(dissenting). This appeal presents an important question of first impression: May the prosecutor use the defendant’s suppression hearing testimony to impeach his or her testimony at trial? I conclude that the prosecutor may not. Because the use of the defendant’s testimony was not harmless, I dissent.
Schultz relies on Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). Defendant Garrett testified in support of his unsuccessful pretrial motion to suppress certain evidence on fourth amendment grounds. The Government used his testimony in its case-in-chief. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction. The Court said:
Those courts which have allowed the admission of testimony given to establish standing [in support of a suppression motion] have reasoned that there is no violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause because the testimony was voluntary. As an abstract matter, this may well be true. A defendant is “compelled” to testify in support of a motion to suppress only in the sense that if he refrains from testifying he will have to forgo a benefit, and testimony is not always involuntary as a matter of law simply because it is given to obtain a benefit. However, the assumption which underlies this reasoning is that the defendant has a choice: he may refuse to testify and give up the benefit. When this assumption is applied to a situation in which the “benefit” to be gained is that afforded by another provision of the Bill of Rights, an undeniable tension is created. Thus, in this case Garrett *384was obliged either to give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection.
390 U.S. at 393-94 (footnotes omitted).
Simmons was not an impeachment case. Garrett’s testimony upon his unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence was used against him on the issue of guilt in the Government’s case-in-chief. This fact has been considered significant by a number of courts. Also considered significant is the language used by the Court in Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 228 (1973), where the Court explained that, under the Simmons doctrine, the defendant is permitted to establish standing to contest an allegedly illegal search by testifying at a pretrial hearing, and “his testimony on that score is not directly admissible against him in the trial.” (Emphasis added.) Another decision of the Court used by some courts to explain Simmons is United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239 (1974), where the Court in a per curiam decision stated that, “The protective shield of Simmons is not to be converted into a license for false representations on the issue of indigency free from the risk that the claimant will be held accountable for his falsehood.” Id. at 243. The Court suggested that the reader compare this statement to the Court’s holding in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
*385The courts have been sharply divided as to how and in what contexts Simmons shall be applied. See People v. Sturgis, 317 N.E.2d 545, 547-48 (Ill. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975) (statements in motion to suppress admissible to impeach); United States v. Mullens, 536 F.2d 997, 1000 (2d Cir. 1976) (under Simmons, defendant could have testified during suppression hearing without risk that anything he there said could later be used against him at trial); People v. Douglas, 136 Cal. Rptr. 358 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (defendant’s testimony made during course of a hearing to suppress illegally seized evidence admissible for impeachment purposes); United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 333 (3d Cir. 1977) (defendant could not be required, as the cost of litigating a valid fifth amendment double jeopardy claim, to waive the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a later trial); United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979) (defendant may testify at a pretrial double jeopardy hearing and his testimony may not subsequently be used against him at the trial on the merits); Gray v. State, 403 A.2d 853, 858 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (Simmons does not preclude the use of defendant’s testimony at a suppression hearing to impeach the credibility of later testimony); McGahee v. Massey, 667 F.2d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982) (under Simmons, testimony at a bond hearing is not admissible at the trial on the merits); United States v. Quesada-Rosadal, 685 F.2d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 1982) (use of prior inconsistent statements given at a suppression hearing can be used to impeach a defendant’s trial testimony); United States v. Gomez-Diaz, 712 F.2d 949, 951 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1051 (1984) (under Simmons, a defendant at a suppression hearing may *386testify without fear that the testimony will be used against him at trial except for impeachment); United States v. Garcia, 721 F.2d 721, 723 (11th Cir. 1983) (defendant may testify at a pretrial double jeopardy hearing and disclose matters without fear that the evidence will be used against him at the ensuing trial); Guenther v. Holmgreen, 738 F.2d 879, 886 n. 7 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1212 (1985) (neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided how Simmons may apply to a pretrial hearing other than a suppression hearing— such as an arraignment or a preliminary hearing); United States v. Hernandez Camacho, 779 F.2d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1119 (1986) (Simmons rule does not apply to the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding); Porretto v. Stalder, 834 F.2d 461, 466 (5th Cir. 1987) (bail testimony voluntarily given by the defendant is admissible against him at trial); U.S. v. Ragins, 840 F.2d 1184, 1193 (4th Cir. 1988) (defendant does not waive his privilege against self-incrimination by offering testimony at a pretrial double jeopardy hearing); U.S. v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200, 207 (3d Cir. 1988) (prosecutor’s argument that defendant’s reliance on his fourth amendment rights constituted evidence of guilt undermine Simmons rule).
In United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1980), the Court said: “This Court has not decided whether Simmons precludes the use of a defendant’s testimony at a suppression hearing to impeach his testimony at trial.” In n. 8, however, the Court said that “[a] number of courts considering the question have held that such testimony is admissible as evidence of impeachment.” (Citations omitted.) In n. 9 the Court said that “[t]his Court has held that ‘the protective shield of Simmons is not to be converted into a license *387for false representations. ..United States v. Kahan 99
Justice Marshall, with Justice Brennan joining, dissented noting that, “Respondents contend that the testimony given at the suppression hearing might be held admissible for impeachment purposes and, while acknowledging that that question is not before us in this case, the majority broadly hints that this is so.” (Citations omitted.) Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 96.
