Article VI, Section 4 of the North Dakota Constitution requires at least four members of this Court to declare a statute unconstitutional.1 Because only three members of this Court have joined in this opinion, the statutory method for distributing funding for primary and secondary education in North Dakota is not declared unconstitutional by a sufficient majority.
We hold that the funding of the previously recognized fundamental constitutional right to education, see, e.g., State v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220 (N.D.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1070, 103 S.Ct. 1525, 75 L.Ed.2d 948 (1983), and other cases cited herein, is an important substantive right. We further hold that the widely disparate effect of the State’s method of accomplishing this important substantive right fails to bear a close correspondence to the achievement of the constitutionally mandated goal of an equal educational opportunity, which was previously recognized by this Court in Lapp v. Reeder Public School District, 491 N.W.2d 65, 67 (N.D.1992), and in In Interest of G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D.1974).
In this appeal, we consider the constitutionality of North Dakota’s statutory method *251for distributing funding for public elementary and secondary schools. The trial court held that the distribution method was unconstitutional and retained jurisdiction to monitor and enforce compliance with its decision. We affirm the trial court’s declaration that the distribution method, as a whole, is unconstitutional, but we reverse the court’s retention of jurisdiction.
In June 1989, nine public high school districts and thirty-one resident taxpayers and parents of children who attend public school in those districts [hereinafter collectively referred to as plaintiffs], brought this action for declaratory relief against the State and the legislative and executive officials constitutionally charged with establishing and maintaining North Dakota’s public elementary and secondary schools [hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants]. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the statutory method for distributing funding to public schools, alleging it was based predominantly upon each school district’s property tax base, which resulted in these nine “property poor” school districts and their pupils receiving fewer educational resources per pupil than “property wealthy” school districts. The plaintiffs alleged that the statutory method for distributing funding for education, as a whole, failed to equalize local property tax disparities and resulted in substantial inequities in educational opportunities in property poor districts in violation of the education [Article VIII, §§ 1 and 2], and equal protection [Article I, §§ 21 and 22], provisions of the North Dakota Constitution.
The district court held that the statutory method for distributing funding for education violated both the education and the equal protection provisions of our state constitution, and retained jurisdiction to monitor the enactment of a constitutional method for distributing funding. The defendants appealed.
I
Relying on Dickinson Pub. School Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906 (N.D.1988), and County of Stutsman v. State Historical Society, 371 N.W.2d 321 (N.D.1985), the defendants assert that the nine school districts, as political subdivisions, do not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutory method for distributing funding for public education.
In Sanstead, this court concluded that NDCC ch. 15-40.1 [State School Aid] did not create an express contract between the State and local school districts for state foundation aid. We thus held that a school district’s action against the State for “compensatory damages” for the alleged failure to properly calculate past foundation aid payments was not one arising upon contract and was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We indicated that “state aid to local school districts is a mere gratuity.” Sanstead, supra, 425 N.W.2d at 910. See also Zenith School District No. 32 v. Peterson, 81 N.W.2d 764, 768 (N.D.1957). In County of Stutsman, this court held that Stutsman County, as a political subdivision of the state, could not successfully assert that the state had violated its constitutional rights, because a county is a creature of the constitution and is not a person or private party under the applicable constitutional provisions.
School districts are political subdivisions created by the state. Baldwin v. Board of Education, 76 N.D. 51, 33 N.W.2d 473 (1948); NDCC § 15-47-43. For purposes of challenging the constitutionality of the statutory method for distributing funding for education, County of Stutsman and Sanstead suggest that the nine plaintiff school districts do not have standing to raise those issues. But see Application of Otter Tail Power Co., 451 N.W.2d 95, 97 (N.D.1990), and State v. Woodworth, 234 N.W.2d 243, 249 (N.D.1975) [“weighty countervailing policies” may authorize standing to assert another party’s rights]. See also Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission v. County of Hennepin, 451 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Minn.1990) [case must involve “substantial public interest” for governmental unit to have standing to challenge constitutionality of statute under which it operates]. However, the defendants concede that the remaining plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutory method for distributing funding for education. Accordingly, it is not necessary for us to resolve the standing issue.
*252II
Before evaluating the parties’ constitutional arguments, we trace the contours of the statutory method for distributing funding for public elementary and secondary education in North Dakota, keeping in mind that the State is responsible for implementing our public school system, and that all taxes for education purposes, including local property taxes, are State taxes. Dornacker v. Olson, 248 N.W.2d 844 (N.D.1976); State ex rel. Haig v. Hauge, 37 N.D. 583, 164 N.W. 289 (1917).
A.
North Dakota has four types of school districts: high school districts which offer instruction in kindergarten through twelfth grade; elementary districts which offer instruction in kindergarten through sixth or eighth grade; rural districts which usually offer instruction to small enrollments in one classroom with one teacher; and nonoperat-ing districts which do not offer instruction and which pay tuition for children residing within their borders to attend school in a neighboring district.
During the 1990-1991 school year, approximately 118,000 students attended public elementary and secondary schools in 269 school districts in North Dakota. Total enrollments ranged from 10,625 students in the Bismarck high school district to no students in some nonoperating districts. The plaintiff school districts generally have some of the state’s largest total enrollments with Bismarck, 1st with' 10,625 students; Grand Forks, 3rd with 9,227 students; West Fargo, 5th with 4,267 students; Mandan, 6th with 3,589 students; Dickinson, 7th with 3,144 students; Devils Lake, 10th with 2,016 students; Valley City, 13th with 1,399 students; Grafton, 14th with 1,153 students; and Surrey, 58th with 382 students.
