¶ 111. (<dissenting). Could a cocaine-pushing, woman-battering man, who does not even know about the existence of his child, have accepted and exercised "significant responsibility for the daily supervision, education, protection and care of the child"? Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) (2003-04).
¶ 112. If that is too close of a call, consider the same question, only the person admitted he never exercised responsibility for the daily supervision of the child, never exercised responsibility for the education of the child, never paid child support, and never met the child. Plus, he has been incarcerated for the vast majority of the child's life.
¶ 113. The circuit court answered no. Such a person has not assumed parental responsibility pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6). The majority concludes the circuit court erred. "[T]he circuit court in the instant case proceeded under an erroneous interpretation of the statute" by failing to "consider the biological father's efforts undertaken after he discovered] that he is the father but before the circuit court adjudicate [d] the grounds of the termination proceeding." Majority op., ¶ 5.
¶ 114. The plain language of the Children's Code contradicts the majority's interpretation of § 48.415(6). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
r-H
¶ 115. Before addressing the analysis of the majority, it is necessary to supplement the facts presented by it.
¶ 116. Marquette was born on August 31, 2003. He was at least six weeks premature and weighed only four pounds and ten ounces. He had respiratory prob*585lems, including bronchiolitis, reactive airway disease, and pneumonia. From the hospital he was placed with foster parents, Dr. Jeffrey and Karen.
¶ 117. When Marquette was born, Bobby G. was facing charges for battering a woman. He was clueless about the existence of the child he had fathered as a result of his one and only face-to-face contact with Denise W. while not in state custody. Lest one conclude Bobby G. had no way of knowing the result of their volitional act, the State contacts fathers, such as Bobby G., if they register pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.025.1 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.27(3)(b)l. provides that a person registered pursuant to § 48.025 receive notice of any CHIPS case involving their potential child.2 However, Bobby G. never registered with the state. Any thought that he may have been ignorant to the potential of a *586CHIPS case should be offset by the fact that Bobby G. already had his parental rights terminated to another child by the time he had face-to-face contact with Denise.
¶ 118. For the first six months of his life, Marquette's health problems required extensive treatment. He required treatment every two to three hours twenty-four hours a day, which his foster parents provided.
¶ 119. While Marquette endured his health problems, Bobby G. faced bail jumping charges. Despite a no contact order, Bobby G. went to the apartment of the woman he had battered a few months earlier. When he refused to leave, the woman contacted the police. The police persuaded him to leave. Within an hour, Bobby G. was back at the woman's apartment banging on the door. By his second visit, the police had discovered the existence of the no contact order.
¶ 120. In Spring 2004 Marquette's health condition got worse. He suffered a series of recurrent ear infections. He developed problems eating and maintaining his nutritional status. As a result of Marquette's condition, Dr. Jeffrey and Karen needed to administer treatment every hour and half to two hours twenty-four hours a day to maintain his hydration and nutrition. Marquette's condition got so bad that he had to be hospitalized for four days. Doctors found that food was going into his lungs and that he had multiple allergies. As they had done for Marquette since he arrived from the hospital days after his birth, his foster parents provided the necessary treatment and coordinated his numerous visits to doctors and therapists.
¶ 121. While Marquette was needing treatment at least 12 times a day, Bobby G. was facing charges for delivering cocaine. He was still oblivious to the exist*587ence of the child he had fathered. He received a maximum term of imprisonment of seven years and six months. The initial confinement in the Wisconsin Prison System was two years and six months and the extended supervision was five years.
¶ 122. In Summer 2004 the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Marquette's parents, Denise W. and "Bobby." At the time the petition was filed, the identity of Marquette's father was unknown by Denise or the State. Denise misidentified Marquette's father twice before she suggested it may be "Bobby." The State used "Bobby" on the petition because Denise did not know Bobby G.'s last name. After genetic testing, Bobby G. was identified as Marquette's father.
¶ 123. In Fall 2004, only as a result of the State seeking out the identity of Marquette's father so it could terminate his parental rights, Bobby G. finally became aware that Marquette existed.
¶ 124. During the grounds phase of the termination proceedings, Bobby G. made a number of admissions. He admitted he never assumed parental responsibility for Marquette. He admitted he never established a substantial parental relationship with Marquette. He admitted he never exercised responsibility for the daily supervision of Marquette. He admitted he never exercised responsibility for the education of Marquette. He admitted he was unaware the he was the father of Marquette until after June 16, 2004, the date the State filed the petition to terminate his parental rights to Marquette. He admitted that he was not involved in assisting in, or providing for, the prenatal care of Marquette. He admitted that he never paid child support for Marquette. He admitted that he never met Marquette. He admitted that he was unaware that he *588was the father of Marquette until he was informed of DNA test results indicating his paternity.
