dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the order denying appellant’s motion to modify the original maintenance award. I would do so based on appellant’s Point II.
As suggested in Herzog v. Herzog, 761 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Mo.App.1988), “[T]here is a *865basic unfairness in requiring a prior spouse to continue support of a spouse who has entered into a long term or permanent relationship having some of the benefits of marriage but few of the detriments.” I believe the trial court, under the facts in this case, erred in failing to grant relief.
Respondent has lived with William Wesley Glenn for two to three years (compared to “approximately a year” in Herzog). They have cohabited. He contributes to rental costs.
Appellant, on the other hand, has the obligation of supporting a child born of his current marriage. He has sustained significant financial reverses since the dissolution of his marriage with respondent. His lifestyle is anything but lavish. Why should he be required to contribute to respondent’s ongoing association with Mr. Glenn?
In my opinion the result in this case encourages what was described in Herzog as “[t]he current social trend of non-marital cohabitation.” Id. I do not believe that result is consistent with the public policy of this state.