dissenting:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff’s promise to forgo another job opportunity is sufficient consideration in return for defendant’s promise of lifetime employment to plaintiff. However, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the employment contract in the case at bar must be in writing because it falls within the requirements of the statute of frauds.
The writing requirement applies to "any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof.” 740 ILCS 80/1 (West 1994). Commenting on this language, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts observes:
"[T]he enforceability of a contract under the one-year provision does not turn on the actual course of subsequent events, nor on the expectations of the parties as to the probabilities. Contracts of uncertain duration are simply excluded; the provision covers only those contracts whose performance cannot possibly be completed within a year.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 130, Comment a, at 328 (1981).
A contract of employment for life is necessarily one of uncertain duration. Since the employee’s life may end within one yearj and, as the majority acknowledges, the contract would be fully performed upon the employee’s death (176 Ill. 2d at 490 n.l), the contract is not subject to the statute of frauds’ one-year provision. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 130, Illustration 2, at 328 (1981); see also 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 14, at 578 (1974) ("The rule generally accepted by the authorities is that an agreement or promise the performance or duration of which is contingent on the duration of human life is not within the statute”); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 19 — 20 (3d ed. 1987) ("if A promises *** to employ X for life, the promise is not within the Statute because it is not for a fixed term and the contract by its terms is conditioned upon the continued life of X and the condition may cease to exist within a year because X may die within a year”). It is irrelevant whether the parties anticipate that the employee will live for more than a year or whether the employee actually does so.
The majority acknowledges that "many courts” subscribe to this view. More accurately, the Restatement rule represents "the prevailing interpretation” of the statute of frauds’ one-year provision. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 130, Comment a, at 328 (1981). Only a "distinct minority” of cases have ascribed significance to whether the parties expected that a contract would take more than a year to perform. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 19 — 18, at 808 (3d ed. 1987). According to Williston on Contracts:
"It is well settled that the oral contracts invalidated by the Statute because not to be performed within a year include only those which cannot be performed within that period. A promise which is not likely to be performed within a year, and which in fact is not performed within a year, is not within the Statute if at the time the contract is made there is a possibility in law and in fact that full performance such as the parties intended may be completed before the expiration of a year.
In the leading case on this section of the Statute the Supreme Court of the United States said: 'The parties may well have expected that the contract would continue in force for more than one year; it may have been very improbable that it would not do so; and it did in fact continue in force for a much longer time. But they made no stipulation which in terms, or by reasonable inference, required that result. The question is not what the probable, or expected, or actual performance of the contract was; but whether the contract, according to the reasonable interpretation of its terms, required that it should not be performed within the year.’ ” 3 W. Jaeger, Willis-ton on Contracts § 495 at 575-79 (3d ed. 1960), quoting Warner v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 164 U.S. 418, 434, 41 L. Ed. 495, 504, 17 S. a. 147, 153 (1896).
Although the majority brands this interpretation "hollow and unpersuasive” (176 Ill. 2d at 490), it has a sound basis in the plain language of the statute. Corbin notes: See also 3 W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 495, at 585 n.7 (3d ed. 1960) (criticizing Marshall v. Lowd, 154 Me. 296, 147 A.2d 667 (1958)).
"[Courts] have observed the exact words of [the one-year] provision and have interpreted them literally and very narrowly. The words are 'agreement that is not to be performed.’ They are not 'agreement that is not in fact performed’ or 'agreement that may not be performed’ or 'agreement that is not at all likely to be performed.’ To fall within the words of the provision, therefore, the agreement must be one of which it can truly be said at the very moment that it is made, 'This agreement is not to be performed within one year’; in general, the cases indicate that there must not be the slightest possibility that it can be fully performed within one year.” 2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 444, at 535 (1950).
