(dissenting).
I. FACTS
The essential facts of this case are set forth by the Court of Appeals in People v Stoudemire, 140 Mich App 687, 688; 365 NW2d 214 (1985).
Defendant was originally charged with assaulting a prison guard, MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3), and as a[n] habitual offender-fourth offense, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. The supplemental information was predicated upon three prior felony convictions for breaking and entering, unarmed robbery and criminal sexual conduct. Both defendant and the prosecution agree that the three prior felony convictions were part of a single transaction and occurred at the same time and place.
*279Defendant brought a motion to dismiss the supplemental information, arguing that the three prior felony convictions arose out of a single transaction charged in one multi-count information. Defendant claims that the three prior convictions count only as one conviction under the habitual offender statute, and therefore any supplemental information should have charged defendant only as a second offender. Defendant’s motion was denied by the trial court, and defendant thereafter pled guilty to the principal charge in exchange for dismissal of the supplemental information. The plea agreement was complied with[. Defendant [then] appealed] as of right from his plea-based conviction.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, defendant relied on People v Ross, 84 Mich App 218; 269 NW2d 532 (1978), and argued that under the habitual offender statute, the supplemental information should have charged him only as a second offender because his three prior felony convictions arose out of a single transaction. The Court of Appeals found that defendant was properly charged under the habitual offender statute as a fourth offender, affirmed defendant’s plea-based conviction, and also certified that its decision in this case conflicts with its decision in People v Carson, 115 Mich App 202; 320 NW2d 343 (1982).1
The section of the habitual offender statute under which defendant was charged as an habitual offender-fourth offense provides in pertinent part:
*280If a person has been convicted of 3 or more felonies, attempts to commit felonies, or both, whether the convictions occurred in this state or would have been for felonies in this state if the convictions obtained outside this state had been obtained in this state, and that person commits a subsequent felony within this state, the person shall be punished upon conviction .... [MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084.]
We granted leave to appeal in this case to. determine whether a defendant can be charged under the habitual offender statute as a fourth offender where his three prior felony convictions arose out of the same transaction. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
II. STATUTORY RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
We must construe the provisions of the statute in question to reach the issue raised in this case. The intent of the Legislature controls statutory construction. Owendale Schools v State Bd of Ed, 413 Mich 1, 8; 317 NW2d 529 (1982). Our primary goal in construing the habitual offender statute is to discover and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. The intent of the Legislature is derived from the actual language used in the statute. Grand Rapids v Crocker, 219 Mich 178, 182-183; 189 NW 221 (1922). When the language used in a statute is plain and unambiguous, a common-sense reading of the provision will suffice. No interpretation is necessary. Dussia v Monroe Co Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich 244, 248-249; 191 NW2d 307 (1971). This rule was first pronounced in Michigan in an 1865 case, People v Blodgett, 13 Mich 127, 167-168 (1865), where Justice Cooley wrote:
*281There are certain well settled rules for the construction of statutes, which no court can safely disregard. Where the statute is plain and unambiguous in its terms, the courts have nothing to do but to obey it. They may give a sensible and reasonable interpretation to legislative expressions which are obscure, but they have no right to distort those which are clear and intelligible. The fair and natural import of the terms employed, in view of the subject matter of the law, is what should govern .... [Citations omitted.]
There is another fundamental rule of statutory construction that we must take into consideration before reaching the question raised in this case. That rule states that "departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question.” Salas v Clements, 399 Mich 103, 109; 247 NW2d 889 (1976).
III. DISCUSSION
I now turn to the challenged habitual offender statute. MCL 769.10 et seq.; MSA 28.1082 et seq. In applying the fundamental rules of statutory construction discussed above, one must read the entire habitual offender statute and give due consideration to every section, to produce, if possible, an harmonious and consistent enactment of the whole act. Grand Rapids v Crocker, supra, 182.
The habitual offender statute provides for enhanced punishment for individuals who have been convicted of at least one previous felony, an attempt to commit a felony, or both, and who commit a subsequent felony within this state.
The various sections of the statute apply to graduated levels of previous felonies ranging from *282one prior felony to three or more prior felonies. If an individual has previously been convicted of felonies or attempted felonies and commits a subsequent felony, the statute authorizes the sentencing court to impose an enhanced sentence. The statute is silent with regard to the necessary sequence of prior convictions. The fact that the statute is silent on this point does not necessarily mean that the language is ambiguous. My reading of the statute as a whole convinces me that the language is plain and unambiguous.
A literal reading of the statutory language indicates that an individual who has been convicted of three felonies which arose out of the same criminal transaction, like the defendant in the instant case, and who commits a subsequent felony, can be sentenced under the habitual offender statute as a fourth offender. MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. One must determine whether the literal meaning of the statute as applied to the facts of this case is so unjust and absurd as to justify a departure. Salas v Clements, supra, 109.
