People v. Dennany

Boyle, J.

(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the result of the lead opinion in Dennany. I also agree that a request for standby counsel is not, as a matter of law, an unequivocal assertion of a desire to proceed pro se. I write separately to disagree with the Court’s suggestion that a departure from the requirements of MCR 6.005(D) and (E) will justify reversal of a conviction. Where the record establishes that a waiver of the right to counsel is knowing and voluntary, reversal is not justified. Consequently, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals with regard to defendant Jones and reinstate his conviction.

i

The court rule imposes a number of strict requirements on a trial judge confronted with a defendant who asserts a desire to proceed pro se.1 *459Although, the remedy for a trial court’s failure to comply with all or some of these requirements is the central issue to be decided in this case,2 the *460lead opinion would not expressly decide it.3 Instead, the lead opinion generally alludes to the nature of the noncompliance and specifically requires reaffirmance of the waiver at each subsequent proceeding. Ante at 434. I would reaffirm the nonformalistic approach approved of in People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 370; 247 NW2d 857 (1976). A defendant validly asserts the right to proceed pro se when the record indicates that "he knowingly and intelligently forgoes his right to counsel” and "is able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.” McKaskle v Wiggins, 465 US 168, 173; 104 S Ct 944; 79 L Ed 2d 122 (1984).

While the court rules provide useful guidance to trial courts, our experience refutes the proposition that "appellate parachutes” are closed by establishing lengthy check lists.4 When a lapse in the *461litany provides an avenue for appellate relief, adoption of a litany approach creates an appellate parachute. All things being equal, the longer the litany and the more times it is required, the more likely it is that a lapse will occur.

A

Neither the precedents of this Court nor those of the United States Supreme Court require a formalistic approach. In People v Anderson, supra at 370, this Court noted that the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver stems from Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458; 58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938), which endorsed a case-by-case approach when reviewing a waiver, including consideration of "the background, experience and conduct of the accused.” Anderson, supra at 370. Adopting such an approach in Anderson, we reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, because the defendant’s sophisticated responses and history of involvement with the criminal justice system indicated "that he knew what he was doing and made his choice with eyes open.” Id. at 371.

Likewise, as the United States Supreme Court explained in McKaskle v Wiggins, supra at 173, the constitutional requirements for proceeding pro se are straightforward: "an accused has a Sixth Amendment right to conduct his own defense, provided only that he knowingly and intelligently forgoes his right to counsel and that he is able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.” Thus, both Michigan5 and federal *462precedent hold that a defendant may proceed pro se if he makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and is able to properly conduct himself in the courtroom.

We should adopt as the standard for appellate review this shorter and simpler approach, which allows appellate courts to assess whether a defendant made his decision to proceed pro se " 'with eyes open.’ ” Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 835; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975). First, the defendant must waive his right to counsel "knowingly and intelligently.” Id.6 When seeking a waiver, the important inquiry is whether a defen*463dant knows what his rights are, and the risks, "dangers and disadvantages” of waiving those rights and going it alone. Id. Any defendant who either refuses to, or is incapable of, fully, or unequivocally, waiving his right to counsel, will not be permitted to proceed pro se.7 In the second inquiry, the judge must determine whether the defendant "is able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.” McKaskle at 173. These two inquiries are all that Faretta, McKaskle, and Anderson require of a trial judge who is charged with determining whether an accused will be permitted to conduct his own defense.

As the lead opinion acknowledges, the majority of federal courts have adopted a nonformalistic approach when determining whether a defendant has properly waived his right to counsel: "[t]he common thread that can be gleaned from [the federal] cases is that '[t]he ultimate test is not the trial court’s express advice, but rather the defendant’s understanding.’ ” Ante at 431. LaFave and Israel explain further:

Other courts take the position that Faretta requires only that the defendant have been aware of the disadvantages of proceeding pro se, and that awareness can be established without regard to any admonitions or colloquies. "Because the test [for a valid waiver] concerns what the accused understood rather than what the court said or *464understood, explanations are not required.” A waiver is constitutionally acceptable where such factors as defendant’s involvement in previous criminal trials, his representation by counsel before trial, and his explanation of his reasons for proceeding pro se indicate that he was fully aware of the difficulties of self-representation. [2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 11.5, p 47.]

