Opinion of the Court by
Justice SCHRODER.The question in this appeal is whether an employer is liable for an employee’s tortious injuries to a guest who accompanied the employee on a business trip. We opine that in order to hold the employer hable for the employee’s tortious injuries to the employee’s guest on a business trip, the employee must have acted within the scope of his authority in inviting the guest and for the purpose of accomplishing the work of the employer. Because the guest in this case had a strictly non-business purpose in accepting the employee’s invitation, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s dismissal.
Mid-States Plastics, Inc. is a Kentucky corporation with its headquarters in Mt. Sterling, Kentucky. Daniel Edwards was the President, General Manager, and Chief Executive for Mid-States (at one time he owned the company). Edwards’ duties involved a significant amount of travel. When traveling for Mid-States, Edwards determined the method and manner of travel and was reimbursed for his travel expenses. Specifically, when he drove his car, he collected mileage, and when he flew commercially, he obtained reimbursement of the plane ticket. Additionally, the company reimbursed Edwards for his mileage when he flew his own private plane, which he often used in his travels.
On this last occasion, Edwards had a business trip to Indianapolis, and invited his pastor, Reverend William Clinton Bryant, along to visit the Reverend’s family while Edwards worked. The trip for the Reverend was free and involved no business purpose on his part for Mid-States. On this trip, Edwards personally leased a plane rather than flying his own. Unfortunately, the plane struck a cell phone tower and crashed on the return trip, killing both Edwards and Reverend Bryant.
The Reverend’s estate and family filed suit against Mid-States and Edwards’ estate. The claim against Mid-States was premised on vicarious liability for the employee’s negligent piloting of the plane. The trial court granted Mid-States’ summary judgment, dismissing the case against it without any detail, reasoning, or analysis. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further findings. The Court of Appeals determined that the sole issue before it was whether there were any genuine issues of material fact concerning Mid-States’ vicarious liability to the decedent’s estate for the pilot’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The Court of Appeals stated that in determining whether Mid-States could be held vicariously hable for the pilot’s negligence, a factual finding had to be made as to (1) whether Mid-States had actual knowledge of the employee’s practice of allowing a non-business passenger to accompany him *730on business trips, and (2) if so, did Mid-States fail to object.
The facts in Wigginton Studio v. Reuter’s Adm’r, 254 Ky. 128, 71 S.W.2d 14 (1934) are similar to our case. In Wiggin-ton, the vice president (Adams) of the corporation and another employee used a private vehicle to drive from Louisville to Middlesboro, Kentucky, ostensibly for business purposes. Myrtle Reuter was one of the two guests invited to accompany Adams and the other employee on the trip. Reuter was going to see the scenery, while the other guest was going to see family. Neither guest’s presence was for the purpose of accomplishing the work of the corporation. During the trip, in a hard rain, the vehicle hit some gravel, skidded, and turned over. Reuter was seriously injured and died a few hours later. Her estate sued Wigginton Studio, Inc., and recovered a judgment. On appeal, our predecessor, the Court of Appeals, reversed opining that:
The rule is well settled in this jurisdiction that a servant has no implied authority to invite or permit a third person to ride on a vehicle in his charge and if, in so doing, the invitee sustains injuries through negligence of the servant, the master will not be liable, as the servant is not acting within the scope of his authority.
Id. at 16. The Wigginton Court recognized that not only does the employee have to be acting within the scope of his/her authority in inviting the guest, but also, the guest’s presence must “be construed as being for the purpose of accomplishing the work of the corporation.” Id.
The Court in Wigginton cited the case of Armstrong’s Adm’r v. Sumne & Ratterman Co., 211 Ky. 750, 278 S.W. 111 (1925) and a number of other cases for its authority. Armstrong’s Adm’r involved a milkman 1 who invited a thirteen-year-old neighbor to ride along in the company truck. The milkman would sometimes even pay the young neighbor for helping him. The young neighbor was accidentally injured and died. In denying recovery, our predecessor Court, the Court of Appeals, held that:
[I]n order for the master to be liable for the acts of his servant even when done within the apparent scope of the latter’s authority, it must be one in furtherance of the master’s business, and for and on his behalf and not for and on behalf of the servant without any intention or purpose on his part to make it the act of the master.
Id. at 115. The Court went on to determine that the milkman was not purporting to act for the employer in either permitting the neighbor to ride in the truck or in paying the neighbor a small contribution for the work he did for the milkman, id.
In our case, it is clear that Reverend Bryant was a guest of Edwards and his presence “could not be construed as being for the purpose of accomplishing the work of the corporation,” as required by Wigginton before liability attaches to the master. 71 S.W.2d at 16. Also, the fact that Edwards was an officer of Mid-States (President, as well as the General Manager and Chief Executive) and not just an employee does not change the outcome. Wigginton made clear that “in order for a company to be held responsible for the tort of one of its officers he must be acting within the scope of his employment and in the furtherance of the corporation’s business.” Id.
*731The Court of Appeals cites to the case of Estell v. Barrickmcm, 571 S.W.2d 650 (Ky.App.1978) for authority that when the employer is aware that the employee invites guests and does nothing to enforce a “no rider” rule, the guests become the invitees of the employer and exposes the employer to liability for the employee’s negligence that may injure the guests. The Court of Appeals’ decision in Estell acknowledged that there were no Kentucky cases for this proposition, but that a number of other states have adopted this position. Id. at 652. The problem, however, with the Estell approach is that it ignores the second requirement of Wiggin-ton, that the guest’s presence on the trip somehow must be for the purpose of accomplishing the work of the employer. We believe the omission of the second element of the tort was not meant to eliminate the requirement that the guest’s presence must also serve the work of the employer. To the extent that Estell does not require this second element, it is overruled. Even if the employer fails to adopt a “no rider” rule, and the employee’s invitation is within the scope of his/her employment, liability for tortious injures does not attach unless the invitation to the guest also served the purpose of accomplishing the work of the employer. Since the invitation to Reverend Bryant in no way served the employer, Mid-States, the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment and dismissing the claim.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s entry of summary judgment dismissing the claims of the estate and family against Mid-States Plastics, Inc.
All sitting, except CUNNINGHAM, J. ABRAMSON, MINTON, NOBLE, and SCOTT, JJ., concur. LAMBERT, C. J., dissents by separate opinion.Dissenting Opinion by
. In the bygone days, a dairy bought trucks and hired men to deliver milk to the doorsteps of customers early in the morning. The drivers were known as “milkmen.”