(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Despite my complete agreement with the first issue, this ease should, nevertheless, be remanded because Sudbeck was not properly served with notice of the Department of Labor’s final decision. Therefore, I dissent to the second issue.
On October 6, 1992, the Department properly served the parties with its findings, conclusions, and order. Employer/Insurer sent Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order to Sudbeck on October 12, 1992. Sudbeck served Notice of Appeal on November 3, 1992, and filed it with the Clerk of Courts on November 12.
Per 1-26-31, an appeal is to be taken within thirty days after the Department served notice of the final decision. No notice of a final decision was served, but Dale Electronics and Liberty Mutual Insurance received proper notice of Sudbeck’s appeal within thirty days of the findings, conclusions, and order. Majority contends that such documents are the equivalent of notice of a final decision. Not so.
Kallstrom v. Marshall Beverages, Inc., 397 N.W.2d 647, 650 (S.D.1986), emphasized the importance of a notice of entry of judgment:
A notice of entry of judgment gives to a party the power to set running the time after which his adversary may not appeal and assures each party that the statutory period of time within which he may appeal does not commence to run until his adversary has given such notice.
Such importance was documented by this Court as far back as Labidee v. City of Pierre, 43 S.D. 31, 177 N.W. 499, 501 (1920). Although this passage is in reference to civil cases, notice of the final decision in administrative hearings deserves the same respect. Without written notice of the final decision, a party cannot be certain that the mailed documents are in fact intended to be notice of the final decision. Clear notice that the mailed document is the final decision avoids argu*68ments concerning proper service and notice, as has happened here.
We dismissed the untimely appeal in Madsen v. Preferred Painting Contractors, 89 S.D. 397, 233 N.W.2d 575, 577 (1975), noting that service of the agency decision was complete when a copy of the findings and conclusions, together with the notice of decision, was mailed to the parties. Herein, despite the October 6 mailing of findings, conclusions, and order by the Department, Employer/Insurer on October 12 served Sudbeck with Notice of Entry of those documents. It is this date of Notice of Entry upon which Sudbeck relies, as advised by Kallstrom. Dale Electronics/Liberty Mutual Insurance, to now avoid the appeal, is eager to support the Department’s mailing as the notice of final decision. Majority says the October 6 mailing was sufficient. But see Nancy Thielen School of Piano v. State, 486 N.W.2d 32 (S.D.1992) (the time for filing an appeal does not begin when the potential appellant learns of the decision). One questions why their attorneys even bothered to serve Sudbeck with an essentially meaningless Notice of Entry.
Majority suggests that perhaps the language “notice of final decision” be included to set the time running, but dismisses such as “judicial legislation.” Ironically, this same majority writing ignores its cited holdings from AT & T Info. Sys. and Presentation Sisters concerning proper statutory interpretation and holds that the serving of findings, conclusions, and order is the equivalent of the SDCL 1-26-31 mandate of serving “notice of the final decision.” Obviously the two are not the same as indicated by Employer/Insurers October 12 mailing. Rather, it is the majority that has liberally construed the meaning of notice of final decision by expanding it to include the mailing of the findings, conclusions, and order. See Sioux Valley Hospital Ass’n v. Yankton County, 424 N.W.2d 379, 382 (S.D.1988). Nay, a strict reading would proffer a notice of entry of judgment.
Sudbeck filed within thirty days of service of Employer/Insurer’s Notice of Entry— three days beyond the majority’s newly defined deadline. The underlying appeal was timely filed and neither Dale Electronics nor Liberty Mutual has been prejudiced by properly starting the clock with service of the notice of entry. We should reverse and remand.