(concurring in part and dissenting in part). The common issue presented in these consolidated appeals concerns the construction and application of § 29(l)(a) of the Michigan Employment Security Act. Additionally, in Lindquist, the application of § 29(l)(b) is implicated, and in Parks, an independent constitutional question is raised.
I concur in the result of Justice Brickley’s opinion in Dolce and Lindquist. I respectfully dissent in Parks.
i
The first two disqualification provisions enumerated in § 29 of the Employment Security Act provide:
(1) An individual shall be disqualified for benefits in the following cases in which the individual:
(a) Left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer ....
(b) Was discharged for misconduct connected with the individual’s work, or for intoxication while at work .... [MCL 421.29; MSA 17.531.]
While I disagree with Justice Brickley’s application of § 29(l)(b) in Lindquist, I would concur in the decision to affirm upon the basis of the Court of Appeals application of § 29(l)(a).1
Justice Brickley’s conclusion that an employee’s failure to comply with an employment rule which may be viewed as a condition of employment or *247rule of selection (i.e., residency requirement or compulsory agency fee payments), without regard to the particular circumstances, constitutes "misconduct connected with the individual’s work” within the meaning of §29(l)(b), is problematic and requires an expansive construction of that disqualifying provision. That expansive construction effectively vitiates the inherent scienter element from the definition of "wilful misconduct” as defined in Carter v MESC, 364 Mich 538, 541; 111 NW2d 817 (1961), and by the courts of other jurisdictions construing similar disqualification provisions.2 Moreover, Justice Brickley’s analysis substantially ignores the statutory requirement that such misconduct be "connected with [the individual’s] work.” See Reed v Employment Security Comm, 364 Mich 395, 396; 110 NW2d 907 (1961).
Every American jurisdiction has similar disqualification provisions within their employment security laws.3 The courts of numerous jurisdictions have considered the application of those provisions in cases in which an employee has failed to comply with a nonwork-performance condition of employment or rule of selection, including the nonpayment of compulsory union dues and voluntary resignations because of the change of location of residency.4 It is significant to note that those reported decisions have considered the applicability of the "voluntary leaving without good cause” *248disqualification as opposed to the disqualification for "work-connected misconduct” in such cases.
In any event, the particular circumstances of each case must be considered in determining the applicability of either disqualifying provision. The application of § 29(l)(a) or (b) requires an inquiry entirely separate from whether the individual was "justifiably discharged.”
In Lindquist, although the claimant did not resign because of the change of location of her residence, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals that her failure to sufficiently comply with the residency requirement, which was a condition of her employment, constituted a "voluntar[y] [leaving] without good cause attributable to the employer,” within the meaning of § 29(l)(a). While I agree that the referee’s conclusions concerning the definition of "residency” and whether the claimant had failed to maintain a bona fide residence within the corporate limits of the City of Saginaw are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence and is not contrary to law, I am not persuaded that the claimant’s attempt to comply with her employer’s residency requirement constituted wilful "misconduct connected with [her] work” within the meaning of § 29(l)(b). Rather than expansively construing § 29(l)(b) to include cases in which an employee "failed to meet one of the requirements of the employer’s rules . . .,” without regard to whether the "violation of the requirement . . . occurred] on the job, . . . [or] because of problems in connection with work or work performance,”5 I would simply treat the claimant as if she had done that which was presumably required under the circumstances — resigned because of the relocation of her *249permanent residence. In construing §29(l)(a) as. applicable in such cases, I would emphasize that, unlike some of the corollary provisions of other jurisdictions, §29(l)(a) is applicable to individuals who leave work "voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer . . . .” (Emphasis added.)6
n
The appellant-claimant in Parks was disqualified under § 29(l)(a). In reaching that conclusion, the referee, reversing the initial determination, expressly found that § 29(l)(b) (misconduct connected with the individual’s work) was inapplicable. Parks’ disqualification under § 29(l)(a) was affirmed by the mesc Board of Review, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals. Justice Brickley does not review the application of § 29(l)(a), but, instead, concludes that Parks’ actions constituted "misconduct connected with [her] work” within the meaning of § 29(l)(b).
