CONCURRING OPINION
POPE, Justice.Lee Dykes and Robinwood Lodge, Inc., sought a mandatory injunction for the removal by the City of Houston of a permanent barricade which some of its employees erected across Buckingham Drive. Dykes and Robinwood are owners of lots which abut upon Buckingwood Drive and they purchased their property with relation to a platted subdivision in Harris County. After the recording of the plat and the dedication of the streets,’ City of Houston annexed the subdivision.
The majority opinion confuses peculiar rights in private easements with the general public’s rights in closing and opening streets. Dykes and Robinwood have rights as purchasers of the lots with reference to the plat which are not shared by the public at large. Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196 (Tex.Sup.1962); City of Corsicana v. Zorn, 97 Tex. 317, 322, 78 S.W. 924 (1904); Dallas Cotton Mills v. Industrial Co., 296 S.W. 503 (Tex.Comm.App.1927); 23 Am.Jur.2d Dedication § 59.65. The general rule is summarized in 26 C.J.S. Dedication § 52:
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“Purchasers of property with reference to a plat showing part of the platted property as dedicated to streets and other public uses are entitled to rely on the dedication, and are entitled to the benefits thereof, even though it may still be incomplete as to the general public, unless the easement has been surrendered in some legally recognized manner. While both the public and the purchasers are affected by the dedication, their rights are not always the same. The rights in dedicated streets acquired by a purchaser are private contract rights, and are not affected by the failure of the municipality to act on the dedication. The purchasers are entitled to the free use of all such streets and alleys necessary to the complete enjoyment of the lots purchased by them, and where the streets have not been accepted by the municipality, may do whatever is necessary to put them in condition for use. * * * ”
The Court’s opinion implies that once the present barricade is removed, other barricades may legally be erected which limit Dykes’ and Robinwood’s use of their easement to a footpath. This question is not before the Court and is obiter dictum. We should not now hold, either expressly or by implication, that the City can legally barricade the easement to the extent of limiting its use to a footpath. Ordinarily one who buys property abutting on a platted and dedicated street has a legal right to make such use of his private easement as is reasonably necessary to its full enjoyment. 21 Tex.Jur.2d 165 Easements, § 37. In this day of almost universal travel by automobile, it would seem that vehicular use of the easement would be reasonably necessary to its full enjoyment.
I do not say that Dykes and Robinwood have a legal right to make further improvements without obtaining a permit as required by Section 36-a of the 1958 Code of Ordinances of the City of Houston, nor express an opinion whether such permit should be issued voluntarily or by judicial action.
The City of Houston did not act by force of any resolution or ordinance. It was without power to deprive Dykes and Robin-wood of their rights in their private easement to use the street, and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
CALVERT, C. J., and WALKER, J., join in this opinion.