ON REHEARING
SUMMERS, Justice.Plaintiff is the parish of Jefferson and it brings this action to enjoin the Louisiana Department of Corrections from purchasing certain property within its borders and establishing on that site a branch of the Louisiana Training Institute for juveniles. The trial judge granted the injunction prayed for, declaring unconstitutional the legislation authorizing the purchase of *1101the site and establishment and operation of the training institute. The constitutionality of these acts, Acts 353 and 452 of 1970 and Act 192 of 1968, is before us on this appeal. In addition, and alternatively, if the assailed acts arc constitutional, the parish of Jefferson is contesting the right of the Department to locate and operate the training institute in the designated location, alleging that to do so will violate the parish zoning ordinance.
Act 192 of 1968
Acting under authority of Article III, Section 32, of the Constitution, authorizing merger and consolidation of executive and administrative offices whose duties are of a similar character, the legislature enacted Act 192 of 1968 creating the Louisiana Department of Corrections. The Louisiana Board of Institutions and the Department of Institutions were merged and consolidated into the Louisiana Department of Corrections. A Board of Corrections was established by this act charged with determining the department’s policies, and a Director of Corrections was created as the department’s chief executive officer. In fixing the authority of the director the act set forth: “The director shall also have the authority, with the approval of the Board of Corrections and the Governor, to buy lands needed for the proper use of any institution under the jurisdiction of the department * *
The parish of Jefferson contends that Act 192 of 1968 is unconstitutional insofar as the quoted clause authorizing the direc" tor to buy land is concerned. The theory of this position is that the title of the act gives no indication that the act authorizes the director to purchase land for the department; hence, in that respect, the act contravenes Article III, Section 16, of the Constitution, the title-body clause requiring every statute to have a title indicative of its object. In reply the department submits that the language of the title is indicative of its object for, after referring to the creation of the department, its board, director, personnel and prescribing functions, duties, etc., the title states, “ * * * to provide with respect to lands under the control of the department * *
Where acts of the legislature are under attack, courts should, in keeping with the general policy we have often expressed, seek to effectuate the legislative intent and resolve any doubt in favor of constitutionality. To this end a liberal construction has been applied to the title-body clause of the constitution. It is only where the variance in the provisions of the act is palpable and totally irreconcilable with its title, or where both title and body express two distinct subjects, that the intention of the legislature will be held to be in conflict with the constitution. Ricks v. Department of State Civil Service, 200 La. 341, 8 So.2d 49 (1942). It is not the purpose of the title-*1103body clause of the constitution to require that the title be an index to the contents of the act. It is sufficient that the title of the act express its object in general terms. All things proper and necessary to carry out the general object stated in the title are deemed to be within the scope of the title. Southern Hide Co. v. Best, 176 La. 347, 145 So. 682 (1933).
Under these principles we find that the language of the title which expresses the legislative intention to “provide” in the act “with respect to lands under the control ' of the department” defines the scope of the act in general terms. The quoted language unmistakably indicates that- the department will have land under its control and that the act will make provisions for the department’s authority “with respect” to those lands. Within this scope it is proper for the legislature to authorize the director “to buy lands needed for the proper use of any institution under the jurisdiction of the department.” Likewise, it is properly within the scope of the title for the act to authorize, as it does, the director to lease, grant rights of way across state-owned lands under its jurisdiction and also to sell or transfer to any other state agency real property of the State under the jurisdiction of the department. These are at least the common and ordinary acts of control to be expected of such a department having lands under its “control”. Control is a broad term denoting the exercise of the rights of ownership. All of this authority is, therefore, properly cognizable under the broad and general language of the title: “to provide with respect to lands under the control of the department.” Thus the title "indicates” the object of the act as the constitution requires. Act 192 of 1968 is, therefore, constitutional.
'Act 353 of 1970
Later, during the same session of the legislature, Act 246 of 1968 was enacted and approved July 20, 1968, twelve days after Act 192. Among other things, Act -246 authorized the Department “to create, establish, operate and maintain a' juvenile correctional institution in the greater New Orleans area.”