I would note, initially, that the reported decisions from other jurisdictions considering the disqualification of individuals who were discharged for failing to pay union dues, even in the absence of any excuse whatsoever, like the referee, board of review, circuit court, and Court of Appeals in the present case, have consistently relied upon the disqualification for "voluntarily [leaving] without good cause.”7 No reported decision has found such actions to constitute "misconduct connected with *250the individual’s work.” Nevertheless, determining the application of either statutory disqualification requires considering the factual circumstances which resulted in the claimant’s unemployment.
I find particularly troublesome the statement in Justice Brickley’s opinion that "[n]o matter what the merits” of Parks’ dispute with her employer were, her failure to pay the agency fees, in the amount demanded, prior to a judicial determination of the constitutionally permissible amount of those fees after remand by the United States Supreme Court in Abood v Detroit Bd of Ed, 431 US 209; 97 S Ct 1782; 52 L Ed 2d 261 (1977), constituted "work-connected misconduct.” To suggest that the Legislature intended § 29(l)(b) to be so expansive as to disqualify an individual who is discharged from public employment in a case in which the employee properly asserted a "meritorious” claim that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protected the individual from submitting to the employer’s demands is untenable.
The flaw in the analyses of my colleagues’ opinions for affirmance stems from their failure to carefully consider the factual circumstances which led to Parks’ discharge in order. to evaluate whether her actions constituted "misconduct” or a "voluntary] [leaving] without good cause” within the statutory meaning of § 29(l)(a) or (b). I would emphasize that the application of either disqualifying provision requires a careful evaluation of the claimant’s conduct within the factual circumstances presented, case by case. Considering the factual circumstances surrounding Parks’ discharge, I would conclude that neither statutory disqualification is applicable. My disposition of this case, based upon a resolution of the statutory issues, would make it unnecessary to address the constitutional question presented.
*251An understanding of the issues presented in Parks requires a brief summary of the dispute which resulted in Parks’ unemployment, including the United States Supreme Court decision in Abood, supra, and Parks’ dismissal as a party plaintiff in that case on remand from the United States Supreme Court.
Pursuant to the agency shop agreement negotiated and incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement concluded in 1969 between the Detroit Federation of Teachers and the Detroit Board of Education, all teachers employed by the board were required either to join the union or to pay the union a service fee equal to dues required of union members as a continuing condition of employment.8 Justice Brickley treats the case at bar as if there could be no justifiable excuse for the nonpayment of the service fee in the amount requested, and that, regardless of an employee’s claim that the amount requested exceeds that which is constitutionally permissible, the failure to forward such payments upon demand constitutes "work-connected misconduct.” My colleagues, like the trial court and the Court of Appeals, treat this case as if the agency shop agreement required, without exception, that the claimant pay the fees, that it gave the union an absolute and unlimited right to require payment of the fees and to demand discharge of a nonpaying employee, and that the board had no alternative but to discharge the claimant. I am persuaded that my colleagues’ view *252of the rights and obligations of the claimant, the union, and the board is erroneous.
In Abood, supra, in which Parks was one of the plaintiffs, the United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals which had affirmed the dismissal of the action commenced by Parks and other teachers challenging the constitutionality of the public sector agency shop and the extent to which nonunion members could be compelled to financially support noncollective bargaining union expenditures which they opposed.9 The Court of Appeals had acknowledged that, because statutory authority permitted the union to expend dissenters’ fees for purposes unrelated to collective bargaining, the agency shop arrangement "could violate” the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.10 None*253theless, the Court of Appeals had affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the plaintiffs had not speciñcally objected to particular union expenditures and, therefore, no appropriate remedy was available.11 It was this aspect of the Court’s decision which was reversed in Abood.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Abood has spawned a great deal of commentary.12 While upholding the public sector agency shop against a broad First Amendment challenge, the Court held that a union’s use of compelled service fees for purposes "not germane to its duties as collective bargaining representative” impermissibly abridges a dissenting nonunion employee’s freedom to refrain from associating with ideas and beliefs which he opposes.13 Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the enforcement of the agency shop agreement in *254question only to the extent that amounts demanded from dissenting nonunion employees reflected their pro-rata share of the costs of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment.14
The Abood Court reversed the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals regarding the burden of proof imposed upon dissenting nonunion members in such cases, referring to its decision in Railway Clerks v Allen, 373 US 113; 83 S Ct 1158; 10 L Ed 2d 235 (1963):
[I]n holding that as a prerequisite to any relief each appellant must indicate to the Union the specific expenditures to which he objects, the Court of Appeals ignored the clear holding of Allen. As in Allen, the employees here indicated in their pleadings that they opposed ideological expenditures of any sort that are unrelated to collective bargaining. To require greater specificity would confront an individual employee with the dilemma of relinquishing either his right to withhold his support of ideological causes to which he objects or his freedom to maintain his own beliefs without public disclosure. It would also place on each employee the considerable burden of monitoring all of the numerous and shifting expenditures made by the Union that are unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative. [Abood, 241.]
