(dissenting).
I’dissent. Under today’s ruling we create two separate rules governing the statute of limitations for claims against governmental entities. The first rule applies when a party fails to give notice to a governmental entity within sixty days of the wrongful death or loss of injury. In this situation Iowa Code chapter 614 is the applicable statute of limitations. Miller v. Boone County Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776, 781 (Iowa 1986). Chapter 614 extends the limitations period for minors “so that they shall have one year from and after attainment of majority within which to commence an action.” Iowa Code § 614.8(2).
The second rule applies when a party gives notice to a governmental entity within sixty days of the wrongful death or loss of injury. Under today’s decision the statute of limitations period ends two years after notice is given and section 614.8(2) will not extend the limitations period.
Applying two different sets of rules to claims against governmental entities makes no sense to me. Although I agree with the majority that we have done surgery twice on Iowa Code section 670.5,2 I *382do not believe section 670.5 survived the second surgery.
In Miller we said: “because section [670.5] is unconstitutional, we hold that Iowa Code chapter 614 is the applicable statute of limitations for all actions arising under chapter [670].” Miller, 394 N.W.2d at 781. To me that means we held the entire statute unconstitutional. A review of Miller confirms my understanding.
In Miller the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for failure to give the defendant, a governmental entity, notice of their claim under section 670.5. Id. at 777. On appeal the plaintiffs alleged the notice requirements of section 670.5 violated equal protection. Id. In our equal protection analysis we focused on whether a rational basis existed to require a sixty-day notice in tort claims against a governmental entity when no such notice was required for other tort claims. Id. at 778-79.
We noted the sixty-day notice requirement did not protect governmental entities from stale claims “because plaintiffs bear the burden to prove negligence, any difficulty in proof in cases arising after sixty days would beset them as well as defendants.” Id. at 779. We also noted the sixty-day notice did not promote early settlement of claims because “[t]he extent of a person’s injuries is often unknown for months, and settlement is unlikely to occur under such circumstances.” Id. at 780. Finally, we stated the sixty-day notice requirement did not lead to the early repair of defective conditions. Id.
We then held there was no rational basis justifying the legislature’s requirement that a person with a tort claim against a governmental entity give a sixty-day notice as a condition of commencing a claim when the legislature did not require a sixty-day notice as a condition of commencing a claim against a nongovernmental entity. Id. at 780-81. As a consequence of holding the sixty-day notice requirement violated equal protection, we held the six-month limitation was also unconstitutional because to allow the six-month limitation to bar the plaintiffs’ cause of action would give effect to the sixty-day notice requirement of section 670.5. Id. at 780. Accordingly, we meant what we said in Miller, “section [670.5] is unconstitutional, [and] Iowa Code chapter 614 is the applicable statute of limitations for all actions arising under chapter [670].” Id. at 781.
Seven years later this court without any analysis or explanation found a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest existed between the sixty-day notice and the commencement of a tort claim against a governmental entity. Clark v. Miller, 503 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Iowa 1993). There we stated:
Allowing the statute of limitations to be extended so as to permit a filing of an action within two years after timely notice of the claim has been given does not violate equal protection guarantees. To allow a person to commence a tort action against a unit of local government within two years after giving timely notice is not patently arbitrary. Such a provision bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. The objective of such an extension is not to bar stale claims, but to encourage prompt reporting of claims. We find the remaining portion of section [670.5] fulfills an apparent legislative intent. Similar statutory authority extending the time to begin a suit is provided in the Iowa Tort Claims Act..
Id. (emphasis added).
Miller and Clark cannot be reconciled. In Miller the plaintiffs did not give notice. There we held the sixty-day notice was not rationally related to a legitimate govern*383ment interest and applied the statute of limitations found in chapter 614. In Clark the plaintiff gave a sixty-day notice. There we held the sixty-day notice was rationally related to a legitimate government interest and applied the limitation period in section 670.5.
The analysis in Miller concentrated on the sixty-day notice requirement and held the sixty-day notice requirement under section 670.5 violated equal protection. Miller, 394 N.W.2d at 780-81. Once we found the sixty-day notice provision of section 670.5 violated equal protection, we found the entire statute unconstitutional. Id. at 781. Clark was wrong to hold otherwise. Miller was correct when it held the statute of limitations found in chapter 614 is applicable to claims under chapter 670. I can see no reason to depart from the holding in Miller. Accordingly, I would overrule Clark and apply the statute of limitations contained in chapter 614 in this case.
Normally, when a plaintiffs claim is based on injury to the person, a two-year statute of limitations is applicable. Iowa Code § 614.1(2). However, at the time of the accident, Perkins was a minor. A minor’s statute of limitations is extended “so that they shall have one year from and after attainment of majority within which to commence an action.” Id. § 614.8(2). Perkins reached her majority on August 7, 2006. Her parents filed this suit on her behalf on August 12, 2004, well within the time limits of the extended limitations period. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and allow the case to proceed to trial.
. Iowa Code section 670.5 was formerly number as 613A.5. In this dissent all references to chapter 613A and section 613A.5 will be referred to as chapter 670 and section 670.5, respectively.