¶ 1. The petitioner, Monika Lackershire, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision affirming a judgment of conviction and an order denying her post conviction motion for plea withdrawal.1 Based on her guilty plea, she was convicted of one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child under Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) (2003-04).2 Lackershire contends that she was the victim, rather than the perpetrator, of a sexual assault. She therefore seeks to withdraw her plea on the grounds that her plea colloquy was defective and her plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
¶ 2. She argues that her plea colloquy was defective for two reasons. First, she asserts that the circuit court did not explain the nature of read-in charges. Second, she argues that the circuit court failed to satisfy the "factual basis" requirement under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(l)(b). As a consequence of the failure, she maintains that she did not realize that if she was the victim of rape, she could not have committed the *424offense charged. In addition to her claim that the plea colloquy was defective, Lackershire argues that she pleaded guilty because she feared that the stress of a trial would affect her pregnancy, and that her plea was therefore involuntary.
¶ 3. We determine that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the dismissed charges were read-in offenses. Because the record does not reflect that the dismissed charges were treated as read-ins, a read-in analysis is not warranted. Thus, whether Lackershire understood the nature of read-ins is not at issue.
¶ 4. We also determine that Lackershire's plea colloquy was inadequate. The factual basis relied upon by the court in accepting Lackershire's plea raised a substantial question as to whether she had committed sexual assault of a child or had herself been the victim of rape. This necessitated that the circuit court make further inquiry to establish a sufficient factual basis to support Lackershire's plea under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(l)(b).3
¶ 5. Finally, we determine that her fear about the effect of a trial on her pregnancy did not render her plea involuntary. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for a hearing on whether Lackershire's plea is knowing and intelligent.4
*425I
¶ 6. In November 2003, Lackershire was charged with one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).5 The charge was based on an alleged act of intercourse with Stephen G., who was then 14, that took place in the evening around August 27, 2003, in the house where Stephen G. and Lackershire both resided. After the preliminary hearing in that case, Lackershire was charged with a second count of the same offense. That count was based *426on an alleged act of intercourse that took place in the shed adjacent to the house around the third week of August 2003 (prior to the incident alleged in the first count). In a separate case, Lackershire was charged with two counts of the same offense for alleged intercourse with Joseph C., who was also 14 at the time.
¶ 7. Lackershire is a mentally and physically challenged person. She suffers from learning and cognitive disorders, has a tenth-grade education, and has a history of psychological problems. She is legally blind, and lives on Social Security Disability and Supplemental Security Income payments.
¶ 8. The probable cause portion of the criminal complaint against Lackershire in the case involving Stephen G. consisted of an incident report by Jesse Van Alstine, chief of police for the Village of Pepin. In that report, Van Alstine describes talking to Matthew Tucke, Stephen G.'s older brother and Lackershire's boyfriend at the time. Tucke informed Van Alstine that Lacker-shire told him that Stephen G. had raped her.
¶ 9. When Van Alstine interviewed Lackershire about the incident, she maintained that Stephen G. had raped her. The incident report relates Lackershire's version of the incident as follows:
She stated that she also believed that the incident was around August 27, 2003 as Matthew and his mother had left.. . and that she and [Stephen G.] were in the living room together.... She stated that [Stephen's brother and father were asleep]. She stated that continuously that night [Stephen G.] had asked her to have sex with him and she continuously told him no that she would not do this because she loved his brother, Matthew, and would not do that to him. Also, that she could get into trouble if she had sex with him because of his age. She stated that during this time period, [Stephen *427G.] walked over to her, pulled the blanket that she had covered herself up with, pulled her shorts down and stuck his penis in her. She stated that due to embarrassment, she placed her face into the pillow and said and did nothing, other than that she had said no several times.
¶ 10. Van Alstine also interviewed Stephen G. about Lackershire's accusation. He stated they had consensual intercourse. The incident report relates Stephen G.'s version of the incident as:
[Stephen G.] stated that on the night in question, which he believed was August 27, 2003, that after his father and brother ... had gone to sleep, and his mother and brother, Matthew [had left], that he asked Monika to have sex with him. He stated that he asked her approximately three to four times and that each time she said no. After the third or fourth time Monika went and laid down on the couch on her stomach. At which time [Stephen G.] asked her one more time if she would have sex with him. At this time Monika gave him a look that he felt showed that she was interested and she said ["]what do you think. ["] At this time he walked over toward her .... at which time they engaged in sexual intercourse.
[Stephen G.] stated that at no time after she said ["]what do you think["] did she say no or protest or in any way try to stop [him] from having sex with her.
¶ 11. At the preliminary hearing in the case, Stephen G. testified about having intercourse with Lackershire in his home. He confirms that he was the one to initiate intercourse:
Q: Where did that event take place?
A: That happened in the living room.
Q: In the living room of your family home?
*428A: Yep.
Q: And, once again, how did that come about?
A: I don't really know. I had asked her, because of the time before. That's kind of how it came about.