It is well established that where the words of a statutory provision are unambiguous, there is no need to resort to external aids of interpretation in order to glean the legislature’s purpose. People v. Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d 218, 222 (1995). Although the statutory language at issue in this case is clear and unambiguous, the majority improperly relies upon policies identified in the introductory clause to the original English statute of frauds (176 Ill. 2d at 489) in order to significantly expand the scope of the one-year provision. Even assuming, arguendo, that it is proper to look beyond the language of the statute in order to determine its meaning, I do not find the majority’s policy analysis to be persuasive justification for the broad construction it gives the statute.
The majority notes the dangers of stale evidence and faded memories. 176 Ill. 2d at 489. But the one-year provision does not effectively guard against these dangers because " '[tjhere is no necessary relationship between the time of the making of the contract, the time within which its performance is required and the time when it might come to court to be proven.’ ” J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 19 — 17, at 807 (3d ed. 1987), quoting D&N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 63 N.Y.2d 449, 454, 472 N.E.2d 992, 993, 483 N.Y.S. 2d 164, 165 (1984); see also E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 6.4, at 391 (1982).
Courts have tended to give the one-year provision a narrow construction precisely because of the lack of a discernable rationale for it. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 19 — 17, at 807 (3d ed. 1987); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 130, Comment a, at 328 (1981) ("The design was said to be not to trust to the memory of witnesses for a longer time than one year, but the statutory language was not appropriate to carry out that purpose. The result has been a tendency to construction narrowing the application of the statute”). I am inclined to do likewise. Since the one-year provision is so poorly suited to the aims it was ostensibly designed to accomplish, I see no compelling reason to expand the provision’s scope beyond the class of contracts to which it applies by its terms. The narrow and literal interpretation that most courts have given to the language of the one-year provision is entirely appropriate under these circumstances.
Lacking any reasoned basis for its holding, the majority resorts to nearly tautological wordplay, declaring that because a "lifetime” employment contract is essentially a "permanent” employment contract, it inherently anticipates a relationship of long duration. 176 Ill. 2d at 490. Merely labelling a lifetime employment contract "permanent” should not change the result that the statute of frauds is inapplicable. See 2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 446, at 549-50 (1950) ("A contract for 'permanent’ employment is not within the one-year clause for the reason that such a contract will be fully performed, according to its terms, upon the death of the employee. The word 'permanent’ has, in this connection, no more extended meaning than 'for life’ ”); 3 W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 495, at 582 (3d ed. 1960) ("A promise of permanent personal performance is on a fair interpretation a promise of performance for life, and therefore not within the Statute”). The parties in this case allegedly agreed to plaintiffs employment for life. But with suitable modesty befitting mere mortals, the parties did not stipulate how long plaintiffs life should be. They left that matter — and hence the duration of the contract — to a higher power (I do not refer to this court).
The majority also suggests that its holding is necessary to avoid confusion and uncertainty. 176 111. 2d at 491. I fail to see how the generally accepted rule that lifetime employment contracts need not be in writing is any more confusing or uncertain than the contrary rule adopted by the majority. Indeed, the majority’s reasoning is likely to cause greater confusion and uncertainty. A lifetime employment contract is only one example of a broader general category of contracts of uncertain duration. While the majority has declared that lifetime employment contracts anticipate a relationship of longer than one year, the decision in this case supplies no guidance as to other types of contracts that do not, by their terms, set forth a specific time frame for performance. Contracting parties can no longer simply look to the actual terms of their agreement to ascertain whether it must be in writing. Instead, they are left to guess whether the type of contract they have entered into will be viewed by a court as inherently anticipating a relationship of more than one year.
In summary, the majority’s holding: (1) is contrary to the relevant statutory language and the great weight of authority; (2) finds no justification in the policy considerations ostensibly underlying the statute of frauds; and (3) is likely to increase, rather than reduce, uncertainty regarding the application of the one-year provision. I would hold that the statute of frauds does not require the contract in this case to be in writing, and I would reverse the judgments of the courts below. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
JUSTICES MILLER and McMORROW join in this dissent.