(dissenting in part, concurring in part).
"Governor to approve or veto bills. ... Appropriation bills may be approved in whole or in part ... and the part approved shall become law, and the part objected to shall be returned in the same manner as provided for other bills.” (Emphasis added.) Article V, Sec. 10, Wis. Const.
approve: "1. to give one’s consent to; sanction; confirm. ...” Webster’s New World Dictionary (2d ed. 1972).
veto: "1. a) an order prohibiting some proposed or intended act; prohibition, esp. by a person in authority b) the power to prevent action by such prohibition. ...” Id.
I dissent to that portion of the majority opinion which allows a gubernatorial veto of individual letters. Article V, Sec. 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution gives the governor the power to "approve” and the power to "veto.” It does not give the governor the power to create. The power to create is so far removed from the plain meaning of the words "approve” and "veto” that to so interpret Art. V, Sec. 10 strains the English language beyond the breaking point. Yet that is precisely the result of the majority’s opinion. The veto of single letters can have but one purpose: to create new words. These new words when joined with others, necessarily create new legislation that in turn becomes law with the approval of as few as 12 members of the legislature. The majority opinion allows the governor to creatively legislate with a few strokes of his pen and the approval of one-third plus one member of one house of the legislature. That simply could not have been the intent of the framers of Art. V, Sec. 10, nor the voters who approved it. It is *467an invitation to terrible abuse.1 Yet the majority, rigidly adhering to the principles of stare decisis, says the constitution affords the governor that power. If past cases demand that result, then the principle of stare decisis should yield to a result consistent with *468the plain meaning of the words within the amendment.
However, past cases from this court do not dictate this result. I conclude that the history of the amendment and the purposes for its creation, purposes which this court has consistently relied on but today abandons, as well as basic constitutional principles, dictate an opposite result from that reached by the majority.
HH
The legislative history of the constitutional amendment, consistently relied on by this court until today, and noted at length in petitioner’s brief, indicates that the prevention of logrolling was at the forefront of the minds of the proponents of the amendment. The power to veto individual letters is not necessary to accomplish that purpose.
The majority’s opinion attempts to minimize the significance of the anti-logrolling objective of Article V, Sec. 10, by noting that "such 'logrolling’ is implicitly acceptable in the budget bill” and that "[i]f indeed the partial veto authority granted the governor by the constitutional amendment ratified in the 1930 general election was intended to prevent 'logrolling’ in the traditional sense, it was a particularly ill-suited and cumbersome way to achieve that goal. ...” Majority opinion at 15-16. Yet, according to this court’s past interpretations of the constitutional amendment the prevention of logrolling within a budget bill, albeit "legal” logrolling, is the paramount purpose behind the grant of partial veto power to the governor.
Beginning with State ex rel. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 315, 260 N.W. 486 (1935), this *469court relied on the anti-logrolling objective of the provision as a justification for upholding the exercise of the governor’s partial veto power. The court stated,
"there are reasons why the governor should have a coextensive power of partial veto, to enable him to pass, in the exercise of his gwasi-legislative function, on each separable piece of legislation or law on its own merits. That is not necessary in many states because they have constitutional provisions which prohibit the legislature from passing a bill which contains more than one subject. Wisconsin, however, has no such prohibition except as to private and local bills. ... Therefore, in order to check or prevent the evil consequences of improper joinder, so far, at least, as appropriation bills are concerned, it may well have been deemed necessary, in the interest of good government, to confer upon the governor, as was done by the amendment in 1930 of sec. 10, art. V, Wisconsin constitution, the right to pass independently on every separable piece of legislation in an appropriation bill.” (Emphasis in original.)
In the subsequent decision of State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 442, 447, 289 N.W. 662 (1940), and more recently in State ex rel. Sundby v. Adamany, 71 Wis. 2d 118, 127, 237 N.W.2d 910 (1976), this court again reiterated that,
"we entertain no doubt either as to the reason for, or the meaning of, the 1930 amendment.... Its purpose was to prevent, if possible, the adoption of omnibus appropriation bills, logrolling, the practice of jumbling together in one act inconsistent subjects in order to force a passage by uniting minorities with different interests when the particular provisions could not pass on their separate *470merits, with riders of objectionable legislation attached to general appropriation bills in order to force the governor to veto the entire bill and thus stop the wheels of government or approve the obnoxious act.” Zimmerman, 233 Wis. at 447.
