dissenting.
We are asked to decide if North Dakota’s educational finance system meets the state constitution’s requirements that the Legislative Assembly “provide for a uniform system of free public schools,” and that “[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.”
Because the majority opinion’s analysis is seriously flawed, ignoring the clear meaning of the constitutional language, and the opinions of this Court, I dissent.
The district court declared virtually every education finance statute unconstitutional. The majority purports to affirm the district court; yet it declares no statute unconstitutional, but says the “effect” of the education finance system is an unconstitutional result.
There is a fundamental right to education. The plaintiffs, however, have failed to establish any student is being denied that right. They concede all plaintiff districts meet or exceed the educational requirements of the state. The students in North Dakota in general, and in the plaintiff districts, are receiving a good. education.
School districts, as political subdivisions of the state, cannot sue the state for “uniform funding.” Through lawsuit, taxpayers are not entitled to the same tax burden as different taxpayers. Students deprived of an education can sue to obtain one, but none assert an education is being denied.
Regardless of the flawed logic of the majority, there is no constitutional right to equal education financing.
To claim the constitutional requirements of a uniform system of education requires sub*264stantially the same per pupil spending everywhere in the state ignores the clear words of the constitution. It ignores the words of the drafters as recorded in the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention. It ignores the contemporaneous interpretation of the constitutional language by the First Legislative Assembly. It ignores all the previous holdings of this Court on this issue since statehood.
In citing this Court’s decisions holding the right to an education cannot be denied to handicapped children, the majority ignores the rationale of the cases and overstates their holdings as a “constitutionally mandated goal of equal educational opportunity.”
The right to an education cannot be denied, but it is absurd to suggest “equal educational opportunity” requires the same educational experience, the same textbooks, the same teachers, the same class options, or the same dollar spending. Students are entitled to the opportunity to receive an education under a uniform system of structure and standards.
The majority seeks to manufacture a new constitutional right where none exists and none was intended. Absent the violation of a legitimate constitutional right, we are not to supplant our judgment for the legislature’s.
I
The majority wrongly states it is unnecessary to resolve the issue of the nine plaintiff school districts’ standing to challenge the constitutionality of North Dakota’s school financing statutes. The districts lack standing. Their lack of standing is not only important, but the majority must ignore their lack of standing in order to find unconstitutionality.
School districts are political subdivisions of the state created by statute. See N.D.C.C. § 15-47-43; Baldwin v. Board of Education, 76 N.D. 51, 33 N.W.2d 473, 482 (1948). Political subdivisions created and controlled by the state do not have standing to claim violations of constitutional rights. County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc., 371 N.W.2d 321 (N.D.1985). In County of Stuts-man, this Court held:
“A political subdivision, as an agency of the state in the exercise of governmental powers, generally has no privileges or immunities under the Federal Constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of the State.
“In this instance the County, rather than a private person, is the party asserting a violation of its constitutional rights. Stuts-man County may not successfully assert a violation of those constitutional rights because it is not a person or private party within the context of those provisions. If Stutsman County has a serious complaint about the burdens placed upon it by this designation under the legislative enactment of chapter 55-10 for preservation of historic sites, the County must take it to the Legislature which controls the County’s fate in matters such as this.”
County of Stutsman at 330 (citations omitted, footnote omitted).
This Court has previously held school districts have no enforceable rights against the state regarding education funding. In Dickinson Public School Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906 (N.D.1988), this Court held local school districts have no contract rights against the state to foundation aid payments. In Sanstead, this Court said, “state aid to local school districts is a mere gratuity.” Sanstead at 910. See also Zenith School District No. 32 v. Peterson, 81 N.W.2d 764, 768 (N.D.1957).
The district court erred when it ignored established North Dakota law and instead applied Minnesota law to find the school districts have standing to assert constitutional claims on their own behalf. See Metro. Sports Fac. v. County of Hennepin, 451 N.W.2d 319 (Minn.1990). Since the majority’s finding of unconstitutionality is not based on specific claims of any but the school district plaintiffs, the ignoring of established North Dakota law is crucial to its holding.
II
The first step in analyzing the constitutionality of North Dakota’s school finance system is determining what the education clause of our North Dakota Constitution requires. *265Does the Constitution require the legislature to create a system of public schools uniform in organizational structure (for example, local school districts and statewide curriculum and accreditation requirements), or must the legislature create a system uniform both in structure and in per pupil funding?