The statutory method for distributing funding for public schools uses a mix of revenues from state, local, and federal sources. The trial court found that, excluding $26 million in federal revenue earmarked for specific purposes, school districts in North Dakota incurred approximately $417 million in operating expenses during the 1990-1991 school year. Of that $417 million, state sources of revenue were $220 million (52.8%), school district sources of revenue were $182 million (43.6%), county sources of revenue were $8.6 million (2.1%), and unrestricted federal sources of revenue were $6 million (1.5%).2
The two primary sources of funding for education are a local ad valorem property tax and state foundation aid. During the 1990-1991 school year, local property taxes generated about 82% of the $182 million in local revenue and state foundation aid constituted about 76% of the $220 million in state revenue.
The local property tax is levied on each school district’s taxable property value as assessed and equalized by each county. See NDCC §§ 57-15-14 through 57-15-14.4. North Dakota school districts vary widely in the value of assessed property per pupil and in the tax burden on district residents. As a result of those valuations, some “property wealthy” school districts can raise more revenue per pupil with a smaller mill levy than other “property poor” school districts.
During the 1991-1992 school year, the value of assessed property per pupil ranged from $77,745 per pupil in the Spiritwood school district to $145 per pupil in the Bel-court school district, and the mill levies ranged from 261.07 in the Bell elementary school district to zero in the Belcourt high school district, the Twin Buttes elementary district, and the Earl, Horsecreek, and Springbrook rural districts. Five non-operating districts also had a mill levy of zero. During that year, the statewide average taxable property value was $7,870 per pupil and the mean average mill levy for all school districts was 186.89. All of the plaintiff school districts had lower assessed property *253values per pupil and higher mill levies than the state averages. The plaintiff school districts’ assessed value of property per pupil and school mill levies were: Bismarck— $6,172 per pupil and 248.68 mills; Devils Lake — $5,541 per pupil and 190.74 mills; Dickinson- — $4,293 per pupil and 227.97 mills; Grafton — $6,802 per pupil and 221.56 mills; Grand Forks — $7,031 per pupil and 226.52 mills; Mandan — $5,795 per pupil and 187.57 mills; Surrey — $3,655 per pupil and 213.66 mills; Valley City — $6,401 per pupil and 209.51 mills; and West Fargo — $7,457 per pupil and 225.17 mills.
The other major source of state funds for education, foundation aid, is distributed by the State to school districts through the statutory formula outlined in NDCC eh. 15^40.1. Each district’s net entitlement to foundation aid is calculated by determining the district’s gross entitlement3 to foundation aid and subtracting a “deduct.” The “deduct” for the 1990-1991 school year was the product of 22 mills times the “latest available net assessed and equalized valuation of property of the school district.” NDCC § 15h10.1-06(3).4 Because the deduct is based on the assessed property value in each district, it allows a greater reduction in total foundation aid for districts with higher assessed property values than for districts with lower assessed property values. The effect of the greater reduction in foundation aid for property wealthy districts provides some slight equalization of the money available for education expenditures in all districts.
Under NDCC ch. 15^44, the State also distributes tuition apportionment funds to local school districts from a “state tuition fund,” which is “[t]he net proceeds arising from all fines for violation of state laws, from leasing the school lands, and the interest and income from the state permanent school fund.” NDCC § 15-44-01. The “state tuition fund” is distributed to school districts on a per pupil basis, and, in recent years, school districts have received the flat amount of approximately $200 per pupil from that fund.
The State reimburses school districts for transportation costs under a statutory formula which is based on the size of buses, the miles transported, and the number of pupils. NDCC §§ 15-40.1-15 through 15-40.1-18. The application of that formula results in the State reimbursing some school districts more than their actual transportation costs while reimbursing other districts substantially less than their actual transportation costs.
Special education is funded by distributions from the state and federal government and, upon a majority vote, school districts may also impose a tax levy for special education. NDCC chs. 15-59 and 15-59.2. The State also distributes funding for vocational educational programs under NDCC chs. 15-20.1 and 15-20.2, and for school activity and school lunch programs under NDCC ch. 15-54.
Other sources of state revenue for education are a coal conversion tax on plants that convert coal into electricity [NDCC ch. 57-60]; a coal severance tax [NDCC chs. 57-61 and 57-62]; an oil and gas gross production tax [NDCC ch. 57-51]; an oil extraction tax [NDCC ch. 57-51.1]; and a tax on mutual and cooperative telephone companies [NDCC ch. 57-34]. Those taxes are “in lieu” of property taxes on the minerals or facilities involved, and the State distributes a portion *254of those tax revenues to school districts in the counties where the taxes originate.