Q: You asked her if she would have sex with you?
A: Yah.
¶ 12. Lackershire negotiated a plea with the State. She agreed to plead guilty to one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child for the incident involving Stephen G. that occurred in the living room of his home. The State agreed to dismiss the second count in Stephen G.'s case and both counts in the case involving Joseph C. The plea questionnaire that Lack-ershire completed stated only that the non-charged offenses were to be dismissed, and made no mention of read-ins.
¶ 13. At the plea hearing,6 the district attorney told the court that the State believed it appropriate to dismiss those counts, and that there was "ample opportunity for punishment, penalty, and rehabilitation, given a conviction on one ... ." Throughout the plea hearing, the court referred to the non-charged offenses as being dismissed. For example, the court established that Lackershire was pleading guilty in part because the State agreed to dismiss other charges:
The Court: I presume and believe that one of the reasons that you're entering the plea to this first count is that, by the plea, the State is agreeing to dismiss several other counts that are pending in this court.
*429Is that true?
Lackershire: Yes.
The court also confirmed with Lackershire's attorney that the charges would be dismissed, stating that "It's my assumption that she is accepting this plea agreement partially on the basis that the other charges that are pending would be dismissed." Nowhere in the plea hearing do the parties or the court indicate that the dismissed charges would be read in at sentencing.
¶ 14. Regarding the offense charged, Lackershire's attorney told the court he had "gone over the elements with my client." The court had the following exchange with Lackershire, in which it described the offense charged as consisting of sexual intercourse with a child under 16 years old:
The Court: The Information in this case — and referring specifically to the first count in the Information of 03-CF-32 [involving Stephen G.] — alleges that, in August of 2003 — that would have been last August — in this county, you had sexual intercourse with a child under the age of sixteen years.
Do you understand that?
Lackershire: Yes.
The Court: Is that true?
Lackershire: Yes.
The Court: Do you understand it's alleged that this is a violation of Section 948.02 of the Wisconsin Statutes?
Lackershire: Yes.
¶ 15. The court established that the factual basis for Lackershire's plea was the criminal complaint and testimony at the preliminary examination. However, at *430no point did the court question Lackershire about her contention that Stephen G. had raped her on the occasion of the offense charged. Neither did the court establish that Lackershire understood that if Stephen G. had raped her, she could not be guilty of sexual assault. The court accepted Lackershire's plea, and ordered a presentence investigation (PSI).
¶ 16. The circuit court sentenced Lackershire to three years initial confinement and six years of extended supervision. In explaining its decision in reaching the sentence, the court made no mention of the dismissed charges being treated as read-ins. Likewise, neither the State nor the defense made any mention that the dismissed charges were to be treated as read-in offenses. However, the PSI contained a description of each dismissed charge, and it captioned those descriptions as "read-ins." Nowhere else did it describe the charges as read-ins.
¶ 17. Lackershire moved to withdraw her plea, or to have her sentence modified. She stated that there had not been a specific recitation of the elements of the crime to which she had pleaded. She also posited, based on a review of the PSI, that the dismissed charges had been treated as read-ins at sentencing, and that she had not understood that they would be treated that way. Further, she argued that her fear of harm to her pregnancy caused by the stress of trial served to coerce her into pleading guilty.
¶ 18. At the hearing on the postconviction motion, the court stated that it thought Lackershire's plea hearing had been thorough, that Lackershire had understood everything, and that her motion to withdraw was meritless:
And the Court has read every sentence of the plea hearing. It is very thorough. In fact, the Judge even *431asked her if she wanted to withdraw her plea. And she was represented by counsel. She did not withdraw her plea. She. said she fully understood everything. Her counsel was there.
So this is a meritless motion, in the Court's opinion, sir. I'm not going to waste a lot of the Court's time on it because I'm incorporating in my opinion the entire transcript of the plea hearing by Judge Radcliffe, which was very thorough and very detailed.
¶ 19. Despite its view that Lackershire's motions were without merit, the court allowed Lackershire to testify regarding her understanding of the plea. However, the court prefaced Lackershire's testimony by stating:
So you can — You're a lawyer. You can do what you want here. I'll give you permission to make as good of a record as you want to. But I want you to know that that's what you're doing.
¶ 20. Lackershire testified that she had not had any discussions with her attorney about read-ins. She also testified that she believed she had a defense to the charge for which she had been sentenced, namely that the intercourse underlying that charge was rape:
Q: Did you have any questions, when you were pleading to the one, exactly what you were pleading to?
A: Well, yes, because of what the crime element is and what I continued to testify as—
Q: Did you believe you had a defense to the charge?
A: Yes.
Q: What was that?
A: I was raped.
*432¶ 21. Finally, Lackershire testified that she had been pregnant during the plea negotiations and sentencing, and that she had been hospitalized in late February 2004 due to the stress of the proceedings. She stated that she had been advised to eliminate stress, and that she had agreed to plead guilty in order to avoid the stress of trial and its potential harm to her pregnancy.
