Claimant (hereinafter plaintiff) appeals an October 31, 1979, Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) decision affirming an administrative law judge’s decision denying plaintiff’s petition for workers’ compensation benefits.
The facts in evidence before the administrative law judge and the WCAB are as follows. Plaintiff commenced employment with defendant on August 16, 1971, after having passed a preemployment physical examination. Plaintiff’s work entailed bending and lifting. Shortly after commencing employment, plaintiff began to experience pain in her back and left shoulder blade. Although plaintiff was treated with heat and pain pills at the plant hospital, plaintiff’s discomfort became such that she felt she could no longer continue working. Beginning in October of 1972, plaintiff was off work for approximately one and one-half months during which time respondent (hereinafter defendant) voluntarily paid workers’ compensation benefits. Plaintiff returned to work on December 6, 1972. On April 5, 1973, plaintiff again left work. Plaintiff saw Dr. Badgley about the pain in her back and left shoulder blade. Plaintiff remained off work until July 6, 1973, when she returned to favored work. Defendant voluntarily paid workers’ compensation benefits from April 5, 1973, to July *7795, 1973. On August 10, 1973, plaintiff was injured in a nonwork-related accident and did not return to work until May 14, 1975. Although plaintiff had fully recovered from her nonwork-related accident, there were no jobs available on May 14, 1975, within her favored-work classification. Plaintiff was placed on sick leave. After having been on sick leave for longer than her seniority would allow, plaintiff’s employment was terminated.
Plaintiff then filed for workers’ compensation benefits, claiming personal injury and/or disablement from occupational disease while in defendant’s employ. A hearing on the matter was held on March 17, 1977, before an administrative law judge. At this hearing, it was undisputed that plaintiff indeed suffered from pain in her back and left should blade while employed by defendant. The only dispute concerned the deposition testimony of the two medical witnesses in the case. The deposition of Dr. Clark was introduced into evidence by plaintiff. Dr. Clark testified that plaintiff had chronic left shoulder and dorsal back strain and that her employment with defendant precipitated or aggravated her back problem. The deposition of Dr. Badgley was introduced into evidence by defendant. Dr. Badgley testified that plaintiff suffered from thoracic outlet syndrome, a congenital anomaly which had nothing to do with plaintiff’s work. Simplified, Dr. Badgley found that plaintiff suffered from an anatomical condition which, when plaintiff does a particular movement or a series of movements, becomes symptomatic and that plaintiff suffers pain. Dr. Badgley clearly testified that:
"Certain types of work will cause her to have symptoms, but it does not aggravate the thoracic outlet syndrome and neither did it cause it.”
*780Both the administrative law judge and the WCAB placed more credence in Dr. Badgley’s testimony and denied plaintiff benefits, finding that plaintiff did not have a work-related disability. Plaintiff appeals the finding.
However:
" 'It may not be necessary to repeat what we have so frequently said that this Court [sic] does not review the findings of fact of the board, except to determine whether there is any evidence to support the award. The evidence may not be direct; it may be circumstantial. The board not only passes on the credibility of witnesses, but draws its inferences from the circumstances and the facts which it finds established. We may reverse awards for a failure of evidence to support them, but we are not the triers of the facts. With this view in mind, we approach the consideration of this case.’ [Meyers v Michigan Central R Co, 199 Mich 134, 137; 165 NW 703 (1917)].
"Our jurisdiction, invoked upon issuance and return of certiorari to the workmen’s compensation department, is markedly limited. The writ brings us questions of law only. It does not permit scale-weight of evidence and inference here, as on appeals from circuit court judgments, to determine whether administrative findings of fact offend rules governing clear weight and preponderance. Our obligation is to accept, without question, findings that are certified here if there be any evidence whatever to sustain those findings, regardless of thought or suggestion addressed to improbability thereof. Furthermore, and when we employ as above the word 'evidence,’ synonymity with the word 'facts’ is not intended. 'Evidence’ is really the means by which inferences may logically be drawn as to the existence of facts (Tjernstrom v Ford Motor Co, 285 Mich 450, 456 [280 NW 823 (1938)]).” Thornton v Luria-Dumes Co-Venture, 347 Mich 160, 162-163; 79 NW2d 457 (1956).