This approach is consistent with that taken in Anderson, in which this Court held that although "the trial court did not explicitly inform defendant Overby of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . the sophisticated and comprehensive nature of defendant Overby’s expressed reasons for dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel, together with his history of personal involvement with the criminal justice system, indicates that he knew what he was doing and made his choice with eyes open.” Id. at 370-371. (Emphasis added.) Finally, this nonformalistic approach is consistent with this Court’s reluctance to reverse criminal convictions on the basis of technical noncompliance with the Michigan Court Rules.8

B

The requirement in MCR 6.005(E) that a trial court obtain a new waiver at every subsequent proceeding is neither compelled nor discussed by Faretta, McKaskle, or Anderson. The imposition of such a requirement for a valid waiver runs counter to the notion, present in all three opinions, that self-representation is a right. A defen*465dant who knowingly and intelligently exercises his right to represent himself has made a choice. Given that the likely consequence of such a choice will be to the defendant’s disadvantage, a searching inquiry into the degree to which the defendant understands the alternatives and consequences is initially appropriate. Assuming, however, that a defendant has in fact intelligently exercised that right at a stage in the proceeding, he need not be subjected at each new proceeding to an intimation that the choice was a poor one.

We do not permit defendants to waive counsel at arraignment on the warrant despite expression of a desire to do so. Unless a defendant says he will retain counsel, an attorney is appointed; "assistance of counsel is automatic; assuming the right is not waived, assistance must be made available at critical stages of a criminal prosecution, whether or not the defendant has requested it.” Adams v Carroll, 875 F2d 1441, 1444 (CA 9, 1989) (citation omitted). We do not permit defendants to waive rights at felony arraignment without the assistance of counsel, nor do defendants express a desire for self-representation at preliminary examination.9 The issue of self-representation is typically a trial-stage problem for the trial judge.

At the stage in the criminal process when the issue of self-representation commonly arises, the most sophisticated defendant is well aware of the right to counsel. He has, in fact, been advised of the right or provided with counsel in at least two previous court appearances. Thus, it should not be presumed that an individual who repeatedly receives the assistance of counsel and negotiates the barriers to waiver "forgets” the right to be repre*466sented or the consequences of self-representation.10 Literal compliance at each successive appearance before the same trial judge is redundant.

The formalistic waiver requirement of MCR 6.005(E), which dictates a new waiver at each successive stage of the prosecution does not serve to further any obvious policy. To be sure, some defendants may change their minds about wanting to proceed pro se and request counsel. There is nothing in our case law that prevents a trial judge from readvising a defendant on the right to counsel if the circumstances require and permit it, just as there is nothing requiring a trial judge to readvise a pro se defendant on the right to counsel.

ii

Applying the nonformalistic approach employed by the majority of federal courts and this Court in Anderson to the particular facts in People v Jones, defendant Jones made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel,11 and therefore his conviction should be affirmed.

*467To begin with, Jones, like the defendant in Anderson, had a history of personal involvement with the criminal justice system consisting of six prior felonies and four misdemeanors. Jones was fully apprised of his right to counsel at the first arraignment and the preliminary examination and exercised this right by asking for and receiving appointed counsel.

Additionally, defendant Jones was represented by counsel during the motion when he asked to proceed pro se. Jones and counsel conferred before the motion was granted, and counsel confirmed that Jones wished to proceed pro se and that, in his opinion, Jones had the intelligence and competence to do so. Jones’ performance in motions and at trial, including knowledge of the criteria considered in setting bond, knowledge of the 180-day rule, and detailed discovery requests, confirm this assessment.

Moreover, Jones’ statement at the motion hearing that he would "appear in pro per” but would have "no objection” to standby counsel providing clerical assistance, suggests that his level of sophistication regarding representation pro se included an understanding that counsel’s participation might constitute an interference with the pro se right in the eyes of the law. Whether or not Jones’ understanding of the complexity of representation pro se was in fact so sophisticated, his clear understanding that he could waive or assert the right to counsel at each subsequent proceeding is shown in his penultimate exchange with the *468trial court when, after having confirmed his desire to proceed with counsel at sentencing, he objected to not having been permitted to personally examine the file in this matter. In these circumstances, it is abundantly clear that Jones fully understood his right to be represented by counsel and knowingly relinquished it.

Defendant Jones had a high school education, some college education, and was described by both counsel and the court as extremely intelligent. Given the totality of circumstances, "it is 'inconceivable that defendant did not know what he was doing.’ ” People v Mack, 190 Mich App 7, 16; 475 NW2d 830 (1991). Jones knowingly waived the right to counsel.12

Finally, although not briefed or argued, and therefore not decided, I observe that even if Jones had not validly waived his right to counsel, it is a distinct question whether error arising from the lack of full representation would be prejudicial.13

*469CONCLUSION

Accordingly, I would hold that a defendant may proceed pro se "provided only that he knowingly and intelligently forgoes his right to counsel and that he is able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.” McKaskle, supra at 173. Whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent is to be assessed in a nonformalistic manner. Anderson, supra at 370. Because a review of the record indicates that the defendant in People v Jones waived his right to counsel, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in that case and remand for consideration of the other issues raised and not addressed below.