¶ 125. The State filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that the undisputed facts entitled it to judgment as a matter of law that Bobby G. failed to assume parental responsibility pursuant to § 48.415(6). The circuit court granted the State's motion. Bobby G. filed a notice of appeal. The court of appeals accepted the no-merit report submitted by Bobby G.'s counsel.
II
¶ 126. When a circuit court grants partial summary judgment, we review it independently applying the same methodology. Oneida County Dep't. of Social Servs. v. Nicole W., 2007 WI 30, ¶ 8, 299 Wis. 2d 637, 728 N.W.2d 652. It is appropriate to grant summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The majority deems summary judgment inappropriate in this case based on its flawed interpretation of § 48.415(6).
¶ 127. When multiple statutes in the same chapter relate to implementing the chapter's purpose, courts construe them to have a harmonized interpretation. In re Angel Lace M., 184 Wis. 2d 492, 512, 516 N.W.2d 678 (1994).3 The majority's interpretation of § 48.415(6) contradicts §§ 48.31(1) and 48.424. Rather than look to the statutes accompanying § 48.415(6) in the Children's Code for the proper definition of a fact-finding hearing, the majority provides a definition based on a contorted reading of the Children's Code.
*589A. A Harmonized Interpretation of the Children's Code Provisions
¶ 128. Reading §§ 48.31, 48.415, and 48.424 together, the scope of a § 48.415(6) fact-finding hearing is limited to the facts alleged in the petition to terminate. Facts that arise subsequent to the filing of the petition to terminate are not relevant to the fact-finder's determination of whether grounds exist to terminate the parent's parental rights.
¶ 129. Before enumerating the grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights, § 48.415 states that "[a]t the fact-finding hearing the court or jury may make a finding that grounds exist for the termination of parental rights." Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(6) provides that one of the grounds for involuntary termination is the failure to assume parental responsibility.
¶ 130. The language of § 48.415 does not specify the particulars of the required fact-finding hearing. However, other provisions of the Children's Code do. Wisconsin Stat. § 48.424, like § 48.415, appears in Sub-chapter VIII of the Children's Code. Subchapter VIII relates to the termination of parental rights. Section 48.424(1) explicitly states that "[t]he purpose of the fact-finding hearing is to determine whether grounds exist for the termination of parental rights." Wisconsin Stat. § 48.424(2) provides that a "fact-finding hearing shall be conducted according to the procedure specified by s. 48.31."
¶ 131. Wisconsin Stat. § 48.31(1) defines a "fact-finding hearing" as "a hearing to determine if the allegations in ... a petition to terminate parental rights are proved by clear and convincing evidence." From the plain language of the statute, the scope of a fact-finding *590hearing is limited to those facts alleged in the petition to terminate parental rights.
¶ 132. Applying the harmonized interpretation of the statutes to this case, no dispute of material fact existed when the circuit court granted the State's motion for partial summary judgment. Bobby G.'s own admissions establish that he never had the requisite substantial parental relationship required by § 48.415(6). The circuit court properly granted the State partial summary judgment.
B. The Majority's Flawed Interpretation
¶ 133. In the face of the plain language of the Children's Code, the majority holds that circuit courts must consider a parent's efforts after the petition to terminate his or her rights has been filed. Majority op., ¶ 5. The majority provides seven reasons for its interpretation. Each reason enumerated lacks merit.
1. "Neglect" is Different than "Willful Neglect"
¶ 134. The majority states that "Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) explicitly uses language that evidences the relevancy of whether a father knew or had reason to believe he was the father before the petition for termination of parental rights was filed." Majority op., ¶ 49. It focuses on the use of the words "neglected" and "refused," which both appear in one of the three factors circuit courts may consider pursuant to § 48.415(6)(b). The factor specifically reads, "whether the person has neglected or refused to provide care or support for the child." Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) (emphasis added). Based on State v. Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d 205, 225, 378 N.W.2d 691 (1985), the majority asserts that "[t]he word 'neglected' is not synonymous with negligence here." Majority op., ¶ 49.
*591¶ 135. The majority's reliance on Cissell is misplaced. Cissell involved the interpretation of a child support statute that used the term "willfully neglects."4 The defendant argued that "willfully neglects" was internally inconsistent because "willful" means intentional and "neglect" means negligence. The Cissell court disagreed and held that the use of the term "willfully neglects" in Wis. Stat. § 52.05(1) did not render the statute void for vagueness.
¶ 136. Unlike Cissell, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) does not include the phrase "willfully neglects." It merely uses the word "neglect." Dismissing the distinction between a statute that uses the phrase "willfully neglects" and "neglect" undermines the majority's interpretation.
2. The Non-Exclusive Discretionary Factors
¶ 137. The majority's interpretation of § 48.415(6) depends on its interpretation of words found in nonexclusive discretionary factors. The plain language of the statute indicates that was not the legislature's intent.
