Pontiac School District v. Bloomfield Township

Levin, J.

(concurring). We agree that the Court of Appeals ruled correctly in reversing the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for the plaintiff and that it erred in failing to remand the cause for trial.

The issues presented center on the question whether the police department of the Township of Bloomfield was the local law enforcement agency *588having immediate jurisdiction of school crossings in Bloomfield Township. No issue has been presented whether 1978 PA 227, MCL 257.57a et seq.; MSA 9.1857(1) et seq., was intended to impose on the local law enforcement agency the responsibility of providing and paying the compensation of school crossing guards as the Court of Appeals had ruled in Pontiac Board of Education v City of Pontiac, 100 Mich App 52; 299 NW2d 37 (1980).1

There is, in our opinion, a substantial question whether the Legislature intended to impose on the local law enforcement agency the responsibility of providing and paying the compensation of school crossing guards or only the responsibility of selecting, supervising, or training school crossing guards.2

We write separately because statements in the opinion of the Court may be read as implicit approval of the construction placed on Act 227 by the Court of Appeals.

*589Kavanagh, J., concurred with Levin, J. Boyle, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

Application for leave to appeal denied 410 Mich 905 (1981). The denial of leave to appeal did not constitute an expression of agreement with the construction placed on the act by the Court of Appeals.

A letter dated September 2, 1977, from John W. Porter, Superintendent of Public Instruction, relied on in the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Pontiac Board of Education v City of Pontiac, 100 Mich App 52, 55-56; 299 NW2d 37 (1980), contains ten numbered paragraphs; the statements adverted to in that opinion, in paragraphs numbered 4 and 8, are not joined or connected. An earlier letter, dated June 29, 1977, from the Department of Highways and Transportation used the term "responsibility”; it stated under the heading "Implications to local units of government” that "[t]he selection and training of school crossing guards would be the responsibility of local police agencies”. The House legislative analysis, prepared after the amendment as of May 10, 1978, makes no reference to providing and paying the compensation of school crossing guards. The act does specify who decides "when” a school crossing guard is "assigned”, MCL 257.613b; MSA 9.2313(2), and imposes this “responsibility” on a subdivision of government, the local law enforcement agency, which does not have taxing power.