(concurring in part; dissenting in part). Count I of the plaintiffs amended complaint, entitled "Intentional Infliction of Injury”, alleges that
"[WJhile under the custody and control of the defendants County of Wayne, through its governing body, the Wayne County Board of Commissioners, William Lucas, and Frank Wilkerson, plaintiff was assaulted, intentionally mishandled, mistreated and physically abused by unknown and unidentified officers, guards and agents of the aforementioned defendants, using excessive and unnecessary force.”
These allegations state a claim in avoidance of governmental immunity against the named defendants. Liberally construed and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, they make out a possible case of intentionally tortious acts committed by agents of the defendants, thus potentially not within "the exercise or discharge of a governmental function”.
I further agree with Justice Williams and would reinstate Count I.
Count II of the plaintiffs amended complaint, entitled "Negligence”, alleges that
*79"[S]aid defendants, having designated plaintiff as a 'mental’ case, failed to take reasonable and necessary steps to insure that plaintiff would not injure himself or others, and failed to exercise due care and caution while plaintiff remained under their care and custody. Defendants were further negligent and lacking in due care and diligence in the selection of personnel entrusted with the care and custody of persons imprisoned in the Wayne County Jail, and of plaintiff in particular.”
These allegations, which involve ordinary claims of negligence, do not state a claim in avoidance of governmental immunity against any of the defendants. The operation and maintenance of a jail is a governmental function, and the immunity statute, MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), provides legislatively mandated immunity for negligence occurring in the exercise or discharge of such functions. Thus, the county is immune. In addition, as noted by Justice Moody in his opinion in the case at bar, the county’s officers and employees, while acting in the scope of their employment operating and maintaining a jail, are likewise immune. No cause of action against defendants is stated in Count II.
Count III of the plaintiffs amended complaint, entitled "Maintenance of a Dangerous and/or Defective Condition in a Public Building”, alleges that the defendants violated MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106), which states, inter alia:
"Governmental agencies have the obligation to repair and maintain public buildings under their control when open for use by members of the public. Governmental agencies are liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from a dangerous or defective condition of a public building if the governmental agency had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect and, for a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge, failed to *80remedy the condition or to take action reasonably necessary to protect the public against the condition.”
The alleged violations were that the defendants failed to
"a) * * * provide even minimum psychiatric assistance and care to those persons confined in the Wayne County Jail;
"b) * * * provide padded cells or other protection for those prisoners designated as 'mental’;
"c) * * * adequately supervise 'mental’ prisoners to assure their and others safety;
"d) ’* * * provide adequate and reasonable medical care.”
Subsections a, c and d all clearly sound in ordinary negligence and therefore do not, for the reasons discussed above with respect to Count II, state a claim in avoidance of governmental immunity against any of the defendants. Subsection b, although mentioning the words "padded cells”, also sounds in nothing more than ordinary negligence. The fact that agents of the defendants may have negligently placed the plaintiff in a cell which was not designed or equipped to handle disturbed individuals does not make the cell itself defective or dangerous. As stated by Justice Ryan in his dissenting opinion in Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716; 275 NW2d 268 (1979), "logic compels the conclusion that a building [or cell] is to be used in accordance with the purpose for which it was designed and constructed and that while the failure to do that may amount to negligence on the part of the user, it surely does not constitute the building defective”.
Count IV of the plaintiffs amended complaint, *81not titled by the plaintiff, alleges a cause of action and should be reinstated for trial.
Count V of the plaintiff’s amended complaint, also untitled, alleges that the city defendants, the City of Detroit and Detroit General Hospital, violated MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106), the defective building statute quoted above (in connection with the discussion of Count III), and also violated MCL 691.1413; MSA 3.996(113), which states, inter alia:
"The immunity of the state shall not apply to actions to recover for bodily injury or property damage arising out of the performance of a proprietary function as herein defined. Proprietary function shall mean any activity which is conducted primarily for the purpose of producing a pecuniary profit for the state, excluding, however, any activity normally supported by taxes or fees.”
Count V of plaintiff’s amended complaint must be reinstated as the result of the majority opinion in Parker v City of Highland Park, 404 Mich 183; 273 NW2d 413 (1978) (Ryan, Williams and Coleman, JJ., dissented), in which it was determined that a city which owns and operates a general hospital may not claim governmental immunity.
Counts I, IV, and V . should be reinstated and remanded for trial. The remaining counts should be dismissed, as ordered by the trial judge.
Ryan, J., concurred with Coleman, C.J.