(concurring in result).
Although I fully agree with this writing and the result, there is but one objection and line of thought to which I cannot subscribe.
Although I agree with the concept that equitable estoppel should not be established in favor of Johnson, I disagree with the statement that “[t]he essential element of equitable estoppel is fraud.”
I have written at great length on this subject, in this Court, that is, the subject of equitable estoppel, and academically attempted to delineate various types of estop-pel and the ingredients thereof. See L.R. Foy Constr. v. South Dakota State Cement Plant, 399 N.W.2d 340, 349 (S.D.1987) (Henderson, J., concurring in part, concurring in result in part, and specially concurring in part); Sander v. Wright, 394 *398N.W.2d 896 (S.D.1986); Roseth v. St Paul Property & Liability Ins., 374 N.W.2d 105, 108 (S.D.1985) (Henderson, J., dissenting); In re Estate of Williams, 348 N.W.2d 471 (S.D.1984); Rapid City Area Sch. Dist. v. Black Hills & Western Tours, Inc., 303 N.W.2d 811 (S.D.1981). The author’s statement is, per my previous writings, too rigid for my beliefs and does not comport, in my opinion, with a concept born in conscience. My application of equitable estoppel is simply more flexible and springy than I have read in some of the writings of this Court. In all other conceptual matters of the majority opinion, it has my general approbation.