(dissenting).
For the reasons that I believe questions of fact existed for a jury’s determination, I respectfully dissent.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is properly awarded “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” SDCL 15-6-56(c) (emphasis supplied). Although summary judgment is appropriate in all types of litigation, it is not generally suitable in negligence actions. Wilson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 83 S.D. 207, 212-13, 157 N.W.2d 19, 22 (1968). This is because issues of negligence, contributory negligence, proximate cause, and other related issues
are ordinarily questions of fact and it must be a clear case before a trial judge is justified in taking these issues from the jury. It is only when the evidence is such that reasonable men can draw but one conclusion from facts and inferences *169that they become a matter of law and this occurs rarely.
157 N.W.2d at 22 (emphasis supplied). As recent as December 12, 1984, this Court stated in Hoffman v. Royer, 359 N.W.2d 387, 390 (S.D.1984): “Questions relating to negligence and contributory negligence are questions of fact for determination by the jury in all except the rarest of instances.” (Quoting Stoltz v. Stonecypher, 336 N.W.2d 654, 657 (S.D.1983)). When addressing a motion for summary judgment, it is to be remembered that (1) evidence must be viewed most favorable to the non-moving party; (2) the movant has the burden of proof to clearly show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (3) summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits when any genuine issue of material fact exists; (4) a surmise that nonmoving party will not prevail at trial is not appropriate basis for granting the motion on issues not shown to be frivolous, sham, or so unsubstantial that it is obvious that it would be futile to try them; and (5) summary judgment is an extreme remedy which should be awarded only when the truth is clear and reasonable doubts as to the existence of genuine issues of material fact should be resolved against the movant. 157 N.W.2d at 21. Further, on June 6, 1984, this Court stated in Nemec v. Deering, 350 N.W.2d 53, 55-56 (S.D.1984), that “[ojrdinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required standard of care is a question of fact for the jury.” If the reader will review these recent cases and the principles established in Wilson, a manifest conclusion will result, namely, that the facts and events of this night of maimed bodies and death cry out for a jury’s deliberation.
With the foregoing Court-enunciated principles in mind, I address the issues presented herein.
BARGER’S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES
A parent’s cause of action for medical and hospital expenses incurred because of the negligent injury of a child is a separate, distinct, and independent cause of action from that vested in the child itself. See Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Cas. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 365 So.2d 315 (Ala.Civ.App.1978); Welter v. Curry, 260 Ark. 287, 539 S.W.2d 264 (1976); Botelho v. Curtis, 28 Conn.Supp. 493, 267 A.2d 675 (1970); Tucker v. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio, 343 So.2d 1357 (Fla.App.1977); Jones v. City Council of Augusta, 100 Ga.App. 268, 110 S.E.2d 691 (1959); Rader v. Collins, 130 Ind.App. 227, 161 N.E.2d 381 (1959); Zarba v. Lane, 322 Mass. 132, 76 N.E.2d 318 (1947); Walter v. City of Flint, 40 Mich.App. 613, 199 N.W.2d 264 (1972); Friedrichsen v. Niemotka, 71 N.J.Super. 398, 177 A.2d 58 (1962); Grange v. Town of Yorkshire, 22 A.D.2d 752, 253 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1964); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Godfrey, 12 Ohio Misc. 143, 41 Ohio Op.2d 166, 230 N.E.2d 560 (1967); Wolff v. DuPuis, 233 Or. 317, 378 P.2d 707 (1963); Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 180 A.2d 772 (1962); Trotti v. Piacente, 99 R.I. 167, 206 A.2d 462 (1965); Hall v. Royce, 109 Vt. 99, 192 A. 193 (1937). Thus,
[a]n injury to a minor child gives rise to two causes of action, one on behalf of the child for pain and suffering, permanent injury, and impairment of earning capacity after attaining majority, the other on behalf of the parent for loss of services during minority, expenses of treatment, and other elements of damage....
67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 137, at 518 (1978). The object of the parent’s cause of action is the recovery of expenses which the parent has paid and services which the parent has lost, while the object of the child’s cause of action is a recovery for the personal injury inflicted upon its being. The parent’s action is not brought for the injury to the child, but instead is brought for the wrong, injury, or loss suffered by the parent as a consequence of the child’s injury. This principle should be particularly applicable in view of SDCL 25-5-7, which provides:
The father and mother of a legitimate unmarried minor child are equally enti-*170tied to its custody, service, and earnings. If either the father or mother be dead or refuse to take the custody or has abandoned his or her family, the other is entitled to its custody, service, and earnings.