Riley, J., concurred with Boyle, J.

First, pursuant to MCR 6.005(D):

The court may not permit the defendant to waive the right to be represented by a lawyer without first
(1) advising the defendant of [a] the charge, [b] the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense, [c] any mandatory minimum sentence required by law, [d] and the risk involved in self representation, and
(2) offering the defendant the opportunity to consult with a retained lawyer or, if the defendant is indigent, the opportunity to consult with an appointed lawyer.

*459Second, pursuant to MCR 6.005(E):

Even though a defendant has waived the assistance of a lawyer, the record of each subsequent proceeding (e.g., preliminary examination, arraignment, proceedings leading to the possible revocation of youthful trainee status, hearings, trial or sentencing) must affirmatively show that the court advised the defendant of the right to a lawyer’s assistance (at public expense if the defendant is indigent) and that the defendant waived that right. Before the court begins such proceedings,
(1) the defendant must reaffirm that a lawyer’s assistance is not wanted; or
(2) if the defendant requests a lawyer and is financially unable to retain one, the court must appoint one; or
(3) if the defendant wants to retain a lawyer and has the financial ability to do so, the court must allow the defendant a reasonable opportunity to retain one.

Finally, in People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 367-368; 247 NW2d 857 (1976), the Court set forth the parameters for effectuating self-representation:

[1] First the request must be unequivocal. . . .
[2] Second, once a defendant has unequivocally declared his desire to proceed pro se the trial court must determine whether defendant is asserting his right knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. The trial court must make the pro se defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and that his choice is made with his eyes open. Defendant’s competence is a pertinent consideration in making this determination. But his competence does not refer to legal skills, "[f]or his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.” [Citations omitted.]
[3] The third and final requirement is that the trial judge determine that the defendant’s acting as his own counsel will not disrupt, unduly inconvenience and burden the court and the administration of the court’s business.

The Court of Appeals in People v Jones encouraged the prosecutor to petition this Court:

[W]e do not ignore, nor are we unsympathetic to, the arguments by the prosecutor. . . . However, neither the court rule nor the case law recognizes this as an exception to the strict *460requirements imposed upon the trial court before allowing a defendant to proceed in propria persona. While we urge the prosecutor to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court to have the Court reconsider whether such strict requirements are necessary where a defendant is represented at the motion to be allowed to proceed in propria persona, or where there is standby counsel available throughout the proceedings, it is for the Supreme Court, and not this Court, to adopt such an exception. [Unpublished opinion per curiam, decided October 29, 1992 (Docket No. 110202).]

See ante at 439, where the lead opinion notes:

Where there is error but it is not one of complete omission of the court rule and Anderson requirements, reversal is not necessarily required. Cf. Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 122-124; 235 NW2d 132 (1975). Whether a particular departure justifies reversal "will depend on the nature of the noncompliance.” Id., p 113.

In contrast, Chief Justice Cavanagh, writing separately, would "explicitly require strict compliance with the court rules.” Ante at 456.

In People v Blue, 428 Mich 684, 689; 411 NW2d 451 (1987), Justice Griffin, writing for a unanimous Court, noted: "[w]e have held that technical noncompliance with the court rules in accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere does not necessarily require reversal. In re *461Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 113; 235 NW2d 132 (1975).” The Court went on to hold that a trial court properly accepted a valid plea of guilty but mentally ill in a case in which there was less than strict compliance with procedural requirements.

The assertion in the lead opinion that art 1, § 13 of the state constitution grants a state right to proceed pro se in a criminal trial is problematic.

*462Article 1, § 13 states:

A suitor in any court of this state has the right to prosecute or defend his suit, either in his own proper person or by an attorney.

Article 1, § 20 provides that "[i]n every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense . . . .” Substantially similar provisions were present in the Constitution of 1850.

Until the nineteen-sixties and Faretta v California, 422 US 806; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975), art 1, § 13 was only applied in civil cases. Considering both the language of the provision and the fact that application of art 1, § 13 to the criminal setting makes the right to an attorney found in art 1, § 20 redundant, such a reading is understandable. This Court in Anderson, without discussion, recognized § 13 as the operative constitutional provision in this area. This is an issue of some importance. If § 13 does not provide a right to self-representation in the criminal setting, we would need to find it either implicitly in § 20 of the constitution or under statute. While a right to self-representation may exist under MCL 763.1; MSA 28.854 (see ante at 443, n 22), under the historical jurisprudence approach in Sitz v Dep’t of State Police, 443 Mich 744, 763; 506 NW2d 209 (1993), it is open to question whether we would discover such a right under the state constitution.

