¶ 38. (concurring). The dissent harkens back to an earlier dissent in Yorgan v. Durkin, 2006 WI 60, 290 Wis. 2d 671, *220715 N.W.2d 160.1 The dissent concludes that Attorney Barrock "should not be disciplined for the alleged violation of SCR 20:1.15(d)(3) because this court has concluded [in Yorgan] that it is permissible [for an attorney] to fail to hold settlement proceeds received from a personal injury claim in an attorney trust account when the attorney knows there is a claim by another person to a portion of those proceeds."2
¶ 39. Because the dissent omits key facts and applicable law, the dissent obliterates any difference between a civil action and a discipline action and any difference between an attorney's claim and a chiropractor's claim.3 The dissent cites no authority (and it cannot) for conflating a civil liability claim against a lawyer by a chiropractor {Yorgan) and an Office of Lawyer Regulation claim against a lawyer for ignoring a statutorily protected attorney lien in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys {Barrock). This conflation contravenes the law and the Rules of Professional Conduct.
¶ 40. I write to help avoid "confusion and delay."4 The dissent is, in my opinion, off track, using the wrong vehicle to express continuing disagreement with the Yorgan case.
*221¶ 41. Barrock and Yorgan are rooted in different causes of action, have materially different facts, are governed by different laws, and are in different forums that are resolving different issues. The crux of the discipline action in the present case (generally speaking) is that the lawyer has, contrary to the Rules of Professional Conduct, released funds in his or her possession knowing that a lawyer claims a statutory lien upon all or part of the funds. The crux of a civil action against a lawyer who has released funds is (generally speaking) that a court is to determine the rights of the various claimants against the lawyer and others claiming an interest in the funds.
¶ 42. I shall summarizes the two cases quickly and then discuss them in more detail.
¶ 43. Barrock is a disciplinary proceeding based on the Rules of Professional Conduct. Simply stated, a state statute recognizes an agreement between a client and an attorney granting the attorney a lien upon proceeds from a personal injury recovery to protect the attorney's fees. The Rules of Professional Conduct provide that an attorney must protect such a hen upon the proceeds by keeping the proceeds in trust. Attorney Barrock disbursed the funds without protecting the alleged hen and thus violated the Rules and faced disciplinary proceedings. The attorney sued Attorney Barrock in the Milwaukee County circuit court for payment of the attorney's bill for legal services rendered the chent. The attorney's civil liability claim (upon his claimed hen) against Attorney Barrock is not before us. That is a separate civil suit.5
*222¶ 44. In contrast, Yorgan was a small claims action by a chiropractor against a lawyer for payment of the chiropractor's bill for services rendered a patient. Simply stated, the chiropractor demanded that the lawyer pay the chiropractor the fees for services rendered a patient who was the lawyer's client and for whom the lawyer recovered funds for personal injury on the ground that the chiropractor had a lien on the funds. This court dismissed the chiropractor's small claims action, holding, inter alia, that the chiropractor has no lien on the proceeds and that the attorney was not a party to the agreement between the chiropractor and the patient. Accordingly, the attorney was not civilly liable to the chiropractor under the facts of that case. Yorgan was not a disciplinary proceeding based on the Rules of Professional Conduct. Yorgan is comparable to the separate civil action against Attorney Barrock in the Milwaukee County circuit court.
¶ 45. I shall now discuss each case in greater detail.
¶ 46. The Barrock Case. This case is a discipline case, governed by a lien statute and the Rules of Professional Conduct.
¶ 47. An injured person hired Attorney Michael Hupy to pursue a claim and signed a contract granting the attorney a lien upon any proceeds for the payment of his fee. The person later retained Attorney Barrock to pursue the same claim.
¶ 48. Hupy's contractual lien is protected by statute. Wisconsin Stat. § 757.36 validates an attorney-client contract that grants the attorney a lien upon the proceeds derived in any action brought for the enforcement of the cause of action, as security for fees in the conduct of the litigation. The statute further provides that when notice of the contract is given to the opposite *223party or his or her attorney, no settlement or adjustment of the action may be valid as against the lien so created.6
¶ 49. Attorney Barrock settled the claim and received funds to which his client was entitled. Attorney Barrock knew of Attorney Hupy's asserted lien on the funds and nevertheless disbursed the funds without making payment to Attorney Hupy.
¶ 50. The Rules of Professional Conduct (SCR 20:1.15 (d)(3)) require that, when "the client and another person claim ownership interest in trust property identified by a lien . . ., the lawyer [here, Barrock] shall hold that property in trust until there is an accounting and severance of the interests."7
¶ 51. Attorney Barrock failed "to hold in his trust account a portion of the settlement proceeds despite his knowledge of [the lawyer's] lien on those funds," and thus he violated SCR 20:1.15(d). Majority op., ¶ 27.8
*224¶ 52. The Yorgan Case. Yorgan involved a lawyer's personal civil liability to a client's creditor when the creditor did not have a lien on the funds. Yorgan is not a lawyer discipline case.