Although a parent’s cause of action is separate, distinct, and independent from that vested in the injured child, it is still subject to any defense that could be raised to negate the existence of a cause of action in the injured child. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 143, at 528 (1978). Thus, Bar-ger’s suit (brought by the mother and guardian of Wares who suffers organic brain damage) could be negated by the former guest statute if Cox’s driving on the night in question was not willful or wanton misconduct.* Because I would hold, as outlined below, that a question of fact exists as to whether Cox’s driving constituted willful and wanton misconduct, I would reverse the trial court’s summary judgment determination that the former guest statute barred Barger’s claim.
GUEST STATUTE DEFENSE — QUESTION OF FACT REGARDING WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT
As stated above, if Cox’s operation of the Jeep on June 10, 1978, did not amount to willful and wanton misconduct, Barger’s cause of action would be barred by the former guest statute. The trial court found that no genuine issue existed as to Cox’s willful and wanton misconduct and the majority would affirm that determination. In light of the facts as adduced from the summary judgment hearing, however, and in light of our Court-enunciated summary judgment principles, I dissent.
Cox had been drinking beer and smoking marijuana before embarking on the fatal journey. Although one of his companions testified that Cox appeared sober, Cox had a blood alcohol content of .13 and thus was driving while intoxicated. He was warned not to drive the Jeep over fifty miles per hour. Cox operated the Jeep in excess of the speed limit and crossed over the center line while negotiating curves. It was dark and early in the morning and Cox was driving down a steep, curved, downhill grade of Highway 85 and 14A. Cox was warned about Deadman’s Curve but continued to exceed the speed limit. The skid and scrape marks left on the road measured a total of 727 feet and the vehicle was extensively damaged. Further, the Patrolman who initially investigated the accident indicated in his Officer’s Investigation Summary of Motor Vehicle Accident that the primary cause of the accident was “Speed — Reckless Driving.”
Construing the above most favorably to Barger (the nonmoving party), I am unable to find such a clear case that reasonable men could draw but one conclusion, to wit, that Cox’s operation of the vehicle was not willful and wanton misconduct as the trial court and majority have so held. On the contrary, if a genuine question of fact does not exist, I would hold that reasonable men could draw but one conclusion, to wit, that Cox’s operation of the vehicle was willful and wanton misconduct.
Although excessive speed alone is not sufficient to constitute willful and wanton misconduct, Mitzel v. Hauck, 78 S.D. 543, 105 N.W.2d 378 (1960), speed, coupled with knowledge and warning of dangerous road conditions, is relevant in guest statute cases and sufficient to establish recklessness. See Anderson v. Elliott, 244 Iowa 670, 57 N.W.2d 792 (1953); Tucker v. Heaverlo, 249 Iowa 197, 86 N.W.2d 353 (1957); Horton v. Fleser, 340 Mich. 68, 64 N.W.2d 605 (1954). Here, the effects of intoxicants and marijuana, coupled with excessive driving speed, dangerous road conditions and knowledge and warning thereof, most as*171suredly created a question of fact concerning willful and wanton misconduct which a jury should resolve. It is apparent that the majority opinion substitutes the defense of the assumption of the risk as a bar to the willful and wanton misconduct cause of action. There is no doubt that the representatives of Cox have every right, in law, to plead and prove up an assumption of the risk defense. Perhaps, indeed, such a defense is classical under these facts. Moreover, the theorist in law can hypothesize that such a defense, under these facts, would be justly palatable to the jury. However, for the majority to assume that the assumption of the risk facts are so strong that they estop a prima facie case of willful and wanton misconduct, is an academic flaw. It begs, before one scintilla of proof is adduced, a total acceptance of an affirmative defense. Even where evidence has been produced, i.e., where one side has had a chance to swing at the ball before they are thrown out of court, we have held: “Questions of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence are ordinarily jury questions, and it is only when the facts are of such a nature that there can be no disagreement that the question should not be submitted to the jury.” Berg v. Sukup Mfg. Co., 355 N.W.2d 833, 835 (S.D.1984). Here, plaintiff/appellant was called “out” before she got to the plate.
