¶ 75. (dissenting). When the court of appeals certified this eminent domain case to our court, it pointed to the difficulty of interpreting and applying the statutory language in Wis. Stat. *645§§ 32.05 and 32.19. It also recognized the statewide implications of a decision on this subject. After this court declined to grant the certification, the court of appeals undertook a careful review of the statutes as well as the cases and policy, actively participated in more than three hours of oral argument, and then produced an outstanding appellate opinion that is linear, clear, and highly persuasive. City of Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc., 2006 WI App 21, 289 Wis. 2d 453, 710 N.W.2d 713. I believe the court of appeals decision should be affirmed. Because the majority believes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
¶ 76. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const, amend. V. The United States Supreme Court has applied this private property protection to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)). Similarly, the Wisconsin Constitution provides in Article I, Section 13 that "The property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor." Wis. Const, art. I, § 13.
¶ 77. These two "takings" provisions embody a number of core principles. In the discharge of its duties, a government may appropriate private property, but it may not do so without being liable to the obligation to pay just compensation. United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 465 (1903). This obligation bars the government "from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the *646public as a whole." Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
¶ 78. The phrase "just compensation" evokes ideas of fairness and equity. United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 631 (1961). "The guiding principle of just compensation is reimbursement to the owner for the property interest taken." Id. at 633. The owner shall receive the "full monetary equivalent" of what he loses. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970). He is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
¶ 79. Historically, these salutary principles have been largely disregarded in the compensation of business owners whose business interests have been damaged or destroyed by government condemnation of underlying land. See Lynda J. Oswald, Good Will and Going-Concern Value: Emerging Factors in the Just Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. Rev. 283 (1991). The "business losses rule," according to Professor Oswald, limits constitutionally required compensation to the "value of the real property and fixtures taken." Oswald, supra, at 286. Thus, historically, most business owners have not had a constitutional basis to recover for "lost profits during the relocation period, permanent reduction in profits because of the loss of an advantageous location, or the complete destruction of good will or going-concern value where a business cannot be relocated." Oswald, supra, at 286-87. Business owners often have not been able to recover even if the difficulties of relocating put them out of business. Oswald, supra, at 287. The business losses rule is what the Supreme Court summarized in United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946), cited by the majority at ¶ 16.
*647¶ 80. Over time, the business losses rule has been subject to withering criticism because it conflicts with the plain language of the Fifth Amendment and because it can be so palpably unfair to business interests.1
¶ 81. In addition, a body of federal and state court decisions, as well as federal and state legislative reforms, have eroded the business losses rule and changed the atmosphere for evaluating just compensation claims. Constitutional law on just compensation has not remained static.
¶ 82. To illustrate, the majority opinion quotes from Petty Motor Co., which stated:
*648The Constitution and the statutes do not define the meaning of just compensation. But it has come to be recognized that just compensation is the value of the interest taken.... It is recognized that an owner often receives less than the value of the property to him but experience has shown that the rule is reasonably satisfactory. Since "market value" does not fluctuate with the needs of condemnor or condemnee but with general demand for the property, evidence of loss of profits, damage to good will, the expense of relocation and other such consequential losses are refused in federal condemnation proceedings.
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 377-78. In this passage, the Court states that it is "reasonably satisfactory" when a business owner receives less than the value of his property, but it does not explain why this is reasonably satisfactory to the owner.
¶ 83. The truth is, the Supreme Court deviated from the business losses rule three years after Petty Motor in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949). The United States had taken possession of a laundry during World War II so that it could be used temporarily for the Army. "Having no other means of serving its customers, the Laundry suspended business for the duration of the Army's occupancy." Id. at 3. Over government objection, the Court upheld an award of $70,000 annual rent to the owners, saying:
We agree with both lower courts... that the proper measure of compensation is the rental that probably could have been obtained.... [I]f the difference between the market value of the fee on the date of taking and that on the date of return were taken to be the measure, there might frequently be situations in which the owner would receive no compensation whatever.
Id. at 7.