A
In People v Podsiad, 295 Mich 541; 295 NW 257 (1940), and People v Lowenstein, 309 Mich 94; 14 NW2d 794 (1944), we were asked to determine whether a defendant convicted of and sentenced for two counts arising out of the same criminal transaction had been convicted of two felonies so as to subject the defendant to enhanced punishment under the habitual criminal act.2 In both cases,3 we concluded that a defendant who was *283convicted of and sentenced for two counts arising out of the same criminal transaction could not be sentenced under the habitual criminal act. The statute applied only to individuals who, after having been convicted of one felony, committed a subsequent crime. The defendants in both Podsiad and Lowenstein had not been convicted of a prior felony at the time they committed the two felonies that were under review.
The holding in Podsiad represents the majority rule which states that "it is a prerequisite that the prior conviction or convictions precede the commission of the principal offense in order to enhance the punishment under habitual criminal statutes.” Anno: Chronological or procedural sequence of former convictions as affecting enhancement of penalty for subsequent offense under habitual criminal statutes, 24 ALR2d 1247, 1249; 22-24 ALR2d (Later Case Service) 544, 545.
The minority rule states that conviction of the previous offense or offenses does not have to antedate the commission of the primary offense. 24 ALR2d 1252.
The defendant in the instant case was initially charged as a fourth offender because he committed a subsequent felony after having been convicted of three counts arising out of the same criminal transaction. The facts of this case are therefore distinguishable from the facts in Podsiad. I do not believe that Podsiad is determinative of the question presented in this case.4
*284B
We have never addressed the appropriate application of the habitual offender statute to cases involving defendants who have been convicted of previous felonies which arose out of the same transaction and who then commit a subsequent felony.5 The habitual statute enhances punishment " 'because of the apparent persistence in the commission of crime by the person convicted and his indifference to the laws deemed necessary for the protection of the people and their property.’ ” People v Hendrick, 398 Mich 410, 416; 247 NW2d 840 (1976), quoting People v Palm, 245 Mich 396, 401; 223 NW 67 (1929). See also In re Southard, 298 Mich 75, 78; 298 NW 457 (1941), where we stated, "The habitual criminal act was passed to provide a punishment for repeated commissions of felonies.”
I note that the statute does not mandate that the prosecutor charge an individual as an habitual offender whenever the individual has been convicted of a prior felony and commits a subsequent felony. The trial court also is not mandated to sentence a defendant under the statute merely because the prosecutor files a separate or supplemental information accusing the defendant of being convicted of prior felonies. Sentencing the defendant under the statute is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
The stated purpose of the habitual offender statute leads me to conclude that the result reached in this case is neither absurd nor unjust. Given the Legislature’s concern with crime and the effect it has on the citizens of this state, the Legislature *285must have intended that the habitual offender statute be applied to prior convictions for multiple felonies which arose out of the same transaction. The appropriate sentence under the statute is determined by the number of prior felony convictions without regard to the sequence of the convictions.
An individual who has been convicted and sentenced, and has served the prescribed prison or probation term for three counts of manslaughter which arose out of the same criminal transaction should have sufficient motivation to reform himself and become an acceptable member of our society. When an individual is not so motivated, he can be sentenced as a fourth habitual offender once he commits a subsequent manslaughter or other felony. I do not believe that the Legislature intended that an individual be sentenced only as a second offender under the statute merely because the three prior manslaughter convictions arose out of the same transaction. A defendant who has been convicted of three counts of manslaughter which arose out of the same criminal transaction and who is convicted of a subsequent felony is no less persistent at committing crimes than a defendant who has been convicted of three independent homicides and commits a subsequent felony. It would be reasonable to subject individuals who commit homicides under either set of circumstances to the same degree of sanctions under the statute.
Defendant’s argument that the purpose of the habitual offender statute is to provide that where a defendant had been convicted of a prior felony he should be given an opportunity for reformation, and that the convictions must be on charges separately brought and tried, would be better addressed by the Legislature.
*286C
My view does not represent the rule adopted by the majority of jurisdictions which have considered this question. In most cases construing a state’s habitual offender statute, the sequence of prior convictions is not an issue. Where this factor is an issue, the rule followed in the majority of jurisdictions is that each successive felony must be committed after the previous felony before it can be counted under the habitual offender statute. 24 ALR2d 1249.
In State v Carlson, 560 P2d 26 (Alas, 1977), the Alaska Supreme Court construed the now repealed Alaska habitual offender statute,6 which was very similar to Michigan’s statute, and concluded that the statute did not apply to an individual who committed four crimes within a short time and *287was given at most one opportunity to reform. Both the Michigan and the Alaska statutes are silent on the required sequence of prior convictions.
While the statutory language contained in the Alaska habitual offender statute is similar to the Michigan statute, there is a significant difference between the rule of statutory construction we must follow and the rule of construction followed by the courts of Alaska. The Alaska Supreme Court rejects the so-called "plain meaning” rule as a strict exclusionary rule. That court has held that "[w]hile a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that a statute means what its language reasonably conveys to others, reference to legislative history may provide an insight which is helpful to making a judgment concerning what a statute means.” The Alaska Supreme Court further held that its inquiry into the meaning of a statute does not end with a literal interpretation of the statute even though the language used is clear and unambiguous. North Slope Borough v Sohio Petroleum Corp, 585 P2d 534, 540 (Alas, 1978).