Vacating the decision of the Court of Appeals as "unduly restrictive,” id., 240, the Court held that *255the union must bear the burden of proving the amount of permissible expenditures. Id., 237, 239. Although the Court found the statutory authority permitting agency shop union security agreements to be overbroad as authoritatively construed by the Michigan Court of Appeals, it did not strike down the statute. See id., 232-237. But see Tribe, Constitutional Law, 589. Because no factual record had been established, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings, including the creation of an appropriate remedy. Id., 242.
Contrary to the implication in Justice Brickley’s opinion, and the representations of counsel,15 the Abood Court did not hold that the plaintiffs could be compelled to forward the entire amount of the service fees to the union and to await a refund in an amount to be determined by the union.16 Nor did the Court hold that plaintiffs, *256nonunion employees, could be required to exhaust internal union remedies prior to receiving a judicial determination of the permissible extent of the fees.17 Although the Abood Court’s holding was limited because of the procedural posture of the case, the Court expressly held that the action commenced by the plaintiffs in Abood could not, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, be dismissed for failure to state a claim, and that the union and the board, not the plaintiffs, were constitutionally required, in the event that the parties could not "voluntarily” resolve their dispute, to establish that the amount of the agency shop fees reflected the proportionate costs of permissible collective bargaining expenditures.
The following appears to have occurred upon remand from the United States Supreme Court. The union and the board demanded payment of all outstanding agency fees pursuant to an internal union procedure by which the union would determine what amounts, if any, were to be refunded. Parks did not object to paying her share of the union’s costs of collective bargaining. She alleged, however, that the amounts demanded grossly exceeded her pro-rata share of those permissible costs, filing an extensive affidavit to support that *257allegation,18 and moved the trial court, unsuccessfully, to allow depositing the entire amount of the fees demanded into a neutral escrow account pending the judicial determination of the appropriate costs. The union and the board moved to have Parks dismissed as a party plaintiff on grounds of lack of standing. After denying Parks’ renewed motion to establish an escrow account, the Court dismissed Parks from the action for lack of standing to challenge the constitutional permissibility of the amount of the fee.19 Immediately thereafter Parks was discharged.20
Parks contended that, pursuant to Abood, because the demanded service fee included disputed amounts, she was entitled to deposit the fees into an escrow account pending proof by the union of her proportionate share of the costs of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance *258adjustment. She argued that compelling the payment of amounts beyond her proportionate share of those costs would be violative of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free speech and association because it would impermissibly impose a prior restraint upon the free exercise of those fundamental rights.
On the basis of my reading of Abood, I am persuaded that Parks’ assertions were meritorious and, therefore, that a justifiable excuse for her actions was presented. My interpretation of Abood in this regard is consistent with the Court of Appeals decision in Ball v Detroit, 84 Mich App 383; 269 NW2d 607 (1978), and the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions.21 Moreover, it is consistent with two recent decisions in which the Supreme Court has interpreted its own decision in Abood. See Chicago Teachers Union v Hudson, 475 US 292; 106 S Ct 1066; 89 L Ed 2d 232 (1986); Ellis v Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 466 US 435; 104 S Ct 1883; 80 L Ed 2d 428 (1984).
In Chicago Teachers Union, supra, 89 L Ed 2d 244, the Court considered the procedural safeguards required by the First Amendment in light of its decision in Abood, supra, that nonunion employees have a "constitutional right to 'prevent the Union’s spending a part of their required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative’ ” *259(quoting Abood, supra, 234). The Court held that "the constitutional requirements for the Union’s collection of agency fees include an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending.” Id., 89 L Ed 2d 259.