Thereafter, in-its 1970 Regular Session, the legislature enacted Act 353 pertaining to juvenile institutions, repealing at the same time the provisions of Act 246 of 1968 authorizing the creation of a juvenile correctional institution in the Greater New Orleans Area. Act 353 of 1970 also directed that “The department of corrections shall establish, operate and maintain the Louisiana Training Institute for juveniles, with the following branches: * * * (4) The Louisiana Training Institute to be located in the greater New Orleans area.” This act became law on July 20, 1970. Another bill enacted in this same session became ef*1105fective on the same day. This was Act 452 of 1970 authorizing- the department:
* * * to purchase the site and facilities known as the House of the Good Shepherd, containing approximately thirty acres of land on the right descending bank of the Mississippi River, located on the river road near “Bridge City” in the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana; and to establish on said site the juvenile correctional instihition authorised by the provisions of Act No. 246 of 1968. (Emphasis added.)
The parish contends that Act 353 of 1970 is also unconstitutional tor the same reasons advanced in their argument that Act 192 of 1968 was unconstitutional — that is, the title is not indicative of the object of the act. Article III, Section 16, is again relied upon to support this position. Specifically, it is asserted that Act 353 of 1970 directs that the department “shall establish, operate and maintain the Louisiana Training Institute for juveniles, with the following branches: * * * (4) The Louisiana Training Institute, to be located in the greater New Orleans area.” No indication appears in the title of the act, the parish contends, that a training institution will.be created or established “in the greater New Orleans area.” And, it is observed, there is no language in the Act’s title indicating that the act authorizes the establishment of any juvenile training facility at any .locality. The title does refer to the establishment of a juvenile reception and diagnostic center, and the body of the act provides for its establishment and location in Baton Rouge. The title of the act also refers to the assignment by the department of juvenile offenders “to the several juvenile institutions operated by the said department.” But there is not the slightest indication that the act authorizes the establishment or operation of juvenile training institutions, in specific localities or otherwise. To the contrary, this important provision of the act is concealed from anyone reading the title. A reading of the title, therefore, gives no indication that additional training facilities for juveniles would be established, and, more importantly, the title gives no indication that facilities will be established in the Greater New Orleans* Area.
Notwithstanding the attitude this Court has taken in applying Article III, Section 16, of the Constitution to acts of the legislature, to effectuate rather than defeat their validity, the Court may not disregard' the constitutional mandate and render this constitutional safeguard nugatory. To accede' to the department’s contention here would have that effect.
Hence it is necessary to conclude that, insofar as this act purports to authorize the establishment, operation or main-( tenance of the Louisiana Training Institute for juveniles in the Greater New Orleans Area, the act is unconstitutional. -This-*1107finding-, however, does not impair the validity of the act otherwise. Section 2, Act 353 of 1970; Conley v. City of Shreveport, 216 La. 78, 43 So.2d 223 (1949). In other . respects the act deals generally with the creation of a diagnostic center, commitment and assignment of juveniles by the department to juvenile institutions under its supervision, etc. Insofar as the title indicates these provisions, the act is constitutional.
Act 452 of 1970
Act 452 of 1970 authorizes the department to purchase the site and facilities known as the House of the Good Shepherd in the parish of Jefferson; and to establish on said site the juvenile correctional institution authorized by the provisions of Act No. 246 of 1968.
Section 891 of Act 246 of 1968 authorized the department to create, establish and maintain a juvenile correctional institution in the Greater New Orleans Area for children under seventeen years of age adjudged delinquent or neglected by the courts.
Acts 353 and 452 of 1970 were enacted in- the same session and became effective on the same day. In addition to its other provisions, Act 353 repealed Section 891 of Act 246 of 1968, authorizing the establishment of a juvenile correctional institution in the Greater New Orleans Area.
Thus, the parish contends, when Act 452 of 1970 authorized the purchase of the House of the Good Shepherd and the establishment of a juvenile correctional institution on that site “authorized by the provisions of Act 246 of 1968,” the establishment of the correctional institution referred to in Act 452 of 1970 was conditioned upon the authority contained in Act 246 of 1968. Therefore, the argument goes, when the authorization in Act 246 was repealed by Act 353, the condition upon which Act 452 of 1970 was predicated failed — it ceased to exist — and the mandate of Act 452 could not be executed.
The question, then, is whether the establishment of the juvenile correctional institution referred to in Act 452 of 1970 is dependent upon the continuing life of Act 246 of 1968.
Since Act 452 of 1970 authorizes the purchase of the House of the Good Shepherd, and because the act contains its independent authorization, direction and mandate to establish a juvenile correctional institution on that site, we hold that the reference to Act 246 of 1968 is merely a reference in aid of the legislative intention that such an institution be estabished in the Greater New Orleans Area. In effect, it amounts to an incorporation by reference. The clause “authorized by the provisions of Act 246 of 1968” does not require that the authorization contained *1109in that act continue in existence in order for Act 452 of 1970 to ..be effective.