As discussed earlier, the "plain meaning” rule is alive and well in Michigan. See Hiltz v Phil’s Quality Market, 417 Mich 335, 343; 337 NW2d 237 (1983); In re Certified Questions, 416 Mich 558, 567; 331 NW2d 456 (1982); Dussia v Monroe Co Employees Retirement System, supra, 249.7
I believe that the Alaska Supreme Court’s rejection of the "plain meaning” rule accounts for the fact that the court interprets the Alaska habitual offender statute as not requiring that a defendant who was convicted of three prior felonies which *288arose out of the same transaction be sentenced as a fourth offender.
In State v Tillman, 228 NW2d 38, 41 (Iowa, 1975), the Iowa Supreme Court held that the Iowa habitual offender statute "dictates that each offense must have been complete as to conviction, sentence and commitment to prison before the commission of the next in order that it qualify for application of the enlarged punishment” provided for under the statute. The challenged statute in Tillman provided in pertinent part:
"Whoever has been twice convicted of a crime, sentenced, and committed to prison, in this or any other state, ... for terms of not less than three years each shall, upon conviction of a felony ... be deemed to be a habitual criminal, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not more than twenty-five years . . . .” [228 NW2d 40.]
Defendant Tillman was convicted on December 23, 1971, of attempting to break and enter and was sentenced to five years imprisonment. The sentence was suspended, and the defendant was paroled for good behavior. On May 12, 1972, the defendant’s parole was revoked, and he was incarcerated.
On March 26, 1972, Tillman committed a shoplifting offense. He was convicted of this crime on July 3, 1972, and was sentenced to seven years in the state penitentiary.
The convictions for shoplifting and breaking and entering were used to justify sentencing the defendant as an habitual criminal when the defendant committed a subsequent offense in November, 1973. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the habitual offender statute did not apply to Tillman under the facts presented, stating:
*289"In the light of its purpose, and applying the principle of strict construction we hold in accordance with the general rule that under § 747.5 the first conviction and imposition of sentence must precede the second offense, and that both of the prior convictions and impositions of sentence must precede the third conviction.
That sequence does not exist in this case. The incidents resulting in the first and second convictions each occurred before conviction and imposition of penalty for the first offense. Therefore, Code § 747.5 is inapplicable . . . .” [228 NW2d 41.]
The Iowa statute, unlike the Michigan statute, defines an habitual offender as an individual who has been convicted of a crime, sentenced, and committed to prison in Iowa or any other state for no less than three years. The Michigan statute does not require that an individual be sentenced and committed to prison for a prior conviction before he can be charged as an habitual offender. Instead, our statute refers to an habitual offender as an individual who has been convicted of a felony, an attempt to commit a felony, or both in this state or any other state. The Iowa statute is therefore distinguishable from our statute.
iv
I would hold that the habitual offender statute is clear and unambiguous on its face. I would further hold that literal construction of the statute would not produce an absurd or unjust result in this case and would not be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act. On the basis of the facts before us, defendant was properly charged under the statute as a fourth offender.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
It is not clear why the Court of Appeals refers to People v Carson in its order certifying a conflict to this Court. The Court of Appeals opinion in this case does not cite Carson. People v Ross is discussed extensively by the Stoudemire Court, but is not mentioned in the order. We note that the habitual offender statute was amended after Ross was decided in 1978, but before Carson. The 1978 amendments do not affect the issue in this case.
This act is now commonly referred to as the habitual offender statute.
People v Lowenstein, supra, relied on the holding in People v Podsiad.
As stated earlier, defendant relies on the Court of Appeals holding in People v Ross, supra, as authority for his argument that the three prior felonies in this case which arose out of the same transaction should only be counted as one prior felony for purposes of applying the habitual offender statute. The Ross Court relied on our holding in Podsiad. I believe the Ross Court misread Podsiad.
See People v Wakeford, 418 Mich 95; 341 NW2d 68 (1983), where we held that the armed robbery of two cashiers in one grocery store during the same period of time was not a single offense.
Alas Stat 12.55.050 provided:
"Increased punishment for persons convicted of more than one felony. A person convicted of a felony in this state who has been previously convicted of a felony in this state or elsewhere, if the same crime elsewhere would constitute a felony under Alaska law, is punishable as follows:
"(1) If the person is convicted of a felony which would be punishable by imprisonment for a term less than his natural life, and has previously been convicted of one felony, then he is punishable by imprisonment for not less than the minimum nor more than twice the longest term prescribed for the felony of which that person is convicted.
"(2) If the person has previously been convicted of two felonies, then he is punishable by imprisonment for not less than the minimum nor more than twice the longest term prescribed herein for a second conviction of felony.
"(3) If the person has previously been convicted of three or more felonies, then on the fourth conviction he shall be adjudged an habitual criminal, and is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 20 years nor more than the remainder of his natural life.” [560 P2d 27, n 2.]
This statute has been repealed and replaced by materially different wording. For the existing legislation on sentences of imprisonment for felonies, see Alas Stat 12.55.125.
The rule states that where language of a statute is clear and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd consequences, the words used are taken as the final expression of the meaning intended, and legislative history will not be consulted. See 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 45.09.