*649¶ 84. But then the Court said more: "[W]hen the Government has condemned business property with the intention of carrying on the business . . . the taker acquires going-concern value, [and] it must pay for it." Id. at 12. "The Government's temporary taking of the Laundry's premises could no more completely have appropriated the Laundry's opportunity to profit from its trade routes than if it had secured a promise . .. that it would not for the duration of the Government's occupancy of the premises undertake to operate a laundry business anywhere else in the City." Id. at 14. "The temporary interruption as opposed to the final severance of occupancy so greatly narrows the range of [the condemnee's] alternatives . . . that it substantially increases the condemnor's obligation to him." Id. at 15. "We conclude... that since the Government for the period of its occupancy of petitioner's plant has for all practical purposes preempted the trade routes, it must pay compensation for whatever transferable value their temporary use may have had." Id. at 16. In short, the Court ordered payment of "consequential" losses.
¶ 85. In his concurrence, Justice Rutledge remarked that the Court had "recognized the possible compensability of intangible interests." Id. at 22 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
¶ 86. The dissent viewed the decision as "new constitutional doctrine." Id. at 22 (Douglas, J., dissenting). "The truth of the matter is that the United States is being forced to pay not for what it gets but for what the owner loses." Id. at 23. The dissent's opening salvo — "The United States took this plant in order to run a laundry for the Army, not for the public" — is so bogus that it illustrates why judicial attempts to defend the business losses rule have often failed. Id. at 22.
*650¶ 87. The Kimball Laundry case is only one of several Supreme Court decisions that undermine the foundations of the business losses rule. More than a century ago, the Supreme Court considered a case in which the United States condemned a company's lock and dam. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). The Court held that the company was entitled to recover compensation for the franchise to exact tolls as well as the value of the tangible property taken. Id. at 345. In other cases, the Court has protected leasehold interests,2 easements,3 and intangible interests such as government entitlements,4 trade secrets,5 liens,6 and contracts in takings.7 The Court's decisions on takings by government regulation show the fluidity in takings law. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922), in which Justice Holmes observed that, "The general rule... is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415. He added that, "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." Id. at 416.8
*651¶ 88. In Wisconsin in 1970 this court issued a landmark decision discarding the rule that "consequential" damages are to be "suffered in legal silence." Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 276, 283, 177 N.W.2d 380 (1970). The court invalidated a statutory, limitation on one form of "consequential" damages. The court's complete and measured opinion cited scholarly criticism of the business losses rule, several of this court's previous opinions, recent Wisconsin legislation providing relocation benefits to property owners, and the Wisconsin Constitution to explain and support its decision.
¶ 89. The Luber opinion's "discard" of the business losses rule on state constitutional grounds may be subject to reconsideration.9 But this court may not *652undo legislation adopted in the wake and spirit of Luber simply because the court might not agree with it. The majority opinion materially weakens current state legislation, and, unfortunately, this action may trigger the very litigation on constitutional issues that Wis. Stat. ch. 32 seeks to avoid.
¶ 90. This case does not require us to decide constitutional issues about the scope of just compensation because we are asked to interpret statutes. But a decision from this court substituting elusive and am*653biguous "parameters" for the statutory requirement that a condemnor timely identify currently available "comparable replacement property" satisfying certain criteria, is bound to stir up legislative reaction.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
¶ 91. In its decision, the court of appeals explained that CC Midwest contended the City of Janes-ville was not entitled to a writ of assistance to remove CC Midwest because the City had not first made available a "comparable replacement property" as required by Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(b) and (c). City of Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc., 2006 WI App 21, ¶ 6, 289 Wis. 2d 453, 719 N.W.2d 713. There was no dispute that the properties nominated by the City were not comparable replacement properties at the time CC Midwest was ordered to leave the property. This was conceded by the City in oral argument on November 22, 2005. Thus, the court of appeals addressed the legal question of what the City was required to do under the statutes to qualify for a writ of assistance. The court treated this question as a matter of statutory interpretation.
¶ 92. I cannot improve on the court's analysis of the statute. Consequently, I insert here paragraphs 11-19, 26, 28, 30, and 31 from Judge Vergeront's opinion. At the conclusion of these 13 paragraphs, I will add supplementary analysis.
¶ 11 WISCONSIN STAT. § 32.05 provides the procedure for certain municipalities to follow when condemning land for certain public projects, and the parties agree that this is the applicable section. After describing the procedure for acquiring title and determining the amount of compensation to the property owner, this section addresses the occupants of the property and provides in part:
*654Condemnation for sewers and transportation facilities. (8) OCCUPANCY; WRIT OF ASSISTANCE; WASTE.