¶ 22. After Lackershire's testimony, the court immediately stated that:
I haven't heard anything here to change my mind.
And these are very self-serving statements by [Lacker-shire]. There's nothing stated that changes the Court's ruling.
We're over with this case.
¶ 23. Lackershire appealed. The court of appeals determined that knowledge of read-in charges "is not required for a defendant to enter a knowing, intelligent, or voluntary plea." State v. Lackershire, 2005 WI App 265, ¶ 15, 288 Wis. 2d 609, 707 N.W.2d 891. It also determined that Lackershire's plea colloquy was not otherwise deficient. Id., ¶ 10. Finally, it concluded that Lackershire's pregnancy concerns did not render her plea involuntary. Id., ¶¶ 19-20.
II
¶ 24. Lackershire contends that her guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. She asserts that she is therefore entitled to withdraw her plea. Whether a plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered presents a question of constitutional fact. State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶ 19, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906. "We accept the circuit court's findings of *433historical and evidentiary facts unless they are clearly erroneous, but we determine independently whether those facts demonstrate that the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Id.
¶ 25. Specifically, Lackershire asserts that her plea colloquy was defective. Whether a plea colloquy conforms to the statutory requirements is a question of law that we review independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and court of appeals. Id., ¶ 21.
rH J — 1 H-f
¶ .26. Lackershire asserts that her plea colloquy was defective in that the circuit court failed to fulfill its plea-taking duties in two ways. First, the court failed to advise her that the dismissed counts would be read in at sentencing and to explain that read-in charges could have consequences on her sentence. Second, the circuit court failed to satisfy the "factual basis" requirement under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(l)(b) because it did not "make such inquiry as satisfies it that [Lackershire] in fact committed the crime charged." As a result of the failure, she did not realize that if she were the victim of rape, she could not have committed the offense charged. We address each in turn.
¶ 27. Lackershire based her motion to withdraw her plea, in part, on the circuit court's failure to explain read-ins,7 and premised her appeal, in part, on the *434claim that the circuit court read in the dismissed charges. Not surprisingly, therefore, the court of appeals analyzed this as a read-in case. Our review of the record, however, reveals that this is not a read-in case.
¶ 28. Nowhere in the transcript of the plea hearing, the transcript of the sentencing hearing, the transcript of the adjourned sentencing hearing, or the plea questionnaire do either the parties or the court refer to the dismissed charges as being read in for the purpose of sentencing. The only place in the record where the charges are characterized as read-ins is the caption reference in the PSI. Without anything in the record establishing that the State and Lackershire agreed to read-in charges, or that the circuit court treated the dismissed charges as read-ins, we cannot treat this as a read-in case. Accordingly, we determine that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the dismissed charges were read-in offenses, and whether Lackershire understood the nature of read-ins is not at issue.8
*435¶ 29. Lackershire's second argument centers on the somewhat unique posture of this case. A violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) is generally viewed as a strict liability offense. Unlike other sexual assault offenses, where consent of the victim may be a central issue, the consent of the child in a Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) violation is not relevant. Yet, here, where we have an assertion that it was the defendant who did not consent to the intercourse, that it was she who was raped by the child, then the issue of her consent becomes paramount. If the defendant was raped, the act of having sexual intercourse with a child does not constitute a crime. Wis. Stat. § 948.01(6).
¶ 30. In her second argument, Lackershire advances that the circuit court did not satisfy the factual basis requirement of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b). In her motion to withdraw her plea, Lackershire did not use the words "factual basis." Rather, she asserted that the circuit court did not adequately explain the elements of second-degree sexual assault of a child, that she did not understand that being raped would preclude her from being charged with such an assault, and that her plea *436colloquy was therefore inadequate under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(l)(a). She similarly framed the issue under § 971.08(l)(a) in her brief to this court. However, at oral argument it appeared that the issue may not have been appropriately framed and this court asked for supplemental briefs.
¶ 31. In her supplemental brief, Lackershire made it clear that her argument was that she had been raped by Stephen G. and that her plea colloquy was deficient because she did not understand that being raped would preclude the charge. Thus, she asserted, the plea colloquy could be deficient either because the circuit court did not fulfill its statutory obligations under § 971.08(l)(a) by not stating the elements or because it did not establish a factual basis under § 971.08(l)(b).
¶ 32. Lackershire has consistently maintained that she was raped by Stephen G. Admittedly, it would have been preferable for her to have been explicit that her motion to withdraw her plea was based on the failure to establish a factual basis. Nevertheless, it has been clear from the time she filed the motion that her argument with respect to the elements was based upon her assertion that she was raped, and that she did not understand that having been raped is inconsistent with her having sexual intercourse for the purpose of second-degree sexual assault of a child.
