State v. Farrah

GILDEA, Justice

(concurring in part; dissenting in part).

I agree with the majority’s analysis of the evidentiary issue in section II, but I respectfully dissent from section I of the majority opinion. I would hold that the district court did not clearly err when it found that Farrah understood the English language well enough to knowingly waive his Miranda rights. I would therefore conclude that the state has met its burden to prove that Farrah waived his Miranda rights.

We review the legal question of whether a suspect knowingly waived his Miranda rights de novo. State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn.2003). But we review the factual findings underlying that legal conclusion for clear error. Id. A finding is not clearly erroneous simply because an appellate court might have resolved the question differently. Stiff v. Associated Sewing Supply Co., 436 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Minn.1989) (“An appellate court exceeds it proper scope of review when it bases its conclusions on its own interpretation of the evidence and, in effect tries the issues anew and substitutes its own findings for those of the trial judge.”); see also Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 102 (Minn.1999) (“An appellate court may not reverse a trial court due to mere disagreement with its findings.”); Gjovik v. Strope, 401 N.W.2d 664, 668 (Minn.1987) (noting that an appellate court “should not substitute its findings for that of the trial court merely because it feels that the case was wrongly decided”). Instead, the clearly erroneous standard means that the finding below will stand unless it “is not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” EOP-Nicollet Mall, L.L.C. v. County of Hennepin, 723 N.W.2d 270, 284 (Minn.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Miles v. City of Oakdale, 323 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Minn.1982) (“We have defined a clearly erroneous finding variously to mean palpably and manifestly against the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”).

Whether a defendant understands English well enough to be able to waive his Miranda rights is a factual question. A district court’s factual finding related to this question is reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir.2005) (“The district court’s finding that [the defendant’s] alleged difficulty with English did not prevent him from knowingly and intelligently waiving his Miranda rights was not clearly erroneous.”), amended by 416 F.3d 939 (9th Cir.2005); United States v. Marrero, 152 F.3d 1030, 1034 (8th Cir.1998) (holding “that district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant could understand English and that he effectively waived his Miranda rights”); United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1209 (8th Cir.1994) (same).

Here, the district court heard testimony from the interrogating officer, considered two psychologist’s reports, both of which stated that Farrah was able to communicate adequately in English, and listened to *346Farrah’s taped statement.7 Based on this evidence, the district court concluded that even if Farrah was entitled to an interpreter at trial, his English skills were sufficient to support a knowing waiver.8

The district court’s finding regarding Farrah’s language skills is supported by the evidence in the record. First, the officer conducting the interview testified at the suppression hearing in part:

Q: [D]id he have any difficulty listening to or following questions that you asked?
A: He didn’t appear to, no.
Q: Did he appear to have any difficulty enunciating his words?
A: It was obvious to me that he had a strong accent, but I didn’t feel that he was unable to understand, nor was I unable to understand him.

Second, a forensic evaluation report dated September 10, 2004, describes records from Farrah’s hospitalization in October 2003. The notes from this hospitalization reflect that “[h]e was able to communicate adequately in English, but used the interpreter at times.” This hospitalization was just one month before Farrah’s interview with police that is at issue in this case. Third, in the recorded interview, Farrah responds appropriately to the officer’s questions. Although he says he only understands a “[ljittle” English, that claim is belied by Farrah’s reaction and responsiveness to the questions posed to him. In short, the evidence supports the district court’s factual finding, and therefore, the finding is not clearly erroneous.

The majority does not directly hold that the district court’s finding is clearly erroneous. Rather, the majority largely ignores the district court on the key issue in this case, and finds for itself that “Farrah had difficulty in expressing himself in English.” With this factual predicate, the majority then concludes Farrah was “disabled” in communication, and therefore entitled to an interpreter under Minn.Stat. § 611.32, subd. 2 (2006). In my view, the majority is doing precisely what our precedent prohibits — substituting its judgment on a fact question for that of the district court. E.g., Gjovik, 401 N.W.2d at 668.