This result is indicated by the fact that Acts 353 and 452 of 1970 were enacted simultaneously. It would be attributing an exercise in futility to the legislature to hold that it authorized the purchase of the House of the Good Shepherd in Act 452 and simultaneously by Act 353 repealed Act 246 of 1968 upon which Act 452 was predicated. In holding that the reference to Act 246 of 1968 is merely in aid of the legislature’s intention to describe the type facility to be established under the authority of Act 452 of 1970 and that the continuing life of Act 246 of 1968 is unnecessary to give effect to Act 452 of 1970, we read these acts as laws in pari materia, giving to each the sense that results from the whole. La. Civil Code art. 17. From the whole it is inescapable that the legislature intended to establish a juvenile training facility in the Greater New Orleans Area, and our decision effectuates this purpose.
It is unnecessary to consider the parish contention that the term “Greater New Orleans Area” as used in Act 246 of 1968 and in Act 353 of 1970 is too vague and indefinite. No reliance can or need be placed by the department on this language of the Acts. Act 452 of 1970 contains its independent, specific designation of the location for the juvenile training school —the House of the Good Shepherd property on the west bank of the Mississippi River. No further designation is necessary, if more were needed, to definitely establish the location of the proposed training school.
In our review of the attack upon the constitutionality of these acts, we conclude that Act 452 of 1970 properly authorizes the department to purchase the Flouse of the Good Shepherd and to establish a training facility thereon such as that referred to in Section 891 of Act 246-of 196S — the facility to be administered according to the authorizations and limitations contained in Act 353 of 1970. Moreover, the general authority delegated to the department by Act 192 of 1968 would also authorize purchase by the.department of sites for juvenile training or correctional institutions, so long as the property acquired were put to an authorized use, the difference being that Act 192 contains no legislative mandate requiting" the purchase of property or designating the specific locations.
Zoning
The trial court found these acts to he unconstitutional and did not consider it necessary to adjudicate the zoning question. However, since we find the acts validly authorize the purchase of the House of the Good Shepherd and the establishment of a correctional institution there for juveniles, it becomes necessary *1111to resolve the contention that the proposed juvenile correctional institution will violate the zoning ordinance in force in Jefferson Parish.
Power has been granted to the parish of Jefferson by Section 29 o'f Article XIV Of the Constitution to “zone its territory; to create residential, commercial and industrial districts, and to prohibit the establishment of places of business in residential districts.” Acting pursuant to this authority, the parish enacted a Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance in 1958 wherein1 the’ area surrounding the House of the 'Good Shepherd was zoned' “R-l”, a sin;gle-family residential district. By this 'classification the property surrounding the House of the Good Shepherd and on which it was located was subject to a use restriction permitting institutions “except correctional institutions or mental hospitals.” Though the zoning classification was changed to R-3 providing for less restrictive use requirements in 1959, and then to R-2, re-imposing other use restrictions, each classification permitted institutions “except correctional institutions or mental hospitals.”
The parish asserts that the House of the Good Shepherd is a religious institution and its establishment and operation have not been in violation of the zoning ordinances. On the other hand, the State contends that the I-Iouse of the Good Shep.herd is, and has been, a correctional institution since its establishment in 1961, operating since that time in violation of the parish zoning ordinance, and the property involved in the violation enjoys the same legal status enjoyed by property with uses made nonconforming by the adoption of zoning restrictions.
Since its establishment as a Catholic institution by the Sisters of the Good Shepherd, the House of the Good Shepherd has been conducted as a correctional school for girls in junior high and high school age groups. In addition to the school program, a counseling and psychiatric treatment service is provided. It is a special type of institution existing to accommodate, and give service to rehabilitate, problem girls, most of whom have been adjudged delinquent or neglected children. When the Sisters determine that a student does not respond to their program of rehabilitation, the child is returned to the court for reassignment to other custodians. Though the institution is owned by Catholic religious organizations, the girls are placed by the court commitment without regard to religion.
In the beginning, the House of the Good Shepherd was built and designed to accomdate 100 girls, but, due to the more rigid standards to which they were subsequently required to adhere and the shortage of funds, it has been necessary for the Sisters to reduce the number of students to 32.
*1113The school is supported, in part, by Catholic Charities; a per diem is paid by Jefferson and Orleans Parish for each girl sent there; contributions are received from the United Fund, a fund-raising organization supporting charitable and other causes; and, since 1966, funds are provided by the State.