From the above, it is apparent that the governor’s constitutional power of partial veto was primarily intended to serve as a check on the improper joinder of legislation by the legislature in the omnibus budget process. It is only in the context of promoting the anti-logrolling objective of Art. V, Sec. 10, during challenges to a governor’s exercise of partial veto authority, that this court has even recognized the governor’s constitutional "quasi-legislative” function in the budget process. See Sundby 71 Wis. 2d at 133-34. Thus, to argue, as does the majority, that the partial veto power was adopted to facilitate the governor’s participation in the omnibus budget process, rather than to curb the practice of legislative logrolling, see majority opinion at 416, mischaracterizes the objective of the amendment, the governor’s function, and our past cases interpreting the amendment.
In light of the anti-logrolling objective of Art. V, Sec. 10, the majority’s expansion of the governor’s partial veto power to strike individual letters within an appropriation bill goes far beyond what is necessary to accomplish that objective. The governor already possesses the power to strike individual words, phrases and paragraphs within the budget bill and, thus, effectively disassemble any objectionable provision. The power to eliminate individual letters does not enhance the governor’s ability to combat "the practice of jumbling together in one act inconsistent subjects in order to force a passage by uniting minorities with different interests when the particular *471provisions could not pass on their separate merits....” Zimmerman, 233 Wis. at 447.
Equally important, it is a usurpation of the legislature’s power to legislate and a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers between the coordinate branches of government to permit the executive branch to create new words and, in effect, new law through the selective excision of individual letters. The power to legislate, and determine policies and programs, is vested exclusively in the senate and assembly. Art. IV, Sec. 1, Wis. Const.; Sec. 15.001, Stats. While the governor has been granted the constitutional power to convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions, to recommend expedient matters for the legislature’s consideration, to direct the preparation of the state biennial budget and to approve the legislature’s appropriation bills in whole or part, there is nothing in the constitution which authorizes the governor to enact new legislation. See Art. V, Secs. 4, 10, Wis. Const.; Sec. 16.46.
However, by granting the governor the power to enact new, albeit "germane,” legislation from the array of letters contained within the budget bill, this court has given the governor extraordinary legislative power surpassing even that of the legislature. Ordinarily, for a bill to become law it must pass both houses of the legislature with a majority vote in each, and then be approved by the governor. Under the power given the governor in the majority opinion, the governor can create new words by the stroke of his pen and, with the acquiescence of one-third plus one member of just one house of the legislature, new law.
*472The majority opinion also overlooks an important limitation on the governor’s ability to "check” the practice of improper joinder of legislation. That limitation, enunciated in this court’s decision of State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 707-708, 264 N.W.2d 539 (1978), is that "[t]he power of the Governor to disassemble the law is coextensive with the power of the Legislature to assemble its provisions initially.” See also Henry, 218 Wis. at 315. This additional limit on the governor’s partial veto power is significant because, in contrast to the requirement that what remains after the exercise of the veto "be a complete and workable law,” the former restricts the exercise of the gubernatorial veto rather than simply limiting the end result of the exercise of that power.
In failing to consider the "coextensive” limit on the governor’s veto power when granting the governor the power to excise individual letters, the majority has created an imbalance of power between governor and legislature. In effect, the majority has given the governor greater power to disassemble than the legislature exercises in assembling legislation. As a practical matter, legislators do not assemble legislative provisions by proposing and arranging individual letters. Rather, bills are based on concepts which are in turn built from words, sentences and paragraphs— each of which have individual meaning and contribute to the ultimate meaning of legislation. Thus, to grant the governor a power to disassemble which exceeds the legislature’s power to assemble abrogates the limit of coextensive power set forth in Kleczka and our previous decisions.
There is a further imbalance created by the majority opinion. Up to now, as the legislature assembled a bill containing an appropriation, they did so *473under the principle of Kleczka that the words they were assembling were subject to disassembling by the governor. They could, by their choice and limitation of words, circumscribe to some extent the governor’s ability to "create” by use of the veto. No more. By holding that appropriation legislation is in essence a potpourri of individual letters, an alphabet soup if you will, the majority has stripped the legislature of any opportunity to circumscribe the parameters of the effects of a gubernatorial veto. The governor is now limited only by the letters in front of him and the extensiveness of his imagination, subject only to the majority’s germaneness requirement.