¶ 33. Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(l)(b) provides that before a circuit court accepts a defendant's guilty plea, it must "make such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed the crime charged." This court has determined that establishing a sufficient factual basis requires a showing that "the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged ...." White v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 485, 488, *437271 N.W.2d 97 (1978) (quoting Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661, 674, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969)); State v. Black, 2001 WI 31, ¶ 21 n. 8, 242 Wis. 2d 126, 624 N.W.2d 363.
¶ 34. The duties established in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 are "designed to ensure that a defendant's plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶ 23. In our recent decision in State v. Kelty, for example, we allowed that a plea may not be "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the plea colloquy was defective in discussing the elements of the crime or the factual basis" for the charges. 2006 WI 101, ¶ 44, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886. Thus, establishing a factual basis under § 971.08(1)(b) is necessary for a valid plea.9
¶ 35. Specifically, the obligation that the circuit court establish a sufficient factual basis helps ensure *438that the defendant's plea is knowing and intelligent.10 The factual basis requirement "protects a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge." State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶ 14, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836. Likewise in Morones v. State, this court noted that "[t]he purpose of the statutory requirement for a court inquiry as to basic facts is to protect the defendant who. pleads guilty voluntarily and understanding the charge brought but not realizing that his conduct does not" constitute the charged crime. 61 Wis. 2d 544, 552, 213 N.W.2d 31 (1973); see also Broadie v. State, 68 Wis. 2d 420, 423, 228 N.W.2d 687 (1975). A defendant's failure to realize that the conduct to which she pleads guilty does not fall within the offense charged is incompatible with that plea being "knowing" and "intelligent."
¶ 36. The essence of the factual basis requirement and its relation to whether a plea is knowing and intelligent is illustrated by this court's decision in White v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 485, 271 N.W.2d 97 (1978). In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of stealing a chainsaw valued at $150 and was sentenced based on the value of the chainsaw being greater than $100. He sought to withdraw his plea, claiming that the circuit failed to establish a factual basis that the value of the saw was $150.
*439¶ 37. There was no question that White's plea was voluntary, and that White understood the nature of the theft charge. However, the court determined that the record did "not suggest that White had any knowledge of the value of the saw." Id. at 491. Thus, White was in the position of "pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct [did] not actually fall within the charge." Id. (citation omitted).
¶ 38. In the present case, the circuit court's inquiry into the factual basis for the plea (that is, its inquiry into whether Lackershire "in fact committed the crime charged") was likewise insufficient. After the colloquy there remained a substantial question as to whether the facts that formed the basis of Lackershire's plea constituted the offense charged. Because of this substantial question, the plea colloquy failed to demonstrate that Lackershire realized that if the underlying conduct was a sexual assault upon her, that conduct could not constitute the offense charged. Like the defendant in White, Lackershire was potentially in the position of pleading guilty without realizing that her conduct did not constitute the offense charged.
¶ 39. At the plea hearing, the court noted that the criminal complaint and the testimony from the preliminary hearing provided the factual basis for the offense charged. However, neither of these documents unequivocally supports the conclusion that Lackershire admitted to conduct that "constitutes the offense charged." The offense to which Lackershire pleaded guilty was the first count of the indictment in Stephen G.'s case. That count was based upon the sexual intercourse between Lacker-shire and Stephen G. that took place around August 27, 2003, in the living room of the house in which they resided.
*440¶ 40. However, Chief Van Alstine's incident report, which formed the probable cause portion of the complaint, makes it clear that Lackershire maintained that Stephen G. had raped her on that occasion. In all of her statements to Van Alstine, Lackershire asserted that Stephen G. had "continuously" asked her to have sex, that she had refused, and that finally Stephen G. had walked over to her, pulled off a blanket and her shorts, and raped her, despite her continuing to tell him "no."
¶ 41. Stephen G.'s statements to Van Alstine confirm Lackershire's assertion that Stephen G. had repeatedly asked her to have sex, and that she had repeatedly refused. Further, his statements do not suggest that Lackershire asked or approached him for sex. His preliminary hearing testimony about the offense charged is scant, and it fails to establish that Lackershire consented to having sex with him on that occasion. He testified that he had asked her to have sex, that she had not asked him, and that his belief that she wanted to have sex with him did not derive from her verbal consent. Thus, there is a substantial question as to whether these facts, which form the basis of Lackershire's plea, constitute the offense charged. That substantial question obligated the circuit court to make additional inquiry, pursuant to § 971.08(l)(b), to ensure that Lackershire in fact committed the crime charged.
¶ 42. Resolving that question is vital to fulfill the purpose of the factual basis requirement, which is to protect the defendant who pleads guilty "without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge." Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶ 14; White, 85 Wis. 2d at 491. This is precisely the concern here. Lackershire's plea colloquy did not demonstrate whether Lackershire realized that if the underlying *441conduct was a sexual assault upon her, then her conduct does not actually fall within the charge.11
¶ 43. During the plea colloquy, the circuit court assessed her understanding of the offense charged in the following exchange:
*442The Court: The Information in this case. .. alleges that, in August of 2003 — that would have been last August — in this county, you had sexual intercourse with a child under the age of sixteen years.