As a result of disparities in the assessed value of property, mill levies, and the number of students in each district, there are disparities between school districts in the amount of money available for per pupil expenditures. During the 1990-1991 school year, the disparities in expenditures ranged from $11,-743.28 per pupil in the Twin Buttes elementary school district to $2,085.97 per pupil in the Salund rural school district. In the 209 high school districts, the disparities ranged from $8,554.94 per pupil in the Fort .Totten district to $2,306.26 per pupil in the United district. The mean expenditure in the high school districts was $3,692.58 per pupil. In the 48 elementary school districts, the disparities ranged from $11,743.28 per pupil in the Twin Buttes district to $2,173.12 per pupil in the Mapleton district. The mean expenditure in the elementary districts was $4,360.49 per pupil. In the 12 rural districts, the disparities ranged from $8,486.60 per pupil in the Earl district to $2,085.97 per pupil in the Salund district. The mean expenditure in the rural districts was $4,434.41 per pupil. The mean average expenditure for all school districts in the 1990-1991 school year was $3,425.12 per pupil.
During the 1990-1991 school year, all of the plaintiff school districts had per pupil expenditures below the state average. Their per pupil expenditures were $2,948.83 in Bismarck; $2,806.18 in Devils Lake; $2,869.22 in Dickinson; $2,709.46 in Grafton; $3,178.34 in Grand Forks; $2,547.44 in Mandan; $2,317.82 in Surrey; $2,614.36 in Valley City; and $2,576.20 in West Fargo.
B.
Within that statutory framework for distributing funding for education and the statewide disparities in expenditures per pupil, mill levies, and assessed values per pupil, we now consider the parties’ constitutional arguments.
The plaintiffs argue that the impact of the statutory method for distributing funding for public education, as a whole, does not provide a “uniform, system of free public schools throughout the state” under the education provisions of our state constitution, Art. VIII, §§ 1 and 2, N.D. Const.5 The plaintiffs concede that the education provisions do not require equal dollars in per pupil funding throughout the state, but argue that the education provisions require the Legislature to distribute funding for public schools so that students throughout the state receive an “equal education opportunity.”
The defendants respond that a “uniform system of free public schools” is satisfied by the Legislature’s creation of school districts and by the implementation of a uniform system of schools in those districts, which, they contend, is achieved through curriculum requirements and accreditation standards. The defendants assert that the education provisions do not mandate any particular type, or level, of funding for public education. They argue that, in the absence of evidence that the statutory method for distributing funding for public education deprives any children either of access to an education, or of an adequate education, the funding method satisfies the education provisions.
. However, the parties agree mere uniformity alone does not fully define the Legislature’s constitutional obligation under the education provisions. The defendants admit a uniformly inadequate system would not satisfy the education provisions and argue that *255state equal protection analysis is the appropriate analytical framework for addressing the uniformity issue. The plaintiffs admit educational opportunities are not totally inadequate, and they also rely upon our state equal protection provisions. We therefore consider the parties’ equal protection arguments.
c.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), the United States Supreme Court considered a federal equal protection challenge to disparities resulting from the method of distributing funding for education in Texas. The Supreme Court concluded that, under the federal equal protection clause, strict scrutiny was not applicable to the Texas financing scheme, because education was not a fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, and because wealth was not a suspect classification. The Court thus analyzed the Texas financing scheme under the rational basis standard and held that it was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose of local control.
Although Rodriguez governs equal protection analysis of school financing under the federal constitution, we have often recognized that our state constitution may afford broader rights than those granted under the equivalent provision of the federal constitution.6 Matter of Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558 (N.D.1993); Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219 (N.D.1989); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.1974).
Long viewed as our state constitutional guarantee of equal protection, Art. I, §§ 21 and 22, N.D. Const., provide:
“Section 21. No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the legislative assembly; nor shall any citizen or class of citizens be granted privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens.
“Section 22. All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.”
*256Those provisions do not prohibit legislative classifications or mandate identical treatment of different categories of persons. They do, however, subject legislative classifications to different standards of scrutiny, depending upon the right that may be infringed by the challenged classification. E.g., Matter of Adoption of K.A.S., supra.
In Gauge v. Clerk of Burleigh County District Court, 429 N.W.2d 429, 433 (N.D.1988), we outlined the standards of judicial scrutiny for equal protection claims under our state constitution:
“When a statute is challenged on equal protection grounds, we first locate the appropriate standard of review. We apply strict scrutiny to an inherently suspect classification or infringement of a fundamental right and strike down the challenged statutory classification ‘unless it is shown that the statute promotes a compelling governmental interest and that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose.’ State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621, 627 (N.D.1977). When an ‘important substantive right’ is involved, we apply an intermediate standard of review which requires a ‘“close correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals.” ’ Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 323, 325 (N.D.1986) [quoting Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D.1978)]. When no suspect class, fundamental right, or important substantive right is involved, we apply a rational basis standard and sustain the legislative classification unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. See State v. Knoefler, 279 N.W.2d 658, 662 (N.D.1979).”
The parties agree that the right to education is a fundamental right under the North Dakota Constitution. See, e.g., Lapp v. Reeder Public School District, 491 N.W.2d 65 (N.D.1992); State v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220 (N.D.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1070, 103 S.Ct. 1525, 75 L.Ed.2d 948 (1983); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D.1980); In Interest of G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D.1974). Compare Rodriguez, supra [education is not a fundamental right under federal constitution].
The plaintiffs thus assert that strict scrutiny applies to the statutory method for distributing funding for the fundamental right to education. See Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979); Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal.3d 728, 135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907, 97 S.Ct. 2951, 53 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1977); Washakie Co. School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 28 (1980).