Two points need to be noted. First, none of the cases have involved the defendant’s testimony in support of his or her motion to suppress on Goodchild grounds a confession or inculpatory statement. Second, those courts which have permitted the prosecutor to use the defendant’s testimony at a suppression hearing for impeachment purposes have relied on decisions of the United States Supreme Court which permit the use of testimony or evidence where exclusion is not necessary to meet the objectives of an exclusionary rule. Harris v. New York and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) involved inadmissible evidence which had been obtained in violation of the defendant’s Miranda warning rights. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), involved inadmissible evidence obtained solely in violation of the defendant’s fourth amendment rights. In describing the results of these cases, the United States Supreme Court has said:
In those cases, the ends of the exclusionary rules were thought adequately implemented by denying the government the use of the challenged evidence to make out its case in chief. The incremental furthering of those ends by forbidding impeachment of the defendant who testifies was deemed insufficient to permit or require that false testimony go unchal*388lenged, with the resulting impairment of the integrity of the factfinding goals of the criminal trial.
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627, reh’g denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980).
“In the case of the fifth amendment, however, it is the constitutional right itself, not simply policy concerns, that requires exclusion of compelled testimony.” State v. Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d 821, 833 n. 8, 419 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Ct. App. 1987). (Citing Note, The Impeachment Exception to the Sixth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 176, 182 (1987)).
We recently held that a probation interview which dealt with the crime with which the defendant was charged could not be used to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony. Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d at 826-34, 419 N.W.2d at 565-68. We relied on Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), and New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
In New Jersey v. Portash, the defendant testified before a grand jury after the prosecutors agreed not to use his statements or evidence derived from them in subsequent criminal proceedings. He was thereafter indicted. He did not testify in his defense after the trial court ruled the prosecution could use his immunized grand jury testimony for purposes of impeachment. He was found guilty. On appeal, he contended that the proposed use of his immunized grand jury testimony violated his fifth and fourteenth amendment rights. The Supreme Court agreed, saying:
The Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments provide that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” As we reaffirmed last Term, a defendant’s compelled statements, as opposed to statements taken in *389violation of Miranda, may not be put to any testimonial use whatever against him in a criminal trial. “But any criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law.” (Emphasis in original) Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398...
440 U.S. at 459 (footnote omitted).
In Simmons, the Court in substance held that Simmons was “compelled” to testify in support of his motion to suppress. While the Court stated that testimony is not always involuntary as a matter of law simply because it is given to obtain a benefit, the Court said it is intolerable that a criminal defendant must give up one constitutional right — not to incriminate himself — in order to assert another — to suppress evidence obtained in violation of a constitutional right.
The United States Supreme Court has already signaled that it will allow testimony given at a suppression hearing to be used for impeachment purposes where the ends of the exclusionary rules are adequately implemented by denying the prosecution the use of the challenged evidence to make out its case-in-chief. Thus, testimony at a pretrial suppression hearing based on a violation of the defendant’s Miranda warning rights or in violation of his fourth amendment rights, and perhaps his sixth amendment right to counsel, may be used to impeach the defendant if he testifies. I see no similar signal where the defendant seeks to suppress evidence obtained in violation of his or her fifth amendment right.
In this case, Schultz attempted to suppress, as involuntary, his statements at the hospital after his arrest. He seeks the protection of the fifth amendment, not an exclusionary rule.
*390The Wisconsin Supreme Court in adopting the rule for determining the voluntariness of confessions, prescribed the “orthodox” procedure described in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 264, 133 N.W.2d 753, 763 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1017 (1966). Under this procedure, known as a Goodchild hearing, the trial judge makes a determination of voluntariness. As to this procedure the court said:
At this hearing the defendant may take the stand and testify for the limited purpose of making a record of his version of the facts and circumstances under which the confession was obtained. By so doing, the defendant does not waive his right to decline to take the stand in his own defense on the trial in chief. Neither does he waive any of the other rights stemming from his choice not to testify.
Id. at 265, 133 N.W.2d at 764 (footnote omitted).
The purpose of a Goodchild hearing is indeed “limited.” The defendant is not expected to defend himself or herself on the merits. The sole purpose of a Goodchild hearing is to make a record of the volunta-riness of the alleged confession or inculpatory statement. It would be a perversion of the Goodchild procedure to allow the prosecution to use the defendant’s Goodchild testimony for impeachment purposes at trial. More important, such use of the defendant’s Goodchild testimony would violate his or her fifth amendment rights.
The state argues that, in any event, if the prosecutor’s use of the defendant’s hearing testimony was error, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The states argues that “it is doubtful” that the questions and the defendant’s answers at the Goodchild *391hearing had any impact on the jury. The state argues that Schultz’s Goodchild hearing testimony simply established that there was a period in which he could not remember an account he had given to the police as to the circumstances of his wife’s death. The possible use by the state of the defendant’s hearing testimony for impeachment purposes was anticipated by the defense and extensive briefs were filed by the state and the defendant. The issue of the use of the defendant’s hearing testimony was argued at length to the trial court before the court made its ruling. Neither the prosecutor not defendant’s counsel regarded this evidence, if admitted, as having little potential impact on the jury. Schultz’s credibility was a major issue in the trial. In the circumstances, I conclude that the use of Schultz’s Goodchild hearing testimony was not harmless error. Cf. State v. Childs, 146 Wis. 2d 116, 123-29, 430 N.W.2d 363, 356-58 (Ct. App. 1988) (harmless error doctrine applied to admission of involuntary confessions or inculpatory statements).