Do you understand that?
Lackershire: Yes.
The Court: Is that true?
Lackershire: Yes.
The Court: Do you understand it's alleged that this is a violation of Section 948.02 of the Wisconsin Statutes?
Lackershire: Yes.
This description of the conduct underlying the charge —that Lackershire had sexual intercourse with a child under 16 years old — is on its face compatible with Lackershire's claim that Stephen G. raped her. Under the facts of this case, however, merely stating that the charge involved intercourse and a child served to obscure the fact that being the victim of rape negates a charge of sexual assault. Similarly, it obscures the fact that if the underlying conduct was a sexual assault of Lackershire, then that conduct does not constitute the offense charged. Given the unique circumstances of this case, the circuit court's description of the charge failed to protect Lackershire from pleading guilty without realizing that if the underlying conduct was a sexual assault upon her, then her conduct does not actually fall within the charge.
¶ 44. We find support for this view in the court of appeals decision in State v. Olson, 2000 WI App 158, 238 Wis. 2d 74, 616 N.W.2d 144. In that case, the defendant, who was 18 years old, was charged with second-degree sexual assault of a child, but claimed that she had in *443fact been the victim of rape. The circuit court denied the defendant's request for a jury instruction that the state had to prove that the intercourse was the result of the defendant's intentional acts or upon her "affirmative instructions." The defendant was convicted of the charge. Id., ¶ 1. The court of appeals reversed the judgment. Noting that there was evidence that the defendant had reported the incident as a sexual assault upon her, it determined that "the act or acts which bring about the sexual intercourse must be,... in the words of [Wis. Stat. § 948.01(6)], undertaken 'upon the defendant's instruction.'" Id., ¶ 13. It therefore determined that under those facts, the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction to that effect. Id.
¶ 45. Like the present case, in Olson there was no dispute that a sexual assault took place, but there was a question as to whether it was an assault by the defendant or an assault of the defendant. In Olson, the proposed jury instruction served to establish the understanding that being the victim of rape would negate the charge that the defendant committed the assault.
¶ 46. In the present case, with similar facts, we determine that the circuit court had an obligation to make sufficient inquiry to establish a factual basis exists for the crime charged. Here, the preliminary hearing transcript and the complaint, which formed the factual basis upon which the circuit court relied, should have raised a red flag prompting further inquiry. Such inquiry is required in order to protect Lackershire from pleading guilty without realizing that the conduct she admitted does not constitute the offense charged.12 *444Because a substantial question exists whether this is a sexual assault of or by Lackershire, and because the colloquy did not establish that Lackershire realized that if the underlying conduct was an assault upon her, she could not be guilty of the offense charged, the circuit court failed to satisfy the factual basis requirement.
IV
¶ 47. Having determined that the circuit court failed to make sufficient inquiry under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(l)(b), we must address the appropriate remedy. In State v. Bangert, this court set out "the proper remedy for failure to follow ... the procedures set forth in sec. 971.08(1)." 131 Wis. 2d 246, 272-73, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). Under Bangert, where a defendant seeks to withdraw her plea and alleges a deficiency in the plea colloquy, she must first make a prima facie showing of a violation of § 971.08(1) or other mandatory procedure and allege that she did not know or understand information that should have been provided at the colloquy. Id. at 274. If the defendant fulfills these requirements, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing at which the state has the opportunity to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was knowing, *445voluntary, and intelligent. Id.; Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶ 40. Bangert encompasses the requirement in § 971.08(1)(b) to "[m]ake such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed the crime charged."
¶ 48. In some ways, however, applying the Bangert procedure for failure to satisfy the factual basis requirement is an awkward fit. Factual basis cases typically involve the question of whether undisputed facts actually constitute the crime charged. Where undisputed facts cannot constitute the crime charged as a matter of law, the defendant is allowed to withdraw her plea to prevent a manifest injustice. State v. Smith, 202 Wis. 2d 21, 25, 539 N.W.2d 232 (1996).
¶ 49. In State v. Johnson, for example, the defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea for armed robbery on the ground that there had been no asportation, and that asportation is necessary for there to be an armed robbery. 207 Wis. 2d 239, 242, 558 N.W.2d 375 (1997). The state did not dispute that there had been no asportation. Id. This court determined that asportation is required for armed robbery, and that the defendant was therefore entitled to withdraw his plea. Id.; see also Black, 242 Wis. 2d 126, ¶ 1 (question of whether undisputed fact that felon handled pistol satisfied factual basis for charge of felon in possession of handgun).
¶ 50. In the present case, however, the facts are in dispute precisely because the circuit court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry into the factual basis of the offense charged. The plea colloquy failed to establish whether the underlying conduct was a sexual assault of Lackershire or by Lackershire. This is not a case in which there are undisputed facts. Rather it is a case in *446which there is a substantial question as to factual basis, which raises doubts as to whether Lackershire's plea was knowing and intelligent.