In Matter of Adoption of K.A.S., supra, we considered a state equal protection challenge to a statutory scheme which authorized court-appointed counsel for indigent parents facing termination of parental rights in a proceeding under the Uniform Juvenile Court Act and the Uniform Parentage Act, but not for indigent parents facing termination of parental rights in an adoption proceeding. NDCC § 14-15-19(6). We applied strict scrutiny to that classification because it impaired the parents’ exercise of their fundamental right to parent their children. 499 N.W.2d at 565. We concluded that conserving fiscal resources was not a compelling state interest which justified impairment of a parent’s fundamental right to parent. In order to avoid that constitutional infirmity, we construed NDCC § 14-15-19(6), to require appointment of counsel for indigent parents facing termination of parental rights in an adoption proceeding, unless the right was waived.
The equal protection challenge in this ease involves financing of the fundamental right to education. The parties agree that the statutory method of distributing funding for that fundamental right results in disparities in expenditures per pupil. Those relative funding disparities ‘may well impair the fundamental right to education. However, we agree with the rationale of those courts that, while recognizing the importance of education, have concluded that legislative determinations about the financing mix for education involve difficult questions of local and statewide taxation, fiscal planning, and edu*257cation policy, which are ill-suited for strict scrutiny analysis. See Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Education, 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo.1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Education, 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983); Bd. of Education, Levittown v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138, 103 S.Ct. 775, 74 L.Ed.2d 986 (1983); Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of Cincinnati v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813, 12 O.O.3d 327 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015, 100 S.Ct. 665, 62 L.Ed.2d 644 (1980). We do not believe that legislative decisions balancing those difficult issues require equal per pupil dollars for education funding, or a perfect solution in order to withstand equal protection analysis. Subjecting the entire method of financing education to the exacting level of strict scrutiny would essentially require the judiciary to micro-manage and second guess difficult policy decisions in the legislative arena. In a state with our demographic characteristics, we believe the Legislature must have some flexibility to relate funding to numerous variables involved with the actual cost of educating pupils in the different school districts. In the absence of a substantial deprivation of the fundamental right to education, those demographic characteristics and variables may result in some funding disparities which do not violate equal protection. We therefore decline to apply the rigorous and exacting standards of strict scrutiny to disparities in education funding, and we conclude that strict scrutiny is not applicable to this equal protection challenge.
However, unlike those jurisdictions which have concluded that strict scrutiny is not applicable to state equal protection challenges to financing education and have thus analyzed the issue under the rational basis standard, our state equal protection cases also require consideration of the intermediate level of heightened scrutiny for important substantive rights. E.g., Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D.1986). Compare Rodriguez; Lujan; McDaniel; Hornbeck; Nyquist; Walter. See also Skeen et al. v. State of Minnesota et al., 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn.1993) [although strict scrutiny applies in determining whether the Legislature has met a student’s fundamental right to a general and uniform system of public schools, rational basis applies to determining whether financing of the system is thorough and efficient],
In Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219, 222-223 (N.D.1989), we explained our rationale for choosing between the intermediate level of scrutiny and the rational basis standard of review:
“Hanson follows our equal protection eases in which we have generally applied the intermediate level of scrutiny to classifications which have completely prevented a class of injured persons from maintaining an action to recover for their injuries. Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc. [420 N.W.2d 733 (N.D.1988) ] supra [intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to statute that prevented a class of plaintiffs from suing for damages for any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property]; Patch v. Sebelius, 320 N.W.2d 511 (N.D.1982) [intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to statute that prevented a class of plaintiffs from suing the state or a state agency]; Benson v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96 (N.D.1979) [intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to statute that excluded a class of employees from workmen’s compensation]; Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D.1979) [intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to statute that prevented a class of plaintiffs from suing a municipality for defective streets or bridges]; Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.1974) [intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to automobile guest statute that prohibited a class of plaintiffs from suing for ordinary negligence of host].
“In contrast, we have generally applied the rational basis test to statutory classifications which involve economic or social matters and do not deprive a class of plaintiffs from access to the courts. Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Service, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D.1984) [rational basis test applicable to comparative negligence provi*258sions of Section 9-10-07, N.D.C.C.]; Law v. Maercklein, 292 N.W.2d 86 (N.D.1980) [rational basis test applicable to statute allowing only residents to participate in the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund]; Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d 39 (N.D.1974) [rational basis test applicable to statute limiting recovery from Unsatisfied Judgment Fund to $5,000 in eases in which the tortfeasor can not be ascertained, while permitting a $10,000 recovery from the Fund in other cases].”
We have also applied the intermediate level of heightened scrutiny to a classification involving homestead rights, which, like édu-cation, have state constitutional underpinnings [Mund v. Rambough, 432 N.W.2d 50 (N.D.1988) ] and to a classification involving a defendant’s wealth and the vital interests in presenting a defense to a criminal prosecution for issuing checks without sufficient funds. State v. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d 16 (N.D.1984); State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D.1980).