Ob) No person occupying real property may be required to move from a dwelling or move his or her business or farm without at least 90 days' written notice of the intended vacation date from the condem-nor. The displaced person shall have rent-free occupancy of the acquired property for a period of 30 days, commencing with the next 1st or 15th day of the month after title vests in the condemnor, whichever is sooner. Any person occupying the property after the date that title vests in the con-demnor is liable to the condemnor for all waste committed or allowed by the occupant on the lands condemned during the occupancy. The condemnor has the right to possession when the persons who occupied the acquired property vacate, or hold over beyond the vacation date established by the condemnor, whichever is sooner, except as provided under par. (c). If the condem-nor is denied the right of possession, the condemnor may, upon 48 hours' notice to the occupant, apply to the circuit court where the property is located for a writ of assistance to be put in possession. The circuit court shall grant the writ of assistance if all jurisdictional requirements have been complied with, if the award has been paid or tendered as required and if the condemnor has made a comparable replacement property available to the occupants, except as provided under par. (c).
*655(c) The condemnor may not require the persons who occupied the premises on the date that title vested in the condemnor to vacate until a comparable replacement property is made available. This paragraph does not apply to any person who waives his or her right to receive relocation benefits or services under s. 32.197 or who is not a displaced person, as defined under s. 32.19(2)(e), unless the acquired property is part of a program or project receiving federal financial assistance.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 12 WISCONSIN STAT. § 32.19, entitled "Additional items payable," provides for payments to persons displaced by public projects and includes payments to both owners and tenants and to businesses, farm operations, and individuals in dwellings, all as defined in this section. The declaration of purpose in § 32.19(1) provides as follows:
(1) DECLARATION OF PURPOSE. The legislature declares that it is in the public interest that persons displaced by any public project he fairly compensated by payment for the property acquired and other losses hereinafter described and suffered as the result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole; and the legislature further finds and declares that, notwithstanding subch. II, or any other provision of law, payment of such relocation assistance and assistance in the acquisition of replacement housing are proper costs of the construction of public improvements. . . .
¶ 13 A "comparable replacement business" is defined in WIS. STAT. § 32.19(2)(c) as:
*656[A] replacement business which, when compared with the business premises being acquired by the condemnor, is adequate for the needs of the business, is reasonably similar in all major characteristics, is functionally equivalent with respect to condition, state of repair, land area, building square footage required, access to transportation, utilities and public service, is available on the market, meets all applicable federal, state or local codes required of the particular business being conducted, is within reasonable proximity of the business acquired and is suited for the same type of business conducted by the acquired business at the time of acquisition.
¶ 14 WISCONSIN STAT. § 32.19(3)(a) provides for payment of certain actual moving expenses as well as actual reasonable expenses necessary to reestablish a business not to exceed $10,000, with an exception; under para, (b) a displaced business may elect instead to receive a fixed payment established by regulation, which is capped at $20,000. Paragraph (c) provides for an additional payment for persons who moved their businesses, elected payments under para, (a), and within two years of the receipt of that payment discontinued their business, up to a combined maximum of $20,000.
¶ 15 WISCONSIN STAT. § 32.19(4m)(b) addresses payments to business owners who rent and are displaced if such an owner either rents or purchases a comparable replacement business within two years after vacating the acquired property. The condemnor must pay the owner of the displaced business based on a formula that compares the monthly rent paid for the acquired property to the monthly rent of a comparable replacement business in an amount not to exceed $30,000.
*657¶ 16 Focusing first on the language of WIS. STAT. § 32.05(8)(c), that section plainly prohibits a condemnor from requiring the occupant of the premises to vacate "until a comparable replacement property is made available," with certain exceptions not applicable here. Subsection (8)(b) repeats that same obligation in the context of the issuance of a writ of assistance: having "made a comparable replacement property available to the occupants..." (with the exceptions provided for in para, (c)) is one of the conditions for the issuance of the writ. While there is no definition of "comparable replacement property" in § 32.05, WIS. STAT. § 32.19(2)(b), (c), and (d) define "comparable dwelling," "comparable replacement business," and "comparable replacement farm operation," each of these definitions corresponding to the categories of displaced persons defined in paras, (e) and (h) of § 32.19(2). Neither party here has suggested that "comparable replacement property" in § 32.05(8)(b) and (c) has any meaning other than that defined in § 32.19(2)(b)-(d). We conclude that "comparable replacement property" in § 32.05(8)(b) and (c) plainly refers to those three categories of replacement properties as defined in § 32.19(2)(b)-(d). The applicable definition in this case is that of a "comparable replacement business" in § 32.19(2)(c), as the City has implicitly conceded in its arguments.
