(concurring in result).
Although I concur in this opinion, I wish to refer to my special writings on equitable estoppel, a concept born in conscience. As I have expressed before, my application of equitable estoppel is more springy and flexible than some of the writings in this Court. See Heupel v. Imprimis Technology, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 464, 467 (S.D.1991) (Henderson, J., concurring in result), referring to cases supporting my position; L.R. Foy Const. v. S.D. State Cement Plant, 399 N.W.2d 340, 349 (S.D.1987) (Henderson J., concurring in result); In re Cancel, of Stabio Ditch Water Right, 417 N.W.2d 391, 397 (S.D.1987) (Henderson, J., concurring in result).
In the anatomy of judge-made law, this Court has assumed a stance, long before Judge Anderson wrote this opinion, which swerved from the original “conscience concept” to a litany of requirements to establish equitable estoppel. I did not swerve. Rainbows have different colors — so does estoppel. There are several kinds with varying gradations. To measure estoppel, you must analyze the factual scenario and its effect upon the litigants. Estoppel was birthed in Equity. In Equity, justice is administered by fairness to men as distinguished from the strictly formulated rules of common law. Equity denotes the spirit and habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men. Gilles v. Department of Human Resources Development, *86811 Cal.3d 313, 113 Cal.Rptr. 374, 521 P.2d 110 (1974).