The defendants argue that the funding of education should not be analyzed under heightened scrutiny, because the plaintiffs’ claims are based on relative disparities in the amount of funding for education and not on the absolute deprivation of the fundamental right to education. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra; Skeen, supra. They argue that differences in the relative level of expenditures per pupil do not translate into inferior educational opportunities and do not affect educational outcomes. Relying on Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 402 N.W.2d 897 (N.D.1987), aff'd 487 U.S. 450, 108 S.Ct. 2481, 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988), the defendants argue that education funding involves “classic” social and economic legislation, which is scrutinized under the rational basis standard rather than under heightened scrutiny.
In Kadrmas, this court considered education and equal protection provision challenges to NDCC § 15-34.2-06.1, which authorized nonreorganized school districts to charge patrons for transportation to and from schools. We held that school districts are not required to provide students with free transportation, because that service is not “essential” to a “uniform system of free public schools.” See Cardiff v. Bismarck Public School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 113 (N.D.1978) [free public schools means those items which are “essential to education”].
In analyzing the state and federal equal protection challenge to NDCC § 15-34.2-06.1, a majority of this court concluded the statute was “purely economic legislation which neither involves a suspect classification, nor a fundamental right or important substantive right which would require the strict scrutiny or intermediate standard of review.” Kadrmas, supra, 402 N.W.2d at 902. The majority thus reviewed that statute under the rational basis standard and concluded it was rationally related to the legitimate governmental objectives of allocating limited financial resources and of providing incentives for school district reorganization. The majority held that the statute did not violate the equal protection provisions of the state or federal7 constitutions.
The dissent determined that the statute involved access to the fundamental right of education, which was an “important substantive right,” warranting the intermediate standard of scrutiny under our state equal protection provisions. Id. at 904-905 (Levine, Justice, concurring and dissenting). The dissent concluded there was no close correspondence between the statutory classification and the legislative goal of conserving and allocating financial resources.
We do not believe Kadrmas is determinative of the level of scrutiny applicable to the effect of the entire statutory method for distributing funding for public education. Kadrmas involved transportation charges, a service which this court held was not an essential element of a “uniform system of free public schools.” Here, the equal protection challenge involves the effect of the entire statutory method for distributing funding for the “uniform system of free public schools” which obviously entails funding for some “es*259sential” components of the “uniform system of free public schools.” We therefore conclude that Kadrmas is not determinative of the level of scrutiny applicable to this equal protection challenge.
Funding of education involves more than social and economic matters like a day of rest, recreation and Sunday closing of businesses [Best Products Co., Inc. v. Spaeth, 461 N.W.2d 91 (N.D.1990) ], or the allocation of damages in tort reform cases. E.g. Kavadas v. Lorenzen, supra. Although the distribution of funding for public education involves money and economic consequences, the focus must be on the rights affected and the individual interests involved. See Vantage, Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 467 N.W.2d 446, 448 (N.D.1991); Hanson v. Williams County, supra, 389 N.W.2d at 325. Here, those rights and interests support use of the intermediate level of scrutiny.
The education provisions of our state constitution have “at least equal standing” with the guarantees of freedom of religion and freedom of speech and press, and the State has a compelling interest in establishing minimum standards of education to ensure that our children receive an adequate education. State v. Rivinius, supra, 328 N.W.2d at 228. Funding of education promotes “[a] high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and morality on the part of every voter in a government by the people ... to insure the continuance of that government and the prosperity and happiness of the people” [Art. VIII, § 1, N.D. Const.] and is essential to the practical realization of the fundamental right enumerated in our state constitution: the right to a “uniform system of free public schools throughout the state” which “shall be open to all children of the state of North Dakota.” Art. VIII, §§ 1 & 2, N.D. Const. In order to meet those state constitutional requirements, the funding of education must be at least on par with the right to bring a personal injury lawsuit [e.g., Hanson v. Williams County, supra], and homestead rights. Mund v. Rambough, supra.
Although the statutory method for distributing funding for education may not totally deprive any student of access to the fundamental right to education, we believe the method of distributing funding for that fundamental right involves important substantive matters similar to those rights involved in cases in which we have applied the intermediate level of scrutiny. Accordingly, we analyze these equal protection claims under the intermediate level of scrutiny, and we require the distribution of funding for education to bear a close correspondence to legislative goals. E.g., Hanson v. Williams County, supra.
The Legislature has identified an educational funding goal to “support elementary and secondary education in this state from state funds based on the educational cost per pupil.” NDCC § 15-40.1-06(1). We have also construed our state education and equal protection, provisions to entitle children throughout North Dakota to an “equal education opportunity.” Lapp v. Reeder Public School Dist., 491 N.W.2d 65, 67 (N.D.1992); In Interest of G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D.1974).
The State is responsible for implementing our public school system, and the Legislature is authorized to provide for the maintenance of that system through a state or legislative levy of taxes, or through a mandatory local tax levy. Dornacker v. Olson, 248 N.W.2d 844 (N.D.1976). All taxes for education purposes, including local property taxes, are State taxes. Id.; State ex rel. Haig v. Hauge, 37 N.D. 583, 164 N.W. 289 (1917).
In this case, the overall effect of the Legislature’s statutory method for funding education authorizes the distribution of funding primarily on the basis of property wealth in the different school districts throughout the state. That distribution is not necessarily related to any aspect of educational needs, or educational cost per pupil, and, as a whole, fails to bear a close correspondence either to the constitutional mandate to provide an equal educational opportunity, or to the legislative goal of “supporting] elementary and secondary education in this state from state funds based on the educational cost per pupil.” NDCC § 15-40.1-06(1).