As related by Louis M. Sowers, Director of the Department of Corrections, if the department should acquire the property, the premises now occupied by the House of the Good Shepherd will be populated by boys in the 12 to 15 year age group who have been determined by a court to be proper subjects for commitment to a training school on account of delinquence or other reasons. Students would be assigned on the basis of prior diagnosis made at the department’s Reception and Diagnostic Clinic in Baton Rouge. A junior high school would be conducted by the department with primary emphasis on academic type training rather than vocational.
Sowers testified there was little difference in the manner of conducting a girls or boys training school, except in the vocational training courses offered. The basic academic offerings are essentially the same. Having visited the House of the Good Shepherd, he was of the opinion the school was being operated in much the same way the department operates its training schools.
Although he was unable to state that the anticipated use of this property would be changed in the future, he stated, “ * * * the need for a school in the Greater New Orleans Area is so desperate that I cannot visualize that there would ever be a change in the school.” He was further of the opinion that the State and Federal funds allocated to the establishment of the school required it to be used for a juvenile training school only.
These facts support a conclusion that the House of the Good Shepherd has operated since 1961 as a correctional institution for girls in junior high and high school age groups. We also find that the use proposed by the department will conform with this use. This use has been contrary to the terms of the ordinance prohibiting correctional institutions in that zone. And, since this violation has continued for more than two years, the property, its buildings and appurtenances have acquired a nonconforming use. La. R.S. 9:5625. Thus no action may be brought by the parish to require enforcement of the zoning restriction against the House of the Good Shepherd or the Department of Corrections should it acquire the property and continue its use in keeping with the nonconforming use established by the House of the Good Shepherd. We are supported in these conclusions by the authority of Section 5625 of Title 9 of' the Revised Statutes.
*1115This result makes it unnecessary for the Court to decide whether the State may, through the action of one of its departments, violate the zoning ordinance enacted by the parish of Jefferson under the authority of Article XIV, Section 29, of the Constitution.
Right of Action
We have considered and adjudicated each of the issues presented by the pleadings and briefs, because all parties have ttrged tts to do so, and for the further reason that the statutes have been declared unconstitutional by the trial court. Once this has occurred the aggrieved party has a constitutional right to an appeal directly to this Court on that question— whether the statutes are constitutional or not. (La.Const. art. 7 § 10 [1]). The statutes are, moreover, essential links in the chain of authority conferring upon the department the right to establish the correctional institution the parish seeks to enjoin. However, the question of the parish’s right to contest the constitutionality of these acts has been raised in this Court. At the same time, no doubt exists that the parish has a right to seek injunctions for violations of its zoning ordinances. Cf. La. R.S. 33:4728 ; 3 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning, § 66-1 (3d ed. 1971).
On this rehearing we adhere to the view that the parish of Jefferson has standing in court to challenge the constitutionality of those statutes.
Any questioning of the right of the parish to contest the constitutionality of these statutes must be based upon the rule announced in Article 681 of the Code of Civil Procedure that "Except as otherwise provided by law, an action can be brought only by a person having a real and actual interest which he asserts.” The question may be raised by the Court on its own motion. La. Code Civ.P. art. 927(5).
The suit before us is a suit by the parish of Jefferson, not a class action. The parish sues to assert its right. That right is a right to enjoin the violation of its zoning ordinance. The action which will constitute the zoning ordinance violation is authorized by, and based upon, statutes which will permit the department to buy the property and establish the institution. If legislative enactments authorize actions which would result in violations of its ordinances, the parish may properly question the constitutionality of those statutes in aid of its undoubted right to enjoin violations of its zoning ordinances. In essence this means that the parish may question the right of the department to violate its zoning ordinance just as it may enjoin the violation itself.
There is little difference between this result and the cases which accord a local government entity the right to bring suit *1117to enjoin as unconstitutional the enforcement of a statute changing its form of government. Mr. Chief Justice O’Niell stated the principle which is controlling here:
It would be an absurdity to hold that a corporation created by the Legislature, with authority to prosecute and defend suits in the courts, cannot invoke the protection afforded by the Constitution to prevent a violation of the rights granted to it. (City of Gretna v. Bailey, 141 La. 625, 75 So. 491 [1917]).
See also State ex rel. Tulare Homestead Ass’n v. Montgomery, 185 La. 777, 171 So. 28 (1936); State ex rel. Board of School Directors v. City of New Orleans, 42 La. Ann. 92, 7 So. 674 (1890).
For the reasons here assigned the former decree is reinstated as the final judgment of this Court.
SANDERS, J., takes no part.