A
The majority reviews the language of Article VIII, § 2, N.D. Const., and concludes the legislature’s obligations under the education clause are not fully defined by “mere uniformity.” The majority, however, never explains what is required under Article VIII. Instead, the majority bypasses this step and applies equal protection principles. To determine if the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to education is being abridged, we must first define the right.
Article VIII, N.D. Const., sets forth the state’s education system. Article VIII provides, in part:
“Section 1. A high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and morality on the part of every voter in a government by the people being necessary in order to insure the continuance of that government and the prosperity and happiness of the people, the legislative assembly shall make provision for the establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools which shall be open to all children of the state of North Dakota and free from sectarian control. This legislative requirement shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of North Dakota.
“Section 2. The legislative assembly shall provide for a uniform system of free public schools throughout the state, beginning with the primary and extending through all grades up to and including schools of higher education, except that the legislative assembly may authorize tuition, fees and service charges to assist in the financing of public schools of higher education.
“Section S. In all schools instruction shall be given as far as practicable in those branches of knowledge that tend to impress upon the mind the vital importance of truthfulness, temperance, purity, public spirit, and respect for honest labor of every kind.
“Section A The legislative assembly shall take such other steps as may be necessary to prevent illiteracy, secure a reasonable degree of uniformity in course of study, and to promote industrial, scientific, and agricultural improvements.”
The district court concluded the uniformity provision in Article VIII, § 2 requires uniformity in “educational opportunity” as measured by per pupil funding. The district court erred in its interpretation of Article VIII. Article VIII, § 2 directs the legislature to create a system of education which is structurally uniform throughout the state. Article VIII, § 2 does not require uniformity in per pupil funding to achieve “equality in opportunity.”
In construing constitutional provisions:
“[W]e must undertake to ascribe to the words used that meaning which the people understood them to have when the constitutional provision was adopted. State ex rel. Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898 (N.D.1977). In so doing, it is appropriate to consider contemporaneous and longstanding practical interpretations of the provision by the Legislature where there has been acquiescence by the people in such interpretations.”
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 402 N.W.2d 897, 899 (N.D.1987).
The record of the North Dakota Constitutional Convention debates reflects the delegates’ intent in requiring “a uniform system of free public schools.” Article VIII, § 2 was reported out of the committee on education, as follows:
“Sec. 2. The Legislature shall provide at their first session after the adoption of this Constitution for a uniform system of free public schools throughout the State, beginning with the primary and extending through all grades up to and including the normal and collegiate course.”
Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the First Constitutional Convention of North Dakota, p. 152 (1889).
*266Delegate Patrick McHugh twice attempted to amend section 2 to eliminate the word “uniform.” McHugh’s first amendment attempted to replace “a uniform” with “an independent district.” The amendment was defeated. Debates of the Convention, p. 152-53. McHugh’s second attempt proposed striking all of section 2 after the word “State” in line three, and inserting:
“And each county of the State shall be divided into a convenient number of independent school districts. But no school district shall be formed containing less than twenty-five inhabitants.”
In opposition to the proposed amendment, Delegate William J. Clapp explained:
“This matter of the school district system came before the committee and it was their idea, and the idea of the Convention that while the school district system might be the best, at some other time there might be some better method, and we thought the better plan would be to adopt a uniform system and if so the Legislature will make it uniform. I hope it will stand as it is here.”
Debates of the Convention, p. 603. The amendment failed.
Clapp’s comments clarify the framers’ intent. The education committee believed the legislature should create a system of local school districts to provide education for North Dakota’s citizens. The committee, however, used the word uniform in section 2 to give the legislature flexibility in determining the best organizational system in the future. The framers did not intend to require the legislature to create an education system with uniform per pupil funding financed by the state.
The early contemporaneous legislative construction of the education provisions also supports the proposition that the state is not required to provide uniformity in per pupil funding. In 1890, the First North Dakota Legislative Assembly enacted chapter 62, entitled: “AN ACT to Provide for a Uniform System of Free Public Schools Throughout the State and to Prescribe Penalties for Violation of the Provisions Thereof.” Chapter 62 established school districts and governed the schools in those districts. N.D.Sess. Laws, ch. 62 (1890); see also Cardiff v. Bismarck Public School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 107-8 (N.D.1978).
Under chapter 62, the state’s school system was financed almost exclusively by local taxes. “[T]he First Legislative Assembly did provide for a uniform system of free public schools through a system of school districts, financed by a local ad valorem property tax levy of not exceeding 30 mills. (Sections 101 and 102, Chapter 62, Laws of 1890).” Dornacker v. Olson, 248 N.W.2d 844, 848 (N.D.1976). The first legislature gave local school boards power to levy a property tax of not more than 80 mills in any one year. S.L. 1890, ch. 62, § 101. Chapter 62 also required each county assess a levy of one dollar on each elector in the county and a further tax of two mills for all taxable property in the county for the support of the common schools. S.L. 1890, ch. 62, § 102.
