 (1871), that every circumstance constituting a statutory offense which would affect the degree of punishment must be pled in the indictment. Long, supra, was the first case which en-grafted upon the statutory scheme of pleading a court imposed requirement that it was necessary to place allegations that the defendant had previously been convicted of a like offense in the indictment before the State could avail itself of the enhanced punishment provisions of the Penal Code.
The Long decision was based upon the necessity of the State proving that the defendant had prior convictions which were final in order to enhance the defendant’s punishment. The Court stated that holding to the contrary would “cut away so much of the pillars of our liberty, which consists in the right of every man to have presented to him an accusation before he is called upon for a defense.” Id. at 10. The Long holding reflects the concern of the Court that the defendant have adequate knowledge of the accusation against him so that he may prepare a defense.
As previously stated, the principle announced in Long, supra, is based upon the idea of notice. An accused is entitled to proper notice of any prior conviction which the State seeks to use whether it be an element of the offense or for enhancement of punishment. See Rogers v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 306, 325 S.W.2d 697 (1959), and Parasco v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 547, 309 S.W.2d 465 (1958). These pleadings requirements inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. See Coleman v. State, 577 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), and Bevins v. State, 422 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).
Although I believe that the rationale of Long, supra, and subsequent cases, see infra, support the conclusion concerning notice reached by this Court today, I agree with the majority that notice of the State’s intention to seek an affirmative finding on the issue of use or exhibition of deadly weapon is not, in this day and time, required to be in the indictment, necessarily. Adequate and timely notice evidenced in the record in some other manner should suffice, although a separate paragraph in the indictment (or addition to it under Art. 28.10, V.A.C.C.P.)1 would seem adequate, *779if not preferable. With these additional comments, I join the majority opinion.
CAMPBELL and WHITE, JJ„ join.. Article 28.10, V.A.C.C.P. (Supp.1985) states:
(a) After notice to the defendant, a matter of form or substance in an indictment or information may be amended at any time before the date the trial on the merits commences. On the *779request of the defendant, the court shall allow the defendant not less than 10 days, or a shorter period if requested by the defendant, to respond to the amended indictment or information.
(b) A matter of form or substance in an indictment or information may also be amended after the trial on the merits commences if the defendant does not object.
(c) An indictment or information may not be amended over the defendant’s objection as to form or substance if the amended indictment or information charges the defendant with an additional or different offense or if the substantial rights of the defendant are prejudiced.