See also Coates v Continental Motors Corp, 373 Mich 461, 467; 130 NW2d 34 (1964), and Dean v *781Arrowhead Steel Products Co, Inc, 5 Mich App 691, 700-701; 147 NW2d 751 (1967).
Dr. Badgley’s testimony clearly supports the WCAB finding that plaintiff did not suffer a work-related injury. Consequently, we may not reverse the WCAB findings of fact.
Plaintiff argues that the WCAB erred as a matter of law by relying solely on Dr. Badgley’s testimony as to the medical "cause” of plaintiffs pain. Plaintiff is incorrect in attempting to apply Kostamo v Marquette Iron Mining Co, 405 Mich 105; 274 NW2d 411 (1979), to the case at bar to find error requiring reversal. Faced with a claim of a work-related heart attack, Kostamo indicated that it is not possible to determine medically whether a particular stress caused a particular injury. It was also noted that it is recognized medically that stress can cause a heart attack. Applying these two principles to the fact situation in Kostamo, the Court held that it was error for the trial court to rely exclusively upon medical opinion testimony that a particular heart attack was not "caused” by work-related stress. The Kostamo Court held that the judgmental question of whether the asserted work-related stress did cause the heart attack was not entirely the province of the medical profession and that both lay and medical testimony should be considered in making this determination. Kostamo, supra, 120-121.
Kostamo is easily distinguishable from the present fact situation. While in Kostamo the board accepted as conclusive medical opinion testimony regarding a question recognized as being incapable of medical determination, i.e., whether a particular work-related stress caused a heart attack, the board in the present case weighed two divergent medical experts’ opinion testimony. One found *782chronic left shoulder and dorsal back strain; the other found thoracic outlet syndrome. Unlike Kostamo, it is undisputed that the body movements required by plaintiff’s employment caused her pain. The question before the board in the case at bar was whether plaintiff’s pain was (1) an aggravation of her back strain as testified to by Dr. Clark, or (2) symptomatic of plaintiff’s underlying congenital anomaly, thoracic outlet syndrome, which is neither aggravated nor caused by her employment-related movements as testified to by Dr. Badgley. Unlike Kostamo, where lay testimony could support a conclusion which was medically impossible to refute that the injury (heart attack) was work-related, lay testimony in the present case could only support that to which both medical experts’ testimony agreed, i.e., that plaintiff’s pain was the result of employment-related movement. Lay testimony could not be expected to confirm or deny the existence of the comparatively rare thoracic outlet syndrome. Therefore, we find no error in the WCAB’s reliance upon the testimony of Dr. Badgley as to the existence of thoracic outlet syndrome.
The present case is similar to the claims involving Fiszer and Hannula reported with Kostamo. It was undisputed that both Fiszer and Hannula were told by their physicians to discontinue working due to arteriosclerosis. Although both claimants argued that they had suffered heart injuries during their employment, the WCAB was presented with conflicting medical testimony as to whether they had suffered heart damage. The WCAB weighed the conflicting medical testimony and found that although there was a causal relationship between the underlying disability, arteriosclerosis, and the claimants’ inability to continue *783working, that disability was not caused and could not have been aggravated by their employment. Kostamo, supra, 118. Likewise, in the present case, plaintiff argued that she had suffered injury during her employment. Similarly, the WCAB was presented with conflicting medical testimony as to whether plaintiff had suffered an employment-related injury or whether plaintiff suffered from thoracic outlet syndrome which, like arteriosclerosis, was not caused and could not have been aggravated by her employment. The WCAB weighed the conflicting medical testimony and denied benefits. As did the Supreme Court in Kostamo with regard to Fiszer and Hannula, we affirm the WCAB’s decision.
Plaintiff’s last claim of error is also without merit. The WCAB did not find that plaintiff’s August, 1973, nonwork-related accident prevented her recovery of benefits. The WCAB did not find that a supervening event precluded recovery for a prior compensable injury which would violate the holding of Powell v Casco Nelmor Corp, 406 Mich 332; 279 NW2d 769 (1979). Rather, the WCAB found that plaintiff was not entitled to recovery of benefits either before or after this nonwork-related accident. As such, no error occurred.
Affirmed.