The First Legislative Assembly did not see the funding for North Dakota’s schools as the responsibility of the state, but rather as a local function. The only state money for education provided by the first legislature came from fines and penalties for violation of state law, school land leases, and interest and income from the state permanent school trust fund. S.L. 1890, ch. 62, § 90. Use of these funds for education was mandated by Article IX, §§ 153 and 154 of the North Dakota Constitution (1889).
In its original form, prior to its amendment in 1970 and 1982, Article IX, § 153, provided:
“All proceeds of the public lands that have heretofore been, or may hereafter be granted by the United States for the support of the common schools in this state; all such per centum as may be granted by the United States on the sale of public lands; the proceeds of property that shall fall to the state by escheat; the proceeds of all gifts and donations to the state for common schools, or not otherwise appropriated by the terms of the gift, and all other property otherwise acquired for common schools, shall be and remain a perpetual fund for the maintenance of the common schools of the state. It shall be *267deemed a trust fund, the principal of which shall forever remain inviolate and may be increased but never diminished. The state shall make good all losses thereof.”
Prior to its amendment in 1982, Article IX, § 154, provided:
“The interest and income of this fund together with the net proceeds of all fines for violation of state laws and all other sums which may be added thereto by law, shall be faithfully used and applied each year for the benefit of the common schools of the state, and shall be for this purpose apportioned among and between all the several common school corporations of the state in proportion to the number of children in each of school age, as may be fixed by law, and no part of the fund shall ever be diverted, even temporarily, from this purpose or used for any other purpose whatever than the maintenance of common schools for the equal benefit of all the people of the state; provided however, that if any portion of the interest or income aforesaid be not expended during any year, said portion shall be added to and become a part of the school fund.” (Emphasis added.)
Although the drafters of North Dakota’s Constitution were aware of the divergent value of property throughout the state and, therefore, the differing ability of local communities to raise money for schools, the drafters determined the proceeds from North Dakota’s trust fund should be distributed on a per student basis, rather than on an equal educational opportunity basis. See Debates of the Convention, pp. 161-63, and 288-89.
Similarly, the early education legislation did not include statewide “equalization” among school districts. As discussed above, the 1890 statutes provided the state’s schools would be funded primarily through school district property taxes, county property taxes, and county poll taxes. S.L. 1890, ch. 62, §§ 101 and 102. The school district property taxes were retained within the school district. S.L. 1890, ch. 62, § 101. The county taxes were paid into the state tuition fund. S.L. 1890, ch. 62, § 102. The state tuition fund was apportioned among the counties strictly by the number of school age children residing in each county. S.L. 1890, ch. 62, § 90. Each county then distributed the state tuition fund moneys to school districts on the same basis (the number of school age children in the district). S.L. 1890, ch. 62, § 95. This funding method included no equalization based on the property wealth of a particular school district.
This Court previously has interpreted the education provisions of the Constitution. Those eases concluded the Constitution only requires the legislature to establish a statewide system of schools. Our past opinions make clear the legislature is not required to provide any particular level or type of state funding for education.
In Todd v. Board of Education, 54 N.D. 235, 241, 209 N.W. 369, 371 (1926), this Court held Article VIII §§ 1 and 2:
“[Requires the establishment and maintenance by the state of a uniform system of free public schools, but this requirement is satisfied by provision for the creation of school districts and for a uniform system of schools in those districts.”
In Zenith School District, 81 N.W.2d at 768, the Court concluded “[s]tate aid to school districts, however, is not reimbursement for or payment for anything. It is a grant in aid and in so far as the local districts are concerned it is in the nature of a gratuity.”
In Dickinson Public School Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d at 909, the Court explained:
“[T]he Legislature could have required, as it did in the distant past, that all funding for public schools be borne by the local district, inasmuch as the State’s constitutional directive to provide a uniform system of public schools is satisfied by provision for the creation of school districts and for a uniform system of schools in those districts.”