The Court held, consistent with its earlier decision in Ellis, supra, that a "forced exaction followed by a rebate” is inadequate because it does not "avoid the risk that dissenters’ funds may be used temporarily for an improper purpose.” Id., 89 L Ed 2d 246. Quoting Abood, supra, 244 (concurring opinion), the Court said: " '[T]he Union should not be permitted to exact a service fee from nonmembers without first establishing a procedure which will avoid the risk that their funds will be used, even temporarily, to finance ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining.’ ” The Court emphasized its holding in Abood that, although the nonunion employee has the burden of raising an objection, "the union retains the burden of proof ” concerning the constitutionally permissible amount of the required agency shop fees. Chicago Teachers Union (citing Abood, supra, 239-240, n 40). The Court addressed the union’s burden of proof in this regard, furthermore, stating that the union is required to establish the amount of expenditures for permissible "collective bargaining and contract administration,” and not simply to identify the amount impermissibly expended. Id., 89 L Ed 2d 247.
The Court addressed the union’s proposal that maintaining an escrow of one hundred percent of the contributions exacted from dissenting nonunion employees would eliminate any valid constitu*260tional objection to the procedure it had instituted.22 The Court rejected that proposal, stating that the union’s procedure would remain flawed in two respects because it did not "provide an adequate explanation for the advance reduction of dues, and it [did] not provide a reasonably prompt decision by an impartial decisionmaker.” Id., 89 L Ed 2d 249. The Court said:
We reiterate that these characteristics are required because the agency shop itself impinges on the nonunion employees’ First Amendment interests, and because the nonunion employee has the burden of objection. The appropriately justified advance reduction and the prompt, impartial decisionmaker are necessary to minimize both the impingement and the burden. [Id.]
The Court concluded that, even with the proposed one hundred percent escrow, the union’s internal rebate procedure would continue "to provide less than the Constitution requires in this context,” and, therefore, affirmed the Court of Appeals judgment of reversal. Id., 89 L Ed 2d 249.
The propriety of Parks’ discharge is not at issue in the case at bar.23 The meritoriousness of her claim, that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited her employer from requiring her to *261submit the agency fees in the manner in which those fees were demanded, must be considered, however, in determining whether her actions constituted "misconduct connected with [her] work” or a "voluntar[y] [leaving] without good cause attributable to the employer” within the meaning of § 29(l)(a) or (b). The circuit court, affirming the split decision of the mesc Board of Review,24 expressly declined considering the "merits” of Parks’ asserted justification for her actions.25 I am persuaded that the circuit court erred in not considering the particular circumstances which led to Parks’ discharge, and that the Court of Appeals memorandum affirmance was likewise erroneous in that regard. In reviewing the application of § 29(l)(a) or (b), the particular circumstances surrounding the claimant’s discharge must be carefully considered. Under the circumstances, I am convinced that Parks’ actions, after remand from the United States Supreme Court in Abood, were based upon a meritorious First Amendment claim against her employer. I would hold, therefore, that her actions did not constitute "misconduct” within the meaning of §29(l)(b), and that her refusal to pay the service fees, which included an amount properly disputed, did not constitute a "voluntary] *262[leaving] without good cause attributable to the employer.”
The analyses of my colleagues, like those of the Court of Appeals and circuit court, fail to adequately consider the particular circumstances which resulted in Parks’ discharge. The assertion in Justice Brickley’s opinion that Parks "did not have a constitutional right not to pay the fees,” is inaccurate, and does not support his analysis. The Supreme Court, in Abood, expressly held that Parks had presented a valid claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and that the burden of constitutionally justifying the amount of the agency shop fees rested with the union and the board. The Abood decision did not require Parks to pay the fees upon demand without any explanation whatsoever of the union’s permissible expenditures, and to submit the entire amount of the disputed fees to the union in order to have standing to challenge’ the constitutionally permissible amount of the fees.
To characterize Parks’ refusal to relinquish her First Amendment rights as wilful "misconduct connected with [her] work” is untenable; it was neither "misconduct” nor "connected” in any significant way with her work as a teacher and counselor.