¶ 51. In a number of cases subsequent to Bangert, this court has reiterated that the failure to fulfill the § 971.08(l)(b) factual basis requirement entitles the defendant to the Bangert procedure. Kelty, 294 Wis. 2d 62, ¶ 44; Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶¶ 35-36; State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶ 17, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891; State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶¶ 48-49, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199; State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 140-41, 569 N.W.2d 577 (1997). Accordingly, we determine that it is appropriate here.
¶ 52. Under the Bangert procedure, where a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea after sentencing and alleges that the plea colloquy is defective, the defendant must first make a prima facie showing that the circuit court violated Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other plea requirements.13 Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274. In addition, the defendant must allege that she did not know or understand the information that the court should have provided at the plea hearing. Id.; Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶ 39. Once the defendant has made a prima facie case and alleged a lack of knowledge or understanding, the'burden shifts to the state "to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered," despite the inadequacy of the plea hearing. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274. To afford the state the opportunity to make such a showing, the circuit court must hold a *447postconviction evidentiary hearing. Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶ 40 (citing Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274).
¶ 53. Because the circuit court had an obligation to make further inquiry as to the factual basis of the offense charged under § 971.08(l)(b), Lackershire has satisfied the first condition necessary for her to withdraw her plea. She has established a prima facie showing that her plea colloquy was defective.
¶ 54. In her motion to withdraw her plea, Lack-ershire stated that "she did not fully understand the elements of the crime to which she pled, that she did not fully understand the consequences of her plea, and that her plea was not knowing or voluntary." Further, she states that "she has always maintained that she was raped."
¶ 55. Lackershire's allegation of lack of understanding focuses on the effect of being raped in relation to the charge of sexual assault of a child. We therefore determine she has alleged that she did not know or understand information that the court should have provided at the plea hearing, and that Lackershire fulfills the second requirement for plea withdrawal.
¶ 56. Once the defendant meets those two requirements, the court must hold a postconviction evi-dentiary hearing at which the state is given an opportunity to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, despite the identified inadequacy of the plea colloquy. Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶ 40 (citing Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274). We therefore conclude that such a hearing is required in this case. Because Lackershire's plea colloquy was defective due to the circuit court's *448failure to make further inquiry to establish an adequate factual basis, the focus of the inquiry will be on whether Lackershire's plea was knowing and intelligent. Specifically, it will focus on whether Lackershire realized that if she was raped, her conduct would not actually fall within the charge.
¶ 57. The circuit court did hold a hearing on Lackershire's motion to withdraw her plea. However, that hearing did not provide an adequate opportunity for the State to demonstrate that there was a sufficient factual basis, and that Lackershire's plea was therefore knowing and intelligent. The circuit court rejected out of hand Lackershire's contention that her plea colloquy was defective, calling it "meritless" and "plain not sensible," in effect holding that Lackershire had not made the prima facie case necessary to shift the burden to the State. The State therefore did not have the opportunity to present evidence with the understanding that it bore the burden of showing that Lackershire's plea was knowingly and intelligently entered.
¶ 58. While the court allowed Lackershire to present evidence, it implied that hearing evidence would not bear on its decision. It prefaced Lackershire's presentation of evidence by stating that "[y]ou can do what you want here. I'll give you permission to make as good of a record as you want to. But what I want you to know that that's what you're doing."
¶ 59. A motion hearing where the court implies that evidence will not affect its decision cannot be characterized as an "evidentiary hearing at which the state is given an opportunity to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, despite the identified inadequacy of the plea colloquy." Brown, 293 *449Wis. 2d 594, ¶ 40. The State asks that if this court determines that the circuit court erred, then the State be provided the opportunity to show that Lackershire's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Although Lackershire submits that the State did have an opportunity to show that her plea was adequate, she recognizes that the record of the motion hearing reflects that the opportunity was limited. We agree that the State has not had the opportunity to present evidence to which it is entitled under Bangert. We therefore remand the case to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing.
¶ 60. In determining whether the plea was knowingly and intelligently made, the circuit court may look at the totality of the circumstances. As we set out in our recent decision in State v. Thomas, in determining whether a defendant's admitted conduct constitutes the charged crime:
[A] court may look at the totality of the circumstances when reviewing a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea to determine whether a defendant has agreed to the factual basis underlying the guilty plea. The totality of the circumstances includes the plea hearing record, the sentencing hearing record, as well [as] the defense counsel's statements concerning the factual basis presented by the state, among other portions of the record.
Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶ 18.
¶ 61. Moreover, in Bangert, this court determined that when a defendant has shown a prima facie violation of § 971.08(1)(a) and alleged that she did not know or understand information that should have been pro*450vided at the plea hearing, the state may use any evidence to determine that the plea was knowing and voluntary:
The state may then utilize any evidence which substantiates that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made... . The state may examine the defendant or defendant's counsel to shed light on the defendant's understanding or knowledge of information necessary for him to enter a voluntary and intelligent plea.