Other state courts which have interpreted similar constitutional provisions have held “uniform” merely applies to the general system of education, and not to equality in funding. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 310 (Minn.1993) (constitutional requirement met *268so long as all state schools provide “adequate level of basic education”); Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (1973) (“general and uniform” requirement met since Arizona’s system assures every child a basic education); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635, 648 (1975); Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P.2d 724 (1993) (“[T]he uniformity requirement in the education clause requires only uniformity in curriculum, not uniformity in funding.”); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139, 148 (1976) (Constitution is “complied with if the state requires and provides for a minimum of educational opportunities in the district and permits the districts to exercise local control over what they desire, and can furnish, over the minimum.”); Coalition for Equit. Sch. Fund. v. State, 311 Or. 300, 811 P.2d 116 (1991); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1018-19 (Colo.1982), (Colorado General Assembly must provide each school age -child the opportunity to receive a free education, and must establish guidelines); Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis.2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568, 577-78 (1989) (“uniform” requirement refers to such items as minimum teacher certification, minimum number of school days, and standard school curriculum); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C.App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432, 433-37 (1987); St. Johns County v. N.E. Fla. Builders, 583 So.2d 635, 641 (Fla.1991). But see Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 90 Wash.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (school funding system found unconstitutional based on requirement making it the “paramount” duty of the state to make “ample” provision for education); Washakie Co. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.1980) (funding based on county wealth violates equal protection).
Article VIII does not require uniformity in funding to achieve equal educational opportunity. A contrary conclusion disregards the constitutional history of Article VIII, the legislative history of school financing in North Dakota, the prior rulings of this Court, and rulings from states with similar constitutional requirements.
B
Although Article VIII does not require uniformity in educational opportunity, it does require the state to create a system of education which ensures basic education. The majority correctly points out a “uniformly inadequate” system would not satisfy the requirements of Article VIII.
Although Article VIII does not set forth a clear mandate that the legislature provide basic education, such a requirement is inherent in Article VIII, §§ 1, 3 and 4. Section 1 provides:
“A high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and morality on the part of every voter in a government by the people being necessary in order to insure the continuance of that government and the prosperity and happiness of the people, the legislative assembly shall ... [establish] ... a system of public schools.... ”
Section 3 provides:
“In all schools instruction shall be given as far as practicable in those branches of knowledge that tend to impress upon the mind the vital importance of truthfulness, temperance, purity, public spirit, and respect for honest labor of every kind.”
Section 4 provides:
“The legislative assembly shall take such other steps as may be necessary to prevent illiteracy, secure a reasonable degree of uniformity in course of study, and to promote industrial, scientific, and agricultural improvements.”
The state, is meeting its responsibility to provide a basic education. The legislature has created a uniform system to deliver educational services through the use of local school districts supervised by local school boards. N.D.C.C. §§ 15-47-43, 15-29-07, and 15-29-08. Each district must meet a set of statutorily imposed requirements. All public, private, and parochial schools in North Dakota must:
(1) Employ certified teachers (N.D.C.C. ch. 15-36) having at least specific minimum qualifications (N.D.C.C. §§ 15-41-25 and 15-45-02).
(2) Offer courses satisfying at least minimum high school curriculum require*269ments and meet required elementary curriculum requirements (N.D.C.C. §§ 15-38-07, 15-41-24 and 15-45-02).
(3) Teach high school courses for at least a set minimum amount of time for a high school student to receive a unit of credit for the course (N.D.C.C. § 15-41-06).
(4) Hold school for at least a minimum number of days each year (N.D.C.C. §§ 15-47-33 and 15-45-02).
(5) Meet health and safety requirements (N.D.C.C. chs. 15-35 and 18-12; N.D.C.C. § 15-45-02).
The teacher certification and qualifications statutes require all teachers be certified based on standards established by the state superintendent of public instruction. Teachers can teach only in their major or minor field of preparation.
The courses included in the minimum high school curriculum requirements are four units each of English and science, three units each of math and social studies, one unit each of health and physical education, music, and six units of electives from at least two course areas identified in the statute. N.D.C.C. § 15^1-24.
Under the statutory curriculum, students in elementary schools must be taught spelling, reading, writing, arithmetic, language, English grammar, geography, United States history, civil government, nature study, and elements of agriculture. Physiology and hygiene also must be taught. N.D.C.C. § 15-38-07. Other statutes impose additional, very specific curriculum requirements on all schools. See N.D.C.C. §§ 15-38-07 through 15-38-11, 15-47-24, and 15-47-37.
A school’s foundation aid payments can be reduced for failure to comply with the curriculum requirements. See N.D.C.C. § 15-40.1-06(2). All public schools in North Dakota, including those in the plaintiff districts, currently meet the statutory curriculum requirements.