¶ 138. Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) defines "substantial parental relationship" and provides a nonexclusive list of three factors the court may consider. Specifically, it states,
*592In evaluating whether the person has had a substantial parental relationship with the child, the court may consider such factors, including, but not limited to, (1) whether the person has ever expressed concern for or interest in the support, care or well-being of the child, (2) whether the person has neglected or refused to provide care or support for the child and (3) whether, with respect to a person who is or may be the father of the child, the person has ever expressed concern for or interest in the support, care or well-being of the mother during her pregnancy.
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) (emphasis and numbering added). The majority even recognizes that § 48.415(6)(b) gives "non-exclusive examples of what a court may consider in evaluating whether the person has had a substantial parental relationship with the child." Majority op., ¶ 46 (emphasis added).
¶ 139. Nevertheless, in explaining its reasons for disregarding the State's harmonized interpretation of the Children's Code, the majority indicates that § 48.415(6) provides a list of elements that "must," or "have to," be satisfied. Majority op., ¶¶ 49, 52. In concluding its discussion of "neglected" and "refused," the majority states that "[a] circuit court therefore would have to take into account whether the father knew or had reason to believe he was the father." Id., ¶ 49 (emphasis added). Why would a circuit court "have to" when the words "neglected" and "refused" appear in one of the non-exclusive list of factors "a court may consider?"
3. The Legislature Defined "Fact-Finding Hearing"
¶ 140. The introductory language of § 48.415 provides that "[a]t the fact-finding hearing the court or jury may make a finding that grounds exist for the termi*593nation of parental rights." Based on that, the majority concludes that "[t]his language does not require that the evidence regarding the grounds be limited to what has transpired as of the date of filing of the petition." Majority op., ¶ 53. This purportedly supports the majority's conclusion that circuit courts must consider evidence that arises from conduct after the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights.
¶ 141. The majority's assessment makes sense only if the introductory language of § 48.415(6) is read in a vacuum. The legislature defined "fact-finding hearing" in §§ 48.31(1) and 48.424. As addressed above, § 48.31(1) does require that the evidence regarding the grounds be limited to conduct before the date of filing of the petition because it is proof of the "allegations in a petition" for which a fact-finding hearing is held.
4. Statutes are Primary Authority
¶ 142. The majority proclaims that § 48.31(1) "does not support the State's position that the relevant cut-off date for evidence relating to the assumption of parental responsibility is the date the petition for termination is filed." Majority op., ¶ 54. Why? Because "[t]he State cites no support except a comment to the jury instruction Wis JI — Children 180." Id.
¶ 143. The plain language of § 48.31(1) supports the State's position. Only by rejecting enactments of the legislature as primary authority does the majority's assessment of §§ 48.31(1) and 48.415(6) reach its erroneous conclusion.
5. The Purpose of the Children's Code
¶ 144. The paramount goal of the Children's Code is to protect children. The majority quoted a portion of *594§ 48.01(a), which is one of the many subsections that states the purpose of the Children's Code, as follows:
While recognizing that the paramount goal of this chapter is to protect children and unborn children, to preserve the unity of the family, whenever appropriate, by strengthening family life through assisting parents and the expectant mothers of unborn children, whenever appropriate, in fulfilling their responsibilities as parents or expectant mothers.
(Emphasis added.) Family unity and strengthening family life are secondary goals that are furthered "whenever appropriate."
¶ 145. With the legislative purposes stated, the majority leaps to the conclusion that "[t]o effectuate the stated legislative purposes requires a circuit court, in determining whether grounds exist under § 48.415(6), to consider the efforts of a biological parent to assume parental responsibility after the filing of the termination of parental rights petition but before adjudication of the grounds for termination." Majority op., ¶ 62.
¶ 146. The legislature has provided evidence that the majority has failed to capture the essence of the Children's Code's purpose. Specifically, the legislature enacted § 48.31(1). Wisconsin Stat. § 48.31(1) explicitly limits the scope of a fact-finding hearing to facts alleged in the petition to terminate. Were the state able to terminate parental rights on allegations outside of the petition, the parent would not have notice of the allegations against him or her.
6. Participation Does Not Ensure that a Party Will Prevail
¶ 147. Regardless of its aversion toward other Children's Code statutes that define the scope of fact-*595finding hearings, the majority claims that §§ 48.42(2)(b)2. and 48.422(6)(a) support its conclusion. However, an examination of the statutes indicates that neither contradicts the definition of fact-finding hearing provided by the legislature in § 48.31(1). Additionally, neither requires that a circuit court consider certain evidence at the fact-finding hearing.