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274-275. We determine that the state should receive similar latitude where the plea hearing is deficient under § 971.08(1)(b).
V
¶ 62. Finally, we consider Lackershire's argument that her plea was involuntary because she feared that the stress of trial would affect her pregnancy. Lacker-shire testified that on February 24 and 25, 2004, she was hospitalized with complications of her pregnancy, and that upon her discharge, she was told to maintain bed rest and to avoid stressful situations in order to protect her pregnancy. She maintains that allowing her to withdraw her plea is necessary to avoid a manifest injustice. We disagree.
¶ 63. This court explained the nature of voluntary pleas in Craker v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 222, 223 N.W.2d 872 (1974). In Craker, the defendant argued that his guilty plea was not voluntary on the ground that he was compelled to plead guilty because of his moral scruples and family pressure rather than his legal guilt. In determining that the defendant's plea was voluntary, the Craker court cited to Rahhal v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 144, 151-52, 187 N.W.2d 800 (1971) for the proposition *451that. . [t]he distinction between a motivation which induces and a force which compels the human mind to act must always be kept in focus. When the defendant is not given a fair or reasonable alternative to choose from, the choice is legally coerced. ..." Craker, 66 Wis. 2d at 229. The Craker court concluded that moral scruples and family pressure are" 'self-imposed coercive elements' [which] do not vitiate the voluntary nature of the defendant's guilty plea." Id. (citing Drake v. State, 45 Wis. 2d 226, 233, 172 N.W.2d 664 (1969)).
¶ 64. Lackershire has raised no plausible argument that her plea was legally coerced. She does not contend that she asked the circuit court to postpone her trial date and was refused. Although she asserts that the district attorney told her that postponement "was not an option," she does not claim that the district attorney implied that the plea agreement was contingent upon Lackershire not seeking such a postponement. Thus, neither the court nor the prosecutor denied her a fair or reasonable alternative to choose from such that her choice was coerced.
¶ 65. Rather, we determine that because the decision whether to seek a postponement was within her control, the choice between pleading guilty and going to trial on the scheduled date was self-imposed. Accordingly, we conclude that her concern about the stress of a trial does not vitiate the voluntary nature of her plea.
VI
¶ 66. In conclusion, we determine that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the dismissed charges were read-in offenses. Because the record does not reflect that the dismissed charges were treated as *452read-ins, a read-in analysis is not warranted. Thus, whether Lackershire understood the nature of read-ins is not at issue.
¶ 67. We also determine that Lackershire's plea colloquy was inadequate. The factual basis relied upon by the court in accepting Lackershire's plea raised a substantial question as to whether she had committed sexual assault or had herself been the victim of rape. This necessitated that the circuit court make further inquiry to establish a sufficient factual basis to support Lackershire's plea under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(l)(b).
¶ 68. Finally, we determine that her fear about the effect of a trial on her pregnancy did not render her plea involuntary. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for a hearing on whether Lackershire's plea is knowing and intelligent.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.
See State v. Lackershire, 2005 WI App 265, 288 Wis. 2d 609, 707 N.W.2d 891 (affirming judgment and order of the Circuit Court for Pepin County, Dane F. Morey, Judge).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted.
Wis. Stat. § 971.08 provides in relevant part:
Pleas of guilty and no contest; withdrawal thereof. (1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no contest, it shall do all of the following:
(b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed the crime charged.
Lackershire's petition for review and original brief to this court focused primarily on the treatment of read-in charges. In *425addition to the factual basis argument and the argument regarding voluntariness premised on her fear of the stress of trial, she also advanced an argument that she lacked an understanding of the elements of the offense. Before oral argument, she submitted supplemental authority on the question of elements.
After oral argument, we requested that both parties submit supplemental briefs. In her supplemental brief, Lackershire advances both the argument that the plea colloquy did not satisfy the factual basis requirement under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(l)(b) and that the plea colloquy inadequately addressed the elements of the offense. Ultimately, however, she advances that:
[I]t is almost irrelevant under the facts of this case whether the issue is viewed as a defective colloquy on the elements, or as the failure to find an adequate factual basis .... Under any view, at the time of the plea Lackershire was not advised and did not understand that she was not guilty of any crime if, indeed, she was the victim of the boy's assault, as she claimed.
Because we determine that the plea colloquy was inadequate as a result of the circuit court's failure to make sufficient inquiry to satisfy the factual basis requirement, we do not address the argument regarding the elements of the offense.
Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(2) provides: 'Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class C felony."
Robert W Radcliffe, reserve judge of the Circuit Court for Pepin County, presided over the plea hearing.