To support its factual finding that Far-rah was “disabled” in communication, the majority cites the district court’s “disposition of [Farrah’s] claim that he asserted his right to counsel,” but it does not find that the district court erred in its resolution of that question. The district court concluded that Farrah’s statement about a *347lawyer was not unequivocal when considered in context. The record reflects that the officer did what our cases require on the question of whether a suspect has requested counsel. When Farrah made an equivocal statement about a lawyer, the officer inquired further. See State v. Risk, 598 N.W.2d 642, 648-49 (Minn.1999). In response to this inquiry, the transcript reflects the following exchange:

Q: Yup and before I talk to you about that you need to understand these, that you do have the right to talk to a lawyer first do you understand that?
A: Like even if I have a lawyer ...
Q: Then they will give you one for free. In other words you don’t have to talk to me right now, although I would like to, to find out what happened.
A: Okay.
Q: But you don’t have to you can talk to a lawyer first if that is what you want to do?
A: Okay.
Q: So do you understand that?
A: Yeah.
Q: Okay having your rights in mind do you want to talk to me now?
A: Yeah go ahead.
Q: Okay you don’t want to talk to a lawyer first?
A: No I don’t want to.9

It was only after securing this understanding that the officer proceeded with the interrogation.

We have said that the state is deemed to have met its burden “to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [Miranda ] right[s]” if the state can show that “the Miranda warnings were given, the defendant stated he understood those warnings, and the defendant gave a statement.” State v. Ganpat, 732 N.W.2d 232, 240 (Minn.2007). In reaching the conclusion that Farrah’s statements must be suppressed, the majority seems to be holding that the state will be unable to meet its burden anytime an immigrant is not read the warning in his native language or provided an interpreter.10 I cannot embrace such a broad holding. In my view, whether a suspect understands English well enough to waive his rights is inherently a fact question that absent clear error, we should leave to the district court. Here, it is undisputed that the Miranda warnings were given and repeated. Farrah stated that he understood the warnings, and the district court found that Farrah’s difficulties with English did not inhibit his ability to waive his rights. Farrah then gave a statement. On this record, I would hold that the state has met its burden, and would affirm.

. From its review of the tape, the district court noted that “there is occasional difficulty in understanding what [Farrah] is saying,” but that "there is an occasional difficulty in understanding a number of things said in the Scales tape by people who are English speakers * ⅞

. The majority notes that “the district court made no specific finding regarding Farrah's language skills” and then quotes the district court as saying “I don't know right now Mr. Farrah's proficiency in language.” (Emphasis added.) This statement was made in reference to Farrah's request for an interpreter at trial. As the district court noted, “the fact that an interpreter is needed for court proceedings does not automatically mean that [Farrah] is unable to waive his rights or understand his rights under Miranda.” With respect to the waiver issue, I acknowledge that the district court made no written findings. But I do not agree with the majority’s suggestion that the district court did not find as a fact that Farrah understood English well enough to have waived his rights. The district court said that after "listening to the overall tape, * * ⅜ I believe (hat there is not evidence to conclude that it * ⅜ ⅛ was not a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Based on its review of the evidence, the court concluded, “it doesn't make sense to me that [Farrah] didn’t know what he was saying and that he didn't know what he was doing” in speaking to police.

. While the majority seems to fault the officer for not going over all of Farrah's Miranda rights a third time, the record reflects that the right to counsel was the only one Farrah questioned. Thus, it was proper for the officer to focus on this right for additional followup.

. Even if I were to assume that Farrah was disabled in communication and therefore entitled to an interpreter under Minn.Stat. § 611.32, subd. 2, it would not lead me to conclude that suppression is required. See State v. Sanchez-Diaz, 683 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn.2004) (noting that the statutory right to have an interpreter present at an interrogation "is not a constitutional one and violation of the statute does not require the application of the exclusionary rule").