In determining whether the waiver is "knowingly and intelligently” made, the inquiry found in MCR 6.005(D) "advising the defendant of the charge, the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense, any mandatory minimum sentence required by law, and the risk involved in self-representation,” is useful. However, approval of the usefulness of this inquiry, apparently modeled on the plurality in Von Moltke v Gillies, 332 US 708; 68 S Ct 316; 92 L Ed 309 (1948), should not be viewed as requiring a formalistic approach on appeal.

We agree with the lead opinion that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding as a matter of law that a request for standby counsel is an unequivocal request to proceed pro se. Although sympathetic to the views of the Chief Justice that a request for standby counsel may create a trap for the defendant who really wants to go it alone, ante at 454, his solution requiring advice of no right to standby counsel creates the trap for the unwary trial judge — the threat of reversal on appeal for failure to comply with rigid requirements. It is precisely such appellate pitfalls that counsel the factual approach to the issue on appeal adopted in Anderson.

In the Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 123-124; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), this Court abandoned the formalistic approach of former GCR 1963, 785.7 and recognized that in cases of waiver, the inquiry is not whether there was an imprecise recital of rights or omission of some given right. The inquiry is whether "the defendant understood what a trial is and that by pleading guilty he was knowingly giving up his right to a trial and the rights and incidents of a trial.” Id. at 124.

Standard forms approved by the State Court Administrative Office require the agreement of counsel and the defendant, after advice of rights, to waiver of the examination.

Neither the court rule nor the lead opinion explain exactly what the trial judge is required to do to obtain a new waiver of the right to counsel pursuant to MCR 6.005(E). If, as the commentary to MCR 6.005(D) hints, the litany is only required when procuring the defendant’s initial waiver, and if, as the lead opinion states, the Anderson litany is also only required at the initial waiver, then I calculate that in the average case involving five proceedings a trial judge must go through approximately seventeen steps to live up to the commands of the lead opinion.

This is a conservative estimate, and it is likely that the number of steps a trial judge will go through will be much higher. Simply informing a defendant that he has the right to an attorney and then asking him to waive it hardly resembles the intelligent and knowledgeable waiver of the right to an attorney that most judges are accustomed to receiving. Moreover, because such a perfunctory waiver itself may create a new appellate issue, trial judges might attempt to obtain a full waiver per MCR 6.005(D) and Anderson to protect the record.

Voluntariness is not an issue on these facts. Although the defendant expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of appointed *467counsel, defendant chose to proceed pro se because he wanted the trial to start on the scheduled date, and substitute counsel would not, in defendant’s mind, have sufficient time to prepare. This is not a case in which it can be argued that the trial judge coerced the defendant into choosing to proceed pro se. See, generally, Maynard v Meachum, 545 F2d 273, 278 (CA 1, 1976).

This waiver was also unequivocal. Although I agree with the lead opinion that a request to proceed with standby counsel is not unequivocal as a matter of law, I do not agree that it can "never be deemed to be an unequivocal assertion of defendant’s rights.” Ante at 446.

When read in its entirety, the colloquy between defense counsel, the defendant, and the court suggests that Jones was assenting to Mr. Narragan’s appointment as standby counsel, not equivocating on his desire to proceed pro se.

While discussion of standby counsel should be postponed until after the defendant fully waives his right to counsel and is proceeding pro se, when the subject does arise, as in this case, it is the trial judge who is in the best position to decide whether or not the defendant is equivocating with respect to his desire to proceed pro se. In the waiver context, Sixth Amendment rights do not turn on the expression of magic words, but on the understanding of the accused. That understanding is best determined as a question of fact by the trial judge, see Adams v Carroll, supra at 1445.

A denial of the right to proceed pro se can never be harmless error. See McKaskle v Wiggins, supra, 465 US 177, n 8. However, where, as here, the issue is whether a trial court obtained a valid waiver of counsel before allowing a defendant to proceed pro se, federal circuit courts have found a defective waiver to be harmless error when an examination of the whole record indicates no reason*469able possibility that the defendant would have been found not guilty had he been represented by counsel. United States v Gipson, 693 F2d 109, 112 (CA 10, 1982), cert den 459 US 1216 (1983); Richardson v Lucas, 741 F2d 753, 757 (CA 5, 1984). The harmless error approach seems especially appropriate in cases such as the present, in which a defendant receives advice throughout the trial from standby counsel, the same counsel who would have represented the defendant had he not asserted his desire to proceed pro se.

A review of the record indicates that the defendant, in fact, was rather successful representing himself; "his conduct prior to and during trial demonstrated more than a passing sophistication in criminal matters.” McQueen v Blackburn, 755 F2d 1174, 1178 (CA 5, 1985). Even at sentencing, Jones was actively preserving objections made at trial.