The lack of a close correspondence to those goals centers on the 22 mill deduct in NDCC *260§ 15-40.1-06(3)(a). See fn. 4. A deduct at that level fails to achieve any reasonable degree of state equalization of disparities in per pupil expenditures and places an even greater reliance on unequalized school district tax bases, which allows property wealthy districts to use their property wealth to outstrip expenditures per pupil in property poor districts.
The equalizing effect of the deduct has deteriorated over the last twenty years. In 1973, the deduct was 20 mills and was supplemented by a 21 mill equalizing county levy for education. That levy was collected on all real property in the county and was distributed to school districts in the county based on the district’s number of students. However, this equalizing county levy was repealed in 1981. 1981 N.D.Sess.Laws, ch. 198. In 1973, the 20 mill deduct and the 21 mill county levy equalized about two-thirds of the statewide average school levy of 65 mills. In the 1991-1992 school year, our state foundation aid payments were equalized only to the extent of the 22 mill deduct, while the statewide average mill levy for education exceeded 186 mills. Compare Skeen, supra [Minnesota education funding system did not violate education and equal protection provisions where approximately 93% of revenues generated by funding system were equalized by state law and approximately seven percent were unequalized and subject to local control].
In the 1973-1974 school year, foundation aid and tuition apportionment represented about 69% of the statewide average expenditure per pupil. In the 1981-1982 school year, foundation aid and tuition apportionment represented about 64% of the statewide average expenditure per pupil. By the 1990-1991 school year, foundation aid and tuition apportionment represented only about 46% of the statewide average expenditure per pupil. The net result of the low deduct is that its capacity for equalization has been dramatically reduced over the last 20 years to the point where the majority of revenues are no longer equalized by state aid.
The deduct also fails to treat the coal conversion and severance taxes, the oil and gas production and extraction taxes, and the telephone tax, all of which are “in lieu” of property tax revenues, as if they were part of the local tax base for equalization purposes. That failure results in further disparate treatment and impact on the state’s overall method of distributing funding for education.
The statutory method of distributing funding for education also allows some school districts to receive state reimbursement for transportation costs which exceed their actual costs while other districts receive less than half of their actual costs. That disbursement is totally unrelated to educational costs per. pupil and does not bear a close correspondence to the constitutionally mandated goal of an equal educational opportunity, nor to the Legislature’s goal to “support elementary and secondary education in this state from state funds based on the educational cost per pupil.” NDCC § 15-40.1-06(1).
We are not persuaded that local control of education justifies the disparities in per pupil expenditures exhibited in this case.8 An element of local control is clearly a useful and desirable aspect of any education system. However, local control in North Dakota is undercut and limited by the Legislature’s enactment of requirements for statewide uni*261formity of education.9 The present method of distributing funding for education fails to offer any realistic local control to many school districts, because it fails to provide many local school boards with a means to generate the funding needed to provide educational opportunities similar to those in other districts, and it fails to give local school boards any realistic credit for the local taxation efforts their patrons bear. See Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983), and Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn.1993) [local control does not provide rational basis for educational funding disparities].
Rather than selectively reweigh the evidence, we accept the trial court’s determinations that the lack of substantially uniform funding has created seriously adverse educational consequences. In other words, relative differences in funding significantly interfere with some children’s right to an education. We summarize the findings about those adverse educational consequences.
Property wealthy districts have lower pupil to teacher ratios in all sizes of districts. (Trial Court Findings of Fact 216, 217). Those districts have substantially higher revenues per pupil and provide their children with substantially more favorable teacher ratios. Teacher-pupil ratios range from 58.5 teachers per 1,000 pupils in grades one through six in the lowest revenue group, compared to 90.9 teachers per 1,000 for those grades in the highest revenue group of districts. There is a clear correlation between revenues and the ratio of teachers to pupils. (Finding 218).
To illustrate, the Fargo school district has greater access to taxable wealth than does neighboring West Fargo, both urban districts. Fargo annually spends over $1,000 per pupil more than West Fargo for an average of over $25,000 more per class room of twenty-five students. (Finding 236). The Crosby district is able annually to spend over $1,300 more per pupil than the Surrey district with a comparable number of pupils, an average of over $32,500 more per classroom. The Billings County district has an educational purchasing power that is annually $5,000 per pupil more than the Bell School District with a comparable number of pupils, an exorbitant average of over $125,000 more per classroom. (Finding 236). These disparities in dollars cause disparate educational opportunities.
The trial court found that property poor districts have a larger number of pupils per classroom than wealthy districts. Larger classes complicate instruction and interfere with educational goals by emphasizing efficiency over effectiveness. (Finding 266). Maximum class sizes allowed under the state accreditation standards are often exceeded at all levels in elementary, junior high, and senior high schools in poor districts. (Findings 266-282). Class size adversely affects student’s educational opportunities. (Finding 273).
Funding disparities cause other deficiencies: reduced currículums; unavailability of textbooks; use of outdated textbooks; shortages and lack of equipment, supplies, and materials; spartan physical education programs; science laboratories without equipment; and lack of libraries. (Findings 283-342).