¶ 148. Wisconsin Stat. § 48.42(2) enumerates the parties that must be summoned when a petition for termination has been filed.5 Therefore, Bobby G. had to be summoned when a petition was filed to terminate parental rights to Marquette. Wisconsin Stat. § 48.422(6)(a) provides that at a Wis. Stat. § 48.422 hearing a circuit court must ensure that all parties to the termination proceeding have been notified.6
*596¶ 149. Neither §§ 48.42(2)(b)2. nor 48.422(6)(a) requires that a circuit court consider certain evidence at fact-finding hearings. Yet, the majority depends on these procedural statutes to determine the proper scope of fact-finding hearings. The majority does so in the face of the how the legislature has already defined fact-finding hearings in §§ 48.31(1) and 48.424.
7. A Legislative Theory
¶ 150. The majority presents the convoluted history of § 48.415(6). Originally, the substantial parental relationship had to exist "prior to adjudication." Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) (1979-80). Later, the substantial parental relationship had to exist prior to the "filing of the petition for termination of parental rights." Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) (1989-90). In 1995, the legislature consolidated, renumbered, and amended § 48.415(6). Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) (1995-96). Any reference to the temporal scope of the fact-finding hearing vanished. What does that mean?
¶ 151. One theory is that the Joint Legislative Council's Special Committee, which addressed statutes throughout the Children's Code, realized it was repetitive to define the scope of a fact-finding hearing in § 48.31(1) and repeat a substantially similar definition in § 48.415(6). At the time, § 48.31(1) referred to "allegations in a ... petition to terminate parental rights" and § 48.415(6)(a)2. referenced a substantial parental *597relationship "prior to the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights." In an effort to rid the statutes of some redundancy, the legislature may have deleted the language.
¶ 152. Of course, the role of courts is not to theorize about what the legislature may have been thinking. Courts interpret the laws as enacted by the legislature. When statutory language manifests a clear meaning, it is unnecessary to consult extrinsic sources to ascertain the legislature's intent, such as legislative history. State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. The rationale behind not delving into the convoluted legislative history in a case like this is that courts are "not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear words of the statute." State v. Pratt, 36 Wis. 2d 312, 317, 153 N.W.2d 18 (1967).
III
¶ 153. Marquette should have been m a permanent home by now. His foster parents wanted to adopt him. The circuit court properly granted the State's motion for partial summary judgment. Bobby G. failed to assume parental responsibility. Nevertheless, instead of being in a permanent home, Marquette continues to be kept in limbo.
¶ 154. For the forgoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 155. I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. PROSSER and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this opinion.
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.025(1) states:
Any person claiming to be the father of a nonmarital child who is not adopted or whose parents do not subsequently intermarry under s. 767.60 may, in accordance with procedures under this section, file with the department a declaration of his interest in matters affecting such child.
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.27(3)(b)1. provides the following:
Except as provided in subd. 2., if the petition that was filed relates to facts concerning a situation under s. 48.13 or a situation under s. 48.133 involving an expectant mother who is a child and if the child is a nonmarital child who is not adopted or whose parents do not subsequently intermarry as provided under s. 767.60 and if paternity has not been established, the court shall notify, under s. 48.273, all of the following persons:
a. A person who has filed a declaration of interest under s. 48.025.
b. A person alleged to the court to be the father of the child or who may, based on the statements of the mother or other information presented to the court, be the father of the child.
(Emphasis added.)
This canon of construction has been referred to as in pari materia. In pari materia means "[o]n the same subject; relating to the same matter." Black's Law Dictionary 794 (7th ed. 1999).
Wisconsin Stat. § 52.05(1) (1981-82) states, in pertinent part, the following:
Any person who deserts or willfully neglects or refuses to provide for the support and maintenance of his or her spouse or child under 18 years (legitimate or born out of wedlock) in destitute or necessitous circumstances shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than 2 years or both. It is a defense to criminal liability that the person has just cause to desert, willfully neglect or refuse to provide support or maintenance.
(Emphasis added.)
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.42(2)(b) provides the following:
(2) Who Must Be Summoned. Except as provided in sub. (2m), the petitioner shall cause the summons and petition to he served upon the following persons:
(b) If the child is a nonmarital child who is not adopted or whose parents do not subsequently intermarry under s. 767.60 and paternity has not been established:
1. A person who has filed a declaration of interest under s. 48.025.
2. A person or persons alleged to the court to be the father of the child or who may, based upon the statements of the mother or other information presented to the court, be the father of the child unless that person has waived the right to notice under s. 48.41 (2)(c).
3. A person who has lived in a familial relationship with the child and who may be the father of the child.
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.422(6)(a) provides the following:
*596If the child is a nonmarital child who is not adopted or whose parents do not subsequently intermarry under s. 767.60 and paternity has not been established, the court shall hear testimony concerning the paternity of the child. Based on the testimony, the court shall determine whether all interested parties who are known have been notified under s. 48.42 (2). If not, the court shall adjourn the hearing and order appropriate notice to be given.