(dissenting). In reversing the trial court, the majority finds the seller’s statement that the rocks would be suitable for use in the plaintiff’s salt water aquarium if rinsed to be an affirmation of fact which became the basis of the bargain, creating an express warranty under sec. 402.313, Stats. The majority holds: (1) there was an express warranty, and (2) the seller breached the warranty. In my opinion the record supports neither conclusion.
The trial court and the circuit court on appeal found that the seller’s statement did not constitute an express warranty. The trial court did not set forth its reasoning in detail, but one may infer that it believed the statement to be too vague to constitute an affirmation of fact forming the basis of the bargain within the meaning of sec. 402.313, Stats. The circuit court explicitly determined that “ [n] either the questions nor the answers to them are so clear or definite so as to constitute such a warranty.”
Ordinarily the question whether a statement constitutes an express warranty is a question of fact. Cf.: Acme Equipment Corp. v. Montgomery Co-operative Creamery Asso., 29 Wis.2d 355, 359-60, 138 N.W.2d 729 (1966). See: Wis. J I—Civil, Part II, 3230. The trial court’s finding should not be upset unless against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. In re Estate of Malnar, 73 Wis.2d 192, 207, 243 N.W.2d 435 (1976). Where the evidence admits of more than a single inference, we must accept the inferences drawn by the trial court. Gehr v. Sheboygan, 81 Wis.2d 117, 122, 260 N.W.2d 30 (1977). I believe the majority ignores these principles in reaching its decision. Here, the buyer asked the sales clerk in a rock shop if the items he selected were suitable for a salt water aquarium, without mentioning fish. Her answer, “yes, if they were rinsed,” was a qualified and conditional response. There*493fore, the buyer was put on notice that the items purchased were not suitable for that purpose in their existing state. The buyer elected not to pursue further inquiry to determine why the items were not suitable for use in a salt water tank in their present condition, did not ask the seller to what extent rinsing was necessary nor what rinsing accomplished to make them suitable for his intended use, did not ask about their effect on fish, and did not specify that his was a closed system aquarium.
This case concerns a merchant dealing in rocks not aquarium accessories. There is no holding out of special expertise on the subject of aquarium supplies by the seller. Between buyer and seller the only one having any apparent experience with an aquarium is the buyer. The record conclusively shows the seller stated the items were not usable in a salt water aquarium unless they were rinsed. The sale occurred notwithstanding this admonition. We do not have an affirmation of fact but instead a cautionary instruction. The buyer bought the items accepting the obligation to do that which would be necessary to make them usable. Since the items were acknowledged by both parties to be unusable for the buyer’s purpose in the form in which they were offered for sale, it was the buyer’s duty to pursue an inquiry as to the reasons they were unsuitable for his purpose and to seek reasonably specific instructions concerning the treatment necessary to make them usable. Such information was reasonably available. After the fish died, upon inquiry plaintiff was told by Edward Duren, the proprietor of the store where he bought his fish and fish tank, that these items are made usable by extended rinsing and soaking.
Thus the evidence amply supports a finding that there was no affirmation of fact by the seller becoming part of the bargain. I believe the majority recognizes as *494much in the last paragraph of the opinion: “A merchant’s vague or incomplete directions will induce the purchase of merchandise and often these directions are as misleading as when erroneous affirmations of fact are given.” (Emphasis added.) I believe sec. 402.313, Stats., requires “erroneous affirmations of fact,” and nothing less, as a condition precedent to recovery. If ever a seller was caught between a rock and a hard place, this is the classic case. Here there was a vague exchange which should have put the buyer on notice that the goods were unsuited in their present state for the intended use. The trial court’s finding is supported by the record.
The majority’s second holding — that the warranty was breached — is equally unsound. Because the trial court and circuit court on appeal found that there was no warranty, there was no need for these courts to reach the question of breach. The circuit court did state, however:
“Suitability for usage in a salt water tank is not so concise as to promise suitability with any or all such fish and plants as might be placed in such a tank. (It might even be argued, however, that the answer to the question put was not in error for the method described by Duren for curing shells is little more than an extended rinsing or soaking.) ” (Emphasis added.)
In making what amounts to a finding of fact that the warranty was breached, the majority compounds the error of determining that there was an express warranty in the inconclusive exchange between the plaintiff and the defendant’s sales clerk: Where there is no definite affirmation of fact, how is one to determine that there has been a breach of the supposed warranty? I agree with the trial court’s suggestion that a reasonable person might conclude that the seller’s general admonition was correct. If anything, the buyer failed to comply with the condition of any “affirmation.”
*495Assuming there was an express warranty, as the majority holds, the evidence does not show that the defendant breached it. The rocks and shells would have been suitable for the plaintiff’s use had the plaintiff rinsed them in the manner he later ascertained to be appropriate. My view of the record would be different had there been an express trial court finding that plaintiff fully complied with the condition.
A “yes but” or a “no unless” representation by a seller should shift the burden to the buyer to get the specifies of the treatment necessary to make the item usable for the buyer’s purposes. Unless he does, he buys at his peril. If instructions to make the item adaptable are given by the seller to the buyer, the buyer must show reasonable conformance with the instructions before he makes out a prima facie case of breach. Such a requirement will cause consideration by both parties of the potential problems involved in the qualified usability. Since the buyer is in the best position to know the specific use contemplated, it should be his duty to seek specific instructions on making the item adaptable.
The trial court and the circuit court on appeal found that no promise or affirmation of fact was made by the seller to the buyer which formed the basis for the bargain under sec. 402.318, Stats. That finding is not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. The buyer, having specific notice of unsuitability, bought at his peril and should suffer the consequential loss. Moreover, the evidence shows no breach of any representation. The trial court properly dismissed the action.
I am hereby authorized to state that Mr. Justice ROLAND B. DAY joins in this dissenting opinion.