Many elementary schools do not have a library. (Finding 293). In one poor district, teachers supplement their outdated textbooks by purchasing scholastic magazines at their own personal expense. (Finding 306). Lack of a library is an inequity of major proportions, depriving students of the essential skills of research, self direction, and independent learning. (Finding 317).
*262Poor districts also have distinctly lower ratios of counselors (Finding 221), librarians (Finding 222), and guidance counselors (Finding 223), frequently below accreditation standards. Other poor districts have fewer or no instructors in art, music, foreign language, and physical education. (Finding 244). Also, in some poor districts, buildings and physical facilities are overcrowded, deteriorating, and unsafe. (Findings 379-408).
A1 of the complaining districts have curtailed or virtually eliminated staff development due to lack of funds, although the trial court found as a fact that “a teacher who takes a course in more effective teaching and applies that information is likely to be a better teacher.” (Finding 344). Athough special education programs are mandated by state and federal law, and although the number of special education students has been increasing, statewide reimbursement for these programs has decreased from 35% in 1985-1986 to 26% in 1989-1990, intensifying problems for poor districts. (Findings 345-360). Some districts receive reimbursement of significantly more money than they actually spend for transportation of students, up to 150% of their actual expenses, while other districts receive only 40-45% reimbursement. (Findings 370-378). These uneven variations in funding add to the lack of uniformity in educational opportunities.
Accreditation is one measure of compliance with minimum standards within each school. (Finding 413). Because of funding shortages, some districts are not accredited by the North Central Association. Other poor districts are deficient and facing disaccreditation because of recommendations that are beyond their financial resources. (Findings 409-A29). However, accreditation assures only uniformity in some basic elements, and wealthier districts easily meet those standards. (Finding 426). Significantly, districts that had all levels of schools accredited by the North Central Association had significantly higher average test scores at all grade levels. (Finding 428).
In sum, the trial court found that the differentials in current revenues per pupil that exist among North Dakota school districts create a lack of uniformity in education. (Finding 431). The quality of education strongly correlates with the revenue per pupil that a district has available to purchase educational services, materials, and equipment. (Finding 432). Money makes a difference.
High-spending schools have educational advantages over low-spending schools: better qualified and trained teachers as well as in-service training of staff, better equipment, and adequate facilities that are not overcrowded. (Finding 434). The higher revenues in wealthy districts translate into more staff, better teacher-pupil ratios and programs, and adequate supplies. (Finding 434). Greater funding means that schools do more things educationally, and do them better. (Finding 434).
The distinct advantages to students in wealthy districts, compared to poor districts, permit some children to compete more favorably for access to • post-secondary training and for jobs, and create life-long advantages for some students in wealthy districts, and life-long deficits for others in poor districts. (Finding 447). The existing school finance system in North Dakota has systematically created and continues significantly unequal educational access and opportunities, stemming from lower per pupil expenditures due to property wealth variations. These serious educational disadvantages for some children are only explained by the lack of uniformity in resources. (Finding 450).
The present educational funding system seriously discriminates against some students and significantly interferes with their right to equality of educational opportunities. Because educational opportunities are not substantially uniform, the existing system of educational funding needs fixing.
We conclude that the effect of the Legislature’s statutory method for distributing funding for primary and secondary education in North Dakota, as a whole, does not bear a close correspondence to the goals of providing an equal educational opportunity, and of supporting elementary and secondary education from state funds based on the educational cost per pupil. We do not hold that any one of the various statutes for distribut-*263mg funding, by itself, is unconstitutional, or that our constitution requires equal dollar funding per pupil throughout the state. The Legislature must have some freedom to relate funding to the actual costs of educating pupils, and those costs may vary throughout a state with our demographic characteristics. We hold only that the impact of the distribution of funding exhibited in this case does not bear a close correspondence to the goals of providing an equal educational opportunity and of supporting elementary and secondary education from state funds based on educational costs per pupil.
We affirm the district court judgment insofar as the court concluded that the overall impact of the entire statutory method for distributing funding for education in North Dakota is unconstitutional.
Ill
Although we sustain the district court’s determination that the statutory method for distributing funding for education, as a whole, is unconstitutional, we also conclude that the district court erred in mandating specific actions to be taken by the Governor, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Legislative Assembly and its leaders, and in retaining jurisdiction to monitor and enforce compliance with its decision. In view of the separate powers entrusted to the three coordinate branches of government, it is not the usual function of the judiciary to supervise the legislative process in that manner. State v. Sathre, 110 N.W.2d 228 (N.D.1961). The procedure for a declaratory judgment provides an adequate alternative to the court’s retention of jurisdiction. Section 32-23-08, N.D.C.C., authorizes “[fjurther relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree ... whenever necessary or proper,” but does not necessarily authorize a court to retain jurisdiction of an action to ensure that coordinate branches of government comply with a judicial decision. Because we accord respect to the coordinate branches of government and we trust that they will act to remedy the disparate effects of the statutory method for distributing funding for education, we conclude that the district court erred in mandating specific actions and in retaining jurisdiction to enforce compliance with its decision. See Odden v. O’Keefe, 450 N.W.2d 707, 710 (N.D.1990) [supreme court declined to issue supervisory writ, because it was “confident that the judges in the Northeast Judicial District will act in light of the principles set forth in this decision”].
Accordingly, we affirm the district court judgment in part and we reverse in part.
