(dissenting.) The majority views this as a "weak back," not a "bad back" case. Because the difference is significant, it is necessary to examine two of LIRC's findings.
7. Based upon his first Cybex test score, Respondent concluded that Complainant had a weak back, which Respondent perceived as a handicap.
8. Between September and November, 1981 Respondent refused to place Complainant on the eligibility list for police patrolman, thereby denying him employment, because of the perceived handicap which Respondent speculated was a predictor of future back problems Complainant might experience under the stress of police work.
Reading LIRC's two findings together, it becomes evident that LIRC found that the police and fire commission viewed Rusch's "weak back" as a "predictor of future back problems." The testimony of the president of the police and fire commission supports LIRC's finding:
THE EXAMINER: [I]f anybody gets a B rating, do you automatically exclude them?
[P & F COMM. PRESIDENT]: We can't afford to have them around. That is our opinion and that is what we have been advised.
*441THE EXAMINER: Okay, so that would be your testimony?
[CITY'S ATTORNEY]: What do you mean you can't afford to have them?
[P&F COMM. PRESIDENT]: Several aspects of it, that there is a possibility and the emergency situation which might arise in both the Police and Fire Departments that they wouldn't be able to properly perform their duties and presuming the Cybex Test, as we have been told, indicates that there can be weaknesses in the back that posing in the line of duty, they may injure their back and not — will no longer be capable of performing their duties. Then immediately the City is responsible for their disability payments, and we can't afford that.
While LIRC could have found that the police and fire commission refused to hire Rusch because his back was not strong enough to permit him to perform the duties of a patrolman, it did not. Instead, it found that Rusch was not hired because the city believed he had the potential of a "bad back."1
A back with somewhat lesser strength than the strongest back and a back susceptible to problems are different things. The former is a variation in human *442body structure. A bad back is a handicap because LIRC could find it to be "a physical . . . impairment which . . . limits the capacity to work." Section 111.32(8)(a), Stats. Susceptibility to a bad back differs only in degree. There is no difference between discrimination because of disability and discrimination because of a likelihood of disability.
In terms of standard of review, I would accept LIRC's finding that the police and fire commission refused to hire Rusch because it perceived him as having a bad back or at least a greater potential for a bad back. Section 102.23(6), Stats. The question of law involved is whether the police and fire commission's perception fits the definition of "handicapped individual." Even LIRC's conclusion of law is subject to a deferential standard of review. Nottelson v. ILHR Department, 94 Wis.2d 106, 117, 287 N.W.2d 763, 768 (1980). I would defer to LIRC's determination that Rusch was handicapped because the police and fire commission perceived him as having the potential of a bad back which, if realized, would limit his capacity to work.
The only remaining question is whether LIRC erred by interpreting sec. 111.31(8)(c), Stats., so as to conflict with prior case law. Manitowoc Co., Inc. v. Sturgeon Bay, 122 Wis.2d 406, 415, 362 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Ct.App. 1984). The majority finds language in Brown County v. LIRC, 124 Wis.2d 560, 568-69, 369 N.W.2d 735, 739 (1985), seemingly contradictory, and concludes that a footnote cannot be correct:
American Motors and Dairy Equipment both recognized that a job applicant would also be perceived as handicapped if he had no physical limitation or condition at all but was erroneously thought by the employer to have an impairment that lim*443ited his capacity to work. Dairy Equipment, 95 Wis.2d at 330, citing Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 22 Wash. App. 576, 591 P.2d 461 (1979) (perceived handicap exists where employer erroneously believes applicant to have epilepsy); American Motors, 119 Wis.2d at 717. . . .
Brown County, at 569 n.9, 360 N.W.2d at 739.
We should attempt to reconcile the text and footnote 9 of Brown County. Where apparently conflicting provisions of a statute are found, we are to construe them to give effect to the leading idea behind the statute. State v. Schaller, 70 Wis.2d 107, 110, 233 N.W.2d 416, 418 (1975). The same should be true of opinions. Additionally, the majority's concern that Brown County and American Motors may have apparently conflicting language is answered by our rule that if decisions of the supreme court are inconsistent, we follow that court's practice of relying on its most recent pronouncement. Bruns Volkswagen, Inc. v. DILHR, 110 Wis.2d 319, 324, 328 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Ct.App. 1982).