With regard to Parks’ disqualification under § 29(l)(a), the merits of her claim must be considered in determining whether she "left work voluntarily” and "without good cause attributable to the employer.” Because Parks asserted a meritorious justification for not paying the agency fees in the amount and terms demanded, her unemployment did not result "voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer.”26
*263Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Abood, Parks reasonably believed, acting upon the advice of counsel, that her constitutional right to be free from coerced political and ideological conformity entitled her not to contribute the agency fee under the circumstances in which it was demanded. She did not refuse "to pay any fee whatsoever;” she refused to pay an amount equal to union dues directly to the union without an escrow arrangement, subject to an internal rebate procedure, without any advance reduction, explanation, or accounting, or an opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decision-maker. I would conclude that the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming Parks’ disqualification under § 29(l)(a) was clearly erroneous. The Court failed to consider the particular circumstances which led to Parks’ discharge, including the asserted justification for her actions. Pursuant to my reading of Abood, supra, Parks’ actions were in justifiable reliance upon her good-faith and meritorious belief that, consistent with the United States Constitution, she could not be compelled, under the particular circumstances, to submit to her employer’s demand.
Finally, I would clarify that the constitutionality of Parks’ discharge is not dispositive of the statutory issues presented in the case at bar. Whether Parks appealed her dismissal as a party-plaintiff in Abood, whether she chose to contest the propriety of her discharge before the Teacher Tenure Commission, and the outcome of any of the potential *264litigation concerning Parks’ discharge which did, or could have, ensued, is, likewise, not dispositive. In reviewing the application of § 29(l)(a) or (b), the particular factual circumstances surrounding the claimant’s discharge are controlling. My colleagues’ analyses are flawed to the extent that they avoid evaluating the asserted justification for Parks’ actions.
hi
In Wickey v Employment Security Comm, 369 Mich 487; 120 NW2d 181 (1963), this Court strictly construed the predecessor of § 29(l)(a), and reaffirmed its earlier rejection of the doctrine of "constructive voluntary leaving.” Id., 497. We granted leave to appeal in each of the present cases to consider the application of § 29(l)(a) in cases in which the claimant was discharged — in each case the claimant’s disqualification was upheld by the Court of Appeals on the basis of that provision.
I would acknowledge that § 29(l)(a) may be applicable, under some circumstances, in cases in which an employee is discharged; the applicability of § 29(l)(a) should not be limited to cases in which the employee says "I quit.” When an employee voluntarily fails to comply with a condition of employment with knowledge that such failure requires resignation or will result in termination, and without good cause attributable to the employer, that disqualifying provision may, under the particular circumstances, be applicable. Issues concerning "volition” and "good cause” must be determined case by case. Whether an employee was formally discharged as opposed to voluntarily resigning should not, in all cases, be dispositive. When a claimant asserts a justifiable excuse for his actions, that justification must be carefully *265considered. See, e.g., Nottelson v Wisconsin Dep’t of Industry, 94 Wis 2d 106; 287 NW2d 763 (1980); Barksdale v Director of Div of Employment Security, 397 Mass 49; 489 NE2d 994 (1986). See, generally, Packard, Unemployment without fault: Disqualifications for unemployment insurance beneñts, 17 Vill LR 635 (1972), and cases and commentary cited therein.
IV
In summary, I concur in Justice Brickley’s decision for reversal in Dolce. While I disagree with Justice Brickley’s construction and application of §29(l)(b) in Lindquist, I concur in the decision to affirm on the basis of the Court of Appeals application of § 29(l)(a).
In Parks, I would conclude that neither subsection (l)(a) or (b) is applicable, under the particular facts presented, and would, therefore, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. My disposition of Parks would make it unnecessary to address the independent constitutional question presented.27
*266Levin, J., concurred only in the result reached by Riley, J.The Court of Appeals, reversing the decisions of the circuit court and the mesc Board of Review, found that Lindquist’s actions "could be considered misconduct.” The Court also held that Lindquist’s failure to comply with the residency requirement constituted a "voluntary leaving without good cause attributable to the employer” within the meaning of § 29(l)(a). 139 Mich App 515, 522-523; 362 NW2d 771 (1984).