LATCHSTRING’S DUTY OF CARE-QUESTION OF FACT REGARDING ITS VIOLATION
Although I agree that Latchstring most assuredly assumed supervision and control over the after-hours activities of its teenage employees, and thus owed a duty of care, I disagree with the majority ruling that a question of fact does not exist as a matter of law concerning Latchstring’s violation of that duty.
Here, Latchstring, in effect, sold a bill of goods to the parents of these teenagers which showed that it was a good, clean operation and that the teenagers were to abide by certain rules. These rules provided that (1) the boys and girls were not supposed to mix but were to stay in their separate cabins; (2) cars were allowed only if the parents agreed; (3) no drinking; (4) no drugs; (5) no friends from town in the cabins; and (6) the cabins were to be kept clean and would be inspected every other week. These rules, I surmise, were implemented not only to insure the orderly operation of Latchstring, but to cajole the teenagers’ parents who obviously would not permit their children to be placed during the summer in a marijuana/alcohol/sex/orgy in a relatively remote portion of the Black Hills for fear their children would be raped, addicted, mugged, impregnated, killed, kidnapped, or that some other disaster would befall them. Having constructed and implemented these rules, and estranged these teenagers from other supervision, Latchstring had a duty of care with respect to their safety. The question thus becomes: Did the trial court err when it ruled, as a matter of law, that no genuine issue of fact existed in regard to Latch-string’s violation of this duty owed? Believing a question of fact did exist, I would reverse the trial court’s summary judgment order. As authority, I rely on settled law in this state that “[i]n reviewing an order for summary judgment, this Court must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party_” Goff v. Wang, 296 N.W.2d 729, 730 (S.D.1980).
As Acting Justice Wuest points out in his dissenting opinion herein, a duty to supervise teenagers cannot be discharged by merely establishing a set of rules and then failing to check on compliance. After implementing the rules hereinbefore stated, and between the end of high school (May 27) and the night of the accident (June 9-10), approximately thirteen days, three parties were held at the boys’ cabin at Latchstring. At all three parties, booze was consumed, marijuana was smoked, girls and boys “mixed,” teenagers from town were present, and loud music was played. During one of these parties, Woodworth, Latchstring’s manager, in response to a guest complaint, went to the boys’ cabin and told them to keep the music *172down. If Woodworth did not actually know such activities were taking place at Latchstring, she should have known. It was her responsibility to supervise these teenagers; the majority opinion recognizes Woodworth — on behalf of Latchstring— had undertaken a duty of care and control over these teenagers. These three parties suggest that the duty 'of care and control did not meet a standard of ordinary care. No reasonable, prudent business, en-charged with such responsibility, would tolerate, condone, or permit wild, raucous employee parties on its premises. From the facts, it may be reasonably inferred that Woodworth either knew or should have known what was going on in this closely confined, isolated area in the Black Hills with these teenagers who were working at summer jobs.
“A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on whether defendant’s conduct measures up to the required standard.” Nemec v. Deering, 350 N.W.2d at 56 (citation omitted). Here, considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Barger, we must conclude that, at the very least, reasonable minds could differ on the issue of breach of a duty owed. Simply put, it is inescapable that there are general issues of material fact. Summary judgment was not appropriate. We, in the legal profession, pride ourselves in the jury system. We tell the laymen this at testimonial dinners and in speeches of state. Need I remind anyone that the plaintiff in this case is simply asking for an opportunity to submit her case to a jury? The facts and events of this night of maimed bodies and death cry out for a jury’s deliberation.
I would reverse the summary judgment in its entirety.
For cases holding the parent’s cause of action to be barred by the application of a guest statute to the child’s cause of action, see Shiels v. Audette, 119 Conn. 75, 174 A. 323 (1934); Lynott v. Sells, 52 Del. 385, 158 A.2d 583 (1958); Whitfield v. Bruegel, 134 Ind.App. 636, 190 N.E.2d 670 (1963); Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565 (Tex.Civ.App.1973); and Hall v. Royce, 192 A. 193. Contra, Shiels, 174 A. at 326 (Haines, Judge, dissenting in part), and Irlbeck v. Pomeroy, 210 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1973).