¶ 17 We conclude there is nothing in the language of WIS. STAT. § 32.19(3) or (4m), or any other subsection of WIS. STAT. § § 32.05 or 32.19, that supports the City's position that it need not make available a comparable replacement property meeting the definitions of § 32.19(2)(b)-(d), but instead need only identify property that could be made comparable and offer the payments required by § 32.19(3) and (4m).
¶ 18 The moving expenses described in WIS. STAT. § 32.19(3)(a) plainly are expenses that would be incurred in relocating to a comparable replacement *658property and cannot reasonably be read as limiting the condemnor's obligation to make a comparable replacement property available. The payments under subsec. (4m) (b) are explicitly based on a comparison of rent for the acquired property to rent for a comparable replacement business and thus cannot reasonably be read as a limitation on the obligation to make available a comparable replacement property. The evident purpose of subsec. (4m) (b) is to provide some compensation to a displaced business owner where the rent for a comparable replacement business is higher than that previously paid; no language in the statute suggests that this compensation affects the condemnor's obligation to make available a comparable replacement business property.
¶ 19 Similarly, the City's argument that the payment in WIS. STAT. § 32.19(3)(c) is intended to fulfill the condemnor's obligation when there is no comparable replacement property has no basis in the statutory language. The comparable replacement property must be made available before the occupant can be required to vacate the acquired property, WIS. STAT. § 32.05(8)(c), whereas the payment under § 32.19(3)(c) is available only after the occupant has vacated. The payment in this paragraph is available when a business owner moves the business, obtains payment for moving expenses, and then within two years of that payment decides to discontinue the business at the new location.
¶ 26 Unlike the owner in Dotty Dumpling's, CC Midwest is not arguing that "make available" in WIS. STAT. § 32.05(8) means "pay for," which was the essence of the owner's argument in Dotty Dumpling's. Rather, CC Midwest's position is that "making available" a comparable replacement property under § 32.05(8)(b) and (c) means identifying a property that meets the applicable definition in WIS. STAT. § 32.19(b)-(d).
*659¶ 28 We are persuaded that the issue presented on this appeal is not resolved by Bassinger or Dotty Dumpling's. A requirement that a condemnor identify a comparable replacement property meeting the applicable definition in WIS. STAT. § 32.19(2)(b)-(d) before making an occupant vacate does not impose an "open-ended" financial obligation on the condemnor and does not render the provisions for payments in § 32.19 meaningless. It is not inconsistent for the legislature to provide that an occupant may not be required to vacate unless the condemnor has identified a comparable replacement property meeting the statutory definition, even though the condemnor's financial obligations to assist the occupant are limited by the provisions for payments in § 32.19.
¶ 30 We acknowledge that construing WIS. STAT. § 32.05(8)(b) and (c) to require that the condemnor identify a comparable replacement property meeting the applicable definition in WIS. STAT. § 32.19(2)(b)-(d) may impose significant impediments to public projects in cases where no such property exists. However, we do not agree our construction will lead to absurd results. While there are important public policies that favor facilitating the condemnation of property and removal of occupants when the property is necessary for projects that benefit the public, there are also important public policies that favor ensuring that displaced occupants have a comparable property to move to. It is for the legislature to decide the proper balance, within the parameters of constitutional requirements, between these policies when there is a conflict. The legislature could reasonably decide that a condemnor should not be able to remove an occupant if there is no comparable replacement property for it to move to, even if this means modifying, or even not going ahead with, a desirable public project.
*660¶ 31 We are satisfied that the legislature has expressed this intent in the plain language of WIS. STAT. § 32.06(8)0») and (c) and WIS. STAT. § 32.19(2)(b)-(d). The legislature could have stated that the condemnor could require an occupant to vacate if no comparable replacement property existed; it could have defined comparable replacement property in less restrictive ways; it could have provided that if the condemnor offers all the payments to which an occupant is entitled under § 32.19, it has satisfied the obligation to make available a comparable replacement property before requiring the occupant to vacate. However, the legislature has done none of these things. Instead it has chosen to plainly state that a condemnor may not require an occupant to vacate "until a comparable replacement property is made available," § 32.05(8)(c), and it has chosen to very specifically define three categories of comparable replacement properties in § 32.19(2)(b)-(d).