Additionally, the legislature has authorized the state superintendent of public instruction to establish standards for accreditation of public and private schools. N.D.C.C. §§ 15-21-04.1 and 15-45-03. Under this statutory authorization, the state superintendent has issued accreditation standards to further ensure educational quality in North Dakota.
The accreditation standards are grouped into eight categories: school improvement, administration, instructional personnel, instructional program, student evaluation, pupil personnel services, library media services, and school policies. Many accreditation standards impose more stringent requirements than are mandated by statute. See Accreditation Standards, Criteria and Procedures for the classification of Elementary, Middle Level/Junior High, and Secondary Schools, prepared by the North Dakota Department of Public. Instruction, August, 1991.
The content of some accreditation standards differ for different schools based on varying enrollments. The different standards for large and small enrollment schools are based on practical considerations. The size of a district makes a difference in the educational programs the district can offer. Larger schools are expected to meet higher standards in regard to breadth and depth of course offerings. For the most part, the plaintiffs’ schools are the larger schools in the state.
Public schools may receive one of four accreditation classifications: (1) accredited with commendation (given to a school that has met the accreditation standards and gone through a school improvement process), (2) accredited (given to a school that has met the accreditation standards but has not gone through a school improvement process), (3) accredited with warning (given to a school that has failed to meet a “required” accreditation standard or a sufficient percentage of the “optional” standards), and (4) not accredited (given to a school that was accredited with warning and failed to correct the problem that caused the warning).
A school accredited with warning suffers no financial penalty during the year it receives the warning, but the school must remove the warning by the next date of accreditation or it will be reclassified as not accredited.
All public secondary schools in North Dakota currently are accredited. All but one of *270North Dakotá’s public elementary schools currently are accredited. All of the plaintiff districts are accredited, some with commendation.
C
Since the legislature has created a system of education uniform both in organizational structure and in curriculum requirements, the Court’s review of Article VIII should be limited to two questions: (1) do the state’s curriculum and accreditation requirements ensure a basic level of education so as to produce responsible productive citizens. See Art. VIII, § 1, N.D. Const.; State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 897 (N.D.1980) (“The State of North Dakota has a recognized and conceded interest in assuring the sufficient education of the children of the residents of the state to enable them to be viable citizens in the community.”); and, (2) are the state’s minimum requirements being enforced to ensure a basic level of education.
All of the schools in the plaintiff school districts meet the statutory curriculum requirements, and all of the schools are accredited. The plaintiffs do not challenge the adequacy of North Dakota’s accreditation system, rather the plaintiffs’ action is based on claims of relative harm — harm caused by differences in per pupil funding among districts.
The district judge assumed relative funding differences, and the different choices school districts are forced to make because of funding differences, amounted to a constitutional violation. The district court, however, mistakenly assumed school districts have a right to equal funding. The district court failed to analyze whether the relative differences in funding amounted to denial of some children’s right to an education. The district court found inadequacies based on outside reading in newspapers and magazines, and on the defendants anecdotal evidence. The majority makes this same mistake.
Rather than examine all the factors which measure quality in education, the district court focused only on funding. To meet its responsibilities under Article VIII, the state must spend sufficient money to ensure children receive a basic level of education. The fact some school districts receive more funding per pupil than others, does not necessarily mean the students in the lower funded districts are being denied their constitutional right to an education. Because North Dakota has both small enrollment rural school districts and large enrollment urban school districts, differences in per pupil funding are not surprising. Larger school districts, because of economies of scale, are able to provide services more efficiently than smaller districts. Because there is not a direct correlation between monetary input and education output, comparisons of school districts’ per pupil funding are not the measure of whether the state is meeting its constitutional responsibility.
Student output is the appropriate measure of education quality. To assess education quality in the state, the department of public instruction coordinates the administration of the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills (CTBS), the Test of Cognitive Skills (TCS), and the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). The CTBS and TCS tests, which are administered and scored together, have been administered in all public schools and almost all private schools in North Dakota in grades 3, 6, 8, and 11 since 1990.
The CTBS test measures achievement in basic skills. The TCS test is a “school ability” test. It does not measure achievement; it measures how well students should be expected to perform in school.
The test results for North Dakota students show students are learning commensurate with their ability. In 1991, North Dakota students on an average scored higher than the national average on all CTBS subtests at all grade levels. North Dakota students also achieved the top scores in the United States on the 1990 NAEP eighth grade mathematics assessment. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence, differences in district funding do not have an effect on student learning as measured by standardized tests.