The majority maintains that former precedent has "ineluctably led to the decision we reach today.” Slip opinion at 416. I disagaree. This court has never before addressed whether the governor may permissibly strike individual letters from an appropriation bill under his partial veto authority.
While Justice Hansen, dissenting in Kleczka, noted the potential abuse of this court’s broad interpretation of the partial veto power in Kleczka, in particular the governor’s ability to reduce a bill to its "single ... letters, digits and punctuation marks,” the majority at that time was not confronted with a veto of individual letters. See Kleczka, 82 Wis. 2d at 726.
HH I — I
We need not abandon the principles of Kleczka to declare that veto of individual letters goes beyond the power authorized by the partial veto. I would continue to allow the governor the power to veto individual words in an appropriation bill, consistent with the principles of Kleczka. As recognized in Kleczka as well *474as in Martin, Henry, and Sundby, every veto has both a negative and affirmative effect, and some vetoes will inevitably bring about a change in policy. While the veto of an individual word or words may at times create new policy, that is not always inevitable nor necessarily an intentional result. Further, I agree with that portion of the majority’s holding which permits the veto of individual digits to effect a reduction in an appropriation. This power is properly subsumed within the governor’s power to veto "in part.” Allowing the governor to veto individual words and digits, while requiring that what remains be germane to the section vetoed, provides the governor with ample discretion to exercise his constitutional prerogatives consistent with the separation of powers doctrine.
In sharp contrast, however, stands the governor’s new authority to veto individual letters. This power to selectively excise letters can only be used with the intent to create new words and, hence, new law. If the principle of stare decisis leads us as the majority states, "ineluctably” to this result, then the principle should yield to fundamental precepts and a result consistent with the plain meaning of the words within the amendment. The constitution does not give the governor the power to create and Art. V, Sec. 10 cannot sensibly be interpreted to do so.
Make no mistake, the majority provides the governor with a broad grant of power that, in the judgment of this writer, cannot be tolerated. Certainly the legislature can, as suggested by the majority opinion, attempt to enact a constitutional amendment. But such a process is lengthy and requires a large expenditure of state and local resources. If passed, the parameters of the new language will *475undoubtedly be tested in court, thus requiring even more resources. It is not an answer to say that any gubernatorial excesses may be rectified through the ballot box or constitutional amendment, particularly when, as here, any "excesses” in regard to the governor’s partial veto power derive primarily from our own pen. It is far better for this court to adhere to the plain meaning of the words within the amendment and longstanding constitutional principles and thus avoid the depletion of limited resources.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON and JUSTICE DONALD W. STEINMETZ join in this opinion which dissents in part and concurs in part.
For example, the 1987 budget bill, 1987 Wisconsin Act. 399, contains sec. 472zkcp. It reads:
"940.03 of the statutes is created to read:
"940.03 Felony murder. Whoever causes the death of another human being while committing or attempting to commit a crime specified in s. 940.225(1) or (2)(a), 943.02, 943.10(2) may be imprisoned for not more than 20 years in excess of the maximum period of imprisonment provided by law for that crime or attempt.”
With a creative pen, the majority opinion now allows the governor to veto that section as follows:
"940.03 of the statutes is created to read:
"940.03 Felony murder. Whoever causes the death of another human being while committing or attempting to commit a crime specified in s. 940.225(1) or (2)(a), 943.02, 943.10(2) may be imprisoned for not mere than SO years in excess of “the maximum period of imprisonment provided-fey law for that crime or attempt. ”
That section would now read as follows:
"940.03 of the statutes is created to read:
"940.03 Felony murder. Whoever causes the death of another human being while committing or attempting to commit a crime specified in s. 940.255(1) or (2)(a), 943.02, 943.10(2) may be sentenced to death.”
With the approval of one-third plus one member of one house of the legislature, the governor has created the death penalty. Is it germane? Almost unquestionably so.
Is it an abuse of power? Quaere: is it an abuse of power to use the power this court says the constitution allows?
Could the framers or the voters have intended this? Clearly not.