This court explained the procedure for read-in charges in Austin v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971). When charges are read in during sentencing, the defendant admits to *434having committed the underlying crimes, but does not plead guilty to the charges, and therefore is not sentenced for those charges. However, such admitted, uncharged offenses are considered in the sentencing for the offenses charged. "Thus under the read-in procedure, the defendant does not run the risk of consecutive sentences or even concurrent sentences. His only risk is a longer sentence for the crime charged but this sentence cannot exceed the maximum." Id. at 732. Read-in charges do not constitute prior convictions and cannot be used under the state's repeater statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.12. Id. Read-ins also serve a role in setting restitution. Robinson v. City of W. Allis, 2000 WI 126, ¶ 42, 239 Wis. 2d 595; 619 N.W.2d 692; State v. Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d 740, 753-54, 460 N.W.2d 819 (1990).
We do not adopt the court of appeals' determinations that read-in charges are merely "collateral consequences" of a plea, and that therefore information about read-ins "is not a prerequisite to entering a knowing and intelligent plea." Lackershire, *435288 Wis. 2d 609, ¶ 15 (citing State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶ 61, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477). Those determinations appear to extend existing law. See Austin v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 734, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971) (stating that "[a] plea agreement should always be made a matter of record whether it involves a recommendation of sentencing, a reduced charge, a nolle prose-qui of charges or read ins with an agreement of immunity."); Garski v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 62, 77, 248 N.W.2d 425 (1977) (providing that "[t]he defendant should be advised by the trial court, on the record, of the effect of the read-ins . . .."). We decline to engage in further analysis regarding the circuit court's obligation to explain the nature of read-in offenses in a case where the record demonstrates that the dismissed charges were not treated as read-ins at either the plea or sentencing.
The dissent objects that Lackershire did not use the words "factual basis" and that this should preclude plea withdrawal. Dissent, ¶ 90. This objection misses the point. Lackershire has consistently claimed that she was raped, and that she did not understand that being raped would preclude the crime with which she had been charged. Thus, her assertions in the motion and at the hearing on the motion comport with the requirement that Lackershire "(1) make a prima facie showing of a violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other court-mandated duties ... ; and (2) allege that the defendant did not know or understand the information that should have been provided at the plea hearing." Dissent, ¶ 78 (citing State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶ 39, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906). To preclude this court's review of the issue on the ground that Lackershire did not use the magic words "factual basis" in her motion, as the dissent would have it, ignores the essence of her argument. To contend that the issue in this case was not really before the court is at odds with the record.
This court has in the past discussed the factual basis requirement in terms of whether a plea is voluntary. See Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661, 673, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969). More recently, the factual basis requirement has been viewed as "distinct from the voluntariness requirement." White v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 485, 491 (1978); State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶ 14, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836.
The dissent concludes that the statutory requirement that a circuit court establish an adequate factual basis for the offense charged amounts to a "new" procedure. Dissent, ¶ 75. It contends that the possibility that a defendant may withdraw her plea based on the circuit court's failure to fulfill a statutory obligation somehow creates a "new obligation" that a judge considering a plea withdrawal motion "will have to be on the lookout for substantial questions and red flags in the record, even if the defendant did not raise them." Id., ¶ 95. This assertion is a disservice because it is both incorrect and may lead to a misinterpretation of the holding of this case.
The requirement that judges establish a factual basis is statutory, Wis. Stat. § 971.08(l)(b), and does not come from this opinion. There is nothing "new" about a statutory requirement. Further, as explained in the text, Lackershire's motion was sufficient to make clear that the motion was based on her failure to understand that having been raped is incompatible with her committing the crime charged. That such a failure is better characterized as impheating § 971.08(l)(b) rather than § 971.08(l)(a) should not prevent review, contrary to the dissent's view. Moreover, the facts in the record relevant to her motion regarding the elements are precisely the same facts as the ones relevant to the factual basis requirement. Thus, the dissent's claims that "a prima facie showing may spring from the record itself," dissent, ¶ 91, and that "a judge will have to be on the lookout for substantial questions and red flags in the record, even if the defendant did not raise them," id., ¶ 95, misconstrue the case.
Finally, the dissent's conjecture that this decision somehow signals there is "[n]o need for a motion that raises [a] 'substantial question'" (id., ¶ 91) is hyperbole. The motion in this case raised a substantial question because it was based on Lackershire's consistent assertion that she was raped.
The dissent contends that an allegation of rape constitutes a defense to the charge of second-degree sexual assault of a child, and that "Lackershire's admission that she had sexual *444intercourse (i.e., affirmatively acted or directed action) means that her admitted conduct did not amount to a rape defense." Dissent, ¶ 108. This argument begs the question. The underlying issue in this case is whether Lackershire understood that being raped is incompatible with having sexual intercourse for the purposes of second-degree sexual assault of a child. To conclude that because Lackershire admitted to having sexual intercourse entails that she admitted to affirmatively acting or directing action simply assumes the answer to the question that the circuit court ought to have addressed in the plea hearing, and which brings the case before this court.
For a catalog of the statutory and court-mandated duties of circuit courts at plea hearings, see Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶ 35.