CC Midwest, 289 Wis. 2d 453, ¶¶ 11-19, 26, 28, 30, 31.
ADDITIONAL COMMENT
¶ 93. The City argues that this plain reading analysis is radical and cannot be supported by the legislative history. I disagree.
¶ 94. Courts have often said that the rule against consequential or incidental damages should be addressed by Congress or by state legislatures. The advice from Justice Douglas on this point is quoted in Luber, 47 Wis. 2d at 277 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 385 (1945) (Douglas, J., concurring)). Both Congress and the Wisconsin Legislature have acted on this advice, and in the process they have made a valiant effort to head off costly litigation on the scope of just compensation.
*661¶ 95. In 1970 Congress passed the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, P.L. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894; 42 U.S.C. §§ 4621-4638. This legislation provided in part that the head of a federal agency could not approve any grant to a state agency for any program "which will result in the displacement of any person" unless the agency head had received satisfactory assurance that fair and reasonable relocation payments and assistance would be provided to or for the displaced person. The Wisconsin Legislature rushed to comply with this federal law and, in most respects, it strengthened existing relocation benefits. See Ch. 103, Laws of 1971; 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 49 (1972); 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 197 (1972). In 1974 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws also promulgated a Uniform Eminent Domain Code that included liberalized provisions on just compensation and relocation benefits.
¶ 96. Wisconsin had begun statutory modification of the business losses rule in 1959. See § 1, ch. 639, Laws of 1959. Section 32.19 was created in 1961. See § 18, ch. 486, Laws of 1961. Thus the subject of additional compensation and assistance was not new to the legislature. But the federal act as well as the Luber decision generated substantial additional legislative activity.
¶ 97. At the beginning of the 1981 legislative session, the declaration of purpose for relocation benefits in Wis. Stat. § 32.19(1)10 and the definitions of "comparable dwelling," "comparable replacement busi*662ness," and "comparable replacement farm operation" were already in place. Wis. Stat. § 32.19(1), (2)(f), (g), and (h) (1979-80). But Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8) was much different from what it is today, because it made no reference to "comparable replacement property." It read:
(8) Occupancy; Writ of Assistance; Waste. The condemnor shall allow any person occupying the property on the date that title vests in the condemnor to continue to occupy the property for at least one month after that date. The condemnor may not charge rent for any property occupied after the date that title vests in the condemnor by a person who occupied the property on that date. Any person occupying the property after the date that title vests in the condemnor shall be liable to the condemnor for all waste committed or allowed by the occupant on the lands condemned during the occupancy. The condemnor shall have the right to possession when the persons who occupied the property on the date that title vests in the condemnor vacate, or one month after the date that title vests in the condemnor, whichever is sooner. This time period may be extended by the circuit court, if the court deems it reasonable under the circumstances. If the condemnor is denied the right of possession, the condemnor may, upon 48 hours' notice to the occupant, apply to the circuit court where the property is located for a writ of assistance to be put in possession. The circuit court shall grant the writ of assistance if all jurisdictional requirements have been complied with and if the award has been paid or tendered as required.
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8) (1979-80).
¶ 98. During the 1981 session, the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations (DILHR) asked Senator Jerome Van Sistine to introduce legislation *663amending Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8) and several other provisions in Chapter 32. See 1981 S.B. 562. The bill analysis read in part:
(1) Current law is unclear and contradictory in regard to the conditions and terms of continued occupancy by displaced persons during the period after acquisition but before displacement. This bill provides that no person may be required to move without at least 90 days' written notice from the condemnor and until a comparable replacement property is made available.
(2) Current law provides that if a comparable dwelling is not available within the statutory monetary limits, the condemnor may exceed the limits and make payments necessary to provide a comparable replacement dwelling. This bill requires the condemnor to exceed the monetary limits under these circumstances. (Emphasis added.)
¶ 99. Senator Van Sistine's bill did not pass, but Governor Anthony Earl submitted DILHR's "comparable replacement property" language in his first biennial budget, and it was approved without change. See 1983 Wis. Act 27, § 877; see also 1983 Wis. Act 27, § 878.