Misconstruing the constitutional requirements, the district court fundamentally erred in focusing on the relative funding differences among school districts, and in discount-*271mg the state’s studies as to education quality as measured by student achievement.
The education clause does not require uniformity in education funding, only that the state ensure a basic level of education. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated the state’s system fails to provide a basic education. The requirements of the education clause are being met, and the system is valid under Article VIII.
Ill
The majority’s equal protection analysis is also faulty. The majority correctly points out that under Article I, §§ 21 and 22, of the North Dakota Constitution, not all legislative classifications are unlawful. We review lawfulness of legislative classifications under three separate standards of review. “The standard used in a particular ease depends upon the challenged statutory classification and the right allegedly infringed.” Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 402 N.W.2d at 902. A statute, however, is conclusively presumed to be constitutional unless it is clearly shown the statute violates the state or federal constitutions. Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 332 N.W.2d 54, 61 (N.D.1983).
Equal protection analysis begins with a review of the right allegedly infringed. This case involves three groups of plaintiffs: the nine school districts, taxpayers in each of the nine plaintiff school districts, and parents suing on behalf of their children who are students in the nine plaintiff school districts.
A
As explained above, the nine plaintiff school districts have no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the state’s education funding system.
B
The taxpayer plaintiffs’ argue they are discriminated against under the current funding formula. They claim their equal protection rights are violated because they are paying property taxes higher than taxpayers in other school districts, and their school district should be receiving more money from the state. The district court found:
“Plaintiff taxpayers are denied equal protection in that they must pay proportionately higher taxes on their real estate for the maintenance of education which does not result in equal education opportunity for the students in their districts.”
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez; 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, reh’g denied, 411 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1919, 36 L.Ed.2d 418 (1973), the United States Supreme Court reviewed claims Texas’ school financing system was unconstitutional. The Court noted wealth discrimination claims in challenges to state public school financing laws are unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination previously reviewed by the United States Supreme Court:
“Rather than focusing on the unique features of the alleged discrimination, the courts in these cases have virtually assumed their findings of a suspect classification through a simplistic process of analysis: since, under the traditional systems of financing public schools, some poorer people receive less expensive educations than other more affluent people, these systems discriminate on the basis of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard threshold questions, including whether it makes a difference for purposes of consideration under the Constitution that the class of disadvantaged ‘poor’ cannot be identified or defined in customary equal protection terms, and whether the relative — rather than absolute — nature of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence.”
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19, 93 S.Ct. at 1289, 36 L.Ed.2d at 34. The Court concluded no suspect classification based on wealth was involved:
“However described, it is clear that ap-pellees’ suit asks this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts. The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disability, or subjected *272to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majori-tarian political process.”
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28, 93 S.Ct. at 1294, 36 L.Ed.2d at 40 (footnote omitted). See also Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d at 1021; Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 314. The taxpayer plaintiffs are not a suspect class.
The taxpayers in districts with relatively low taxable value per pupil are not, on average, poor. Kathryn L. Strombeck, a research analyst with the Tax Commissioner’s Office, compared the average adjusted gross incomes for taxpayers in the plaintiff districts, with statewide average adjusted gross incomes. Strombeck concluded no significant relationship existed between average adjusted gross income and taxable valuation per pupil. School districts with high average adjusted gross incomes do not consistently have high levels of taxable valuation per pupil, nor do they consistently have low levels of taxable valuation per pupil.
The taxpayers in districts with relatively low taxable value per pupil do not necessarily pay higher property taxes than taxpayers in school districts with relatively high taxable value per pupil. The plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. John Augenbliek, established statistically there is little or no relationship between a districts’ property wealth and its mill levy. The taxpayer plaintiffs’ only complaint is that because the state has failed to fully equalize its funding to school districts, the school boards in some of the districts, with the consent of the people, have chosen to raise the school districts’ mill levy, forcing some of the taxpayer plaintiffs to pay more property taxes than some taxpayers in other districts. This complaint does not state a valid constitutional claim. The equal protection clause does not guarantee taxpayers rates identical to all other taxpayers in the state. Signal Oil and Gas Company v. Williams County, 206 N.W.2d 75 (N.D.1973). The legislature has wide discretion to fix the basis of taxation. Signal Oil and Gas Company at 82. A tax will be upheld:
“[I]f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. Furthermore, a court need not know the special reasons, motives, or policies of a State legislature in adopting a particular classification, so long as the policy is one within the power of the legislature to pursue, and so long as the classification bears a reasonable relation to those reasons, motives, or policies.”