¶ 53. In Yorgan, the chiropractor rendered services to a patient for injuries incurred in a car accident. At the chiropractor's request the patient signed an "Authorization and Doctor's Lien" stating that funds from any settlement from the accident be used to compensate the chiropractor. The patient retained Attorney Thomas Durkin to handle the personal injury claim. The attorney knew about the "lien authorization contract" but nevertheless disbursed the funds without paying the chiropractor.
¶ 54. The chiropractor sued the attorney in small claims court for payment of the fees for the chiropractic services. On a petition for review, this court held against the chiropractor, reasoning as follows: the chiropractor had no statutory, equitable, or common law lien upon the proceeds of the settlement; the contract between the patient and the chiropractor contemplated that, before the attorney was bound by the contract, the attorney would have to sign it; the attorney never signed the agreement or otherwise accepted the terms of the "lien authorization contract" and therefore was not bound by the contract; even if the attorney had a duty to the client to pay the chiropractor, the applicable general rule is that an attorney is not liable to third parties for breach of a duty to the client; and public policy does not favor an attorney being liable to creditors and assignees of the client. Based on this reasoning, the court held that the attorney was not civilly *225liable to the chiropractor for having disbursed the funds without paying the chiropractor.
¶ 55. The Yorgan court considered the applicability of SCR 20:1.15(d), as did Justice Wilcox's concurrence in that case. Both opinions conclude that SCR 20:1.15(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct was not determinative of an attorney's civil liability.9 The Preamble to SCR 20 explicitly states that the Rules of Professional Conduct do not provide an independent basis for civil liability.10 The Yorgan court addressed civil liability and refrained from addressing the applicability of the Rules of Professional Conduct to the circumstances of the case.11
¶ 56. Synthesis and Conclusion. According to the dissent, the determinative factor in both the present discipline case and in the Yorgan civil liability case is the attorney's knowledge that a claim exists. While both cases involve an attorney who holds a client's funds knowing of the claims of another, the similarities end there.
¶ 57. In the present discipline case, a statute recognizes an attorney's lien on the proceeds, and SCR 20:1.15(d) prohibits an attorney from paying the proceeds and ignoring the lien. Attorney Barrock violated the Rule and is being disciplined. In Yorgan, the court *226determined that the chiropractor had no protected rights or interests in the proceeds against the lawyer and the lawyer was not liable in a civil claim. The Yorgan court never addressed whether that attorney violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Discipline was not an issue in the case.
¶ 58. The applicable law and the nature of the proceedings conspire to distinguish the two cases. In perceiving an analogy when none exists, the dissent creates an analysis when none is required.
¶ 59. For the reasons set forth, I write separately.
¶ 60. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.
Yorgan v. Durkin, 2006 WI 60, ¶¶ 53-80, 290 Wis. 2d 671, 715 N.W.2d 160 (Roggensack, J., dissenting).
Dissent, ¶ 61.
"I cannot agree that it is not contrary to public policy to distribute trust account funds to which a chiropractor makes a claim, but it is contrary to public policy to distribute trust account funds to which an attorney makes a claim. Therefore, I conclude Attorney Barrock did not violate SCR 20:1.15(d)(3)." Dissent, ¶ 76.
Sir Topham Hatt, the railroad controller on the children's television series "Thomas the Tank Engine and Friends," fre*221quently scolds the engines with, 'You have caused confusion and delay!"
Michael F. Hupy & Assocs. v. Omni Ins. Co., No. 2002CV11870 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct.).
Wisconsin Stat. § 757.36 provides as follows:
Any person having or claiming a right of action . .. may contract with any attorney to prosecute the action and give the attorney a hen upon the cause of action and upon the proceeds or damages derived in any action brought for the enforcement of the cause of action, as security for fees in the conduct of the litigation; when such agreement is made and notice thereof given to the opposite party or his or her attorney, no settlement or adjustment of the action may be valid as against the hen so created....
See also Wis. Stat. §§ 757.37, .38.
SCR 20:1.15(d)(3), Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, reads as follows:
(3) Disputes regarding trust property. When the lawyer and another person or the client and another person claim ownership interest in trust property identified by a hen, court order, judgment, or contract, the lawyer shah hold that property in trust until there is an accounting and severance of the interests. If a dispute arises regarding the division of the property, the lawyer shah hold the disputed portion in trust until the dispute is resolved.. ..
For a discussion of a lawyer's duty regarding property in *224the lawyer's possession, see 1 Restatement (3d) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 44^45 (1998).
Yorgan, 290 Wis. 2d 671, ¶ 25.
Id. The Yorgan court also cited Williams v. Rexworks, Inc., 2004 WI App 228, ¶ 20, 277 Wis. 2d 495, 691 N.W.2d 897 ("[I]t is clear from the preamble, and from the lack of any authority to the contrary, that the [Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys] do not provide an independent basis for civil liability, and do not create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached."); and Nauga, Inc. v. Westel Milwaukee Co., 216 Wis. 2d 306, 318 n.5, 576 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1998).
Yorgan, 290 Wis. 2d 671, ¶ 25.