Justice, dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
A review of the legislative history of KRS 342.320 reveals that, from the outset, the attorney fee for representing a workers’ compensation claimant has been subject to the approval of the fact-finder. Typical of the versions of KRS 342.320 which preceded it, the 1964 amendment provided for a maximum authorized attorney fee, at that time 20% of the amount recovered, and authorized the Board to reduce the fee in a given case “to an amount commensurate with the services performed.” Acts, 1964, Ch. 192, § 25. In 1970, the statute was amended to provide, in addition, that:
the board, in making an allowance of attorney fees, shall in each case examine the record to ascertain the extent of the services rendered, and fix a reasonable fee for the services rendered, not to exceed the maximum authorized by this section.
Acts, 1970, Ch. 16, § 6.1 It was not until 1974 that subsection (4) [now, (5) ] was added to the statute. Acts, 1974, Ch. 177, § 2. As amended in 1974, KRS 342.320(4) provided that, “The board shall approve any contract between attorney and client if the limits on fees enumerated below are followed....”2
When the legislature amended KRS 342.320 in 1974 and added subsection (4) to the statute, it was aware that subsection (1) permitted the fact-finder to fix a reasonable attorney fee. Nonetheless, the reasonableness determination set forth in subsection (1) was not altered. Therefore, it is my opinion that the use of the word “shall” in subsection (4) indicates a legislative intent to remove discretion from the fact-finder to reduce attorney fees when the limits enumerated therein were followed. Likewise, the retention of the reasonableness determination in subsection (1) indicates a legislative intent that the fact-finder fix a reasonable attorney fee in those cases in which there was no contract between the attorney and client.
Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the ALJ for the entry of an attorney fee as provided in the contract between claimant and the attorney. Although such a result might seem unreasonable on the particular facts of this case, it is the function of the legislature to set *254the parameters for awarding attorney fees in workers’ compensation cases.
GRAVES, J., joins in this dissent.
. The various factors to be considered when determining a reasonable attorney fee upon which the Administrative Law Judge relied in this case were added to the statute in 1990. Acts, 1990, Ch. 352, § 1.
. The attorney fee in this case was awarded in 1993. It was not until 1994, that ICRS 342.320(5) was amended to provide, “The administrative law judge shall approve any contract between attorney and client if the fees are reviewed and approved by the administrative law judge pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and if the limits on fees enumerated below are followed....”