See Packard, Unemployment without fault: Disqualiñcations for unemployment insurance benefits, 17 Vill LR 635 (1972); Kempfer, Disqualiñcations for voluntary leaving and misconduct, 55 Yale L J 147 (1945).
See Kempfer, n 2.
See Anno: Termination of employment as a result of union action or pursuant to union contract as "voluntary” for purposes of unemployment compensation beneñts, 90 ALR2d 835, 851; Anno: Eligibility for unemployment compensation as affected by voluntary resignation because of change of location of residence, 21 ALR4th 317.
Ante, pp 232, 233.
Pursuant to the similar disqualifying provisions of some jurisdictions, "good cause” need not be "attributable to the employer.” See Anno: 21 ALR4th 317. See also Packard, n 2 supra, 641.
See Anno: 90 ALR2d 835. See also, e.g., Nottelson v Wisconsin Dep’t of Industry, 94 Wis 2d 106; 287 NW2d 763 (1980), text accompanying n 12 and cases cited therein. Cf. Barksdale v Director of Div of Employment Security, 397 Mass 49; 489 NE2d 994 (1986).
In 1973, the Legislature amended the public employment relations act to permit agency shop union security agreements. See MCL 423.210; MSA 17.455(10). In Abood v Detroit Bd of Ed, 60 Mich App 92, 98; 230 NW2d 322 (1975), the Court of Appeals held that the 1973 amendment could not be applied retroactively and, therefore, invalidated the agency shop provision in the contract entered into in 1969 between the Detroit Federation of Teachers and the Detroit Board of Education.
Abood v Detroit Bd of Ed, 431 US 209; 97 S Ct 1782; 52 L Ed 2d 261 (1977). Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined in Justice Stewart’s opinion. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens also wrote separate concurring opinions, and Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined.
Abood, n 8 supra, 60 Mich App 99. The Court construed § 10 of the pera, as amended, which permits employment to be conditioned upon the payment of a service fee equal in amount to dues required of union members, as not limited to the proportionate necessary costs of collective bargaining and the concomitant benefits received by nonunion employees. The Court further stated:
The political activities of labor unions are well-recognized. It is reasonable to assume that at least a portion of every union’s budget goes to activities that could be termed political, e.g., support of candidates sympathetic to the union cause and lobbying for the passage of bills in the Legislature. Since the amendment of MCL 423.210; MSA 17.455(10), does not limit the nonmember’s contribution to his proportionate share of the costs of collective bargaining, it is clear that the amendment sanctions the use of nonunion members’ fees for purposes other than collective bargaining.
Therefore, we conclude that the agency shop clause, as prospectively authorized by the amendment to MCL 423.210; MSA 17.455(10), could violate plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [Id., 99-100.]
Id., 102.
See, e.g., Sullivan, Freedom of association and the public sector agency shop: Ball v Detroit, and Abood v Detroit Board of Education, 85 Dick L R 21 (1980); Pulliam, Union security clauses in public sector labor contracts and Abood v Detroit Board of Education: A dissent, 31 Lab L J 539 (1980); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 Harv L R 70, 188-198 (1977); Note, Constitutional limits on the use of contributions compelled under agency shop agreements, 38 La LR 850 (1978); Comment, Abood v Detroit Board of Education: Association as a First Amendment right — The protection of the nonmember employee in the context of public sector unionism, 1977 Utah LR 487. See also Developments in the law — Public employment, 97 Harv LR 1611, 1728-1734 (1984); Schmedemann, Of meetings and mailboxes: The First Amendment and exclusive representation in public sector labor relations, 72 Va L R 91 (1986); Comment, The use of public funds for legislative lobbying and electoral campaigning, 37 Vand L R 433 (1984).
The Court accepted the proposition that the agency shop itself impinges upon dissenting employees’ First Amendment rights of free speech and association inasmuch as the employee is forced to support an association espousing demands and ideas with which he does not agree. The Court acknowledged that the activities of public unions directly "influence governmental policymaking” and "may be properly termed political.” Abood, supra, 231. The Court upheld the public sector agency shop only to the extent that it was necessary to promote labor peace and stability, by permitting an exclusive bargain*254ing representative, and avoiding the "free-rider” problem that would arise if the employees were not required to support the union financially, but still benefited from the union’s collective bargaining activities. Id., 224.