Signal Oil and Gas Company at 83 (citations omitted); see also Caldis v. Board of Cty. Com’rs, Grand Forks Cty., 279 N.W.2d 665, 672 (N.D.1979); So. Valley Grain Dealers v. Bd. of Cty. Com’rs, 257 N.W.2d 425, 436 (N.D.1977).
Because the legislature’s funding scheme for public education promotes both local control and local involvement, it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. The district court erred in concluding the taxpayer plaintiffs’ constitutional rights are violated by the current public school financing system.
C
In North Dakota, education is a fundamental right under the North Dakota Constitution. In In Interest of G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D.1974), this Court resolved whether G.H., a child with severe physical handicaps, was entitled to have the state pay her tuition at the Crippled Children’s School. This Court held:
“We are satisfied that all children in North Dakota have the right, under the State Constitution, to a public school education ....
“Handicapped children are certainly entitled to no less than unhandicapped children, under the explicit provisions of. the Constitution.”
In Interest of G.H. at 446. After reviewing the United States Supreme Court’s Rodriguez opinion, this Court concluded, even if education was not a fundamental right under the North Dakota Constitution, G.H. would be entitled to a state funded public education under the equal protection clauses of the United States and North Dakota Constitutions. This Court concluded classifications *273based on physical disability are inherently suspect, subject to strict scrutiny:
“When North Dakota undertakes to supply an education to all, and to require all to attend school, that right must be made available to all, including the handicapped, on equal terms.”
In Interest of G.H. at 447.
In Lapp v. Reeder Public School Dist. No. 3, 491 N.W.2d 65 (N.D.1992), this Court reiterated its holding in In Interest of G.H., explaining:
“Under our state constitution, all children in North Dakota have the right to a public school education. N.D. Const. Art. VIII, § 1. Our state constitution also guarantees ‘equal educational opportunity’ to a handicapped child. In Interest of G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D.1974). The school board of a public school has a duty ‘[t]o establish for all children of legal school age residing within the district, a system of free public schools which shall furnish school privileges equally and equitably.’ Section 15-29-08(1), N.D.C.C.; see also N.D. Const. Art. VIII, § 2.”
Lapp at 67 (citations omitted).
In Interest of G.H. and Lapp are very different from this case. In In Interest of G.H., the issue was which public entity, if any, would be responsible to pay for G.H.’s education. Similarly, in Lapp, the issue was the handicapped child’s residence so as to determine the financially responsible district. Both In Interest of G.H. and Lapp involved a total deprivation of the child’s right to an education and an inherently suspect classification. This case involves neither a complete denial of education opportunity, or an inherently suspect classification.
A party attacking the constitutionality of a statute must show the statute affects the party’s rights in an unconstitutional manner. Benson v. Schneider, 68 N.W.2d 665, 670 (N.D.1955). When reviewing challenges to classifications which affect fundamental rights, or important substantive rights, “the challenged law must be shown to ‘significantly interfere’ with the right ... before a court need apply heightened scrutiny.” Gange v. Clerk of Burleigh Cty. D. Court, 429 N.W.2d 429, 433 (N.D.1988); see also Wills v. State, 821 P.2d 866 (Colo.App.1991) (When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, the strict scrutiny test is used to evaluate its constitutionality.); Walters v. Edwards, 396 F.Supp. 808 (E.D.La.1975) (If classification of voters into two groups significantly interferes with fundamental right, such classification must meet compelling state interest test to pass equal protection scrutiny.).
The plaintiffs have not proven a “significant interference” with their fundamental right to an education. The scope of the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to an education is defined by Article VIII. Article VIII requires the state to provide a basic level of educational opportunity. The state has met its responsibility under Article VIII through the establishment of a uniform system of schools with curriculum and accreditation standards. Since Article VIII is satisfied under the current system, the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to an education is not infringed. The appropriate standard of review, therefore, is the rational basis test, which is “the traditional standard for scrutinizing legislation facing equal protection attack and is most often utilized in cases involving economic and social welfare legislation.” Kadrmas, 402 N.W.2d at 902.
In Kadrmas, several parents brought an action to enjoin the collection by a school district of a fee for school bus transportation. The parents asserted under Article VIII, § 2, the state was required to provide free school bus transportation because it is an essential element of the education process. This Court rejected the parents’ claim, holding:
“In our view transportation is not a necessary element of the educational process, and it is not an integral part of the educational system to which the constitution refers in requiring the Legislature to provide ‘a uniform system of free public schools.’ Although transportation may be an important prerequisite to accepting the educational opportunities offered in the public school system it is not part of the system.”
