Ridgway v. Ford Motor Co.

KAREN ANGELINI, Justice,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Under the summary judgment evidence before the trial court, there is no evidence of a manufacturing defect. Thus, summary judgment was properly granted.

Jack Ridgway was driving his Ford F-150 pickup truck when it caught fire, causing him to sustain personal injuries. He filed suit against the Ford Motor Company alleging a manufacturing defect under theories of product liability and negligence. Ford filed a motion for summary judgment under both the no-evidence and traditional summary judgment standards, claiming there was no evidence of and no material fact issue as to a product defect. Ford’s-summary judgment evidence consisted of portions of Ridgway’s deposition.

Ridgway responded to the summary judgment motion and presented evidence consisting of his own affidavit, affidavits of two previous owners of the vehicle, an affidavit of an expert witness, and the vehicle’s title history. Ridgway’s summary judgment evidence showed as follows: he was driving the vehicle when he noticed flames in his rear view mirror curling up around the cab; the only modification to the vehicle was when a spotlight was installed for the first owner; all repairs were performed by an authorized Ford dealer; the vehicle had never been involved in a wreck; and Ridgway was not smoking a cigarette when the fire began.

The affidavit of Ridgway’s expert, Bill Greenless, states that Greenless investigated the fire to determine, if possible, the *33cause and origin. Greenless states that he performed a visual inspection of the vehicle and found significant fire and heat damage in the engine compartment, the passenger compartment, and the truck bed. He also found evidence of a hot spot in the engine compartment. Greenless testified that, in his opinion, the fire originated in the engine compartment and that “[a] malfunction of the electrical system in the engine compartment is suspected of having caused this incident.” Further, he stated that he could not eliminate a portion of the fuel system as a cause and that “[t]he actual cause of the fire has not been determine [sic] yet.”

As the majority recognizes, the Ridgways’ claims rest upon alleged manufacturing defects. And, in order to prove a manufacturing defect, the Ridgways were required to show that the finished product deviated in construction or quality from the specifications or planned output in a way that rendered it unreasonably dangerous. Relying upon Ford Motor Co. v. Gonzalez, 9 S.W.3d 195 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.), the majority states that, absent evidence of a specific manufacturing defect, the Ridgways could offer evidence of the product’s malfunction as circumstantial proof of the defect. In Gonzalez, the plaintiff claimed his injuries were caused by a manufacturing defect in his car consisting of a misalignment in the suspension system, which caused damage to the ball joint from the moment the car left the factory until the day of the accident. Id. at 199-200. In holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff, this court relied, in substantial part, on Sipes v. General Motors Corp., 946 S.W.2d 143 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1997, writ denied), which involved injuries caused by the failure of an airbag to deploy. See Gonzalez, 9 S.W.3d at 199. The Sipes court recognized the general rule that the mere fact an accident occurred is not proof that an automobile was defective, but held that “when a specific mechanism does not function as it is designed, it is under seal, and there is no evidence suggesting that anyone has tampered with it since it left the manufacturer, that is circumstantial proof of a defect.” Sipes, 946 S.W.2d at 155.

The summary judgment evidence in the case before us is distinguishable from that presented in Gonzalez and Sipes. In this case, the Ridgways have failed to identify any specific mechanism that did not function as it was designed. Although it is true, as the majority states, that eyewitness testimony alone may be sufficient to raise a fact issue, the eyewitness testimony here shows nothing more than the occurrence of a fire in the truck as Ridgway was driving it. It does not amount to circumstantial evidence of a manufacturing defect.

Further, Greenless’ expert testimony offers no evidence of a manufacturing defect, circumstantial or otherwise. Although the majority states that, in his affidavit, Greenless concluded that “[the fire] was most likely the result of an electrical system malfunction,” a careful reading of Greenless’ affidavit reveals that he only suspected that an electrical system malfunction caused the fire, that he could not eliminate at least one other cause, and that he had not determined the actual cause. These statements are nothing more than mere speculation and are not evidence of a manufacturing defect.

In conclusion, there is simply no evidence the truck deviated from the specifications or planned output in a way that rendered it unreasonably dangerous. Because there was no evidence of a manufacturing defect, the trial court did not err in *34granting summary judgment. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.