The court's statement in the body of Brown County was: "Hence, this court in American Motors held that, for there to be a perceived handicap, there must be an actual impairment, which need not, in fact, be a handicap to job performance." (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 568-69,360 N.W.2d at 739. By using the term "impairment," the court was recognizing the obvious — without some factor differentiating a claimant from others, discrimination cases do not arise. The court in American Motors held that though the claimant was impaired by her stature, the impairment did not become a handicap. The court said:
We conclude that Basile's stature is not a disability or impairment that makes achievement un*444usually difficult or that limits her capacity to work. Although Basile's height and weight are below the norm, and may impose some limitations on her general ability to achieve and work, a person with her stature is capable of a wide range of achievements, including many that a taller and heavier person could not do. Thus, Basile's stature does not constitute such a significant deviation from the norm that it makes achievement unusually difficult, or limits her capacity to work. [Emphasis in original.]
American Motors Corp. v. LIRC, 119 Wis.2d 706, 714, 350 N.W.2d 120, 124 (1984).
The majority does not accept the view that a short person suffers an impairment. That conclusion is not the invention of this dissent, but a part of the court's reasoning in American Motors. There the court said:
[A] "handicap" is an injury, deterioration or lessening that could impede a person's normal functioning in some manner and preclude the full and normal use of one's sensory, mental or physical faculties. Thus, a handicap within the meaning of the Act is a physical or mental condition that imposes limitations on a person's ability to achieve and capacity to work beyond the normal limitations that might render a person unable to make certain achievements or perform every possible job. All persons, given their individual characteristics and capabilities, have inherent limitations on their general ability to achieve or to perform certain jobs. All persons have some mental or physical deviations from the norm. However, such inherent limitations or deviations from the norm do not automatically constitute handicaps. A handicap is a mental or physical disability or impairment that a person has in addition to his or her normal limitations that makes achievement not merely difficult, but unusu*445ally difficult, or that limits the capacity to work. [Emphasis in original.]
Id. at 713-14, 350 N.W.2d at 123-24.
Just as importantly, the employer in American Motors did not perceive short stature as a disability. The court said:
Because Basile's stature is not a disability or impairment that makes achievement unusually difficult or that limits her capacity to work, and because AMC did not perceive her as having such a disability or impairment, we hold that she is not handicapped under the Act.
Id. at 708, 350 N.W.2d at 121.
We are not free to reject prior decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. State v. Olsen, 99 Wis.2d 572, 583, 299 N.W.2d 632, 638 (Ct.App. 1980).
American Motors would be easier to understand had the claimant not been hired because she wore dentures, but the principle is the same: An impaired but non-handicapped person who is perceived as impaired but not handicapped may be discriminated against in employment without liability under sec. 111.32(8), Stats.
The relevant facts found by LIRC pertaining to Rusch are entirely different. Though a "bad back" is not a medical term, LIRC was entitled to find that a bad back is the sort of impairment that limits the capacity to work, and that the police and fire commission perceived a bad back to be an impairment limiting the capacity to work. The employer in American Motors prevailed because there was neither handicap nor perception of handicap. That case is hardly precedent *446for the majority's conclusion in this case where there is no handicap, but the employer believed one existed.
I conclude that LIRC's determination is supported by credible and substantial evidence, and is not contrary to any published appellate opinions. I would therefore affirm LIRC's order.
LIRC also made findings that the police and fire commission had failed to show that Rusch's back condition was reasonably related to his dbility to adequately undertake his responsibilities as a patrolman. Section 111.34(2)(a), Stats., excepts from employment discrimination liability employers otherwise guilty of employment discrimination "if the handicap is reasonably related to the individual's ability to adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of that individual's employment. ..." LIRC's order may be viewed as based on two theories. I see no need to examine LIRC's second theory because I conclude we should sustain LIRC’s order based on its first theory.