MESCHKE and LEVINE, JJ., concur.. Art. VI, § 4, N.D. Const., provides:
"A majority of the supreme court shall be necessary to constitute a quorum or to pronounce a decision, provided that the supreme court shall not declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional unless at least four of the members of the court so decide."
. Federal sources of revenue include: (1) federal "874” impact aid (Public Law 81-874, 20 U.S.C. § 240); (2) federal funds under an act to promote the mining of coal on the public domain (NDCC § 15-40.1-13; 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq.); (3) federal funds under the Taylor Grazing Act (43 U.S.C. § 315i); and (4) miscellaneous other sources such as Johnson-O’Malley funds (25 U.S.C. §§ 452-457).
. A district's "gross entitlement” to foundation aid is calculated by multiplying "educational support per pupil,” which the Legislature set at $1,552 per pupil for the first year of the 1991-1993 biennium and at $1,608 for the second year, times the district’s "weighted pupil units.” A district’s weighted pupil units are calculated by multiplying the larger of the district’s average daily membership during the previous school year or fall enrollment for the current year times weighting factors or "cost indices” for each student. The "cost indices" are calculated by multiplying the number of students in each grade by a cost index for that grade and by totaling those figures to establish the district's "weighted pupil units.” See NDCC §§ 15-40.1-07 through 15-40.1-08.
. The "deduct" was set at 20 mills from 1973 until the 1989-1990 school year. During the 1989 legislative session, the Legislature raised the deduct to 21 mills for the 1989-1990 school year and to 22 mills for each year thereafter. 1989 N.D.Sess.Laws, ch. 213, § 2. During the 1993 legislative session, the Legislature raised the deduct to 23 mills for the 1993-1994 school year and to 24 mills for each year thereafter. 1993 N.D.Sess.Laws, ch. 3, § 19.
. The education provisions provide:
"Section 1. A high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and morality on the part of every voter in a government by the people being necessary in order to insure the continuance of that government and the prosperity and happiness of the people, the legislative assembly shall make provision for the establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools which shall be open to all children of the state of North Dakota and free from sectarian control. This legislative requirement shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of North Dakota.
"Section 2. The legislative assembly shall provide for a uniform system of free public schools throughout the state, beginning with the primary and extending through all grades up to and including schools of higher education, except that the legislative assembly may authorize tuition, fees and service charges to assist in the financing of public schools of higher education.” [Emphasis added].
. Because Rodriguez essentially foreclosed federal equal protection challenges to state methods for funding education, litigants in other states have, with varying success, focused on the education or equal protection provisions of their state constitutions to challenge methods for funding public education. See Note, State Constitutional Analyses of Public School Finance Reform Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 Vand.L.Rev. 129 (1991); Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis Of State Constitutional Provisions In Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 Va. L.Rev. 1639 (1989).
Some courts have held that their state education funding systems violate the education provisions, the equal protection provisions, or both provisions, of their state constitutions. DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983); Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal.3d 728, 135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907, 97 S.Ct. 2951, 53 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.1989); McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Education, 415 Mass. 545, 615 N.E.2d 516 (1993); Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn.1993); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. One v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed.2d 219 (1973); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.1989); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. One v. State, 90 Wash.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 28 (1980).
Other courts have upheld their education funding systems against state constitutional challenges. E.g., Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo.1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983); Skeen et al. v. State of Minnesota et al., 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn.1993); Board of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138, 103 S.Ct. 775, 74 L.Ed.2d 986 (1983); Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of Cincinnati v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813, 12 O.O.3d 327 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015, 100 S.Ct. 665, 62 L.Ed.2d 644 (1980); Fair School Fin. Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla.1987); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976); Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 399 A.2d 360 (1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 294 S.C. 346, 364 S.E.2d 470 (1988); Kulcor v. Grover, 148 Wis.2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989).
. The United States Supreme Court affirmed our decision under the federal equal protection clause. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public School Dist., 487 U.S. 450, 108 S.Ct. 2481, 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988).
. A number of other jurisdictions have upheld state education financing systems challenged on equal protection grounds after subjecting those funding systems to the "rational basis” test. As in Rodriguez, those courts have concluded that spending disparities between school districts were rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of local control. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo.1982); Bd. of Education, Levittown v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138, 103 S.Ct. 775, 74 L.Ed.2d 986 (1983). See also McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983); Skeen et al. v. State of Minnesota et al., 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn.1993); Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of Cincinnati v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813, 12 O.O.3d 327 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015, 100 S.Ct. 665, 62 L.Ed.2d 644 (1980); Fair School Fin. Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla.1987); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976); Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis.2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989).
. Those legislative requirements include compulsory school attendance [NDCC ch. 15-34.1]; teachers’ certification [NDCC ch. 15-36] with minimum education requirements [NDCC §§ 15-41-25, 15-47-46]; minimum elementary and high school curriculum requirements [NDCC §§ 15-38-07, 15-41-24, 15-45-02];’ minimum number of school days for each year [NDCC § 15-47-33, 15-45-02]; class requirements for units of credit [NDCC § 15-41-06]; and health and safety requirements [NDCC chs. 15-35, 18-12, and NDCC § 15-45-02], Public schools suffer financial penalties if they fail to meet statutory approval requirements, specifically foundation aid payments are reduced. NDCC § 15-40.1-06.