¶ 100. In short, the requirement to make a "comparable replacement property" available was submitted to the legislature by the executive branch, first under Governor Lee Dreyfus, then under Governor Anthony Earl. The language emanated from and was approved by DILHR which was charged with the responsibility of administering a major portion of the relocation provisions in the law. Presumably, after years of working with state and federal laws on relocation, state regulators knew what they were doing.
¶ 101. The DILHR package of proposals did not require a condemnor to exceed statutory payment limits for a "comparable replacement business" as it did for a *664"comparable dwelling." But the continuing caps on relocation payments for businesses and farm operations are mitigated somewhat by forcing the condemnor to strictly comply with the law.11 Strict compliance requires a condemnor to identify a "comparable replacement property" that exists. Strict compliance may nudge the parties to negotiate time to turn a potential "comparable replacement property" into an available "comparable replacement property" — current availability being a condition precedent to issuance of a writ. This is precisely what the statute requires.
¶ 102. The City argues that the court of appeals' plain reading analysis is unreasonable because it may prevent the condemnor from ever removing the con-demnee. Again, I disagree.
¶ 103. A party seeking a writ of assistance is required to make available a "comparable replacement *665property." Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8). Whether a nominated property is a "comparable replacement property" is a question to be resolved by the circuit court. If the condemnor prevails in court, it obtains a writ and forces the condemnee's removal.12 Hence, compliance with the requirement greatly benefits the condemnor. If the condemnor does not prevail, it will look anew for "comparable replacement property" — with more precise information on what is required — or it will negotiate an agreement with the condemnee.
¶ 104. A municipality should make a realistic assessment of whether a "comparable replacement property" is available early on and develop an appropriate strategy. A "comparable replacement property" may not always be available. If the municipality is able to purchase the underlying property instead of condemning it, the municipality ought to be able to assume the original owner's rights under a lease. Thereafter, it may *666seek to evict tenants under normal landlord-tenant law. See Wis. Stat. §§ 704.17, 704.19. If the municipality is required to condemn the property instead of purchasing it, it may be necessary to condemn the entirety of any business that would have occupancy rights on the property under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8) and pay accordingly. The cost would be borne by the public, which presumably benefits from the taking.
¶ 105. If the law is not interpreted in a way that requires the availability of a "comparable replacement property" tied to the definitions in Wis. Sta.t. § 32.19(2), it is likely to destroy existing businesses or leave individuals without a home.
¶ 106. The majority is simply not prepared to apply clear statutory language. Its injection of ambiguous "parameters" into the statutory scheme may help the condemnor but does absolutely nothing to help the condemnee. Its apparent reliance on potential comparable replacement properties is a direct contradiction of the statutory language.
¶ 107. For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.
See generally Nathan Bursdal, Just Compensation and the Seller's Paradox, 20 BYU J. Pub. L. 79 (2005); Charles M. Cork, A Critical Review of the Law of Business Loss Claims in Georgia Eminent Domain Jurisprudence, 51 Mercer L. Rev. 11 (1999); Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 579 (1995); Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. Rev. (1995); Alan T. Ackerman, Just Compensation for the Condemnation of Going Concern Value, 64 Mich. Bar J. 1314 (1985); D. Michael Risinger, Direct Damages: The Lost Key to Constitutional Just Compensation When Business Premises are Condemned, 15 Seton Hall L. Rev. 483 (1985); Gideon Kanner, When is "Property" not "Property Itself: A Critical Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 Cal. W L. Rev. 57 (1969); Frank A. Aloi & Arthur Abba Goldberg, A Reexamination of Value, Good Will, and Business Losses in Eminent Domain, 53 Cornell L. Rev. 604 (1968); Comment, "Just Compensation" for the Small Businessman, 2 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 144 (1966); Comment, An Act to Provide Compensation for Loss of Goodwill Resulting from Eminent Domain Proceedings, 3 Harv. J. on Legis. 445 (1965); Emerson G. Spies & John C. McCoid, II, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent Domain, 48 Va. L. Rev. 437 (1962); Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 Yale L.J. 61 (1957); Robert Kratovil & Frank J. Harrison, Jr., Eminent Domain — Policy and Concept, 42 Cal. L. Rev. 596 (1954).