*274Kadrmas at 901. In Kadrmas, the parents also challenged the statute authorizing school bus charges as violating their rights to equal protection. The parties based their equal protection challenge on two classifications. First, they asserted the transportation charges created a wealth classification which discriminated against poor persons. Second, they asserted the statute, by authorizing only school districts which had not been reorganized to charge a school bus service fee, created a classification between reorganized and nonreorganized districts, which discriminated against persons residing in nonreor-ganized districts.
This Court applied the rational basis test and upheld the statute:
“In our view the challenged statute in this case is purely economic legislation which neither involves a suspect classification nor a fundamental or important substantive right which would require the strict scrutiny or intermediate standard of review.... We conclude that the rational basis test is the appropriate standard of review for the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims in this case. Accordingly, Section 15-34.2-06.1, N.D.C.C., must be upheld unless it is patently arbitrary and fails to bear a rational relationship to any legitimate government purpose.”
Kadrmas at 902. This Court concluded the statute was rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of allocating limited resources, and the statute did not discriminate on the basis of wealth so as to violate federal or state equal protection rights. Kadrmas at 903.
The current financing system satisfies the rational basis test. The system provides a basic education to all of the plaintiffs. The system also fosters local control and involvement in education, a legitimate legislative goal.
D
The plaintiffs make a valid public policy argument when criticizing the shortcomings of the 22 mill deduct1 in the state’s foundation aid program. The deduct is not working as it did originally, and it is unfortunate the legislature has not done more to correct the problem. The job, however, is the legislature’s. Issues of funding necessarily involve the balancing of an infinite number of variables, and involve making value judgments as to which variables deserve more attention. Value judgments associated with allocating scarce resources, in most situations, are properly made by the legislature, with the consent of the people. The judiciary’s role is limited. The judiciary should not “constitu-tionalize” complex public policy issues unless fundamental or substantive rights are being abridged.
More involved than the truncated version stated by the majority, the stated intent of N.D.C.C. § 15-40.1-06 is to support elementary and secondary education based on educational cost per student (with various exclusions). It does not state the goal is to “equalize” or “achieve equality” in per pupil spending. The majority claims the legislature has not sufficiently achieved the funding goal the majority says the legislature has established, and therefore, the funding system is unconstitutional. Even if the section represented a legislative goal to equalize funding for schools in the state, equalization is not a constitutional requirement. The legislature can create and eliminate funding goals at will as long as it ensures basic educational opportunity to all North Dako-tans. The legislature’s failure to meet a goal of equalized funding would not render the entire education funding system unconstitutional.
The majority, citing to no specific legal principle, creates a new substantive right under the North Dakota Constitution: The right of school districts to receive less disparate per pupil funding than they are currently receiving. The majority concludes strict scrutiny does not apply because “legislative determinations about the financing mix for education involve difficult questions of local and statewide taxation, fiscal planning, and *275education policy, which are ill-suited for strict scrutiny analysis.”
The majority, however, later concludes such determinations are suited for intermediate substantive right scrutiny:
“Although the statutory method for distributing funding for education may not totally deprive any student of access to the fundamental right to education, we believe the method of distributing funding for that fundamental right involves important substantive matters similar to those rights involved in cases in which we have applied the intermediate level of scrutiny.”
The majority does not explain the legal source of the substantive right, or define what level of funding equality is mandated under its requirements. The majority’s “we know it when we see it” approach tells the legislature to “try again,” without providing the legislature with a blueprint for constructing a new system.
Under the majority’s holding, the legislature could meet its constitutional obligation of providing “equal educational opportunity” by decreasing the amount of funding given to “property rich” school districts, without increasing the funding to the “property poor” school districts. The majority’s opinion leads to this absurd result because of the majority’s failure to clearly define a child’s fundamental right to an education.
The majority’s opinion is an example of why issues of funding are best left to the discretion of the legislature. Unless the legislature is denying a child his or her constitutional right to an education or acting in an arbitrary fashion, this Court has no business telling the legislature how to finance education. The majority’s holding is not an appropriate exercise of judicial power, and is not a proper interpretation of the North Dakota Constitution.
I would uphold the constitutionality of North Dakota’s school financing system.
. See N.D.C.C. § 15-40.1-06(3)(a). The deduct has been increased by the legislature to 23 mills for the 1993-4 school year, and to 24 mills for each year thereafter. N.D.Sess.Laws 1993, ch. 3, § 19.