The Court held unanimously that nonunion employees could not, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, be compelled to contribute to the support of ideological causes which were not work-related and that the employees opposed. See id., 232-237.
Id., 235.
Counsel for appellee, Detroit Public Schools, has inaccurately represented the Supreme Court’s decision in Abood. Counsel continues to assert that in Abood, the Court held that Parks had no "First Amendment right not to pay an agency service fee.” During the circuit court proceedings, counsel argued, although she was subsequently corrected partially by cocounsel, that the Abood decision specifically disapproved the escrow remedy, and approved the pure rebate procedure. Wayne Circuit Court, Brennan, J., July 28, 1982, on appeal from the mesc Board of Review, pp 36, 47-49. Counsel continues to argue that the constitutional issues underlying the dispute which resulted in Parks’ discharge were entirely settled "adversely to [Parks] in Abood.” The specific holding in Abood vacating the Court of Appeals affirmance of the dismissal of Parks’ claim and effectively reinstating that claim to proceed consistent with the Court’s decision that the constitution requires imposing the burden of proof upon the union in such cases, has been completely ignored.
Because of the procedural posture of the case — dismissal for failure to state a claim — the Court did not pass upon the merits of the case or the constitutional sufficiency of the possible remedies which it discussed. Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring, Abood, supra, 244, said:
[T]he Court’s opinion does not foreclose the argument that the union should not be permitted to.exact a service fee from nonmembers without first establishing a procedure which will avoid the risk that their funds will be used, even temporarily, to finance ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining.
*256More recently, in Ellis v Brotherhood of Ry Clerks, 466 US 435, 443-444; 104 S Ct 1883; 80 L Ed 2d 428 (1984), the Court expressly rejected the "pure rebate approach” because "the union obtains an involuntary loan for purposes to which the employee objects,” and alternatives, such as "interest-bearing escrow accounts” are "readily available alternatives.” See Sullivan, n 12 supra, 39-41.
See Sullivan, n 12 supra, 28-32. The Abood Court "merely suggested the desirability of an internal union remedy,” and the possibility that the parties would "voluntarily” resolve their dispute. Chicago Teachers Union v Hudson, 475 US 292, —, n 19; 106 S Ct 1066; 89 L Ed 2d 232, 247, n 19 (1986) (citing Abood, supra, 240, and n 41). In Chicago Teachers Union, the Court held that a "reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decision-maker” is constitutionally required, id., 89 L Ed 2d 249, and, thus, that a dissenting nonunion employee "need not exhaust internal union hearing procedures . . . .” Id. (White, J., concurring).
Parks filed an affidavit in which she specifically objected to the use of the service fees for all political and ideological purposes unrelated to the union’s duties as exclusive bargaining representative. She referenced numerous issues of an official union publication to support her allegation that the demanded fees included impermissible amounts, that she had not been provided with an accounting of her proportionate share of the union’s costs of collective bargaining, and that the "authorization for deduction of full agency-shop service fees” which the union demanded she sign, contained the following language: " 'I hereby waive all right and claim for . . . monies paid in accordance with this authorization.’ ”
See Detroit Bd of Ed v Parks, 98 Mich App 22, 46-48, n 24; 296 NW2d 815 (1980). The constitutionality of Parks’ dismissal escaped judicial review. The Court of Appeals found that issue to be moot "because Mrs. Parks’ case is before us now . . . .” Id., 48. Parks’ motion for reconsideration in which she asked the Court to reconsider, or at least explain, its disposition of her "constitutional” challenge to her discharge as somehow having become "moot” was denied.
Parks appealed her discharge to the State Tenure Commission, which ruled in her favor. Her statutory challenge was rejected on appeal to the circuit court, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the teacher tenure act, MCL 38.71 et seq.; MSA 15.1971 et seq., was inapplicable. Detroit Bd of Ed v Parks, n 19 supra. This Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. 417 Mich 268; 335 NW2d 641 (1983). Her constitutional challenge was not addressed by this Court.