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
The majority opinion attempts to distinguish cases cited in this discussion on the basis that they concern takings and not *651awards of consequential damages. Majority op., ¶ 20 n.18. However, as the definition of "taking" has broadened over the years, the broadening of "just compensation" has followed accordingly. The majority fails to acknowledge that today just compensation for a taking may include what previously has been categorized as consequential damages.
The majority contends that this court "expressly limited the holding in Luber to the 12-month limit for rental income losses." Majority op., ¶ 17 n.16 (citing Rotter v. Milwaukee County Expressway & Transp. Comm'n, 72 Wis. 2d 553, 562-63, 241 N.W.2d 440 (1976)). I disagree. The crux of Rotter is to require strict compliance with the procedure in the condemnation statute even when making claims for consequential damages. The Rotter court stated:
[In Luber], owners of condemned property, sought recovery for rent loss for thirty-two months even though the statute only allowed recovery for rent loss for the twelve months preceding condemnation. Our court majority held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the entire rent loss amount, placing such entitlement on constitutional grounds. ... Luber placed the thirty-two month rent loss within the items of compensable items of damage under sec. 32.19, Stats. It did not create a new category of "incidental'' or *652"consequential" damages which could be brought directly to court without regard to the statutory procedure as to claims and without meeting the requirement of filing a claim with the commission or public body involved in a taking before going to court.
The Luber holding is to be read and limited to its holding that the twelve-month limit as to rent losses allowable was constitutionally invalid. It is true, as Luber noted, that when property is taken by condemnation "incidental damages are very apt to occur." That is not to say that a cause of action for compensation for incidental damages has been created that has no basis or relatedness to the items made compensable by sec. 32.19, Stats. It means only that payment and time limits set forth in sec. 32.19 may encounter constitutional difficulties .... This does not alter the mandated procedural steps set forth in sec. 32.20, for the making of any and all claims by condemnees.
... All claims for compensation by condemnees must be filed with the commission or public body involved within the two-year time limit set by the statute. It is only after disallowance of such claims by such commission or public body that there is a right to take the claim or the challenge to commission disallowance to court.
Id. at 562-64 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
In this case, CC Midwest has not concocted a novel constitutional claim for compensation. CC Midwest is insisting that the City of Janesville comply with the statute. It is the city's failure to comply with the statute that creates "constitutional difficulties."
This was cited in ¶ 12 of the court of appeals decision. See ¶ 92 above.
"Because the power of eminent domain under WIS. STAT. ch. 32 is extraordinary, we strictly construe the condemnor's power under WIS. STAT. § 32.05, while liberally construing provisions favoring the landowner, including available remedies and compensation." TFJ Nominee Trust v. DOT, 2001 WI App 116, ¶ 10, 244 Wis. 2d 242, 629 N.W.2d 57 (citing Miesen v. DOT, 226 Wis. 2d 298, 304, 594 N.W.2d 821 (Ct. App. 1999)); see also Shepherd Legan Aldrian Ltd. v. Vill. of Shorewood, 182 Wis. 2d 472, 478, 513 N.W.2d 686 (Ct. App. 1994). This formulation can be traced back to Aero Auto Parts, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 78 Wis. 2d 235, 241, 253 N.W.2d 896 (1977), in which the court quoted 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 3.213[4] (rev. 3d ed. 1976):
The rule of strict construction applies to the power of the condem-nor and to the exercise of such power. It is a rule intended for the benefit of the owner who is deprived of property against his will. It follows, therefore, that the converse of this rule is' also true. Statutory provisions in favor of an owner, such as provisions regulating the remedies of such owner and the compensation to be paid to him, are to he liberally construed.
Wisconsin's business replacement payments, which were once considered a substantial right and a breakthrough in the law of eminent domain, have been eroded by time. Since 1977 and 1979 when the legislature provided for maximum business replacement payments of $50,000 for business owners and $30,000 for business tenants respectively, the legislature has never increased these máximums. We understand that $50,000 from 1977 and $30,000 from 1979 are not worth the same in today's world. According to the United States Department of Labor, what was worth $50,000. in 1977 is now worth $171,575.08, and what was worth $30,000 in 1979 is now worth $85,929.34. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/bls/inflation.htm (last visited June 26, 2007).
Should the legislature want to minimize the disruption to business owners and tenants, it should increase the statutory máximums for business replacement payments in Wis. Stat. § 32.19(4m).