concurring.
The Court decides this case on the basis of lack of specificity and definiteness; however, the Court chooses to leave open the issue of whether more specific statements assuring job security can modify at-will contracts. Because the terms “good reason” and “good cause” lack a standardized meaning, but can mean different things in different contexts, I concur with the Court’s judgment. Definiteness is but one element of contract formation that will be helpful in determining whether an agreement is sufficient to rebut the strong presumption of at-will employment. See American Lantern Co. v. Hamilton, No. 04-95-00517-CV, 1997 WL 667167, — S.W.2d - (Tex.App.—San Antonio, Oct.22, 1997, n.w.h.); Rebecca Guerra, Comment, Oral Contracts to Fire for Good Cause Only: Texas Courts Putting the Cart Before the Horse, 47 Bayloe L.Rev. 1181 (1995). But even assuming that Brown’s job assurances were specific and emphatic enough to show that the parties had the mutual intent and understanding necessary to create a contract, I would hold the contract void under the Statute of Frauds. See Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 26.01 (making unenforceable an oral “agreement which is not to be performed within one year from the date of making the agreement”). This would more fully resolve whether oral statements of job security can ever trump the presumption that employment is at-will.
The Court holds that Brown’s job assurances are not subject to the Statute of Frauds, citing Bratcher v. Dozier, 162 Tex. 319, 346 S.W.2d 795 (1961), and Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co., 517 S.W.2d 773 (Tex.1974), for the proposition that “[a]n employment contract for an indefinite term is considered performable within one year.” 517 S.W.2d 775. I disagree. While the general rule is that “where no period of performance is stated ... the statute is inapplicable,” this is true only if “there is nothing in the agreement itself to show that it cannot be performed within a year according to the tenor and the understanding of the parties.” Bratcher, 346 S.W.2d at 796; Miller, 517 S.W.2d at 776 (emphasis added). Our inquiry should not end simply because the contract was for an indefinite term. We should examine the understanding of the parties and the nature of the performance expected before deciding whether the agreement can be performed within a year.
The fact that the parties do not expressly state the term of performance is not determinative. It is settled law in this state that “where an oral contract omits the performance term, duration may properly be implied from extrinsic evidence.” Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex.1982) (per curiam); see also Hall v. Hall, 158 Tex. 95, 308 S.W.2d 12, 16 (1957) (‘When the parties omit an express stipulation as to time, it is in accord with human experience and accepted standards of law for us to assume that they meant whatever term of days or years might be reasonable in the light of the circumstances before them at the date of the contract.”). For summary judgment purposes, Brown’s reliance upon the District’s alleged assurances establishes that the “tenor and understanding” between the parties, if any, was that Brown would have many years of job security. Brown asserts an entitlement to her job that must be objectively understood as extending until she retired, quit, or *505died, provided there was no good reason or good cause to fire her.
This Court implied a term of working-life duration into a similar oral contract for job security. See Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.1991). Schroeder sought assurances of job security from his supervisor because he was “about to build his home and ‘did not want to just get it built or just moved in and get laid-off.’ ” Id. at 484. The supervisor assured him: “No, don’t worry about that, go ahead and build it.” Id. There was no mention in this oral exchange of any definite period of time. Nevertheless, we did not hesitate to imply a definite term of eight to ten years into this job security agreement, since Schroeder was 57 years old and hoped to five out his eventual retirement in the house he was building. Id. at 489. Because Schroeder expected more than one year of job security, we held that these oral assurances were void under the Statute of Frauds. Id.
In Texas Iron Works, we recognized Schroeder’s expectation of long-term job security by noticing his residential concerns; likewise, Brown’s residential concerns reveal that she had similar expectations of long-term job-security. Brown explains that “[t]his representation was important to me since I was going to have to relocate from Houston to the Conroe area if I accepted the position with the Hospital.” Moreover, there is no evidence that Brown believed that the District’s promise of job security was for one year or less. Consistent with Schroeder, I would imply a term of working-life duration into the District’s alleged oral commitment to provide Brown job security, a period that clearly exceeded one year.
There were three contingencies which could have terminated Brown’s employment within one year: Brown could have (1) died; (2) breached the contract by not performing at the level of a person of ordinary prudence; or (3) quit. However, none of these three contingencies removes the alleged contract from the operation of the Statute of Frauds.
In Gilliam v. Kouchoucos, 161 Tex. 299, 340 S.W.2d 27 (1960), this Court held that a provision of an oral contract of employment terminating the contract upon the death of the employee did not remove the contract from the operation of the Statute of Frauds. We noted that the Statute of Frauds “has application only to contracts which are terminated by performance, and does not apply to contracts which may be terminated within a year by some means other than performance.” Id. at 28. Death, we explained, is not performance, but instead excusable nonperformance. Id. at 29.
This reasoning is equally applicable to termination by breach. Although it was possible for Brown to discontinue “doing her job” within one year of the alleged agreement, such a contingency would constitute nonperformance and would not save the contract from the operation of the Statute of Frauds. See Collins v. Allied Pharmacy Mgt., Inc., 871 S.W.2d 929, 934 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (“[F]or a contract to fall outside the statute of frauds, performance must be possible within one year; termination for cause is not equivalent to performance of the contract.”).
Likewise, it was possible for Brown to quit her job within one year of the alleged agreement; but by quitting, Brown would have simply exercised her unilateral right to discharge the District of its obligation to retain her. Quitting constitutes a release, not a performance of an employment contract. As we explained in Gilliam, “[contracts for service for more than a year [terminable] at the election of a party upon the happening of some event, or even at the mere will of a party, have generally been held to be within the statute.” 340 S.W.2d at 29 (quoting Marble v. Clinton, 298 Mass. 87, 9 N.E.2d 522, 524 (1937)).
Although the Court held that the Statute of Frauds did not apply to the oral employment contracts in both Miller and Bratcher, those cases concerned the enforcement of oral compensation agreements, not promises of future job security. In both cases the employer was free to terminate the employee at any time and for any reason, provided it compensated the employee for work done up until the time of termination. Accordingly, in both cases the employer and employee were capable of completely performing their *506respective obligations within a year, and therefore Miller and Bratcher do not apply to Brown’s alleged agreement.
In summary, I would hold that even if the District’s alleged oral agreement with Brown formed a contract, it would be subject to the Statute of Frauds. This would settle the issue we left open in Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 879 S.W.2d 47, 52 n. 8 (Tex.1994), of whether oral statements assuring job security can modify employment-at-will contracts. Because a promise not to terminate employment except for good cause cannot be performed within one year, but can only be terminated by the promisee’s death, breach, or release, the promise is not enforceable unless it is in writing.