Ball involved similar challenges to an agency shop agreement entered into in 1970 by the City of Detroit and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees. The Court of Appeals postponed its decision in Ball, pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Abood. See Sullivan, n 12 supra, for a discussion of Ball and Abood. Cf. White Cloud Ed Ass’n v Bd of Ed, 101 Mich App 309; 300 NW2d 551 (1980). See also School Comm v Greenfield Ed Ass’n, 385 Mass 70; 431 NE2d 180 (1982); Beck v Communications Workers of America, 468 F Supp 93 (D Md, 1973). See, generally, Anno: Union security arrangements in state public employment, 95 ALR3d 1102 (1979).
The union had instituted the escrow procedure subsequent to the district court’s decision. The Court considered the procedure as it was presented to the district court, stating: "It is clear that 'voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case.’ ” Chicago Teachers Union, n 17 supra, 89 L Ed 2d 246, n 14 (citation omitted). The union also advised the Court that it "would not object to the entry of a judgment compelling it to maintain an escrow system in the future.” Id., 89 L Ed 2d 248.
Parks does not challenge the constitutionality of her discharge, but only her disqualification from receiving unemployment benefits. The merits of her dispute with the board are considered in this opinion only to the extent that "[t]he circumstances under which one leaves work must be carefully examined” in determining the applicability of § 29(l)(a).
The mesc Board of Review affirmed the referee’s decision by a vote of two to one. The dissenting member correctly considered the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Abood concerning the limited permissibility of the public sector agency shop, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the union’s burden of proof to constitutionally justify the amount of the agency fees compelled from dissenting nonunion employees as a condition of public employment.
The circuit court noted that the constitutionality of the public sector agency shop was "exhaustive[ly]” addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Abood, supra. The circuit court also noted that the propriety of Parks’ discharge had been examined in "another action.” The circuit court, therefore, found it unnecessary, in reviewing the application of § 29(l)(a), to consider, to any extent, the merits of Parks’ asserted justification for her conduct. See id.
See n 18.
*263Cf. Nottelson v Wisconsin Dep’t of Industry, 94 Wis 2d 106; 287 NW2d 763 (1980). When an employee, in good faith, relies upon a meritorious legal justification for his noncompliance with a rule of employment, his actions are not necessarily inconsistent with the employer-employee relationship, and, therefore, his unemployment after being discharged, without regard to the propriety of the discharge, may not have been "voluntary” or "without good cause attributable to the employer” within the meaning of § 29(l)(a).
Parks challenges her disqualification under § 29(l)(a) as violative of the federal constitution on independent First Amendment grounds. Parks asserts that because "the agency shop itself is 'a significant impingement on First Amendment rights,’ ” Chicago Teachers Union, n 17 supra, 89 L Ed 2d 247-248, n 20 (quoting Ellis, n 16 supra, 455), her disqualification, assuming she voluntarily terminated her own employment without good cause attributable to her employer within the meaning of § 29(l)(a), would be unconstitutional as applied and, therefore, that an exemption would be constitutionally required. See Anno: Discharge from employment on ground of political views or conduct as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 29 ALR4th 287; Anno: Leaving or refusing employment for religious reasons as barring unemployment compensation, 12 ALR4th 611 (1982). Parks argues that the important governmental interest in labor stability, which justifies, to a limited extent, public sector union security agreements inasmuch as they narrowly serve that interest by preventing the "free rider” problem, does not justify the additional penalty resulting from the denial of unemployment benefits. She argues that no independent overriding governmental interest justifies compelling her to choose between her entitlement to unemployment compensation benefits and her First Amendment rights. Defendant*266appellee board of education argues that "the only response which [this] Court needs to make to this argument is to rebuke Parks for asserting it,” because "Abood had already decided the 'constitutional issue.’ ”
Because I would conclude that neither statutory disqualification is applicable in Parks, I would not reach this independent constitutional issue.
*267The voluntary procedure was described in Abood, supra, 240, n 41.
Under the procedure adopted by the Union, as explained in the appellees’ brief, a dissenting employee may protest at the beginning of each school year the expenditure of any part of his agency-shop fee for " 'activities or causes of a political nature or involving controversial issues of public importance only incidentally related to wages, hours, and conditions of employment.’ ” The employee is then entitled to a pro rata refund of his service charge in accordance with the calculation of the portion of total Union expenses for the specified purposes. The calculation is made in the first instance by the Union, but is subject to review by an impartial board.